








LEARNING TO COLONIZE: STATE KNOWLEDGE, EXPERTISE, AND THE 














A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the 














© 2016 William A. S. Brown 










As recent scholarship has recognized, administrative knowledge-making was 
crucial to the formation of “modern” European states.  This dissertation explores an 
important new domain of state knowledge in seventeenth-century France: overseas 
empire.  When King Louis XIV began his personal reign in 1661, France lagged 
behind its European rivals as a maritime power, and control of its scattered fleets, 
ports, and colonies lay almost exclusively in private hands.  Five decades later, 
Louis’s empire was the most powerful in Europe, and managed by royal officials 
according to well-defined protocols.  Scholars have tended to cast the governance of 
France’s empire as an extension of “royal absolutism” to the New World.  But in fact, 
there was no essentialized absolutism to be applied to the Americas in this period, 
only a rapidly shifting and contested set of practices.  The records left behind by 
leading officials who served in Canada and the Caribbean reveal how administrators 
on the ground tailored a new suite of policies and procedures for the colonies through 
a collective process of learning.  Their knowledge was rooted in firsthand experience 
of plantation management, overseas trade, urban planning, imperial rivalry, local 
jurisprudence, and indigenous diplomacy and warfare, all of which involved daily 
encounters with the unruly colonists, “barbaric savages,” and African slaves they 
sought to govern.  By regulating and recording affairs for their superiors at court, they 
transformed the administration of colonies into a distinct realm of expertise, or 
“science,” controlled by the state.  Ultimately, their experience encouraged the Old 
Regime monarchy to see the colonies as distinct from the metropole—alike in the fact 
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Grenada, November 27, 1702.  In a decaying fort whose roof leaks so badly 
that “it rains [in here] like it does in the Street,” the newly arrived governor, Joseph 
de Bouloc, fears for the safety of his post.  The French have been planting sugar and 
indigo on this small island at the southern tip of the Grenadine chain for more than 
half a century, and over the past thirty-six years they have relied on the fort to shield 
them from enemies both real and imagined: vengeful Caribs, rebellious slaves, 
foreign invaders, and stateless raiders.  Grenada belongs to France’s New World 
empire, which has swelled from its humble sixteenth-century origins to encompass 
vast dominions in Canada, Acadia, Louisiana, Guyana, and the West Indies.  To no 
one’s surprise, war has broken out between the great powers of Europe over the right 
of Louis’s grandson to inherit the Spanish throne—recently vacated by the timely 
death of the ineffectual, sickly, and childless Carlos II—and Bouloc knows it is only a 
matter of time before their various colonies join the fray.  Now, to protect this remote 
corner of the realm, he is desperate to patch up the crumbling defenses around him.1   
But even at this critical moment, Bouloc is powerless to make repairs without 
the funds needed to purchase building supplies, pay an engineer, recruit a team of 
skilled workers, and hire out slaves from local planters, and so he sits down to write 
an urgent appeal to Navy Minister Jérôme Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain, his patron in 
France.  He is doing so from a difficult, indeed embattled position.  A minor 
nobleman and experienced cavalry officer who had come to Pontchartrain’s attention 
as a retainer in the entourage of the king’s brother, Philippe d’Orléans, he had once 
                                                
1 “Procès verbal d’une visite aux fortifications de l’isle de Grenade,” 25 November 1702, Archives 
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seemed like a fine choice to oversee a distant colony on a wartime footing, where he 
could be trusted to serve loyally and competently while the minister tended to more 
pressing affairs.2  Already, however, the Grenadians have soured on him.  In a flurry 
of outraged missives to his superiors at Martinique, they complain bitterly that 
Bouloc is exploiting Pontchartrain’s benign neglect to rule Grenada like a petty 
tyrant—usurping the authority of the local judge, pillaging the royal depot, and 
monopolizing both legal and clandestine avenues of trade.  “I should have thought he 
would be a model for all the best governors of America,” laments Intendant François-
Roger Robert, the king’s chief civilian administrator in the Caribbean, “that we would 
see in him an Example of virtue, piety, moderation, [and] disinterest, a Father of the 
People, an exact observer of the King’s regulations and ordinances; and that he would 
combine with these qualities an admirable deference to the advice that one might 
wish to give him.  But he has appeared to be the opposite of all that since he arrived 
in Grenada.”3   
If Bouloc is aware of the accusations swirling around him, his letter betrays no 
sign of it.  Yet in pressing the urgency of his proposed repairs, he cannot help but 
vent his frustration with the way things are done in the colonies.  Exasperated at 
having to seek funding and approval from the governor-general and Robert (who has 
promised him only a “modest” sum), he declares impatiently that he “will not live 
long enough to see [these works] completed if you leave Monsieur the Intendant in 
                                                
2 For Bouloc’s early career in the colonies, see his personnel dossier, “Bouloc, Joseph de,” ANOM 
COL E, vol. 45. 
3 These complaints would continue into the following year, at least.  Robert to Pontchartrain, 26 June 
1702, ANOM COL C8A, vol. 14, f. 160v; 28 October 1702, ANOM COL C8A, vol. 14, f. 267v-270 
(“Example of virtue”); 10 February 1703, ANOM COL C8A, vol. 15, f. 85v; “Extraits de lettres reçues 
des Iles annotées par Pontchartrain,” 1704, ANOM COL C8B, vol. 2, pièce 73 (letters of Machaut de 
Bellemont and Montrayer).  
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charge of sending me the funds intended for them.”  Why, he wonders, must a 
governor of Grenada, who is responsible for the colony’s defense, submit his plans to 
the scrutiny of officers stationed 180 miles away?  “How can they reason correctly 
about a place that neither of them has ever seen?”  The arrangement defies not only 
logic, he argues, but also the hallowed administrative customs observed in the 
metropole.  “I am quite new to the practices (usages) of the Navy,” he admits, but 
I had believed [the funding of fortifications] was 
practiced as it is in the landed services, where each year 
the minister sends local Governors an Account of the 
funds intended as much for the expansion of [new] 
fortifications as for the upkeep of those already built, 
which funds are placed in the hands of the treasurer, 
after which the Governor visits the sites with an 
Engineer to see what must be done, to have quoted in 
his presence the cost of all the works determined to be 
absolutely necessary, and also to see that the laborers 
who have done the work are paid.4 
 
In France, in other words, he would have had ready access to the funds necessary to 
do his duty as he sees fit.  In the colonies, by contrast, he must depend on the 
goodwill of distant bean counters whose bureaucratic machinations have left him 
wholly incapable of defending Grenada and, by extension, his honor.  “It would be 
quite sad for me, My Lord, to have come here from 2,000 leagues away only to lose 
the esteem that I have earned myself in France,” he grumbles.5 
The problem for Bouloc, besides the threat of invasion and the denunciations 
heaped upon him by his fellow officials, is that the practices of governance here seem 
foreign to him—and indeed they are.  For the past four decades, royal officials across 
the colonies have been working out their own ways of doing things in response to 
                                                
4 Bouloc to Pontchartrain, 27 November 1702, ANOM COL C10A, vol. 1, dossier 3, pièce 82, p. 2. 
5 Bouloc to Pontchartrain, 27 November 1702, p. 3. 
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local exigencies.  It is not only military expenditures that operate differently in the 
New World, but also the day-to-day business of justice, trade, conscription, labor, 
urban planning, warfare, taxation, and diplomacy.  Like any seasoned administrator, 
Bouloc has had ample experience bringing men and matériel together to achieve the 
king’s objectives.  Yet his metropolitan career has proven an unreliable guide to 
action in a place whose rituals and rhythms of life are unfamiliar.  Even his fellow 
officers, while ostensibly French, seem like strange, almost monstrous versions of 
their European selves.  They have “metamorphosed into Panurges,” he will complain, 
referring to the cowardly rogue in Rabelais’s Gargantua and Pantagruel.  Some, like 
the judge, are symbols of disorder as “frightening” as rebellious slaves, exercising 
their public duties without the sumptuary accoutrements—wigs, hats, ties, and 
coats—typically worn by men of their position.  With “nothing above them but the 
burning American Sun” and “only its rays to fear,” they ignore precedent and good 
sense to do whatever they think best, “like the gentlemen in Molière, who know all 
without ever having learned a thing.”6  Stymied in his labors and beset on all sides by 
agents of chaos, Bouloc portrays his own imperious hand, working through tried and 
true metropolitan protocols, as the sole means of asserting royal authority on the 
island. 
Pontchartrain will disagree, but to the governor’s good fortune, the minister will 
forgive his alleged misconduct with no more than a stern warning to observe the 
customs of the colony and the limits of his commission.  And in the years to come, 
                                                
6 Bouloc to Pontchartrain, 1 March 1704, 1 December 1704, and 20 April 1708, ANOM COL C10A, 
vol. 1, dossier 3, pièces 86 (“American Sun”), 88 (“Panurge”), and 111 (“wig”).  Bouloc claimed in 
1708 that he had been pleading with the judge for six years to hold the king’s trials in proper dress and 
without a tobacco pipe in his mouth, but to no avail. 
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Bouloc will learn to navigate the political landscape around him with greater skill.  
Not only will he survive numerous disputes with rival administrators in Grenada and 
Martinique, he will also become an innovator in his own right, proposing reforms to 
colonial settlement and the slave trade, new ways to discourage piracy, and less 
confrontational methods of pacifying the indigenous Caribs, all based on “the long 
time we have spent in the islands and our continuous efforts to study [their 
inhabitants].”7  He will see the colony safely through much of the war, which will 
rage until 1713.  His crowning achievement will be a brand-new fort, completed 
posthumously in 1710 and destined to survive him by 306 years (and counting).8 
This embattled official, appealing desperately for money from a leaky hut in a 
tiny fort on a far-flung island, may not seem like one of the founders of the French 
colonial empire.  And yet it was through the mundane, often messy efforts of men 
like Bouloc that the crown came to see its American possessions as different: 
different from the metropole, different from conquered lands in Europe, and different 
from the classical world colonized by Greece and Rome.  Overseas territories, the 
monarchy gradually surmised, could not be ruled like existing French provinces, nor 
incorporated and governed like Alsace or Flanders or Franche-Comté (all of which 
were annexed to France under Louis XIV).  Their populations, logistical needs, and 
administrative and military resources were just too different.  As officials on the 
ground struggled to impose a familiar brand of “order” on the king’s scattered New 
                                                
7 Bouloc to Pontchartrain, 1 March 1704, ANOM COL C10A, dossier 3, pièce 86, p. 5 and the other 
pièces cited above. 
8 Bouloc’s Fort Royal, renamed Fort George following the British takeover of the island in 1763, is 
now home to the Royal Grenada Police Force. 
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World dominions, their superiors in Paris and Versailles concluded that the colonies 
required a governance all their own. 
This dissertation tells the previously unknown story of how French officials like 
Bouloc learned to govern overseas colonies and, in the process, transformed the Old 
Regime monarchy into an imperial state.  The pages that follow will provide a 
reinterpretation of two interconnected histories: the early modern origins of French 
imperial science (more on this term in a moment), and the emergence of France’s 
various New World possessions as an empire—united by their difference from the 
metropole and therefore comprising, in the eyes of royal officials, a common imperial 
project.  In the first place, I want to show that the animating ideas and everyday 
practices of colonial rule, as subjects of extensive reflection and debate among royal 
servants, were a creation of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, and to 
provide a new take on why this was so.  In the second place, I will argue that the 
unprecedented political, naval, and territorial expansion undertaken during the 
personal reign of Louis XIV (1661-1715) encouraged his agents to observe and order 
the world around them in radically new ways.  As French officers confronted 
unfamiliar peoples and problems in the Americas, they began to think like colonizers, 
with profound consequences for the exercise of state power in the New World as well 
as the Old.  By the end of Louis’s reign, they had developed a nascent administrative 
science tailored to the governance of an overseas empire. 
The process of learning how to rule colonies was rapid, dynamic, intense, 
violent, and subject to a logic all its own.  In these decades of fierce imperial rivalry 
both on and over the seas, Louis’s fledgling New World dominions seemed to call for 
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immediate and sustained intervention by the crown if they were to survive.  Yet there 
were no pre-packaged policies or procedures in place to dictate how they should be 
administered.  The men dispatched by Louis to govern them on his behalf were, for 
the most part, experienced military and civilian administrators (to draw a distinction 
they would not have recognized as clearly as we do), but they had never before seen 
political arenas as foreign as sugar plantations worked by African slaves, diplomatic 
councils hosted by Amerindian “savages,” or settlements carved out of a “wilderness” 
and peopled by the king’s “meanest” subjects.  In response, they cobbled together 
techniques of governance from an array of sources at hand: their training in France’s 
fleets and ports, printed news and histories of the colonies, the example of rival 
empires, the advice of resident informants, and above all their own experience in the 
Americas.  In reporting their conclusions to superiors in France, they constructed a 
suite of political practices, grounded in empirical observation, that would underpin 
French imperial policies through the fall of the Old Regime.   
The crucial question of how European states came to see their scattered 
overseas colonies as elements of a single, coherent political project was not limited to 
France, of course, and the conclusions I draw here are therefore suggestive for other 
European empires.  Historians of Britain, Spain, France, Portugal, and the 
Netherlands have long debated the origins of imperialism in those nations.  Much of 
their research has focused on metropolitan discourses—how a variety of people in 
London, Paris, Amsterdam, Lisbon, or Madrid began to perceive empire as both an 
affair of state and a fundamental aspect of national identity.9  What I provide is 
                                                
9 David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven, CT: Yale 
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another way of approaching the problem: to understand how the Old Regime 
monarchy defined itself as a colonial empire, and not just a state that possessed 
colonies, I look to events on the ground, where interactions between royal 
administrators, settlers, indigenous peoples, and slaves taught the crown to think of 
colonization across the Americas as a collective problem of governing difference.10 
The process of governing difference through firsthand experience and 
reportage represented a momentous shift in the everyday practice of French statecraft 
and the values that animated it.  For contemporary political theorists, the king, and his 
servants, the stated ends of politics were glory, renown, and eternal salvation under 
God.  These supposedly timeless aims implied fixed qualities of rule: as Robert so 
neatly put it, those entrusted by God and king to lead others should be examples of 
virtue, piety, moderation, and disinterest, fathers of the people who commanded 
obedience and in turn obeyed their father-king, observing his regulations and 
ordinances with precision.  But even in France itself, the meanings of those virtues, 
and their application in practice, were subject to constant debate and reinterpretation.  
Louis XIV’s regime was neither the homogeneous nation-state later portrayed by 
                                                                                                                                      
University Press, 2005); Kathleen Wilson, ed., A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and 
Modernity in Britain and its Empire, 1660-1840 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); 
J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2007); Benjamin Schmidt, Inventing Exoticism: Geography, Globalism, 
and Europe’s Early Modern World (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); Anthony 
Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-1800 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); David A. Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing 
Nationalism, 1680-1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 78-106.  For an 
alternative approach that balances metropolitan and colonial discourses in the forging of imperialist 
thought, see Gabriel Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759-
1808 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) and the collective portrait painted by the essays in Sophus 
Reinert and Pernille Røge, eds., The Political Economy of Empire in the Early Modern World 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
10 On the problem of cultural difference as a central, driving phenomenon in the history of empires, 
see Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Cultural 
Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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nationalist historians nor the “tranquil and sterile despotism” described by Alexis de 
Tocqueville; rather, it was a loose patchwork of provincial customs and institutions 
held together by a dynamic interplay of collaboration, repression, and charismatic 
self-fabrication.11  The diverse, composite nature of the kingdom encouraged such 
flexible repertoires of governance.  Under the pens of Louis’s apologists, famously, 
the paternal role of the king took on a decidedly more coercive bent, and “observing 
exactly” his regulations and ordinances became not only a cardinal principle of so-
called “absolutism” but also a powerful means of enforcing discipline among his 
subjects and servants (as Robert’s denunciation likewise attests).12  Less famously, 
Louis’s Navy Minister and Controller-General of Finance, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, 
enhanced the political pre-eminence of the monarchy by importing merchant practices 
of accounting and observation into the world of government paperwork, obsessively 
gathering and deploying information about the kingdom in ways that undermined the 
crown’s entrenched rivals for public authority, the aristocratic parlements and the 
Catholic Church.  Some contemporaries opposed these developments as pernicious 
innovations, but others saw no contradiction between an expansive, empirically-
                                                
11 The relevant literature on the louis-quatorzian state is vast.  See the works cited elsewhere in this 
introduction, as well as William Beik, “The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration,” Past & 
Present, vol. 188, no. 1 (August 2005): 195-224; David Parker, Class and State in Ancien Régime 
France: The Road to Modernity? (London: Routledge, 1996); Peter Burke, The Fabrication of Louis 
XIV (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).  Tocqueville quoted in Lucien Jaume, Tocqueville: 
The Aristocratic Sources of Liberty, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2013), 278. 
12 Examples of royal servants who denounced each other for failing to observe the king’s codes of 
conduct, courtesy, and administration are legion, and their increasing frequency in the seventeenth 
century across a variety of milieux attests to the growing rhetorical power of this line of attack.  See, 
for example, Orest Ranum, “Courtesy, Absolutism, and the Rise of the French State, 1630-1660,” The 
Journal of Modern History, vol. 52, no. 3 (1980): 426-451; Norbert Elias, The Court Society (Dublin: 
University College Dublin Press, 2006 ed.).  On the making of Louis’s public image, see Burke, 
Fabrication and Orest Ranum, Artisans of Glory: Writers and Historical Thought in Seventeenth-
Century France (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980). 
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minded absolutist state and the traditional social and political values of the realm.13  
The efforts of royal officers to translate their knowledge of the colonies into suitable 
customs and ordinances grew out of this broader campaign to extend control over the 
king’s expanding, diverse, and notoriously fractious domains, and they make us 
question assumptions about the Old Regime state by showing us how it maintained a 
presence in marginal places where its authority was strained to its limits. 
This story has not been told in part because historians have so often taken the 
collapse of France’s first colonial empire for granted, treating it as a mere prelude to 
the formation of modern nation-states in France, Canada, Great Britain, the United 
States, and the Caribbean.  Since its demise in 1763, no one political community has 
emerged to take ownership of its legacy, and as a result the various components of the 
empire have been absorbed into distinct historiographies that rarely speak to one 
another.  Even in France, where memory of French adventures in the New World has 
sometimes served to bolster claims to a unique imperial destiny or “genius,” the lost 
early modern colonies of the Americas have long been overshadowed by their more 
“successful” modern counterparts in Asia and Africa.  When France’s first empire has 
been invoked at all, nationalist scholars have found it politically expedient to either 
dismiss or romanticize it as a rigid monolith doomed to failure, much like the Old 
Regime from which it sprang.14 
                                                
13 Jacob Soll, The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s Secret State Intelligence System (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009); John Rule and Ben S. Trotter, A World of Paper: Louis 
XIV, Colbert de Torcy, and the Rise of the Information State (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2014). 
14 Gilles Havard and Cécile Vidal, “Making New France New Again: French Historians Rediscover 
Their American Past,” Common-Place, vol. 7, no. 4 (July 2007), URL: http://www.common-place-
archives.org/vol-07/no-04/harvard/ (accessed 3 July 2016); Cécile Vidal, “The Reluctance of French 
Historians to Address Atlantic History,” Southern Quarterly, vol. 43, no. 4 (2006): 153-89; Alyssa 
Goldstein Sepinwall, “Atlantic Amnesia?  French Historians, the Haitian Revolution, and the 2004-
 11 
Recent trends in the field, meanwhile, have made it more difficult to excavate 
the administrative origins of French imperial governance, despite a flood of works on 
empire.  The newfound emphasis upon borderlands and subaltern actors has shifted 
attention away from problems of policy and administration that long dominated the 
sort of archivally-broad, top-down studies of empire now blamed (rightly, in many 
cases) for ignoring the colonized and perpetuating the language of the colonizers.15  
Eager to challenge the exaggerated image of European sovereignty conveyed in 
contemporary maps, charters, and other state documents—and accepted too readily by 
nationalist historians and today’s textbook writers—scholars of late have downplayed 
the role of governing structures in shaping colonization.16  Institutions are out, along 
with the people who staffed them, except insofar as their weakness can be shown to 
enable the kind of widely diffused agency, cultural hybridity, and promiscuous 
movement of people and goods currently ascribed to most early colonial settings.  
Some historians have rejected the imperial perspective altogether, favoring Atlantic, 
continental, or frontier frameworks that seem better equipped to capture processes 
whose contours frequently transcended imperial boundaries.17  In their telling, 
colonial power was not imposed by metropolitan governments, but rather negotiated 
                                                                                                                                      
2006 CAPES Exam,” Proceedings of the Western Society for French History, vol. 34 (2006), URL: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.0642292.0034.019 (accessed 3 July 2016). 
15 For a formative statement of this turn toward what is now called the New Imperial history, see 
Wilson, ed., A New Imperial History.  Jane Burbank and Fred Cooper provide a more recent one.  
Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History. 
16 On the ways in which nationalist frameworks continue to shape public and scholarly conceptions of 
France’s North American empire, including exaggerated visions of territorial sovereignty perpetuated 
in textbooks, see Catherine Desbarats and Allan Greer, “Où est la Nouvelle-France?,” Revue d’histoire 
de l’Amérique française, vol. 64, no. 3-4 (hiver-printemps 2011): 31-62. 
17 These competing frameworks are examined and represented in Philip D. Morgan and Jack P. 
Greene, eds., Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).  For a 
defense of the imperial perspective, see Trevor Burnard, “Empire Matters? The Historiography of 
Imperialism in Early America, 1492–1830,” History of European Ideas, vol. 33, no. 1 (2007): 87–107. 
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or contested among ordinary people on the ground—free and enslaved, European and 
not—whose multifarious encounters served as crucibles of our modern politics of 
cultural difference.18   
As colonial historians have attributed greater political power to bottom-up 
localism over top-down statism, historians of the state have questioned whether or not 
early modern France even had an empire worthy of the name.  The word itself rarely 
appeared in discourses of the time, prompting some scholars to reject the term 
altogether.19  Others have embraced it as a category of analysis but found France’s 
colonies wanting for the sort of demographic and economic “development,” 
centralized political authority, robust communications, “integrative markets,” and 
sustained metropolitan commitment that supposedly characterizes true or “successful” 
empires.  The titles of their works aptly reflect the argument: for the Old Regime, 
overseas empire was something “elusive,” “chased,” or sought after but not achieved 
until later.20  Instead of an empire, we are told, what Louis XIV’s France had was a 
scattered collection of colonies with little in common but their neglect.21   
                                                
18 A touchstone example being Jack P. Greene, Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political 
and Constitutional History (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 1-24.  On empire as 
an engine of the modern politics of cultural difference, see Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World 
History. 
19 James S. Pritchard, In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730 (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), xx, 263. James Muldoon has explained why early modern rulers 
were reluctant to embrace explicitly the language of imperium.  James Muldoon, Empire and Order: 
The Concept of Empire, 800-1800 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).  On variable uses of the term 
in the political discourses of early modern Spain, Britain, and France, see Pagden, Lords of All the 
World.  
20 Pritchard, In Search of Empire; Banks, Chasing Empire Across the Sea: Communications and the 
State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763 (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2006); Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
21 Pritchard, In Search of Empire, esp. 230-263. 
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Broadly speaking, these parallel trends have left us with two competing 
images of France’s early modern empire.  One, focused on real people and places, 
views empire as a mundane struggle for power that played out across multiple 
cultures and social ranks but only rarely according to anyone’s intentions (least of all 
those of the crown); the other, focused on bureaucratic “machinery,” communications 
“networks,” and other abstract agents of royal power, treats empire as a goal 
conceived and pursued according to prefabricated “European” or “absolutist” ideals.22  
One casts empire as a byproduct of everyday encounters between individuals who 
acted according to their own motives, while the other paints it as an unrealized 
ambition chased by disembodied European structures.  In one case, empire is 
everywhere; in the other case, it is confined to the French imagination.  In both cases, 
local realities give the lie to grandiose metropolitan claims to sovereignty over far-
flung peoples and territory. 
Yet even as both approaches do the important work of challenging 
exaggerated narratives of French dominion in the New World, they pose serious 
interpretive obstacles of their own.  The otherwise salutary attention of colonial 
historians to the day-to-day practices and meanings of empire on the ground, and the 
resulting “discovery” of agency among a wide array of previously neglected 
indigenous and enslaved peoples, makes it difficult to explain the very real growth of 
                                                
22 For examples of the former approach, see Havard and Vidal, Histoire de l’Amérique française 
(Paris: Flammarion, 2003); Gilles Havard, Empire et métissages: Indiens et français dans le Pays d’en 
Haut, 1660-1715 (Paris: Septentrion, 2003); Sophie White, Wild Frenchmen and Frenchified Indians: 
Material Culture and Race in Colonial Louisiana (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2013); Gainot, L’empire colonial français.  For the latter, see James McClellan and François Regourd, 
The Colonial Machine: French Science and Overseas Expansion in the Old Regime (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2011); Banks, Chasing Empire (“networks”); Pritchard, In Search of Empire.  A trenchant 
critique of the latter approach is provided by Paul Cheney and Loïc Charles, “The Colonial Machine 
Dismantled: Knowledge and Empire in the French Atlantic,” Past & Present, vol. 219, no. 1 (2013): 
127-163. 
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French imperial power in this period.  There is no denying that royal authority was 
subject to negotiation, contestation, and reappropriation by local societies.  And yet, 
somehow, by 1715, the crown’s military, diplomatic, and commercial presence in the 
Americas was dramatically more elaborate and centralized, and not only on paper: the 
king’s fleets, ports, officer corps, customs revenues, courts of justice, and indigenous 
alliances were demonstrably greater and more sophisticated at his death than they had 
been when he first assumed direct rule of his colonies in Canada (1663) and the 
Caribbean (1674).  How did this happen if governing structures were utterly weak? 
Historians who deny the existence of a French empire have likewise failed to 
deliver on this crucial question.  The notion that scholars should not call Louis XIV’s 
France an “empire” because few contemporaries employed the label flies in the face 
of established academic practice (one wonders how many studies could be undertaken 
without recourse to modern analytical concepts, or how useful such studies would 
be).  Those who find France’s colonies lacking the cohesion necessary to comprise an 
empire, meanwhile, impose a dubious standard.  Primarily concerned with institutions 
and structures, they attribute any perceived failures of colonization to a lack of 
political will, while every achievement is defined by its correspondence to 
“successful” models, namely eighteenth-century Britain (imagined as laissez-faire, 
demographically “developed,” and economically “integrated”) and modern France 
(portrayed as bureaucratic and statist).  They encourage us to believe that “empire” 
was indeed something desired and obtainable at this time, yet also fatally undermined 
by administrative incoherence or inattention, at least until someone strong or willful 
enough (Louis XV? Napoleon? Napoleon III?) finally came along to achieve it.  What 
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sort of empire the French were seeking, and who exactly was seeking it, is rarely 
examined in any detail, and the result, predictably, is analytical confusion (“the 
elusive empire existed and continued to exist”).23 
The fundamental flaw in strictly “top-down” or “bottom-up” perspectives is 
that neither bridges the gap between metropolitan discourses and local practices to 
explain how imperial repertoires of governance actually took shape.  The flaw is 
compounded by the longstanding failure of most historians of the colonies and the 
metropole to engage meaningfully with each other’s work.  Although colonial 
historians no longer believe that Louis XIV or his ministers had a coherent vision of 
colonization, they continue to treat the meanings and practices of absolutism in 
France as a static monolith.24  For their metropolitan colleagues, meanwhile, Louis’s 
New World dominions seem so far from the center of the action as to be hardly worth 
studying at all.25  In the absence of any substantive or sustained dialogue, the two 
sides continue to view each other’s histories as separate, even though Old Regime 
France and its colonies emerged in tandem, governed by many of the same people 
and subject to many of the same historical processes.26 
Indeed, the dynamism of royal governance in the colonies reflected the 
dynamism of royal governance in France itself, where the complexion of the state 
                                                
23 Pritchard, In Search of Empire, 420-423 (“elusive empire”); Banks, Chasing Empire; Bernard 
Gainot, L’empire colonial français de Richelieu à Napoléon (1630-1810) (Paris: Armand Colin, 2015). 
24 For a critique of the problem, see Havard and Vidal, “Making New France New Again.” 
25 On this tendency in the literature, see Vidal, “The Reluctance of French Historians.”  
26 For recent works that buck this trend and demonstrate the promise of studying metropolitan and 
colonial processes of state formation together, see Laurie Wood, “Archipelagoes of Justice: Law in 
France’s Early Modern Empire” (PhD dissertation: University ofTexas-Austin, 2013); Helen Dewar, 
“’Y establir nostre auctorité: Assertions of Imperial Sovereignty through Proprietorships and Chartered 
Companies in New France, 1598-1663” (PhD dissertation: McGill University, 2012); Alexandre Dubé, 
“Les biens publics: Culture politique de la Louisiane française” (PhD dissertation: McGill University, 
2010); Havard, Empire et métissages. 
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changed dramatically during this period from one decade to the next.  By the time 
Louis began to remove the colonies from company rule and place them under his own 
direct administration, his predecessors had long been working to expand their 
political power at home.  Responding to nearly a century of devastating religious 
warfare and civil strife, two cardinal-ministers, Richelieu and Mazarin, had employed 
various means of persuasion and force to bring the kingdom’s willful elites into the 
royal fold.  One of their creations, the royal intendants, had evolved from glorified 
quartermasters into the monarchy’s “eyes and ears” in the provinces, where some 
received fixed appointments and even supplanted local notables as the chief brokers 
of influence with the crown.  From the 1650s onward, Louis and his ministers 
expanded the mandates of their intendants and governors, gave them salaried 
commissions and teams of subordinates, and dispatched them to strategic places on 
the kingdom’s margins such as ports and newly-conquered territories where they 
became the face of the king to inhabitants who had previously witnessed few, if any, 
incursions of royal authority.  Meanwhile a host of bureaus arose in Paris and 
Versailles to process the growing tide of paperwork these officials produced.  As the 
scope of the monarchy’s political and military ambitions grew, then, so did the 
administrative structures required to service them.  The expansion of officialdom 
multiplied the points of contact between Louis’s agents and his subjects—defined and 
policed with ever greater sophistication as traders, taxpayers, conscripts, criminals, 
artisans, vagabonds, manufacturers, religious heretics, and so on—making the state an 
increasingly important presence in the everyday lives of ordinary people.27 
                                                
27 For a nuanced survey of these (admittedly much simplified) developments, see James B. Collins, 
The State in Early Modern France (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), esp. 79-123. 
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Only in the past few years have conditions become ripe for a study that would 
link the histories of royal governance in France and its colonies as unfolding, 
interrelated problems of state learning.  The king’s administrators, of course, have 
long been a focus of historical writing about the formation of the Old Regime state.28  
First cast by Alexis de Tocqueville as all-powerful agents of royal “despotism,” then 
by social and political historians as glorified negotiators whose fragile authority 
depended upon collaboration with traditional elites, the king’s officials are now 
coming under scrutiny in a different role: as purveyors of knowledge.  In recent years, 
historians have redirected the study of state formation toward the development of 
state information.29  How did the king and his ministers collect, digest, and act upon 
the intelligence gathered by their agents?  How did they train those agents to report 
and classify the sort of knowledge they considered most useful?  And how did new, 
                                                
28
 See Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New 
York, 1998); Collins, The State in Early Modern France; Beik, “Social Collaboration” and Absolutism 
and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985).  Some prominent studies of the intendants in 
particular include Vivian Gruder, The Royal Provincial Intendants: A Governing Elite in Eighteenth-
Century France (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968); Anette Smedley-Weill, Les intendants 
de Louis XIV (Paris: Fayard, 1995); Jean-Claude Dubé, Les intendants de la Nouvelle-France 
(Montreal: Fides, 1984). 
29 In addition to the works by Soll, Mukerji, and Ben Trotter and John Rule discussed below, see Giora 
Sternberg, “Manipulating Information in the Ancien Régime: Ceremonial Records, Aristocratic 
Strategies, and the Limits of the State Perspective,” The Journal of Modern History 85, no. 2 (2013): 
239-279.  For a comparative perspective, see Randolph Head, “Knowing Like a State: The 
Transformation of Political Knowledge in Swiss Archives, 1450-1770,” The Journal of Modern 
History 75, no. 4 (2003): 745-782; Paul S. Fritz, “The Anti-Jacobite Intelligence System of the English 
Ministers, 1715-1745,” The Historical Journal 16, no. 2 (June 1973): 265-289; Mary Poovey, A 
History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago, 
1998), 92-143.  On the broader culture of information management in early modern Europe, see Ann 
Blair, Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information Before the Modern Age (New Haven, 
2010).  For a touchstone analysis of state knowledge, power, and administrative “legibility” in the 
modern period, see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). 
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more refined methods of compiling, organizing, and exploiting information change 
the role of the state in French society under the monarchy and beyond?30   
These questions move beyond older, teleological debates about the transition 
of the Old Regime state from “feudal” to “modern,” instead asking how the vaunting 
military, commercial, and political aims of a glory-hungry monarch encouraged his 
officials to study and act upon their surroundings in new ways.  In the hands of 
historians and sociologists of knowledge, the concept of bureaucracy—traditionally 
one of the academy’s most powerful sedatives—has been redefined from a shorthand 
for linear institutional development into a richly contested and contingent set of 
practices grounded in diverse (and firmly premodern) intellectual origins.  Thus Jacob 
Soll has recast Colbert, as “a scholar of state learning: not simply a bureaucrat but an 
expert” whose “secret state intelligence system,” shaped by humanist scholarship as 
well as merchant culture, became a powerful tool of governance that encouraged the 
use of empirical knowledge toward “public” ends.31  Chandra Mukerji has proposed a 
more “distributive” view of state knowledge under Colbert, showing how 
entrepreneurs and noble officeholders transformed the vernacular “collective 
intelligence” of lower-status “technical experts”—including engineers, artisans, 
financiers, and peasant women—into impersonal knowledge through the media of 
paperwork and numeracy, imbued it with their own authority, and then marshaled it 
                                                
30 The precise meanings of “knowledge,” “intelligence,” and “information” are not always defined in 
this literature.  For my own purposes, I have found it most useful to treat knowledge as something 
produced by an individual “knower.”  I treat information and intelligence as less processed forms of 
observation, with the slight difference that intelligence comes from sources taken to be reliable, 
whereas information may come from unknown or unreliable sources.  Both are more processed than, 
say, “data,” which requires human action to become intelligible.  In drawing these working 
distinctions, I roughly follow the definitions spelled out by Ann Blair and C. A. Bayly.  Blair, Too 
Much to Know, 1-2; Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social 
Communications in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 3. 
31 Soll, Information Master. 
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in the king’s name to carry out major public works over fierce provincial 
opposition.32  And in a detailed institutional study of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs 
under Colbert’s nephew, Torcy, Ben Trotter and the late John Rule have provided a 
window onto the ministry’s “actual workings of power” as they unfolded via 
routinized work, specialized tasks, and the everyday flow of people, paper, and 
objects through Torcy’s offices.33  Despite their differences, all of these scholars 
portray knowledge and power as inextricably bound under the Old Regime in ways 
that appear at once rooted in early modern cultures of learning and statecraft and 
suggestive of a modern bürokratischer Staat.34  Together their research reveals an 
impulse among Louis XIV and his leading servants to cultivate in themselves a more 
“intelligent” brand of rule.35   
                                                
32 By fusing noble and non-noble cultures of knowledge, Mukerji argues, the minister and his 
collaborators introduced a “more modern and effective” form of territorial control, as well as a 
growing tension between patrimonal conceptions of power and abstract discourses of technical 
proficiency.  Chandra Mukerji, “Jurisdiction, Inscription, and State Formation: Administrative 
Modernism and Knowledge Regimes,” Theory and Society 40, no. 3 (2011): 223-245; Mukerji, 
Impossible Engineering: Technology and Territoriality on the Canal du Midi (Princeton, 2009). 
33 John C. Rule and Ben S. Trotter, A World of Paper: Louis XIV, Colbert de Torcy, and the Rise of 
the Information State (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014), 32. 
34 Soll and Mukerji join other historians of “political knowledge” in placing their work in dialogue 
with the touchstone theories of Weber and Michel Foucault.  See Mukerji, “Jurisdiction, Inscription, 
and State formation”; Soll, Information Master, 9-14; Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The 
Birth of the Prison (New York, 1977); Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York, 1980); Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: 
Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978 (New York, 2007). 
35 This turn toward the study of state knowledge has been propelled by a broader surge of interest in 
the history of knowledge tout court.  Led by intellectual historians and historians of science and 
medicine, for whom the construction of knowledge is an abiding disciplinary concern, scholars have 
sought to replace a whiggish chain-of-ideas approach to intellectual culture with a more contingent, 
democratic, and interdisciplinary focus on practices of knowledge-making broadly defined.  Their 
research has emphasized the social, cultural, and spatial dynamics that conditioned “truth” across a 
variety of intellectual traditions and milieux.  As a result, we are beginning to learn as much about the 
epistemological foundations and embodied practices of cooking, prophecy, accounting, sex, 
midwifery, musical performance, and administration, for example, as we are about the emergence of 
hallowed disciplines such as botany or Biblical exegesis.  On early modern practices of information 
management and their relationship to knowledge-making, see Ann Blair, Too Much to Know [cite, 
2010]; Emilio Campi, Scholarly Knowledge: Textbooks in Early Modern Europe [cite]; Paul Nelles, 
“Libros de papel, libri bianchi, libri papyracei: Note-Taking Techniques and the Role of Student 
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The growing academic interest in political knowledge has drawn particular 
attention to the concept of expertise—namely its meanings, origins, and relationship 
to state power.  In questioning what role expertise plays (or should play) in modern 
democratic arenas such as courtrooms and the media, scholars across the humanities 
and social sciences have produced a flurry of research into its early modern roots.36  
Although the term “expertise” is something of an anachronism—the word “expert,” 
signifying someone well versed in a particular art through firsthand experience, 
appeared in French as early as the early seventeenth century, but “expertise” did not 
debut until the nineteenth century—it has helped scholars to think through a 
phenomenon new to the period: the advent of useful, exclusive, specialized, and 
increasingly systematic bodies of knowledge wielded by individuals generally 
recognized as authorities in their disciplines.37  The legitimating force of state 
institutions was crucial to this process, because states helped to distinguish “experts” 
from mere “practitioners” at a time when public claims to authority were vigorously 
contested by people of differing ranks, genders, confessions, and educational 
                                                                                                                                      
Notebooks in the Early Jesuit Colleges,” Archivum historicum Societatis Iesu, vol. 76 (2007): 75-112; 
Intellectual History Review, Special Edition: Note-Taking in Early Modern Europe, vol. 20, no. 3 
(2010): 301-432.  On cooking, see Amanda Herbert, Female Alliances: Gender, Identity, and 
Friendship in Early Modern Europe (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 78-117; on sex 
and midwifery, see Mary Fissell, “When the Birds and the Bees Were not Enough: Aristotle’s 
Masterpiece,” The Public Domain Review (2015), URL: 
http://publicdomainreview.org/2015/08/19/when-the-birds-and-the-bees-were-not-enough-aristotles-
masterpiece/ (accessed 20 November 2015); on accounting, Jacob Soll, The Reckoning: Financial 
Accountability and the Rise and Fall of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 2014); on prophecy, 
Jonathan Green, The Strange and Terrible Visions of Wilhelm Friess: The Paths of Prophecy in 
Reformation Europe (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2014); on history and health care, 
see Nancy Siraisi, History, Medicine, and the Traditions of Renaissance Learning (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 2007).  
36 Harry Collins and Robert Evans, Rethinking Expertise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007). 
37 See the entries on “Expert” and “Expertise” in the dictionaries (1606-1935) digitized by the 
University of Chicago’s ARTFL Project, URL: http://artfl-project.uchicago.edu/node/17 (accessed 3 
May 2016). 
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backgrounds who competed for the social and political rewards such distinction could 
bring.  In arts ranging from law and medicine to mathematics, shipbuilding, 
midwifery, and scriptural exegesis, state-sanctioned experts put their knowledge in 
the service of rulers, allowing those rulers to pursue new kinds of action with greater 
force and at greater distances than ever before.  The ability of early modern states to 
recognize, co-opt, and eventually control various bodies of expertise enabled them to 
undertake increasingly complex tasks, including the administration of far-flung 
overseas empires.38  “Expertise,” then, is something of a productive misnomer.  I use 
it here to identify and analyze a group of officials who mobilized their experience in 
America to make authoritative claims about the measures necessary to govern New 
World colonies. 
It is this collective body of expertise, forged in everyday acts of governance 
and filtered back to court through paperwork, that I call “science.”  At first glance this 
term, too, might seem anachronistic.  After all, politics and public administration did 
not emerge as “scientific” disciplines in Europe until the eighteenth century or later, 
when learned elites self-consciously applied the positivist model of the natural 
sciences to the study of human affairs.39  Yet science, understood simply as a branch 
of learning, was how colonial administrators described their knowledge.  They 
                                                
38 See the collected essays in Eric Ash, ed., Expertise: Practical Knowledge and the Early Modern 
State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).   
39 Philippe Steiner, La ‘science nouvelle’ de l’économie politique (Paris: Presses universitaires de 
France, 1998); Johan Hellbron, “The Rise of Social Science Disiplines in France,” Revue européenne 
des sciences sociales, vol. 42, no. 129 (2004): 145-157; Eric Brian, La mésure de l’État: Géomètres et 
administrateurs au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Albin Michel, 1994); Corinne Delmas, Les rapports du savoir 
au pouvoir: l’Académie des sciences morales et politiques de 1832 à 1914 (PhD dissertation: 
Université de Paris IX-Dauphine, 2000); Andre Wakefield, The Disordered Police State: German 
Cameralism as Science and Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Fidel Tavarez, The 
Commercial Machine: Reforming Imperial Commerce in the Spanish Atlantic, ca. 1740-1808 (PhD 
dissertation: Princeton University, 2016). 
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frequently invoked science (knowledge), savoir-faire (know-how), or connaissances 
(ideas and impressions formed by experience) to denote the lessons they had learned 
in the course of their duties.  In doing so, they were no different from the king 
himself, whose edicts and declarations ordinarily began with the formula, “By Our 
certain science, full power, and Royal authority...”40  Louis and his servants took it 
for granted that public acts were guided by the light of personal experience.  In 
appropriating the term science, I aim to explain how colonial officials constructed a 
branch of political knowledge they considered to be distinct, useful, and proven 
according to the conventions of their time, not scientific in the way we understand 
that term today.  Their learning resembled modern administrative science in the sense 
that they sought to establish laws, policies, and usages that were morally and 
politically sound, but what that meant, and how it was expressed in practice, would 
look quite different in 1750 or 1850 than it had in 1650 or 1700. 
To capture the variety of ways in which administrators articulated, made 
credible, and preserved knowledge about the colonies, I draw on a wide range of 
sources, including state records, personal letters, print media, poetry, chronicles, 
family archives, and probate inventories, as well as maps and other images.  Like 
knowledge itself, the written and visual artifacts cited here are the products of cultural 
constructs and material processes.  Although much of my analysis will focus on case 
studies of individual officers, I will also stress that their learning was fundamentally 
social.  The laws, regulations, ordinances, and other techniques of rule that emerged 
in the New World were elaborated less in the minds of solitary aristocrats scribbling 
                                                
40 See the entry on “Science” in the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (1694). 
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away in their cabinets (or in tumble-down forts) than within bustling households, 
political councils, ministerial bureaus, and routine encounters with a variety of people 
on the ground.  Historians often overlook the social side of administration because 
most administrative documents were written in a single, coherent voice that 
emphasized the heroic labors of their individual authors.  But if read carefully, these 
records betray the presence of others who helped to produce them, or whose insights 
were mobilized to make claims about how a particular problem should be resolved.  
In that sense, they can tell us a great deal not only about how administrative ideas and 
practices took shape, but also about how they were passed down from one official to 
the next at a time when centralized archives and standardized methods of record-
keeping were still in the making.  It was largely through personal relationships with 
other people on the scene that officials arrived at the “facts” about the colonies—facts 
which were subsequently interpreted and preserved, through the ministrations of 
metropolitan clerks, into a science controlled by the state.41  
The bulk of my sources were produced by approximately one hundred 
governors and intendants who served in France’s New World colonies between 1663 
and 1715.  Not all were strictly royal appointees—approximately half were nominated 
by commercial companies or seigneurs, such as the West Indies Company—but all 
were approved, if not directly commissioned, by the crown, and they were 
responsible to it even if they simultaneously served the private interests of their 
patron-proprietors (in all cases they addressed their paperwork to the king or his navy 
                                                
41 For a similar insight about the primacy of personal relationships in shaping French administrative 
policies, albeit in a later period, see William Trumbull IV, An Empire of Facts: Colonial Power, 
Cultural Knowledge, and Islam in Algeria, 1870-1914 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2014). 
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minister).  In theory, governors were responsible for defense, diplomacy, and public 
order, whereas intendants oversaw commercial, judicial, and financial affairs.  In 
practice, however, their respective spheres of action were ill defined and frequently 
subject to dispute (as they were in the case of Bouloc and Robert).  They were 
assisted in their daily labors by teams of secretaries, clerks, scribes, and lesser 
officers, as well as domestic servants, members of household, and assorted hangers-
on who lent support in a variety of ways.   
In the chapters that follow, I will focus on the printed and scribal knowledge 
produced by these officials and their collaborators.  It would have been possible, 
certainly, to study the administrative culture of empire among other royal servants, 
such as the clerks of the navy ministry in Paris, but that would have required a 
different approach from the one I have adopted here.42  More important, it would have 
minimized the ideas and practices elaborated by officials on the ground, which, as I 
will argue in the conclusion, were decisive in shaping the way France’s colonies 
would be ruled in the eighteenth century.  The laws, ordinances, and usages that 
aimed to define relationships of power between the crown and its subjects emerged 
primarily from everyday encounters between royal administrators and the people they 
sought to govern, which should compel us to look more closely at the careers of these 
agents who stood at the crossroads of the local and the imperial. 
Each of the following chapters tracks a separate theme in the shifting and 
overlapping efforts of royal officials to govern Louis XIV’s overseas dominions.  
                                                
42 The attitudes of various ministers toward the empire has received plenty of attention in histories of 
the individual colonies and of the ministry.  A close study of their commis, on the other hand, has never 
been done, although such a work would undoubtedly reveal a great deal about how the empire was 
understood by the officers most responsible for its day-to-day administration in the metropole.  
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They proceed in roughly chronological fashion, beginning in the 1660s, with the 
crown’s campaign to re-build the Royal Marine and revive its flagging colonies, and 
concluding with the dawn of a new reign and a new imperial politics around 1715.  
Through several case studies, I examine the people and problems that emerged most 
compellingly from my reading of the sources.  Chapter 1 studies the transformation of 
the Arnoul family from a clan of courtiers and tax farmers into a naval and colonial 
administrative dynasty.  Their experience shows how enterprising households took 
advantage of Louis’s maritime ambitions to achieve traditional social and political 
aims, enriching and promoting themselves by learning to build ships, outfit fleets, and 
police ports and colonies in his name.  The next chapter analyzes the ways in which 
three promoters of colonization envisioned the stakes of overseas expansion and 
proposed measures to carry it out.  Their relationships to the crown differed, but they 
were alike in having firsthand experience of the colonies, a preoccupation with 
improving their governance, and a tendency to frame them as political entities distinct 
from the metropole and each other.  Chapter 3 explains how this perception changed.  
Focusing on Intendant Antoine-Denis Raudot’s project to establish Cape Breton 
Island as an entrepôt that would integrate the trade of France and its colonies, it 
explains how a series of economic and military crises around the turn of the 
eighteenth century spurred royal officials to think imperially.  Chapter 4 turns to 
French administrators’ diplomacy with indigenous peoples.  By reconstructing the 
moments in which governors assumed ritual personas assigned to them by their 
Native allies, it demonstrates the close link between science and performance, and 
reveals how officials laid the empirical foundations for enduring myths about 
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indigenous “savagery” and European “civility” in French imperial culture.  I follow 
with a brief conclusion and epilogue about France’s empire later in the eighteenth 
century.   
To be sure, there were many other individuals and themes that could have 
received equal attention, but did not.  My aim in selecting these particular cases and 
writing them up as I have done is to give the processes of colonization and empire 
formation what literary historian Stephen Greenblatt has called “a touch of the 
real”—to emphasize ordinary, even banal events that give us a concrete sense of what 
people on the ground were up to and, in the process, to illustrate a key moment of 
transition between two very different periods of colonial rule.43  This focus on 
individuals demands a sympathetic understanding of their settings and motives.  It 
demands just as forcefully, however, that their settings and motives not be treated as 
















                                                
43 Stephen Greenblatt, “The Touch of the Real,” Representations, vol. 59 (Summer 1997): 14-29. 
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Chapter 1. Becoming bons marins sur terre: State Knowledge, Maritime Empire, 
and the Arnoul Family’s Turn to the Sea 
 
“My son is working at everything under me for the sake of his instruction.  [I am] seeking to make of 
him a bon marin sur terre, and I dare say paternally that he is not doing a bad job of it.” 
– Nicolas Arnoul to Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1669) 
 
“Stay close to your desks and never go to sea, 
And you all may be rulers of the Queen’s Navy!” 
– William S. Gilbert, H.M.S. Pinafore (1878) 
 
Sometime during his second tenure as Royal Intendant of the Galleys at 
Marseille (1710-1719), Pierre Arnoul received a sonnet composed in his honor by his 
attorney, Ricard.  Ricard opened by saluting the precocious intelligence and maturity 
that had propelled Arnoul to a well-traveled career as an administrator of the king’s 
navy and galleys: “Epitome of virtue, model of wisdom / Arnoul sees what we have 
seen from his earliest years / Giving a thousand embellishments to several ports / And 
joining prudence to the fire of youth.”  Initially Ricard characterized the intendant’s 
return to Marseille as a divine gift, but the poem’s final lines made clear that Arnoul 
the administrator had not simply arrived fully formed from the heavens: “A true and 
illustrious image of your father. / Without fighting, you know how to emerge 
victorious in combat / And will cause it to be said, in following in his footsteps / That 
he could never surpass you except in age.”1  It was only in emulating his renowned 
father, Nicolas, who had preceded him as intendant (1665-1673), that Pierre had been 
                                                
1 The full text of Ricard’s sonnet reads: “Abregé de vertu, modele de sagesse / Arnoul voy qu’on a vû 
de ses plus jeunes ans / Donner a plusieurs ports mille embellissements / Et joindre la prudence au feu 
de la jeunesse. / Pour faire son portrait vainement je m’empresse / Ma voix ne peut pousser que de 
foibles accens / Tandis que je voudroit v’ofrir un digne encens / Ma meuse sans parler veut v’admirer 
sans cesse. / Le Ciel avec nos voeux semblant être d’accord / Te fait pour nôtre bien intendant de ce 
port / De ton pere fameux illustre et vraye image. / Sans combatir tu sçais vaincre dans les combats / Et 
vas faire avoüer en marchant sur ses pas / Que jamais il ne pût te surpasser qu’en age.”  Ricard to 
Pierre Arnoul, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Nouvelles Acquisitions Françaises [hereafter BnF 
NAF] 21416, fol. 146 (ca. 1710-1719).   
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able to match and even to outstrip his achievements as an official of France’s fleets 
and ports. 
 As both a resident of Marseille and a longtime client of the family, Ricard 
knew how active Arnoul père had been in grooming Pierre as his successor, even if 
that process was hardly as pre-ordained as the attorney’s sonnet made it seem.  In 
1665 Nicolas had been “horrified” to learn that his son wished to become a Jesuit 
priest.  With the encouragement of his patron, Controller-General of Finances and de 
facto Minister of the Navy Jean-Baptiste Colbert, he had plucked Pierre from a 
brilliant career at the elite Collège de Clermont in Paris and brought him to Provence 
to learn firsthand the art of managing the king’s slave ships.2  The training up of a 
royal official at his father’s side was not unusual in Old Regime France, but this 
particular apprenticeship was extraordinary: no one had ever been raised for a career 
administering the fleets and ports of the realm.3  Pierre’s instruction would combine 
for the first time the technical as well as the bureaucratic aspects of maritime service, 
ultimately fashioning him into a new kind of royal officer, the naval administrative 
specialist.  In mastering the variety of skills necessary to project French power 
overseas, Pierre would not only assure himself and his kinsmen a prominent role 
within Louis XIV’s burgeoning empire—serving as intendant at Marseille, Toulon, 
Havre, Rochefort, and Cadiz while moulding his younger brother, Nicolas-François 
                                                
2 Colbert to N. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21306, fols. 169v-170 (Nov. 20, 1665). “Memoire sur la vie et sur 
les services de M. Arnoul a present intendant des galeres et du commerce,” BnF NAF 21416, fol. 117 
(ca. 1715).   
3 For some examples of royal officials trained by their fathers or other male relatives in this period, see 
John Rule, “A Career in the Making: The Education of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy,” 
French Historical Studies 19, no. 4 (1996): 967-996; Jacob Soll, “Managing the System: Colbert 
Trains His Son for the Great Intendancy,” in The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste-Colbert’s Secret 
State Intelligence System (Ann Arbor, 2009), 84-93; Louis Delavaud, Un ministre de la marine: 
Jérôme Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain. Son éducation et ses premiers emplois, sa visite des ports de 
France en 1694, 1695 et 1696 (Rochefort, 1911). 
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de Nicolas-François, into an intendant of Martinique and of the galleys—but also 
advance a radical reorientation of his family’s ambitions and lifestyle from Paris to 
Provence and from the land to the sea.4 
The household apprenticeships of Pierre and Nicolas-François provide an 
opportunity to balance competing claims about the tectonic shift from an early-
modern culture of royal service predicated on personal loyalties and patron-client 
bonds to one based increasingly (though never entirely) on formal instruction and 
technical expertise.5  Many scholars have attributed the emergence of a 
professionalized state service to bureaucratization, the formation of royal corps and 
écoles, and the application of state power to ever more complex administrative tasks, 
and as a result they have tended to portray the process as a natural, even inevitable 
consequence of top-down efforts to “modernize” the state.6  By contrast, the careers 
                                                
4 Pierre served as intendant of Marseille (1673-1675, 1710-1719), Toulon (1675-1679), Havre (1680), 
Bayonne and the Île de Rhé (1681-1683), and Rochefort (1683-1688), in addition to stints as intendant 
des classes (1692-ca. 1710) and intendant of Marine at Cadiz (1702-?), among other posts mentioned 
below.  Nicolas-François served as intendant of Martinique (1704-1715) and of the galleys (1719-
1726) after spending two decades in lesser positions on campaign and in the ports.   
5 Studies of state-affiliated agents and institutions in the modern period show that the rational, 
disinterested bureaucracy described by Max Weber has never been more than an ideal type.  See, for 
example, the touchstone works of Pierre Bourdieu on the social embeddedness of the modern state.  
Pierre Bourdieu, Loic J. D. Wacquant, and Samar Farage, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure 
of the Bureaucratic Field,” Sociological Theory 12, no. 1 (1994): 1-18; Bourdieu, The State Nobility: 
Elite Schools in the Field of Power, trans. Lauretta C. Clough (Palo Alto, 1996); Max Weber, Economy 
and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, eds. Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 vols. 
(Berkeley, CA, 1978), esp. II: 956-1031. 
6 Some leading examples of this voluminous literature, which varies widely in its conclusions about 
the Old Regime state’s “modernization” and modes of governance, include James Collins, The State in 
Early Modern France (Cambridge, UK, 1995); Michel Antoine, Le Coeur de l’État: Surintendance, 
contrôle général et intendances des finances, 1552-1791 (Paris, 2003); William Beik, Absolutism and 
Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc 
(Cambridge, UK, 1985); Sharon Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century 
France (New York, 1986); Guy Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal 
Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701 (Cambridge, UK, 2002); Julian Swann, Provincial Power and 
Absolute Monarchy: The Estates General of Burgundy, 1661-1790 (New York, 2003); Fanny 
Cosandey and Robert Descimon, L’Absolutisme en France: histoire et historiographie (Paris, 2002).  
For a critical overview of some of this literature, see Beik, “The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social 
Collaboration,” in Past and Present, no. 188 (Aug. 2005): 195-224; David Parker, Class and State in 
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of the Arnoul show how the informal and highly contingent instruction of officials on 
the ground could impart specialized knowledge and expand state power long before 
the crown established fixed avenues of training and promotion for its servants.  Their 
experience suggests that the initiative in the pre-history of bureaucracy could come 
not only from ministers and monarchs eager to enlarge their authority, but also from 
ambitious families at the kingdom’s margins who anticipated their patrons’ desires 
and fashioned themselves accordingly.  In their profound commitment to embodying 
and applying knowledge in the naval service of the king, the Arnoul demonstrated the 
growing currency of technology, imperial expansion, and an “expert” persona as 
sources of social and professional advancement—an early case of one household’s 
“personal identity at epistemological work” on behalf of the state.7 
The Arnoul brothers came of age amidst an unprecedented expansion of French 
seapower and the administrative apparatus that serviced it.  In the 1660s, fixed 
maritime intendancies were a recent phenomenon, part of the naval renaissance that 
Louis and Colbert believed necessary to challenge the seafaring economic might of 
                                                                                                                                      
Ancien Régime France: The Road to Modernity? (London, 1996).  On the royal corps and écoles, see 
René Taton, ed., Enseignement et diffusion des sciences en France au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1964); 
Frederick B. Artz, The Development of Technical Education in France, 1500-1850 (Boston, 1966); 
Jane Langins, Conserving the Enlightenment: French Military Engineering from Vauban to the 
Revolution (Boston, 2003); Anne Blanchard, Les ingénieurs du Roy de Louis XIV à Louis XVI: étude 
du corps des fortifications (Montpellier, 1979); Isabelle Laboulais, “Serving Science and the State: 
Mining Science in France, 1794-1810,” Minerva 46, no. 1 (2008): 17-36; Terry Shinn, “Science, 
Tocqueville, and the State: The Organization of Knowledge in Modern France,” Social Research 59, 
no. 3 (1992): 533-566.  For sociological works on professionalization and its history, see Jean-François 
Kesler, “Le développement de la fonction publique en France,” L’Année sociologique 28, 3e série 
(1977): 213-230; Howard M. Vollmer and Donald L. Mills, eds., Professionalization (Engelwood 
Cliffs, NJ, 1966); Magali S. Larson, The Rise of the Professions: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley, 
CA, 1979), esp. 2-9; Philip Elliott, The Sociology of the Professions (London, 1972); Andrew Abott, 
The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago, 1988).  
7
 Here I apply Steven Shapin’s formulation about natural philosophers to royal administrators, whose 
claims to knowledge and truth were likewise mediated by social status, reputation, patronage, and 
comportment.  Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Chicago, 1995), xxviii. 
 32 
the English and the Dutch.8  Until Colbert’s reforms the day-to-day business of the 
navy, galleys, and colonies had been overseen only on an ad hoc basis, by private 
companies, individual entrepreneurs, or officers attached to a particular campaign.  
Beginning with Nicolas and his counterparts in France’s major ports, the minister 
ensured that all three branches of the service were staffed exclusively and on a 
permanent basis by salaried officers bearing royal commissions.9  His insistence that 
they develop the naval know-how necessary to meet the unique demands of their 
work—directing the construction and repair of ships, outfitting fleets, and managing 
the business of ports and colonies—distinguished these intendants de la marine from 
their fellow administrators in other parts of the kingdom.10  Between 1661 and 1672 
alone, they helped to increase the number of rated vessels in the French navy from 
nine to 172 and to raise the total of galleys from seven to twenty-four—a massively 
complex enterprise that harnessed thousands of acres of virgin oak forest, enormous 
quantities of money and matériel, and the collective specialized and non-specialized 
                                                
8 Charles Cole’s classic study remains the best reference for Colbert’s commercial ambitions, although 
more recent work has emphasized the minister’s pragmatic approach to policy over any coherent 
mercantilist design.  Charles Cole, Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New York, 
1939), I: 356-532, II: 1-131, 549-558; James Pritchard, In Search of Empire: The French in the 
Americas, 1670-1730 (Cambridge, UK, 2004), 234-237; Alisa V. Petrovich, “Revisioning Colbert: 
Jean-Baptiste Colbert and the Origins of French Global Imperial Policy, 1661-1683” (PhD diss., 
University of Houston, 1997): 7-34.  On colonial trade, emulation, and imperial rivalry in this period, 
including Colbert’s role in them, see Sophus Reinert, Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins 
of Political Economy (Cambridge, MA, 2011), esp. 13-72; Daniel Dessert, La Royale: Vaisseaux et 
marins du Roi-Soleil (Paris, 1996), 9-10. 
9
 Dessert, La Royale, 9-11, 15-55; René Mémain, La marine de guerre sous Louis XIV. Le matériel : 
Rochefort, arsenal modèle de Colbert (Paris, 1937), 263-269, 361-381.  As minister of Marine (1669-
1683), Colbert himself would enjoy a new position designed to streamline the administration of the 
king’s fleets, one that united many of the functions previously shared between the Grand-Maître de la 
Navigation and individual admirals.  Michel Vergé-Franceschi, La Marine française au XVIIIe siècle: 
Guerres, administration, exploration (Paris, 1996), 33-43, 203-215.  
10 Claude Aboucaya, Les intendants de la marine sous l’ancien régime: contribution à l’étude du 
département, du port et arsenal de la marine de Toulon (Marseille, 1958), 21-25; Mémain, La marine 
de guerre, 263-283, 367-371. 
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manpower of all the major ports.11   Given the scale of this effort, it is no accident that 
royal shipyards, and those who staffed them, were at the leading edge of 
developments in state expertise. 
As an administrative dynasty founded upon service in the king’s fleets, ports, 
and colonies, the Arnoul were precocious and extraordinarily successful, but their 
experience was not exactly unique.  Indeed, nearly every colonial governor and 
intendant in this period was, like the Arnoul men, a product of training in the navy, 
the army, or the Parisian courts.  Their administrative practices and personas were 
forged in the crucible of those institutions.  While the colonies posed unprecedented 
problems of governance, the formative experience of managing paperwork, 
personnel, and the idiosyncracies of fleets and ports began along metropolitan shores.  
I start with the Arnoul, then, in order to provide a common backdrop for the chapters 
that follow.  In Marseille, Toulon, and beyond, the Arnoul learned to cope with 
unfamiliar peoples and problems on a scale unprecedented for royal servants.  Their 
experience directly informed policies, regulations, and ordinances that would shape 
administrative culture within the king’s maritime services for decades to come.  To 
understand the intellectual and institutional baggage that conditioned the science of 
governance in the New World, I propose, we should begin by looking at careers like 
theirs. 
                                                
11 Pritchard, In Search of Empire, 293; Dessert, La Royale, 15-16, 61-137; Paul Bamford, Fighting 
Ships and Prisons: The Mediterranean Galleys of France in the Age of Louis XIV (Minneapolis, 1973), 
24; Biography of Nicolas Arnoul, BnF NAF 21416, fols. 1-2v (ca. 1715).  To cite one example, the 
Royal Louis, flagship of the Mediterranean fleet in the 1670s and 1680s, required 47,780ft2 of 
Burgundian and Provençal oak to build, in addition to vast amounts of other raw and finished 
materials.  Guillaume Hayet, Description du vaisseau “le Royal Louis”, dédiée à messire Pierre 
Arnoul... (Marseille, 1677), 10.  In 1660 the crown spent approximately 300,000 pounds on its navy, 
whereas in 1670 it spent 13,400,000; during the intervening decade the average annual budget for the 
navy was 10,000,000 livres.  Cole, Colbert and a Century, I: 451-452. 
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Learning the Cordages: Pierre Arnoul and the Galleys  
 
The apprenticeships of Pierre and Nicolas-François fit within a long-term 
pattern of strategic self-fashioning that had already marked their father’s career.  
Nicolas was descended on both sides from several generations of royal servants, 
based in Paris and Picardie, that included military officers, king’s councillors, tax 
receivers, and secretaries of the royal household.12  As a young man he learned to ride 
at an academy with the aim of becoming a soldier, but his older brother, an aide 
(commis) to Minister of War Sublet de Noyers, instead sought to place him in 
Noyers’ service.13  At first meeting Nicolas the minister balked,  
not believing that this young man could ever apply 
himself nor discipline himself sufficiently for a position 
of this kind [commis], because he saw that his 
inclination was for arms and that he always dressed in 
extraordinary finery—in contrast to which Monsieur de 
Noyers was a very simple and extremely modest man; 
[Noyers] said that he was very doubtful that their 
dispositions were compatible and that it would be better 
to leave [Nicolas] on the path he had already taken.  
 
At his brother’s insistence, Nicolas abandoned “all his fripperies and the worldly air 
that he had” and “presented himself to Monsieur de Noyers as if he were entering into 
a seminary, which made Monsieur de Noyers receive him all the more agreeably for 
having seen this young man show the strength to overcome his inclination and his 
                                                
12 Among these forebears were a trésorier des cent gentilhommes de la maison du Roi, a cavalry 
lieutenant, a sécretaire du Roi, and a controller of the queen’s household, on his father’s side, and a 
conseiller du Roi and a receveur des tailles et des aides at Mans on the side of his mother, Marguerite 
Taron, daughter of a rich Picard family.  Gaston Rambert, Nicolas Arnoul, Intendant des Galères à 
Marseille (1665-1674) (Marseille, 1931), 9-10; Biography of Nicolas Arnoul, BnF NAF 21416, fol. 1. 
13 It is unclear why Nicolas’s brother, rather than his father, took charge of his career.  Most likely his 
father was deceased by this time.  If so, his experience would anticipate that of his younger sons, who 
advanced in the world largely thanks to Pierre’s efforts. 
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temperament.”14  It was this sudden, radical transformation from a worldly soldier-
dandy into a monkish secretary that proved Nicolas’s ability to “discipline himself 
[s’assujetir],” launching his career as a commis at Noyers’ side, a fortification-builder 
and military supplier in Picardie, an ambassador and spy under Richelieu, and a 
commissioner-general of the navy at Toulon.15  After the Cardinal’s death he retired 
from public life to pursue his fortune, only to return two decades later following a 
bankruptcy and the timely intervention of Colbert.  Thus, when Nicolas began 
grooming Pierre as his successor in 1665, he was already engaged in a familiar task, 
reinventing himself to please a powerful patron.16    
 As a fortification-builder Nicolas had already discovered one niche of service 
in which the crown desperately sought to cultivate and reward home-grown expertise; 
in the galleys he found another.17  At the time of his appointment to Marseille, the 
royal slave ships were an ideal place to rebuild a lost fortune and elevate a family’s 
prospects.  Louis and Colbert were committed to building a fleet to rival those of 
                                                
14
 BnF NAF 21416, fol. 1.  On Noyer’s famously austere disposition and approach to his work, see 
Orest Ranum, Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII: A Study of the Secretaries of State and 
Superintendants of Finance in the Ministry of Richelieu, 1635-1642 (Oxford, UK, 1963), 100-120. 
15
 Rambert, Nicolas Arnoul, 10-13.  Nicolas’s biography claimed that Richelieu wished him to spy on 
Louis XIII, but that Nicolas refused, explaining honorably that he could not serve two masters.  Later 
the Cardinal planned to give Arnoul a post as intendant des Finances, but delays forced him to appoint 
Séraphin de Mauroy instead.  After Richelieu’s death and Noyers’s retirement, Nicolas believed he 
would succeed Noyers as Minister of State for War, but was passed over in favor of Michel Le Tellier.  
BnF NAF 21416, fols. 1-1v; Rambert, Nicolas Arnoul, 16. 
16 Daniel Dessert and Louis Journet suggest that Nicolas sought Colbert’s patronage in order to rebuild 
his fortune as a tax farmer.  Dessert and Journet, “Le lobby Colbert,” 1334n40.  Sharon Kettering 
agreed, adding that the minister’s protection was probably secured by one of Nicolas’s friends, 
François Berthelot, a military supplier, financier, and Colbert client.  Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and 
Clients, 200.  The family’s anonymous biographer told a different story, claiming that Nicolas had 
been the first to hire Colbert into royal service and that the minister therefore appointed him out of 
friendship and obligation: “M. Colbert estoit deslors entré dans le ministere et comme il estoit amy 
particulier de m. arnoul qui luy avoit donné le premier employ qu’il eut jamais eu le fit rendre pour 
scavoir s’il voudroit de nouveau s’attacher a la marine dans le dessein ou il estoit de la relever, et M. 
arnoul l’ayant accepté il fut fait intendant des Galeres en l’année 1665.”  BnF NAF 21416, fol. 2. 
17 On the monarchy’s efforts to harness the practical knowledge produced by military engineers during 
the Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years’ War, see Langins, Conserving the Enlightenment, 39-41. 
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Spain, the Ottoman Sultan, and the Italian states.  Beyond providing a nimble form of 
coastal defense, galleys held immense symbolic value to a young king eager to punish 
Muslim insults and establish himself as a Christian warrior-monarch in the crusading 
tradition.  Over the next twenty years he would invest tremendous sums of money and 
manpower to replace his six “old hunks of galleys” with the largest fleet in Europe.18  
Elite families saw an opportunity and clamored to place their sons among the Knights 
of Saint John, whose ranks produced around half of France’s galley officer corps in 
these years.19  In 1666 Henri d’Oppède, President of the Parlement of Aix and a 
powerful ally of the Arnoul, endorsed the trend by obtaining captaincies for his 
brother and a cousin.20  Nicolas envisioned the same future for his youngest son, 
Nicolas-François, whom he placed in the Order two years later.21  No less concerned 
with rebuilding his fortune, meanwhile, he used his position as intendant to secure 
lucrative supply contracts, pay off his creditors, and amass an estate that would 
ultimately encompass 300,000 pounds, two fiefs near Paris and Avignon, and 
profitable lands adjoining the arsenal of Marseille.22   
Nicolas used both money and influence to reorient his son’s education toward 
the needs of the service.  He hired a governor to complete Pierre’s study of belles 
                                                
18 Cole, Colbert and a Century, I: 451. 
19 Bamford, Fighting Ships and Prisons, 97-101.   
20 Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients, 54.  Oppède’s portrait would accompany Pierre to 
Rochefort and Toulon.  “Estat de mes meubles venûes de Toulon qui doivent se trouver encore a 
Carpentras et a Baume,” BnF NAF 21417, fol. 260 (Oct. 2, 1699). 
21 Decision of Nicolas Cotoner, Master of the Hospital of Saint John of Jerusalem and of the Military 
Order of Saint Sepulchre, regarding the request of Nicolas Arnoul and Genevieve Saulger, BnF NAF 
21416, fols. 231-232v (Jan. 19, 1668). 
22 In 1669 Nicolas bought a collection of lands known as le Marquisat, located along the port’s Rive-
Neuve, for 15,600 livres.  Then, in 1671-1672, he spent 74,689 livres to build lodgings and magazines 
on those lands that brought a substantial return which, by 1710, was earning Pierre 11,130 livres per 
year.  Pierre Masson, Les galères de France (1481-1781): Marseille, port de guerre (Paris, 1938), 
367n1; Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients, 200-201; Rambert, Nicolas Arnoul, 33-44. 
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lettres, provided him lessons in geometry and trigonometry with a mathematician 
loaned to him by the general of the galleys, and ensured that he learned the “science 
of fortifications” under a Monsieur de Combe, reputedly “the finest engineer of his 
time, much more profound than [Commissioner-General of Fortifications] Monsieur 
de vauban.”23  Instead of pursuing the advanced rhetoric and philosophy that would 
have occupied his final years at collège (and advanced his career in the priesthood), 
Pierre developed a mind for figures and angles.  He applied himself to his lessons, he 
later declared, “with so much devotion that he had his meals brought to him and 
placed at the edge of the table where he labored, without leaving his work, the usual 
amount of study time not being enough for him.”24  If his masters were as gifted and 
his dedication as constant as he and his biographer claimed, he would have received 
as good or better an education in these subjects as the highest-ranking military 
officers of his day.25  
Unlike those officers and perhaps every other young nobleman in France, 
however, Pierre’s instruction also included a crash course in a subject normally 
foreign to young nobles: carpentry.26  In 1668 Colbert responded to a proposal from 
Arnoul: 
                                                
23 “Memoire sur la vie et sur les services de M. Arnoul a present intendant des galeres et du 
commerce,” BnF NAF 21416, fol. 117 (ca. 1715).  Pierre’s autobiographical notes are more modest 
about Combe’s reputation, referring to him only as “un des plus grands ingenieurs de son temps.”  
Autobiographical notes of Pierre Arnoul, BnF NAF 21416, fol. 23 (ca. 1715).   
24 “Memoire sur la vie et sur les services de M. Arnoul a present intendant des galeres et du 
commerce,” BnF NAF 21416, fol. 117.   
25 On the education of élite sword nobles destined for officers’ commissions, see Motley, Becoming a 
French Aristocrat, 68-70.   
26 In dictionaries of the period, carpentry is not mentioned among the undignified métiers associated 
with derogation, but menuiserie, a closely-related occupation, was sometimes judged dérogeant.  J.-B. 
Dumoulin, Lettres de noblesse accordées aux artistes français (XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles) (Paris, 1873), 
3.  Derogation was an ambiguous and flexible concept, both juridically and socially, and one way in 
which an otherwise derogative activity could become more dignified was to be attached to warfare or 
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It is good to apply your son to everything that could 
concern the service or anything that depends upon the 
service of the galleys.  If he undertakes under your 
supervision and the guidance of [master carpenter 
Pierre] Hubac to make himself a carpenter [se rendre 
Charpentier], I am convinced that he will become one 
very soon, and that he will know perfectly all the pieces 
of wood that enter into the construction of a galley and 
the method of assembling them.27   
 
The minister, who was eager to end French dependence on foreign shipbuilders by 
training homegrown experts, implied that instruction in naval carpentry should form 
part of a broader familiarity with all aspects of the service; in the absence of written 
manuals, that instruction would have to come directly from a master carpenter.28  The 
guiding presence of Hubac, a specialist in galley construction and the son of Brest’s 
renowned master shipbuilder, Laurent Hubac, would ensure that Pierre received the 
best teaching available.29  In the end Pierre dutifully spent 18 months as Hubac’s 
“disciple,” learning the technical side of shipbuilding while overseeing the 
construction of two galleys and a galeasse commissioned by the king.30 
 Pierre needed to be familiar with the building of ships because, if he were 
promoted to an intendancy, he would be responsible for initiating the construction 
                                                                                                                                      
the manufacture of arms (as in the case of metallurgy).  Thus the construction of ships for the king’s 
fleet likely would have been considered more dignified than other, similar works of carpentry.  On 
derogation and its causes, see Laurent Bourquin, La noblesse de la France moderne (XVIe au XVIIIe 
siècles) (Paris, 2002), 15-18.   
27 Colbert to N. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21308, fols. 147v-148 (August 3, 1668).  
28 Cole, Colbert and a Century, I: 454-457; Dessert, La Royale, 91.  The first guide to naval 
architecture would not appear until 1677, and it was more of a manual to the elements of a ship than a 
description of how they could be assembled in phases according to mathematical principles.  The first 
“true manual of construction” written by a “veritable technician” was a 1683 manuscript penned by the 
Toulonnais carpenter, François I Coulomb.  Dessert, La Royale, 123. 
29
 Dessert, La Royale, 83. 
30 “Memoire sur la vie et sur les services de M. Arnoul a present intendant des galeres et du 
commerce,” BnF NAF 21416, fol. 117; Autobiographical notes of Pierre Arnoul, BnF NAF 21416, 
fols. 23-23v.  For Pierre’s orders to build and design the galeasse and galleys, see Colbert to N. 
Arnoul, BnF NAF 21308, fol. 395v (Mar. 23, 1668); Colbert to N. Arnoul, fol. 86 (May 18, 1668); N. 
Arnoul to Colbert, fol. 123v (Jul. 7, 1668). 
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process and ensuring that it was carried out according to the king’s financial interests 
(i.e., as cheaply as possible).  Typically, when an intendant received orders to build a 
vessel, he would seek out a master carpenter to request a detailed estimate of the 
work.  The carpenter’s proposal would include the proportions of the ship he planned 
to build (carefully chosen since these would determine its performance on the water) 
and occasionally the qualities of the wood required.  It also would propose an 
itemized estimate of the cost.  Work on the vessel would not begin until the intendant 
had approved the proposal.31   There was a great deal of room for negotiation in this 
process, since the intendant could withhold his approval, holding out for a lower 
estimate or, if he were knowledgeable and assertive enough, for certain principles of 
design.32  Throughout, he needed to know how to discuss the specifics with the 
carpenter and, no less important, how to explain them to the minister. 
Seventeenth-century ships were products of imagination, improvisation, and 
practical know-how, and in learning how to build them Pierre likely relied as much 
on the cognitive tools bestowed by his collegiate education as any formal principles 
of mathematics or engineering.33  Visualization, contemplation, and note-taking were 
firmly intertwined in Jesuit pedagogy and devotional practice.  The order encouraged 
its members to record their visions of the divine as a spiritual exercise and an aid to 
future meditation.  Similarly, Jesuits collégiens were taught to use notebooks as 
“short-term memory aids” designed to accelerate their appropriation of course 
                                                
31
 Dessert, La Royale, 123-124. 
32 This working relationship could be difficult regardless of the intendant’s leverage.  Simon Chabert, 
proud of his family’s three centuries of shipbuilding experience, was “very able, but hard to manage 
and to chasten,” according to Pierre.  Masson, Les galères de France, 388. 
33 See the paragraph and citations below.  The same was true of fortifications, whose construction in 
this period, despite requiring advanced mathematics, was more an art than a science.  Langins, 
Conserving the Enlightenment, 39-62.   
 40 
material.34  Pierre’s ability to internalize and creatively re-formulate his lessons had 
ranked him among the best in his class at Clermont (alongside Colbert’s son and 
successor, the Marquis de Seignelay), and his talent for rendering conceptual imagery 
into verse and prose had won him prizes from his instructors.35  The lessons stuck: for 
the rest of his life he would continue to write poetry, much of it consisting of odes to 
Louis XIV or descriptive first-person “portraits” of devotional subjects such as Jesus, 
the nativity, a soul in Purgatory, and a converted sinner.36  This facility for turning 
mental images into recorded observations—whether poetic, epistolary, or 
administrative—is what allowed Jesuit missionaries to “order and codify” their 
experience of new worlds into “objects of knowledge.”37  Pierre, having learned their 
techniques, was equipped to do the same for the unfamiliar world of the shipyard. 
The details of Pierre’s apprenticeship to Hubac are unknown, but later events 
would demonstrate his appropriation of these lessons and their importance to his 
reputation and career.  In 1677, two years after his appointment as intendant at 
Toulon, he was hailed by one of his subordinates in a published description of the 
Royal Louis (b. 1666-1670), then the flagship of the Mediterranean fleet and a vessel 
built under Pierre’s indirect supervision.  In an epigraph preceding his dedication to 
                                                
34
 Paul Nelles, “Seeing and Writing: The Art of Observation in the Early Jesuit Missions,” Intellectual 
History Review 20, no. 3 (2010): 317-333.  For more on the education of gens de robe and life in the 
collèges, see L. W. B. Brockliss, French Higher Education in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries: A Cultural History (New York, 1987). 
35
 “M. Arnoul a esté elevé chez les jesuites au college de Clermont depuis la sixieme jusqu’a la fin de 
seconde.  Il estoit toujours des premiers dans ses classes et a toujours eu des prix a la fin de chacune, 
de prose, de poesie ou de memoire. Il estoit aussy de toutes les declamations avec M. le Marquis de 
Seignelay qui estoit dans le meme temps que luy au college, et de la meme classe, et comme il y avoit 
une espece d’emulation entr’eux deux, on pretend que M. Colbert le donnoit souvent pour exemple a 
M. son fils.”  “Memoire sur la vie et sur les services de M. Arnoul a present intendant des galeres et du 
commerce,” BnF NAF 21416, fol. 117. 
36 Pierre’s poems are undated, but internal evidence suggests that they were written across several 
decades.  The devotional pieces are in BnF NAF 21400, fols. 127-142. 
37 Nelles, “Seeing and Writing”: 327-333. 
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Arnoul, the author imagined that the ship, “having been built by so great a man / Will 
cut down the vast enemies of the French / So that such a glorious ruler of the seas, 
Arnoul, watching over them / Is known to all who meet him.”38  The following year 
Colbert ordered Pierre to prepare with meticulous precision all of the pieces of a 30-
gun vessel so that he could “undertake to build, or more precisely, to assemble in its 
entirety” a spectacular “chef-d’oeuvre” over three or four days in case Louis were 
ever to visit Toulon.39  Some months later, Pierre earned kingdom-wide publicity for 
overseeing the construction of a 103’ ship in under seven hours.  France’s official 
gazette wondered at the feat, which involved 700 workers, forty port holes, and 2,000 
pieces of rigging.40   
                                                
38 As the commissioner’s dedication made clear, the ship was not built under Pierre’s direct 
supervision (at the time he was in Marseille, overseeing the construction of a galeasse and two galleys 
of his own design), but rather under the direction of the carpenter Rodolphe Gédéon and the Marquis 
d’Infreville, then a commandant du navire of the Mediterranean fleet.  I am grateful to Nathan Daniels 
for help with the Latin translation.  Hayet, Description du vaisseau “le Royal Louis”, front matter; 
Dessert, La Royale, 324.  Edmund Dummer, a future Surveyor of the Royal Navy, toured the Royal 
Louis during his visit to Toulon in 1683 and found it wanting: “[She is] a great ship and glorious in her 
first carving, no doubt; but to my judgment not of good proportion, nor good workmanship, her figure 
under water I know not, nor is that above to be admired.”  Quoted in Celina Fox, “The Ingenious Mr 
Dummer: Rationalizing the Royal Navy in Late Seventeenth-Century England,” Electronic British 
Library Journal (2007): 17, www.bl.uk/eblj/2007articles/pdf/ebljarticle102007.pdf. 
39 Colbert to P. Arnoul (Aug. 3, 1678), reproduced in Pierre Clément, ed., Lettres, instructions et 
mémoires de Colbert, 7 vols. (Paris, 1861-1882), III1: 115-117.  By comparison, the minister had once 
asked Nicolas to be ready to build a light galley in fewer than twenty-four hours; when he asked 
another intendant to do the same for a ship-of-the-line, the official protested that he would need more 
than a week.  Colbert to N. Arnoul (Oct. 17, 1670), reproduced in Clément, Lettres, 299 and 299n1. 
40 La Gazette (Jul. 29, 1679), quoted in Clément, Lettres, 299-300n1; see also Archives nationales 
[AN], Fonds Marine B
3
 32, fols. 389-393, cited in Dessert, La Royale, 157.  The Gazette’s report of a 
similar stunt in Marseille some months later describes the ordered pageantry involved in these staged 
constructions: “Le sieur Brodart, intendant des galères à Marseille, y a fait bâtir une galère dans 
l’espace de dix heures et demie.  Le marquis de Seignelay, sécretaire d’État, étant arrivé à l’arsenal à 
six heures du matin, à peine y fut-il entré que le sieur Brodart fit paraître d’un coup de sifflet huit cents 
ouvriers qui commencèrent à batir une galère.  Ils étaient de plusieurs métiers, tous distingués par leurs 
habits différents, afin qu’ils pussent se reconnaître en travaillant, et qu’il n’y eût pas de confusion.  Ils 
commencèrent à travailler à six heures et demie du matin et, à cinq heures du soir, la galère étant 
achevée et équipée, le maréchal duc de Vivonne, le marquis de Seignelay et le chevalier de Noailles, 
lieutenant général des galères, montèrent dessus et allèrent jusqu’au Château-d’If.”  La Gazette (Nov. 
11, 1679), quoted in Masson, Les galères de France, 188-189.  The Musée national de la Marine’s 
online exhibtion, “La construction navale en bois aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles,” gives a sense of the 
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Pierre’s apprenticeship taught him the skills necessary not only to oversee naval 
constructions, but also to perform the mundane work of maritime administration.  He 
watched up close as Nicolas organized the outfitting and debarkation of ships, 
asserted royal prerogatives to police and expand the port, and handled the acquisition 
and care of several thousand convicts and slaves to row the galleys, all while 
maintaining a web of correspondence that stetched across France and the 
Mediterranean.41  The intendant’s daily duties involved a series of face-to-face 
encounters punctuated by intensive paperwork.  A steady stream of merchants, 
craftsmen, naval officers, municipal officials, foreign dignitaries, and subjects-in-
need called at his residence, the Maison du Roi, while the business of the port 
frequently took him and his small team of commissioners (commissaires) and scribes 
(ecrivains) out to the shipyard and into its workshops.42  In the course of inspecting 
the magazines, the galleys, and other sites around Marseille’s burgeoning arsenal, his 
team produced documents that translated what he saw and heard into recorded 
observations for his and Colbert’s reference.  Performing these tasks well demanded 
more than a wide-ranging grasp of naval construction, accounting, and the law; they 
also required a degree of self-assertion over master craftsmen and ship’s officers that 
could only be achieved to the extent that he could discuss intelligently the issues 
                                                                                                                                      
enormous scale and difficulty involved in designing and building a ship at this time: www.musee-
marine.fr/programmes_multimedia/construction_navale/ (accessed Feb. 26, 2013). 
41 The following composite account of the Arnouls’ daily activities draws upon the correspondance 
between Nicolas and Colbert conserved in the Arnoul papers and in sub-series B2 6 of the AN’s Fonds 
Marine.  Zysberg’s Les galériens and Dessert’s La Royale likewise provide useful information about 
the routine work involved in administering the galleys. 
42 Some of the Arnouls’ more eminent callers stayed to dine as guests; their identities are listed in the 
family’s daily table expenses.  “Comptes de dépenses tenus par Tournay secrétaire de l’intendant des 
galères,” Archives Départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône, 5E 17 (1674-1675). 
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relevant to their labors.43  His work demanded, in other words, both a multitude of 
connaissances and the ability to deploy them credibly with a range of people across a 
variety of settings. 
Nicolas gradually phased Pierre into this work while informing Colbert of the 
boy’s progress.  In addition to supervising the construction of ships, Pierre served as 
his father’s copyist and part-time secretary, and he was left in charge whenever 
Nicolas was called from town.44  In doing so he became directly familiar with the 
routines and conventions of administering the port.45  According to Nicolas, Pierre 
proved “conscientious” during his father’s absences and “likes the work, not being at 
all idle.”46  Only three years after bringing his son to Marseille, he reported proudly 
that Pierre was mastering the various demands of the intendancy:  
My son is working at everything under me for the sake 
of his instruction.  [I am] seeking to make of him a bon 
marin sur terre, and I dare say paternally that he is not 
doing a bad job of it; rather he is enjoying it and 
applying himself entirely to the economy of the galleys, 
which he now knows.  The vessels whose construction 
you are pleased to assign me will show him the rest.  I 
                                                
43
 These insights draw upon René Mémain’s study of the intendancy of Rochefort in this period.  
Mémain, La marine de guerre, 370. 
44
 N. Arnoul to Colbert, BnF NAF 21306, fol. 296v (Jan. 16, 1666); N. Arnoul to Colbert, BnF NAF 
21306, fol. 324 (Feb. 6, 1666).  For passing mention of Pierre’s roles as copyist and secretary, see 
Autobiographical notes, BnF NAF 21416, fol. 23v; “cest [mon fils] qui ecrit les lettres que j’ay 
l’honneur de vous mander,” N. Arnoul to Colbert, BnF NAF 21307, fol. 77v (Mar. 12, 1667).   
45
 Pierre also would have seen how his father, as the administrator of a new and expanding service, 
attempted to resolve problems of information mobility and overload.  For example, Nicolas tried to 
replace bulky convict registers with a system of blank playing cards on which the name of every forçat 
in each chain gang was inscribed, which he hoped would allow galley captains to trade crews 
efficiently and without losing track of which convicts were working under them.  The experiment 
failed when the captains repeatedly lost their cards.  Zysberg, Les galériens, 46-47. 
46
 “Mon fils fait icy pour moy en mon absence et par la raison que c’est mon fils je n’auserois dire 
qu’il fait bien.  Je vous diré seulement qu’il est soigneux ayme le travail n’estant pas evanté vous me 
pardonnerez aisement vous este pere.”  N. Arnoul to Colbert, BnF NAF 21306, fol. 296v (Jan. 16, 
1666). 
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will have him oversee [the work] under the master 
[carpenter], since he has [already] overseen a galley.47 
 
Knowledge of shipbuilding remained Pierre’s most distinctive selling point as a 
client, Nicolas suggested, but it was his ability to perform well at “everything” that 
would demonstrate his readiness for a post of his own.48 
To further encourage and justify Colbert’s protection, the Arnoul gave regular 
proofs of Pierre’s progress that demonstrated both the breadth of his learning and his 
embrace of a value cherished by the minister: thrift.  His first “project” was a 
proposal to rationalize the distribution of funds within the galleys.  Nicolas claimed 
that Pierre’s reorganization of accounts would be more than an abstract exercise: 
“when the book that I am having my son write, covering all that concerns the galleys, 
is complete, I hope that His Majesty and you, from your study [cabinet], can prevent 
[even] the greatest scoundrel from robbing 2,000 escus from the galleys or from 
paying them out without our seeing it.”49  The book would not only show that his son 
“knows” the “economy of the galleys,” it would also serve as a practical tool of 
governance, allowing the king to keep better track of his pennies.50  The minister’s 
                                                
47 N. Arnoul to Colbert, BnF NAF 21307, fols. 464v-465 (Mar. 19, 1669).   
48 Nicolas had incentive to make a favorable impression of his son’s progress to Colbert—already 
Nicolas was seeking an appointment for him, as captain of the arsenal—but as a client he also risked 
his credit and perhaps his position if he misled the minister about Pierre’s abilities, a fact of which 
Colbert had taken care to remind him.  N.Arnoul to Colbert, BnF NAF 21308, fol. 212v (Sep. 11, 
1668); Colbert to N. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21308, fol. 256 (Sep. 21, 1668); Colbert to N. Arnoul, BnF 
NAF 21306, fol. 472 (Sep. 17, 1666). 
49
 “Je vous renvoye le memoire des apostilz de l’estat respondu, et quand le livre que je faicts faire par 
mon fils de tout ce qui concerne les galeres sera achevé j’espere que S. M. et vous de vostre cabinet 
vous pourez empescher le plus grand fripon de derober 2000 escus sur toutes le galeres ny les doner a 
gagner sans qu’on le voye on dit que je gaste le metier.”  N. Arnoul to Colbert, BnF NAF 21307, fol. 
52v (Feb. 12, 1667). 
50
 N. Arnoul to Colbert, BnF NAF 21308, fols. 464v-465 (Mar. 19, 1669); N. Arnoul to Colbert, BnF 
NAF 21307, fol. 52v (Feb. 12, 1667); “il aura l’honneur de vous pn’ter son livre quand il y aura mis la 
dernier main pour eschantillon de son caprice,” N. Arnoul to Colbert, BnF NAF 21307, fols. 77-77v 
(Mar. 12, 1667).   
 45 
enthusiastic response suggests that he recognized its value.51  Pierre’s subsequent 
projects included a treatise on the construction and arming of a galley, which he 
dedicated to Colbert, and the design of the grand staircase of the hospital of Marseille, 
which he claimed to achieve without any previous architectural training.52  In 
providing such “demonstrations of his intellect [echantillons de son caprice],” he 
displayed a precocious grip of administrative style, a capacity for both logical and 
creative thinking, and a knack for grabbing his patron’s attention—qualities that 
rapidly earned him favor from a minister whose obsessive information-gathering and 
exacting standards of performance were already well known. 
Crucially, Pierre was able to demonstrate his technical knowledge not only on 
paper, but also in face-to-face encounters with his superiors.  In 1667 Colbert sent 
him away from his father’s side for the first time to oversee fortification works 
elsewhere in Provence.  Nicolas prepared his son for the task by giving him model 
bills of payment to contractors, dispatching an experienced treasurer to offer help and 
advice, and laying out meticulous orders that included how to produce durable 
masonry, where and when to pay laborers, and a reminder to keep his daily account 
book in his study.53  Despite these precautions, Pierre floundered when local 
authorities mocked his youth (he was then fifteen) and refused to follow his orders; 
when the minister called him to Court to explain himself, however, he so impressed 
                                                
51
 Colbert was so enthusiastic about the proposal, sight unseen, that he immediately asked for Pierre’s 
age and height as well as an assessment of his constitution and fitness for service.  Colbert to N. 
Arnoul, BnF NAF, fols. 62v-63 (Feb. 25, 1667); Autobiographical notes, fol. 23v. 
52 “Memoire sur la vie et sur les services de M. Arnoul a present intendant des galeres et du 
commerce,” BnF NAF 21416, fol. 117; Autobiographical notes, BnF NAF 21416, fols. 23-23v.  
Pierre’s treatise has not survived among the family’s papers in Paris or Marseille. 
53 N. Arnoul, “Ordres qui seront observées a la conduite de la fortification de Pignerol par les Srs. 
Arnoul et du Cayron que le Roy a choisy pour la conduite des travaux des fortiffications de cette 
place,” BnF NAF 21307, fols. 106-107v (Apr. 12, 1667). 
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Colbert and Minister of War Louvois that they granted him two audiences with the 
king, the first an hour-long interview in Louis’s cabinet to discuss plans for a 
proposed fort (drawn up in relief by Pierre himself), and the second to present the 
king with a model of the Arsenal of Marseille “in the presence of the entire Court.”54  
Afterward Louis, Colbert, and other leading ministers all praised his maturity and 
intelligence.55  Pierre’s first foray into public life had been a failure, but in the 
presence of his patrons he was able to perform his budding expertise well enough to 
regain their confidence and “enter the world” as an intendant-in-waiting.56 
Pierre’s ascenscion rested in good part on his ability to distinguish himself as a 
hybrid administrator-craftsman who could satisfy in concrete ways the emulative 
                                                
54 Within three months of Pierre’s arrival at Pignerol, the site of these fortifications, the minister 
ordered Nicolas to visit the works in person to put them back on a stable footing.  Colbert to N. 
Arnoul, BnF NAF 21307, fols. 148-148v (Jul 4, 1667).  Colbert was unhappy with the plaintive 
appeals he received from Pierre, but softened his criticism to account for the boy’s youth: “Je vous 
avouë que j’ay esté surpris & un peu scandalisé de voir le billet (cy joinct) escrit de la main de vre filz 
et conçeu dans les termes qu’il est.  Tout ce que l’on peut alleguer pour l’en excuser en quelque façon 
est que c’est encore un jeune garçon, Mais a la verité ce stile n’est pas propre pour une personne qui 
doit avoir l’Inspection et la conduite sur plusieurs autres.”  Colbert to N. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21307, 
fols. 157-157v (Sep. 21, 1667).  Pierre traveled to Court with orders to present sketches of the galleys, 
a model of the proposed Arsenal of Marseille, several interesting rocks and beads, and two “turcs 
levantin” destined to serve as models for the Academie Royale de Peinture; he was also ordered to give 
Colbert a full account of affairs under his father’s charge, including the works at Pignerol.  He was 
accompanied on his visit by the famous Genoese sculptor and architect, Pierre Puget, then serving as 
an advisor to Nicolas on the construction of the Marseille arsenal, who was far less warmly received by 
the minister.  Colbert to N. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21307, fol. 273v (Dec. 30, 1667); fol. 313v (Jan. 2, 
1668); fol. 364v (Feb. 17, 1668); Masson, Les galères de France, 177.  On the audiences Pierre 
received, see Autobiographical notes, BnF NAF 21416, fols. 23v-24 and “Memoire sur la vie et sur les 
services de M. Arnoul a present intendant des galeres et du commerce,” fols. 117-117v. 
55
 The king expressed “all the more satisfaction [with him] because he did not seem to be more than 17 
or 18 years old”; Colbert wrote Nicolas that Pierre “is well made...wise and moderate”; and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hugues de Lionne, judged him “very well made and sharp witted,” adding 
that he would be happy to render the boy some service in future.  Colbert to N. Arnoul, BnF NAF 
21307, fol. 370 (Feb. 23, 1668); Lionne to N. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21308, fol. 8 (Apr. 8, 1668). 
56 Mark Motley has defined “entering the world” as the moment when young nobles crossed the 
threshold from household care and instruction to maturity, formal service, and an individual identity at 
Court—a moment of passage often marked by a public test and triumph.  Motley, Becoming a French 
Aristocrat, 169-203. 
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impulse that underpinned French naval and commercial policy during these years.57  
Upon returning from Court in May 1668 he oversaw the construction of a galeasse 
and two galleys of his own design, honed his draftsmanship, negotiated the purchase 
of slaves at Livorno, and sailed the coast of Provence aboard the fleet.58  These feats 
prepared him, in the minds of Nicolas and Colbert, for intelligence-gathering 
missions to Italy, Holland, and England.59  Tours of Europe were common among 
sons of the high nobility, but Pierre’s travels were unique in that he received strict 
orders from Colbert to use his advanced training in navigation, fortifications, 
construction, machinery, and drafting to produce detailed memoranda about anything 
that might give France’s navy and galleys an edge over their competitors.60  In the 
                                                
57 As Sophus Reinert has noted, military and commercial policy were closely linked in Colbert’s mind, 
since he perceived finances to be the lifeblood of Louis’s war efforts.  His desire to mimic the best 
attributes of the Italian, Dutch, and English fleets reflected a broader pattern of competitive emulation 
that characterized the political economies of early modern European empires.  See Reinert, Translating 
Empire, esp. 17; Cole, Colbert and a Century, I: 450, II: 1-32. 
58
 Colbert to N. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21308, fol. 395v (Mar. 23, 1668); Colbert to N. Arnoul, fol. 86 
(May 18, 1668); N. Arnoul to Colbert, fol. 123v (Jul. 7, 1668); N. Arnoul to Colbert, fols. 464v-465 
(Mar. 19, 1669).  Pierre had already been tasked with drawing for his father, who claimed to have 
neither the patience nor the talent for it himself.  N. Arnoul to Colbert, BnF NAF 21308, fols. 464v-
465 (Mar. 19, 1669); N. Arnoul to Colbert, fol. 197v (Sep. 11, 1668). 
59 Details about Pierre’s voyages are scattered across the correspondence of his father and Colbert as 
well as Pierre’s autobiographical notes.  Some of the relevant sources are listed here: Colbert to N. 
Arnoul, BnF NAF 21309, fols. 31-32v, 34v (May 10, 1669); Colbert to N. Arnoul, fols. 62v-63 (May 
31, 1669); Colbert to N. Arnoul, fols. 122-122v (Jul. 12, 1669); N. Arnoul to Colbert, fols. 143-143v 
(Jul. 27, 1669); Colbert to N. Arnoul, fol. 156v (Aug. 9, 1669); Colbert to N. Arnoul, fol. 228v (Oct. 
11, 1669); Colbert to N. Arnoul, fol. 248v (Oct. 25, 1669); N. Arnoul to Colbert, fols. 289-290 (Nov. 
16, 1669); Colbert to N. Arnoul, fol. 306 (Nov. 29, 1669); Colbert to N. Arnoul (Aug. 16, 1669), 
reproduced in Clément, Lettres de Colbert, III1: 153; Colbert to N. Arnoul (Oct. 24, 1670), in Clément, 
Lettres de Colbert, III1: 302; Colbert to N. Arnoul (May 1, 1671), in Clément, Lettres de Colbert, III1: 
363; Autobiographical notes, BnF NAF 21416, fols. 24v-25v; “Memoire sur la vie et sur les services 
de M. Arnoul a present intendant des galeres et du commerce,” fol. 117v. 
60
 Although Pierre was accompanied by a draftsman and a carpenter, Colbert insisted that he make his 
own observations: “Prenez bien garde, pendant le séjour que vous faites à présent en Hollande, 
d’observer avec grand soin tous les ouvrages qui se font en ce pays-là pour l’avantage et la facilité de 
leur navigation, de prendre des dessins de toutes les machines dont ils se servent pour vider leurs ports, 
pour la construction de leurs vaisseaux et généralement pour tout ce qui nous peut estre utile aux 
travaux que nous entreprenons.  Surtout ne vous contentez pas de la superficie comme la plupart des 
jeunes gens; mais approfondissez les matières et faites un journal exact de tout ce que vous verrez un 
peu extraordinaire jour par jour.”  Colbert to P. Arnoul (Oct. 24, 1670), excerpted in Clément, Lettres 
de Colbert, III1: 302n2.  The carpenter was imprisoned in Venice on suspicion of espionage.  Colbert 
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event, each of his reports was more exhaustive and incisive than the last.61  At 
Pierre’s urging, Colbert ordered that the Italian method of choosing, preserving, and 
drying wood be adopted immediately; several years later, Pierre would draw on his 
experience in Holland to import a labor-saving device, the sawmill, to France.62  His 
recommendations reflected an increasing ability to see the work of shipbuilding from 
a carpenter’s perspective.63  Reportedly, Colbert was so pleased with Pierre’s 
memoranda that he “made it a pleasure and a study to have each chapter produced by 
[Pierre] read to him the same day it was written, during the evening time when he 
relaxed with his children.”  He also made them required reading for Seignelay before 
the Marquis’s own journeys abroad, then filed them away in his personal library.  The 
                                                                                                                                      
to N. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21309, fol. 131v (Jul. 19, 1669); N. Arnoul to Colbert, fols. 143-143v (Jul. 27, 
1669); “Memoire sur la vie et sur les services de M. Arnoul a present intendant des galeres et du 
commerce,” BnF NAF 21416, fol. 117v.  Nicolas again offered instructions and advice, this time 
drawing on his diplomatic background to educate his son about the identities of England’s most 
important royal and naval officers, the structure of its nobility, and the necessity of holding his tongue 
when the English styled their king “Roy de France.”  “Memoire pour servir d’instruction a mon fils 
alant en angleterre et holande, et ce outre les memoires cy apres concernant les vaisseaux remarquera 
en holande principalement,” BnF NAF 21399, fols. 252-257 (ca. 1671).  On the European travels of 
young court nobles of the period, see Motley, Becoming a French Aristocrat, 187-192; F. Du Soucy, 
L’Art de voyager utilement où l’on apprend à bien servir son prince, sa patrie, et soy mesme (Paris: 
1650); Pierre Clément, ed., L’Italie en 1671. Relation d’un voyage du marquis de Seignelay (Paris, 
1867). 
61
 These mémoires on the arsenal at Venice, the Dutch fleet, and the English navy are in BnF NAF 
21399, fols. 115-138v (Venice), 186-204v (Dutch), 258-279 (English).   
62 Colbert to P. Arnoul (Oct. 24, 1670), reproduced in Clément, Lettres de Colbert, III1: 302. 
63
 For example, after describing the phases of naval construction practiced by Dutch builders, which 
allowed them to examine and re-size timbers throughout the building process by eyeballing the 
contours of the hull, he wrote: “What I find most advantageous in this method is that [the carpenters] 
have the leisure to consider the curve of their ship and to adjust it up to the point where they no longer 
find fault with it, instead of having the timbers [varangues] posed so that a carpenter—who could only 
examine his work once this was done—cannot recognize its faults until there is no longer time to fix 
them.  This leads me to conclude that [the Dutch] method, on this point, is the easiest and most sure, 
even though it seems that the rules followed by most of our master carpenters for the cutting of their 
timbers is more certain than a [carpenter’s] eye that relies only on the practice and experience that he 
has acquired.”  This method, he argued, allowed the ship’s sides to be joined more securely, and gave 
carpenters the freedom to examine the hull from inside and out.  Mémoire concerning the Dutch fleet, 
BnF NAF 21399, fols. 186-204v; also in BnF Cinq Cents de Colbert 201, fols. 9-10, quoted in Dessert, 
La Royale, 125-126. 
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following year, he rewarded Pierre with a commission as controller-general on 
campaign with the fleet at Rochefort.64 
Pierre’s reports reached Colbert with particular force because they advanced 
two of the minister’s larger aims: to standardize the tools of French economic life, 
and to build a library of all knowledge useful to the state.65  In the mid-1670s, Colbert 
revealed the extent of his ambitions for Pierre’s expertise when he asked him to help 
develop “a theory on the subject of ship construction,” including the precise 
proportions of a “perfect” ship and the pieces that composed it, so that in future the 
king’s fleets could be built according to proven standards of measurement and 
method—to ensure, as he put it to another official, that “that which has until now 
depended upon the fancy [fantaisie] of carpenters is founded upon certain and 
invariable rules.”66  The minister believed that warships, like tolls or laws or weights 
and measures, could be regularized in order to make the outcomes of royal policy 
more efficient and predictable.67  He ordered Arnoul to choose the best vessels of 
each rank at Toulon, oversee the technical drafting of their profiles and designs, 
confirm the accuracy of these drawings by examining the ships himself, and then 
                                                
64
 “[Colbert] se faisoit un plaisir et une estude de se faire lire chaque jour ce que m. arnoul avoit fait 
cette mesme journée dans le temps que se delassoit le soir avec m. ses enfans.”  Autobiographical 
notes, BnF NAF 21416, fol. 25.  On Pierre’s appointment as commissaire-général, see fols. 25v-27.  
By this time, Colbert’s library was already well on its way to becoming “a documentary collection 
based on the interests of administering the state.”  Soll, Information Master, 95.   
65 On the minister’s efforts to impose standards of quality on French economic life, see Eli F. 
Heckscher, Mercantilism, 2 vols. (1931; repr. New York, 1955), I: 102-106, 110-127, 157-184; Cole, 
Colbert and a Century, II: 363-457.  On his data bank, see Soll, Information Master; Soll, “From Note-
Taking to Data Banks: Personal and Institutional Information Management in Early Modern Europe,” 
Intellectual History Review 20, no. 3 (2010): 373. 
66 Colbert to Desclouzeaux, AN Marine B2 38, fol. 462 (Nov. 19, 1678), quoted in Dessert, La Royale, 
149. 
67 On Colbert’s campaign to standardize tolls, laws, industrial production, weights and measures, and 
other spheres of domestic life, see Cole, Colbert and a Century, II: 132-548; Heckscher, Mercantilism, 
102-106, 110-127, 157-184.  One of the chief successes of this campaign was the unification of 
weights and measures between the various naval arsenals and Paris, suggesting that in this area, too, 
the ports were a key site of monarchical centralization. 
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assemble a group of three or four artisans and naval officers to deliberate over what 
should be included among “the [just] measures and proportions necessary to perfect 
constructions.”68  The minister sent similar requests to all the ports, but Pierre’s 
memorandum detailing his meeting with Toulon’s master carpenters and Admiral 
Abraham Duquesne drew special praise from Colbert and revealed a deeper 
involvement in the deliberations than did the reports of his Ponant counterparts.69  His 
firsthand experience with naval carpentry thus positioned him to serve as a rare 
conduit between the practical know-how of naval craftsmen and Colbert’s library, 
allowing the minister to exert greater control over the construction of royal ships even 
if he could not always prevail over the “fancy” of carpenters.70 
Pierre’s learning, then, advanced Colbert’s ambitions for the service.  The 
minister had been trying unsuccessfully for years to match the speed of shipbuilding 
in Venice, where galleys were routinely assembled in less than a day, and in England 
and Holland, where ships of the line were constructed in three or four months 
(compared to France’s sluggish twelve to eighteen).71  He also had been working 
                                                
68 Colbert had long resolved to pursue such a theory, but had been forced to wait until “many years of 
experience” had accumulated before launching the endeavor.  Colbert to P. Arnoul (Sep. 12, 1678), 
reproduced in Clément, Lettres, III1: 125-126.   
69 Duquesne was considered an authority in naval constructions in his own right, and both Pierre and 
Colbert tended to defer to his judgment, believing that those who actually navigated vessels were more 
reliable witnesses to their quality than those who built them.  Colbert did not trust that any one 
individual had complete knowledge of shipbuilding, however, which explains why he wanted 
intendants, carpenters, and naval officers to work together toward this “theory.”  Some of his most 
trusted advisors on the policy of naval construction were the Arnoul, Seignelay, Duquesne, Intendant 
of Rochefort Colbert de Terron, Intendant of Brest Jean-Baptiste Chertemps de Seuil, and Admiral 
Anne Hilarion de Costentin de Tourville.  Mémain, La marine de guerre, 697-707; Dessert, La Royale, 
139-157.  Saint-Simon later wrote of Tourville, “[he] had a perfect grasp of all aspects of the navy, 
from that of the carpenter to that of an excellent admiral.”  Louis de Rouvroy, duc de Saint-Simon, 
Memoires de Saint-Simon, ed. Arthur-Michel de Boislisle, 22 vols. (Paris, 1873-1886), III: 18. 
70 Dessert, La Royale, 149-150. 
71 Colbert ordered Toulon, Brest, and Rochefort to experiment with pre-fabricated materials in order to 
increase the efficiency of naval construction.  Both Ponant ports fell short of Toulon’s standard, 
requiring twelve to fifteen hours to build a ship of similar proportions.  Pierre was able to repeat his 
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doggedly to extract the arcane secrets of naval construction from a renowned 
Marseillais family of constructeurs, the Chabert, who refused even to give lessons in 
carpentry for fear of losing their trade.72  For the minister, Pierre’s triumph likely 
represented not only the promise of increased efficiency, but also an important 
victory against the sort of self-interested concealment of knowledge that perpetually 
limited the king’s sphere of action.  Pierre himself certainly believed that shipbuilding 
was crucial to his standing as a client.  When he returned to service following a brief 
disgrace in 1679—Colbert had blamed the loss of two ships in a storm on rushed 
repairs under Pierre’s supervision—he thanked Seignelay for arranging his 
reappointment, promising above all to take further lessons in construction.73  The 
selection and “method of assembling” pieces of wood into ships had by then become 
a defining feature of his administrative reputation.  
Pierre demonstrated his value to Colbert and the king not only by achieving 
feats of construction and administration on the ground, but also by translating his 
experience into regulations that standardized the process of shipbuilding more 
generally.  As early as 1671, due in large part to Pierre’s own recommendations, the 
crown decreed the establishment of naval construction councils, or conseils de 
construction.  Composed of carpenters, naval officers, and intendants at each of the 
ports, the councils met regularly to approve and supervise the work of construction 
and repair.  Louis’s decree explained that “experience makes us recognize every day 
the flaws we encounter in our navigation and the means to improve them,” and he 
                                                                                                                                      
achievement in Seignelay’s presence when the marquis visited Toulon several months later.  Dessert, 
La Royale, 146-158. 
72 Bamford, Fighting Ships and Prisons, 74-76; Cole, Colbert and a Century, I: 454. 
73
 P. Arnoul to Seignelay, BnF NAF 21328, fols. 82-82v (Mar. 10, 1681). 
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created the councils in order to ensure that French ships were built longer and 
smaller, with flat-timber bottoms, a lower gun deck, and reduced height between the 
bridges, among other innovations meant to mimic the strengths of English and Dutch 
vessels.74  The inclusion of a variety of officers and artisans with different 
relationships to the building process—carpenters who designed and assembled the 
ships, intendants who conducted the labor and resources, and admirals who 
commanded and inhabited the final product—was intended as a sort of quality control 
that would prevent abuses and harness the collective wisdom of the king’s gens de 
mer.  In 1673, again at Pierre’s urging, Louis ordered the councils to build vessels of 
each rate according to specified, uniform dimensions.75 
In all of these ways, Pierre’s apprenticeship both reflected and helped establish 
a new administrative setting in which specialized knowledge of maritime affairs was 
a prerequisite for appointment.  In a joint effort that united familial self-interest with 
the crown’s maritime ambitions, Nicolas and Colbert sought to make of him a “bon 
marin sur terre”—a landed seaman whose mastery of naval skills would be matched 
only by his command of paperwork.76  Pierre’s training therefore anticipated the 
instruction of Seignelay, which likewise drew upon a complex array of intellectual 
sources—the humanist tradition, Jesuit pedagogy, administrative usages, the law, and 
the commercial world of bookkeeping and travelogues—all of which privileged lucid 
prose, detailed and organized reporting, and massive amounts of red tape.77  His 
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 See Ordinance of Mar. 12, 1671 and AN Marine B2 13, fols. 51-54, discussed in Dessert, La Royale, 
142-143. 
75 Alexandre Lambert de Sainte-Croix, Essai sur l’administration de la marine de France, 1689-1792 
(Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1892), 79-80. 
76 N. Arnoul to Colbert, BnF NAF 21308, fols. 464v-465 (Mar. 19, 1669). 
77 Soll, Information Master, 86-88. 
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apprenticheship conditioned him to the specific routines and demands of his father’s 
work: in his speech, his writing, and his habits, Pierre learned to embody the image of 
an able administrator and a consummate expert in all aspects of maritime service, one 
whose presence in the ports could bring France’s fleets under greater royal control.  
Maintaining that image would assure his position as a leading voice in the articulation 
of French naval, commercial, and diplomatic policy for a further five decades. 
 
The Strategy Stymied: Pierre and Nicolas-François at Toulon and Rochefort 
 
On its own, Pierre’s training seems to represent a successful union of family 
strategy, specialized knowledge, and state power.  Yet the experience of Pierre’s 
youngest brother, Nicolas-François, reveals how highly personalized and conditional 
that union was.  Despite the mentorship and protection of his powerful brother, 
Nicolas-François was unable to inherit Pierre’s technical expertise, and instead of 
following in his footsteps he seemed, for the two decades preceding his own 
appointment as intendant of Martinique, to toil in Pierre’s shadow.  Several other 
factors may explain his deferred advancement: fraternal negligence, a failure of 
patronage, the deaths of Nicolas and Colbert, incompetence, a reputation for 
debauchery, newly-fixed standards of promotion, or social bias against cadet brothers, 
to name a few.  Whatever the case, knowledge passed down and built upon de père en 
fils did not translate de frère en frère.  At a time when state knowledge still resided in 
the minds or personal papers of individual servants rather than in centralized archives, 
Nicolas-François’s failure to reproduce his brother’s knowledge represented a 
breakdown in what had previously been a successful transmission of learning from 
one administrator to the next.  This sort of “breakdown” is rarely accounted for in 
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works that define state knowledge only as the disembodied content of written sources, 
yet in the case of Nicolas-François, it reduced in concrete ways a productive union of 
expertise and monarchical ambition to a dull marriage of passable service and delayed 
rewards.78 
At the time of Nicolas’ death, Nicolas-François appeared destined for a career 
as a soldier of God.  In 1668 his parents had placed him with the military Order of 
Saint Sépulchre at just five years old, with the understanding that until he could begin 
his noviciate and take his vows his education would be in the hands of the hospitallers 
of Saint John at Marseille.79  Had he remained in the Order he likely would have 
become a galley captain, but plans for him changed when his father died and the 
children’s inheritance was thrown into doubt, and at age ten he was placed by Pierre 
on a ship bound for war against the Dutch.80  The following year he began studies at 
the collège de Clermont under the care of a précepteur.81  At some point Pierre 
decided that his youngest brother “appeared more suited to the pen [than the sword]” 
and “pushed him in that direction.”82  In 1679 Pierre wrote Seignelay that he was 
training his brother for service.83  Over the next decade Nicolas-François would rotate 
between Toulon, Paris, Brest, Havre, and Rochefort, learning the practice of 
                                                
78 On the failure of current models of the knowledge-state equation to account for “breakdown,” see 
Cheney and Charles, “The Colonial Machine Dismantled.” 
79 Nicolas-François’s young age required his parents to obtain a special dispensation from the master 
of the Order.  “Décision de Nicolas Cotoner, maître de l’hospital de Saint Jean de Jérusalem,” BnF 
NAF 21416, fols. 231-232v (Jan. 19, 1668).  A later letter between the two brothers suggests that 
Nicolas-François indeed spent much of his early youth at the hospital.  Vaucresson to P. Arnoul, BnF 
NAF 21430, fol. 295v (Feb. 17, 1715). 
80 Vaucresson to P. Arnoul, 17 February 1715, NAF 21430, fol. 292. 
81
 Compte de dépenses de M. de Vaucresson, 1676, Archives Départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône 
[hereafter ADBR], 5E 23.   
82 Autobiographical notes, BnF NAF 21416, fol. 80. 
83 P. Arnoul to Seignelay, BnF NAF 21327, fols. 211v-212 (Aug. 15, 1679).  Nicolas-François later 
pointed to this year as the beginning of his career in service.  Vaucresson to Pontchartrain, Archives 
nationales d’Outre-Mer (hereafter ANOM), C8A 16, fol. 390 (Aug. 22, 1708). 
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administration under his brother while taking lessons in arms, dance, writing, Latin, 
and arithmetic in his spare time.84 
The evidence of Nicolas-François’s early schooling is patchy, but there was 
more to his education than formal instruction and on-the-job training: the household 
environment in which he was raised, too, likely shaped him as a person and an 
administrator.  The two intendant’s residences where the Arnoul lived during his 
childhood served both as the administrative hearts of Toulon and Marseille and as 
training centers for future officers of the Marine.  From their second-story rooms at 
the Maison du Roi of Marseille, members of the family could observe all of the 
workshops and construction sites within the arsenal.85  Two cousins, barely older than 
Nicolas-François, lived with the Arnoul and took writing lessons before receiving 
commissions under Nicolas and Pierre; a third Arnoul brother, Raoul, was put to 
work by Pierre arming ships and learning hydrography and cannonry from local 
experts before entering the naval officer corps.86  In addition to witnessing up close 
the business of the intendancy and the training of his closest kin, Nicolas-François 
was exposed to the array of classical, Christian, royal, and maritime imagery that 
decorated his family’s home.  This included a dozen naval maps; portraits of Louis, 
                                                
84 Compte de dépenses de M. de Vaucresson, 1679, BnF NAF 21416, fol. 408; Bill for items provided 
by Du Cunoy to Mr. de Vaucresson for writing lessons, fols. 421-421v (Jun. 30, 1682); Bill for writing 
lessons and materials given by M. de Biere to M. de Vaucresson, BnF NAF 21417, fol. 11 (Oct. 6, 
1685); Bill for Latin and dance lessons, fol. 12 (Oct. 6, 1685).  All bills were signed by Nicolas-
François himself and paid through Pierre’s agent in Paris.  These payments are listed elsewhere among 
Pierre’s personal expenses for the years 1679, 1682, and 1685.  “Estat de la recepte et despence faite 
pour Monsieur Arnoul,” BnF NAF 21403, fols. 41, 43-44 (1679), 115 (1682), 291-291v (1685).  See 
also the accounts for these years and those of 1676, 1684 contained in ADBR, 5E 23-24. 
85 Masson, Les galères de France, 181.   
86 P. Arnoul to Seignelay, BnF NAF 21327, fols. 211v-212 (Aug. 15, 1679).  These lessons in 
cannonry and hydrography were first established by Nicolas.  On the writing lessons and appointments 
of the Croiset, cousins of the Arnoul, see “Recette et Depence que j’ay fait pour Monsieur l’Intendant,” 
BnF NAF 21416, fols. 239-252 (May 1, 1674); “Liste generale des off. de finances et de plumes de la 
Marine, des Galeres, et des Colonies, et autres entretenus,” AN Marine C2 55, fol. 95v. 
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Colbert, Seignelay, Louvois, Oppède, and Louis’s late Superintendant of Navigations, 
Cesar de Vendôme; as well as paintings of the burning of Rome, the miracles of Saint 
Mark, and the sale of Joseph by his brothers.87  At Toulon the Arnoul coat of arms 
was etched into the four corners of the magasin général.88  To what extent these 
images served a didactic purpose or moulded the values of Nicolas-François is 
impossible to say, but neither he nor Pierre—nor any of their visitors—could have 
remained long in these surroundings without knowing what their family’s faith was, 
who their patrons were, and how important royal service and the sea were to their 
family’s present and future prospects.89 
During and after the years of Nicolas-François’s apprenticeship, the brothers’ 
residences reflected a deepening identification with maritime life and intellectual 
pursuits.  Their shared home at Rochefort displayed paintings of a galeasse, a 
tempest, and the beginnings of the arsenal of Marseille, and they kept collections of 
seashells and Dutch medals.  They also owned a pair of spyglasses, a barometer, a 
thermometer, architectural instruments and books, and guides to navigation and 
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 Where and how the family displayed these images is unknown, but most of them were framed at the 
time of Nicolas’s death.  “Memoire des meubles qui ont estes Embarquis sur la Barque du patron 
Jacques decagis de la Ciontat, le 9e fev 1675,” BnF NAF 21416, fols. 288-291v; “Estat des meubles 
portez par l’inventaire faict apres le deces de Nicolas Arnoul lesquels n’ayant point alors esté estimez 
n’estant pas apparamment l’usage du pays ont a present esté mis a prix suivant ce qu’on eu connoist et 
sur l’avis d’un tapissier et Chaudronier conseillez a ce sujet,” fols. 305-307v (ca. 1686?). 
88 According to Nicolas’s biography, he was “so beloved” following his first stint at Toulon that 
“when he left this intendancy, the consuls en chaperon placed his arms at the four corners of the 
[magazine], which remained there always, even up to the time when the new arsenal was built.”  
Biography of Nicolas Arnoul, BnF NAF 21416, fol. 1v.  Among the family’s papers is a piece of 
masonry, presumably from this building, in which the Arnoul coat of arms has been carved.   
89
 The boys also would have come into contact with a stream of honored guests who joined the family 
at table.  The Arnouls’ expense accounts for 1674-1675 list galleys captains, commissioners, Venetian 
and Spanish ambassadors, the chevalier Le Febvre de La Barre (chef d’escadre, former governor of 
Cayenne, and future governor of Canada), and the chevalier de Valbelle (in whose fleet Nicolas-
François would serve that year) among those who dined at the intendant’s residence at Toulon.  
Comptes de dépenses tenus par Tournay, sécretaire de l’intendant des galères, ADBR, 5E 17. 
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hydrography.90  At Rochefort, Toulon, and Marseille, their assortment of patrons’ and 
allies’ likenesses grew to include portraits of Seignelay, Pontchartrain, and the 
military engineer Vauban; the Marshal of France and Caribbean naval specialist, Jean 
II d’Estrées; Intendant of the Galleys Jean-Baptiste-Nicolas de Brodart and the 
intendant of Marseille and Rochefort, Michel Bégon; as well as a medal depicting the 
Grand Admiral of France and governor of Brittany, Louis-Alexandre de Bourbon.91  
In addition to many religious tableaux, Pierre owned paintings of maritime scenery, a 
shipwreck, naval battles, the port and arsenal of Marseille, and two “philosophes,” 
together with maps of Naples, Rome, Genoa, London, Copenhagen, Messina, Nantes, 
La Rochelle, Marseille, Provence, England, Asia, and the Mediterranean, all of which 
eventually hung throughout his château at Rochegude.92  Nicolas-François, for his 
part, later acquired two tables whose gilded legs were carved to resemble African 
figures—a motif that may have been inspired by his years in Martinique—as well as 
seven maps of French provinces that he kept in his study.93  These practical and 
decorative objects suggest that the brothers’ patterns of consumption and display 
                                                
90 “Meubles qui doive. se trouver au Comtat de ceux sont venus de Rochefort,” BnF NAF 21417, fols. 
258-258v (Oct. 2, 1699).  On the purchase of the barometer, thermometer, architectural instruments, 
and books, see Comptes domestiques for 1676 and 1679, ADBR, 5E 23-24. 
91 “Estate de mes meubles venûes de Toulon qui doivent se trouver encore a Carpentras et a Baume,” 
NAF 21417, fols. 259-261 (Oct. 2, 1699).  Nicolas-François’s note on fol. 262v states that these 
possessions had been transported from Rochefort to Toulon before being moved to the family’s estates 
at Carpentras and Baume.  On Brodart as co-tuteur of Pierre’s surviving children, along with Nicolas-
François and others, see notarial record of guardianship in BnF NAF 21418, fols. 297-298. 
92 “Rôle des tableaux apartenants à la succession de feu Mr. arnoul, qui n’ont pas esté vendûs,” BnF 
NAF 21418, fols. 242-244 (Dec. 29, 1722); “Inventaire General des Meubles qui se sont trouvées dans 
le Chateau de Rochegude donts le sr. Anselme Ecclesiastique s’est chargé le dixieme octobre mil sept 
cent dix huit, et qu’il rend à mrs. Pierre Terrasse et Joseph Gaud, deputés et Commis par Monseigneur 
l’Intendant de vaucresson, le douze juin mil sept cens vingt deux,” BnF NAF 21418, fols. 225-241 
(Jul. 12, 1722). 
93 The tables were kept in his bedroom.  “Inventaire des meubles, Linge, argenterie, et autres Effets 
apartenant a M. de Vaucresson, Intendant general des galeres,” BnF NAF 21418, fols. 251-259v (Aug. 
14, 1725). 
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were bound up intimately with royal patronage, the cultivation of knowledge, and the 
naval-colonial world in which they lived and worked. 
The family’s marriage alliances further cemented its place in that world.  
Shortly after Nicolas’s death, his widow remarried to Horace-Joseph de Rus, seigneur 
de Raffelis, the elder son of a ship’s captain from Carpentras.  Pierre’s youngest 
sister, Geneviéve, was promised to Horace-Joseph’s younger brother, Pierre-
Dominique, a captain of the galleys.  And Pierre himself married the two brothers’ 
widowed mother.94  These alliances did not necessarily reflect a conscious strategy to 
marry into the world of naval officerdom—Pierre later claimed to have been 
“bewitched” by Madame de Rus when he consented to them—but that was their 
effect: the children and grandchildren of Pierre-Dominique and Geneviéve would 
include five officers of the navy and galleys, and Pierre would remarry to Brodart’s 
daughter.95  Nicolas had removed his family from its base in Picardy and Paris (where 
the Arnoul nonetheless maintained a home and the nearby seigneuries of Nicolas-
                                                
94
 The royal genealogist who recorded these marriages in the Arnoul family history marveled that “par 
l’arrangement singulier de cette femme ingénieuse [Madame de Rus], Pierre Arnoul devint tout à la 
fois beau-père de ses deux fils, beau-fils de l’aîné et beau-frère du puiné, tandis qu’elle devint elle-
même belle fille de son fils aîné et belle-soeur de son fils puiné, le fils aîné beau père de sa mère et de 
son beau-père, le fils puiné beau-frère de sa mère, beau-fils de son frère et gendre de sa belle-soeur, 
etc. ; et tout [231] cela sans dispense et sans inceste.”  BnF Cabinet des titres, dossier bleu 744: 
Arnoul, quoted in Saint-Simon, Memoires, VI: 230n1.  See also Jean-Antoine Pithon-Curt, Histoire de 
la noblesse du Comté-Venaissin, d’Avignon et de la principauté d’Orange (1750; Paris, 1970 repr.), 
IV: 566-573. 
95
 Madame de Rus was Françoise de Soissans de la Bédosse, a friend of the royal mistress, Madame de 
Maintenon.  According to Pierre and several contemporaries, Rus manipulated the family’s grief and 
Pierre’s distraction to contract the triple marriage and thereby seize the Arnoul fortune.  
Autobiographical notes, BnF NAF 21416, fols. 27-80; “Memoire pour la justification du sr. Arnoul sur 
ce qui peut avoir causé sa disgrace outre la perte des travaux,” NAF 21416, fols. 396-399v (1679 or 
1680); Anne-Marguerite Du Noyer, Mémoires et lettres galantes de Madame du Noyer (1663-1720) 
(Paris, 1910), 134-139; Saint-Simon, Memoires, VI: 222-231.  Pierre’s 1704 marriage contract with 
Henriette de Brodart testified to the riches accumulated by the Arnoul in the four decades following 
Nicolas’s appointment to Marseille.  Brodart provided a dowry of 287,000 pounds, while Pierre made 
her a gift of diamond earrings, a diamond and peridot carquan, a diamond buckle, two toilettes (one of 
velour, the other for silverware), pieces of gold-braided fabric, a fur stole, scarves, a repeater watch, 
and more, at values ranging from upwards of 500 to nearly 25,000 pounds.  Masson, Les galères de 
France, 368. 
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François and La Tour Ronde), but within a generation his children managed to 
entrench themselves within the pen and sword nobilities of Provence and the Comté-
Venaissin.  Rooting themselves along the Mediterranean ensured the Arnouls’ long-
term stake in an ongoing effort to integrate one of France’s fiscal-military 
“frontiers.”96 
For Nicolas-François, the family’s deepening identification with maritime 
service did not lead him to develop a unique persona or fund of knowledge 
independent of Pierre.  The uncertainty of Pierre’s temporary disgrace in 1679 may 
have distracted both of them from his apprenticeship.97  Nicolas-François did attend 
collège during this time, but he was still learning Latin, writing, and arithmetic when 
he received his first appointment as commissioner in 1681.  Despite Pierre’s later 
claims that he had “hired all sorts of masters and forgotten nothing that could have 
contibuted to [his brothers’] education,” there is no evidence that Pierre paid for 
Nicolas-François to receive the same expert tutoring in mathematics or fortifications 
that Nicolas had provided for him, nor that he sent him into the shipyards for months 
of study with master craftsmen.98  Nor is there any sign that Nicolas-François sought 
                                                
96 Blaufarb, “Survival of the Pays d’États.” 
97 Seignelay to P. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21326, fols. 96-96v (Feb. 3, 1679); Seignelay to P. Arnoul, fol. 
296v (Mar. 18, 1679); Seignelay to P. Arnoul, fols. 341-343 (Apr. 3, 1679); Seignelay to P. Arnoul, 
fols. 410-410v (Apr. 15, 1679); Colbert to P. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21327, fol. 241 (Sep. 6, 1679).  
Ironically, Pierre’s devotion to paperwork counted against him in the months preceding his disgrace: 
Colbert excoriated his tendency to lock himself up in his study writing useless mémoires instead of 
performing his duties in the arsenal.  Colbert to P. Arnoul (Nov. 8, 1679), excerpted in Clément, 
Lettres de Colbert, III2: 170-171. 
98 Nicolas-François’s study of Latin and writing continued for at least another three years. 
Autobiographical notes, BnF NAF 21416, fol. 87.  Later in life Nicolas-François would reproach Pierre 
for giving him a second-rate education.  Vaucresson to P. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21430, fol. 292 (Feb. 17, 
1715). 
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to emulate his brother in any respect but his wealth.99  As a result, Nicolas-François 
began his career with very little training, no technical knowledge, and none of the 
reputation with his patrons that Pierre had enjoyed at the same age. 
The unexpected change of scenery from Provence to the Ponant nonetheless 
reoriented Nicolas-François’s career toward the Atlantic.100  In 1682 he received 
appointments as commissioner at Brest and at Havre before joining Pierre at 
Rochefort three years later.101  As a commissaire, Nicolas-François’s duties required 
him to supervise on his brother’s behalf a range of business including mustering, 
magazines, artillery, and shipbuilding and repairs.102  To what extent he applied 
himself to his work is unclear—there were rumors that he was a pleasure-seeker—but 
Pierre would contend later that his own encouragement, combined with his brother’s 
                                                
99 During Nicolas-François’s tenure at Martinique, the brothers quarreled to the point of estrangement 
over Pierre’s alleged mismanagement of their inheritance.  Nicolas-François accused him of having 
given his siblings only miserly stipends during their youths, while Pierre insisted that he had been 
generous even in the leanest of times.  Eventually they reached a settlement and reconciled with the 
help of an arbiter.  Vaucresson to P. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21430, fols. 291-297 (Feb. 17, 1715), 299-301v 
(Mar. 14, 1715).  Some of Pierre’s autobiographical notes appear to have been written during this time, 
since he stresses repeatedly and perhaps defensively the good he had done for his siblings “from their 
earliest years.” Autobiographical notes, BnF NAF 21416, esp. fols. 79-90; also see the letters laying 
out his side of the dispute with Nicolas-François and their sisters, fols. 91-104.  Nicolas-François had 
reason to be jealous of Pierre’s wealth, which in these years included a yearly salary of around 14,000 
livres, a 6,000-livre annual pension as inspector of commerce, Henriette de Brodart’s dowry of 
287,000 livres, several fiefs, the revenues of le Marquisat, much valuable silver and plate, and a small 
army of servants that included a factotum (at 800 livres per year), a maître d’hôtel (400), a head cook 
(300), numerous cooks and cook’s assistants (100-150), two coachmen (154 each), a gamekeeper 
(120), and several lackeys (100 each).  Masson, Les galères de France, 368-369; the family accounts 
and inventories after death cited above also attest to Pierre’s wealth. 
100
 This was equally true for Raoul, who received an appointment aboard the king’s ships as an ensign 
in 1681.  Raoul, also known as Naugeville, makes no further appearances in the archives except for a 
passing reference to his untimely death in Pierre’s notes.  P. Arnoul to Seignelay, 23 January 1681, 
BnF NAF 21328, fols. 23v (Jan. 23, 1681), 46v (Feb. 15, 1681); Autobiographical notes, BnF NAF 
21416, fol. 79v. 
101 Nicolas-François likely served as an uncommissioned scribe.  No official evidence of his service 
on this campaign survives, but Pierre’s expenses for December 1679 included 110 pounds “pour 
[Nicolas-François’s] necessitez de la camp’e sur le parfait.”  “Estat de la recepte et despence faite pour 
Monsieur Arnoul,” BnF NAF 21403, fol. 45 (Dec. 1679).  For Nicolas-François’s commissioned 
appointments, see “Liste generale des off. de finances et de plumes de la Marine, des Galeres, et des 
Colonies, et autres entretenus,” AN Marine C2 55, fol. 11. 
102 Claude Aboucaya, Les intendants de la marine, 39-40; Mémain, La marine de guerre, 466-469;  
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“probity” and “constant attention to his duties,” gave Nicolas-François a firm enough 
grounding in the service that he was able to earn posts “as great as his own.”103   
The details of Nicolas-François’s apprenticeship to his brother at Rochefort are 
obscure largely because Pierre was not nearly as enthusiastic an advocate as their 
father had been for him.  Pierre consistently passed up chances to nominate Nicolas-
François for advancement or for special missions that might have let him prove 
himself to the minister, and he never left his brother in charge when he was away, as 
Nicolas had done for him at a much younger age, perhaps because Nicolas-François 
indeed loved his pleasures excessively.104  In 1684 the brothers did travel together to 
Amsterdam to purchase ships and gunpowder on Seignelay’s orders, but the fate of 
their mission is unknown, and in any case it produced no further opportunities of its 
kind for Nicolas-François.105   
                                                
103
 Autobiographical notes, BnF NAF 21416, fol. 87.  When lower positions in the Marine became 
venal, Pierre helped Nicolas-François purchase the office of commissaire—a position he had already 
held for two decades—as a necessary prerequisite for his appointment as intendant of Martinique.  
“Déclaration de Panon, Chancelier du Consulat de la nation française à Cadis,” BnF NAF 21417, fols. 
171-172 (Apr. 24, 1703).  On Nicolas-François’s pleasure-seeking, see Sara Chapman, Private 
Ambition and Political Alliances: The Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain Family and Louis XIV’s 
Government, 1650-1715 (Rochester, NY, 2004), 126. 
104 It was in Pierre’s interest to recommend only capable candidates for promotion, and if Nicolas-
François was indeed a poor worker, he may have been a risky appointment; or Pierre, already assured 
of his brother’s loyalty, may have been focused on building an extra-familial network of clients in the 
port.  Whatever the case he reserved all of his praise for his senior commissaire, Mauclerc, and another 
commissioner, Du Guay, whom he cited respectively as “le plus capable” and “le plus intelligent” 
among his staff.  In 1687 it was Mauclerc whom he proposed over Du Guay for the vacant position of 
commissioner-general, without any mention of Nicolas-François.  P. Arnoul to Seignelay, BnF NAF 
21332, fol. 120v (Sep. 21, 1685); P. Arnoul to Seignelay, BnF NAF 21334, fol. 92v (May 6, 1687); P. 
Arnoul to Seignelay, fol. 105 (May 15, 1687). 
105 The orders were sent directly to Nicolas-François, and they presumed that he would know how to 
assess the quality of the ships’ construction and to outfit them for a journey from Holland to Provence 
at minimal expense.  Nicolas-François had probably been recommended for this mission by Pierre, but 
Seignelay clearly had little idea of who he was, expressing confusion about whether he should call him 
Arnoul or Vaucresson.  Seignelay to P. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21330, fol. 6 (Jan. 11, 1684); Seignelay to P. 
Arnoul, fol. 24 (Feb. 6, 1684); Seignelay to Vaucresson, fol. 35 (Feb. 28, 1684); “Estat de la recepte et 
despence faite pour Monsieur Arnoul,” Jul. 1682-Jun. 1684, BnF NAF 21403, fol. 234.  Pierre made 
no further requests on his brother’s behalf during their time at Rochefort, except to have Nicolas-
François’s salary raised to equal that of his fellow commissioners and to beg Seignelay’s indulgence 
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Despite failing to distinguish himself in these years, Nicolas-François’s time in 
the Ponant eventually gave him enough experience to become a plausible candidate 
for promotion to an intendancy.  At Rochefort he worked directly under Pierre, who 
was responsible for provisioning the colonies, arranging transport for newly-
appointed intendants and governors, and maintaining correspondence with his 
counterparts in the New World.  If Nicolas-François ever became curious about the 
islands, he could have asked his brother to lend him a two-volume history of the 
Antilles that Pierre owned; if he wanted to learn about New France, he could have 
questioned his close friend and cousin, Croiset, at that time chief scribe at Rochefort, 
who sailed to Québec on campaign in 1687; and if he wished to follow the latest news 
of Europe and the New World, he could read the foreign gazettes to which his brother 
subscribed.106  Whether or not he took an interest is unknown, but between word-of-
mouth, the publications at hand, and the demands of his position, Nicolas-François 
had access to a steady stream of information about the fleets, commerce, and colonies 
of France and its rivals. 
Whereas Pierre’s appointment as intendant appears to have been in good part a 
consequence of his ability to master and apply useful knowledge, Nicolas-François’s 
                                                                                                                                      
when he fell sick with fever for over six months.  Despite Nicolas-François’s illness, Pierre wrote, 
somewhat ambiguously, that he “s’est toujours apliqué autant qu’il a pû.”  P. Arnoul to Seignelay, BnF 
NAF 21331, fol. 246v (Jun. 12, 1685).   
106
 This must have been the Histoire naturelle et morale des Îles Antilles de l’Amérique, published in 
1667 and attributed to Jean-Baptiste du Tertre.  Pierre’s expense accounts for Apr. 18, 1673 show the 
purchase of this and several other books, including a history of La Rochelle, Pascal’s Pensées, 
Richelieu’s La perfection du chrestien, Grenade’s four-volume Catechisme, and the New Testament in 
duodecimo.  “Despence faitte par boulliet a commencer du [blank] octobre apres avoir arresté les 
comptes du voiage d’Italie,” BnF NAF 21402, fol. 48v (Apr. 18, 1673).  Pierre’s expenses for 1683 
included 3 livres and 4 sous “pour les gazettes de bruxelles qui ont esté envoiées aud. sieur arnoul 
pendant lesd. mois.”  BnF NAF 21403, fol. 225v (May 1683).  On Croiset’s appointments and voyage 
to America, see “Liste generale des off. de finances et de plumes de la Marine, des Galeres, et des 
Colonies, et autres entretenus,” AN Marine C2 55, fol. 95v; Croiset to P. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21334, 
fols. 298-300 (Aug. 22, 1687). 
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seems to have resulted only from patronage, nepotism, and some amount of chance.  
It would take an additional eight years as commissaire at Brest, seven more as 
commissioner-general and controller at Marseille (a position Pierre obtained for him 
over two more senior candidates, including another Croiset cousin), and a fortunate 
meeting with Minister of Marine Louis de Pontchartrain’s hard-drinking son, Jérôme, 
to bring Nicolas-François his appointment as intendant at Martinique in 1704.107  
Neither Pierre, nor Jérôme, nor any of Nicolas-François’s contemporaries attributed 
this promotion to his superior administrative or intellectual qualities.  Pontchartrain 
described him only as “well established...loyal, wise, hardworking” and “the brother 
of M. Arnoul,” and Nicolas-François’s commission included nothing more than the 
usual bland formalities.108  Pierre credited his own influence.109  The coincidence that 
Pierre was empowered to act as the minister’s representative to the Royal Asiento 
                                                
107 Nicolas-François met Jerôme de Pontchartrain while serving at Brest in 1695.  Jerôme was then on 
a tour of the ports at his father’s behest, learning the ways of the navy and recruiting young clients 
among its commissioners and scribes.  He arrived at Brest drunk on brandy and bloodied from a fall, 
after which he and Nicolas-François became friendly.  Chapman, Private Ambition and Political 
Alliances, 126-127.   
108 After meeting Nicolas-François at Brest, Jerôme praised him to his father: “The sieur de 
Vaucresson has served in all the employs of the arsenal, and so is very well established.  He has always 
gone onto the ships when they have an army or strong squadron at the port.  He has proven to be loyal, 
wise, hardworking, and, because he is such an able worker, it is good to give him many duties.  He is 
the brother of M. Arnoul.  Some have accused him in the past of loving his pleasures, but at present, he 
has returned to fulfilling his duties with exactitude.”  Several months later Jerôme wrote Nicolas-
François to assure him of his protection.  Chapman, Private Ambition and Political Alliances, 126-127.  
For Nicolas-François’s commission as intendant of Martinique, see BnF NAF 21417, fol. 282 (Dec. 1, 
1704). 
109 “That the intendancy of America having been vacated, M. Arnoul did not cease to solicit 
Pontchartrain father and son until he had obtained it for [Nicolas-François]...although the services of 
M. de Vaucresson, his experience and his integrity could have earned it, it was no certainty that he 
would have obtained it—the ministers not lacking for creatures and men of worth to place—without 
the kindness they have always had for M. Arnoul.”  Pierre added, perhaps to reassure Nicolas-
François, who felt that his appointment to Martinique was a form of “exile,” that “an intendancy of 
America is worth more than one in France, because the provisions that must be sent there are worth 
double what they cost in France and moreover because there is the help of the negres which other 
intendants do not have...it is one of the rewards of this intendancy that some of those who have held it 
before him have gained 4 and 500 livres [annually?] from it.”  Autobiographical notes, BnF NAF 
21416, fol. 88; Vaucresson to P. Arnoul, BnF NAF 21430, fol. 301 (Mar. 14, 1715) 
 64 
Company at nearly the same time that Nicolas-François received his appointment to 
Martinique suggests that Jérôme may have been seeking to consolidate control over 
the slave trade by positioning loyal, cooperative clients at both ends.110  Nicolas-
François, for his part, insisted that his brother had neglected to push his candidacy 
strongly enough over the years, despite the clout he held with Seignelay and the 
Pontchartrain; it was his own “seniority...the number of my campaigns, and my 
application in the arsenals” alone that had secured his advancement.111 
Nicolas-François’s failure to transform himself into an administrator capable of 
wielding useful, specialized knowledge coincided with adverse changes within the 
Marine and the crafts that supported it.  It was still possible in these years for colonial 
and naval intendants on the make to distinguish themselves through individualized 
learning, as the careers of Antoine-Denis Raudot (versed in economics) and Michel 
Bégon de la Picardière (law) attest.112  But the structures of training and promotion 
within the navy had shifted unfavorably since the 1660s and 1670s.  On the military 
side, young officers were now required to pass through écoles de la marine that gave 
special instruction in navigation, hydrography, cannonry, fortifications, and 
                                                
110 “Arrest qui commet le Sr. Arnoul à la place du Sr. Deshaguais pour en l’absence et sous les ordres 
du Sr. de Pontchartrain remplir les mesmes fonctions qu’il feroit s’il estoit present aux Assemblées de 
la Compagnie de l’Assiente,” AN Marine C7, dossier Arnoul, fols. 10-10v (Aug. 19, 1704).  Six years 
later, when Vaucresson was still serving in Martinique, Pierre was granted inspection of the Royal 
Africa Company, which required him to familiarize himself with the details of the company’s trade and 
to report his findings to the minister.  “Arrest qui commet Mr. Arnoul pour avoir Inspection sur la 
Compagnie d’Affrique,” AN Marine C7, dossier Arnoul, fol. 12 (May 21, 1710). 
111 “Je conviens au reste que je dois avoir de la reconnoissance de çe que vous avéz fait pour mon 
avancem. mais est-ce à vous a mettre a un si haut prix vos bons offices à cet egard, et devriez vous par 
quelque fois songer que j’estois d’un nom a me pousser dans la marine, que j’ay esté mis tres jeune 
dans le service, que je n’ay esté avançé que suivant mon ancienneté, et que le nombre de mes 
Campagnes, et mon application dans les arsenaux pourroient méritoit de [possedé]?”  Vaucresson to P. 
Arnoul, BnF NAF 21430, fol. 293v (Feb. 17, 1715). 
112 See their respective biographies in Dubé, Les intendants de la Nouvelle-France; entries on “Michel 
Bégon de la Picardière” and “Antoine-Denis Raudot,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography online: 
www.biographi.ca.  
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carpentry.113  Officers of the pen had no schools of their own, but after 1689 they 
were expected, in principle, to ascend through fixed stages of advancement designed 
to impart the sort of “perfect familiarity with all aspects of the service” that Colbert 
had once demanded of Pierre.114  Household apprenticeships for administrators had 
become old-fashioned—Pontchartrain actively discouraged them—and in 1684 the 
crown had begun to recruit “young men from good families” who were willing to 
work their way up as scriveners and commissioners.115  Meanwhile, by the time of 
Nicolas-François’s appointment to Martinique, the navy was already experimenting 
with institutional means of co-opting or instructing its own ship designers, engineers, 
and constructeurs.  From the early decades of the eighteenth century onward, 
specialization within the service would increasingly divide administrators and 
technicians into separate spheres.116 
Ironically, the same institutional changes that may have delayed Nicolas-
François’s appointment were a product, in part, of his family’s numerous 
contributions to state knowledge about the Marine and galleys.  Nicolas and Pierre 
were trusted authorities whose recommendations helped forge over time a consensus 
about how to guarantee the bon fonctionnement of the fleets.  That consensus was 
codified in comprehensive regulations governing the administrative and technical 
aspects of the service, including promotion, known as Ordonnances de la Marine.  
Nicolas was one of a handful of authors credited by Colbert with the Ordonnance of 
                                                
113 Vergé-Franceschi, Marine et éducation sous l’Ancien Régime (Paris, 1991), 72-98, 175-193, 209-
217. 
114 Vergé-Franceschi, La Marine française, 203; Dessert, La Royale, 32. 
115 Gruder, Royal Provincial Intendants, 88; Mémain, La marine de guerre, 361. 
116 Taton, ed., Enseignment et diffusion, esp. Paul Gille, “Écoles de constructeurs de la Marine,” 477-
478.   
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1674; Pierre took a leading hand in drafting its more thoroughgoing successor fifteen 
years later.117  Successive ministers sent copies of these regulations to every port, 
where they were to be posted, enforced, and read (and re-read annually) in order to 
ensure that all personnel could benefit from the accumulated expertise of the navy’s 
leading lights.118  Nicolas-François, who owed his career to his family’s ability to 
remake the service in Colbert’s rationalizing image, may have experienced it as a 




Even at the apex of their careers, the Arnoul brothers sometimes struggled to 
make knowledge work for them, and by extension for the crown.  In Martinique, 
Nicolas-François suffered from the slowness and inconsistency of transatlantic 
communications, complained about the rats that chewed up his books, and proposed 
reforms to liberalize colonial commerce that fell on deaf ears despite being “well-
considered” and approved by “those who know this trade à fonds.”119  Pierre devised 
a system of apprenticeship for diplomats, based on personal experience and conceived 
                                                
117
 When Intendant of Rochefort Honoré Lucas de Demuin wished to make changes to the Ordinance 
of 1674, Colbert reminded him, “il faut qu’il (Demuin) considère que ces réglemens ayant été faits sur 
les advis et mémoires du sieur Colbert de Terron, du feu sieur Arnoul, du sieur de Seüil et de tous les 
plus habils et plus anciens officiers de Marine, il doit s’appliquer à les faire exécuter...,” quoted in 
Mémain, La marine de guerre, 276.  On Pierre and the Ordinance of 1689, see Dessert, La Royale, 30-
32. 
118 Demuin’s instructions, for example, urged him to do a thoughtful and extensive reading of all 
documents and regulations concerning the Marine, past and present, including all of his predecessor’s 
correspondence.  In his first months at Rochefort he produced mémoires based on these readings that 
demonstrated his grasp of their contents. Mémain, La marine de guerre, 271, 371, 422-423, appendix 
VI.  At the end of each year the intendants were supposed to review the previous ten years’ worth of 
regulations in order to refresh their memory of them.  Mémain, La marine de guerre, 369. 
119
 For his complaints about the rats, see Vaucresson to Pontchartrain, ANOM, Fonds ministériels, C8A 
20, fol. 103v (Oct. 26, 1714) and C8A 19, fol. 349 (May 20, 1713).  For Nicolas-François’s proposal to 
reform trade and the lack of response, see Vaucresson to Pontchartrain, C8B 2, fol. 92v (Jun. 1, 1708); 
Pontchartrain to Vaucresson, B 31, fols. 95-99v (Jul. 25, 1708).  On the slowness and uncertainty of 
transatlantic communications, see Kenneth Banks, Chasing Empire Across the Sea: Communications 
and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763 (Montréal and Kingston, 2003). 
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at a time of serious need, and received no formal response from his superiors.120  
Beyond what survived in the Ordonnances de la Marine, moreover, the brothers’ 
expertise seems to have been lost with their deaths.  Pierre used his influence to 
advance his nephews’ careers, but there is little evidence that he trained them, and his 
own sons appear not to have entered royal service; Nicolas-François died unmarried 
and childless.121  However much the Arnoul contributed to the long-term 
bureaucratization of France’s navy, galleys, and colonies, the knowledge they 
produced remained fundamentally tied to their bodies, their personal authorities, and 
the material and institutional conditions in which they worked. 
Despite these instances of breakdown, there were ways in which the Arnouls’ 
careers represented the successful union of knowledge and state power.  That union 
lasted because the Arnoul were willing to give Colbert what they thought he 
wanted—when he did not ask for it explicitly—in exchange for rewards that rescued 
the family from ruin and elevated it to a prominent place among Louis’s most favored 
servants.  Pierre owed his rapid ascent in large part, of course, to his father’s 
reputation and guidance, ministerial protection, and the timely expansion of Louis’s 
overseas ambitions, but his ability to master technical as well as administrative skills 
made him uniquely valuable in his own right.  In a kingdom where power devolved 
from the monarch and weakened at every remove from his person, Pierre, like his 
                                                
120 Arnoul’s proposal resembled Colbert de Torcy’s Académie politique, founded in 1712.  Guy 
Thuillier, “Aux origines de l’académie politique de Louis XIV: Le projet de Pierre Arnoul (1696 ?),” 
La revue administrative, 42e année, no. 247 (Jan.-Fev. 1989): 15-18. 
121 Pierre did, however, make provision in his will for his third son to receive 15,000 livres per year 
beyond his annual stipend of 12,000 livres as soon as he reached majority and “est en estat de tenir 
galere au service de la Religion de malthe.”  Draft of the last will of Pierre Arnoul, BnF NAF 21418, 
fol. 187v (ca. 1718).  Nicolas-François left his entire fortune to the Hôtel-Dieu of Marseille.  Masson, 
Les galères de France, 369. 
 68 
contemporary and sometime collaborator Vauban, was one of the rare royal servants 
capable of strengthening the state at its borders (and even beyond).  Also like Vauban, 
he did so by placing artisanal know-how under crown control for the first time.  
Although Colbert left the day-to-day business of training Pierre to Nicolas, he 
groomed him much as he had groomed Vauban and would soon groom Seignelay, 
moulding him into a valuable craftsman of state knowledge.122  In each case the 
emphasis was different.  Pierre was neither a born-and-bred minister of state nor a 
specialist in urban fortifications, although his training equipped him to deal 
intelligently with both.  He was, instead, a landed administrator who could make the 
king’s presence felt overseas by constructing, staffing, and servicing his ships and 
ports. 
The Arnoul case thus serves as a reminder that state formation occurred not 
only in courts, colonies, and provincial capitals, but also on the edges of the sea.  The 
family’s ability to govern areas that had remained stubbornly beyond royal control 
was as significant to its patrons as any specialized learning.123  That effort required 
daily interactions with rough-hewn locals (“great belly-achers who say more with 
their shoulders than their tongues, and who speak more evil with their gestures than 
their mouths”), lower-status craftsmen (who labored by “fantaisie”), and the king’s 
most marginal subjects (“I oversee four or five thousand of the meanest rogues on 
                                                
122 On Colbert’s influential role in Vauban’s approach to paperwork, see Michèle Virol, “Les carnets 
de bord d’un grand serviteur du roi: les agendas de Vauban,” Revue d’histoire moderne et 
contemporaine (1954-) 48e, no. 4 (2001): 66-67. 
123 Nicolas’s biography emphasized this theme, explaining his appointment to Toulon under Richelieu 
as part of the Cardinal’s attempt to reduce Marseille, which then “had a reputation as a town that was 
proud of its privileges and little attached to the king’s service.”  One of Nicolas’s main challenges as 
intendant of the galleys was to expand the arsenal of Marseille against the opposition of the town’s 
municipal leaders.  Biography of Nicolas Arnoul, BnF NAF 21416, fols. 2-2v; Rambert, Nicolas 
Arnoul. 
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earth”).124  The work was sometimes distasteful and often overwhelming: Nicolas 
lamented the necessity of having to “become an investigator [soliciteur] when there is 
someone to punish,” and Pierre took meals “over his papers” and had himself 
transported every night in a litter between Toulon and Marseille in the frantic months 
following his father’s death.125   Yet the ability of the Arnoul and officials like them 
to overcome such obstacles and impose a sense of order upon the ports was a 
precondition of sustained imperial ventures.  If the problem of extending European 
sovereignty to new lands began upon the oceans, we might fairly ask if the 
construction of early-modern empires originated along metropolitan shores.126  
By studying the knowledge-producing role of families such as the Arnoul, we 
can identify changes in administrative culture under the Old Regime without making 
presentist assumptions about their “modernity.”  Even as the Arnoul brought new 
forms of knowledge and power to the state, the family used its position primarily to 
generate wealth and status for its members within a traditional system of patronage.  
Successes on both fronts reinforced each other.  The Arnouls’ frequent “proofs” of 
loyalty and caprice allowed them to build their own local network of allies and 
dependents, marry into the maritime service elite of Provence, purchase lands in 
Marseille and the Comté-Venaissin, etch their coat of arms onto the magasin général 
                                                
124 N. Arnoul to Colbert, BnF NAF 21307, fols. 26v-27 (Jan. 25, 1667); N. Arnoul to Colbert (Dec. 
13, 1670), AN Marine B6 2, fol. 28, quoted in Zysberg, Les galériens, 162. 
125 “Je ne suis point intendant de justice.  Je ne le souhaite mesme pas.  On a assez de ses peschez, ce 
n’est pas une chose trop agreable que de conda’ner du monde mais je voy que le service le veult.”  N. 
Arnoul to Colbert, BnF NAF 21307, fol. 4 (Jan. 5, 1667).  On Pierre becoming overburdened by work, 
see draft of biography of Pierre Arnoul, BnF NAF 21416, fols. 27v-28; Rambert, “Une aventurière à 
Marseille et à Toulon au XVIIe siècle, la dame de Rus,” Provincia, bulletin trimestriel de la Société de 
Statistique d’Histoire et d’Archéologie de Marseille et de Provence 5 (1925): 14-16; and the letters 
from Colbert preceding Pierre’s disgrace in Clément, Lettres de Colbert, III2: letters of May 1677-Nov. 
1679. 
126 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010): esp. 104-161. 
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of Toulon, and, most importantly, invest their children back into the service.  These 
achievements in turn created further opportunities to buttress the family’s reputation 
for naval-administrative expertise.  The connaissances developed by Pierre and (to a 
lesser extent) Nicolas-François cannot be understood without reference to their 
apprenticeships, and those apprenticeships make little sense independent of a 
household strategy that sought ministerial favor, personal gain, and upward mobility 
through the cultivation of knowledge. 
Cultivating knowledge, however, involved more than lessons in shipbuilding, 
accounting, or mathematics: it also implied the fashioning of a persona.  Nicolas’s 
ability to “s’assujetir” in swapping arms, “fripperies,” and “the worldly air that he 
had” for a sober life counting royal deniers was only the first example of a more 
general pattern of discipline that reworked the minds, bodies, and habits of young 
Arnoul men.  In learning to police the moeurs of convicts and slaves, Pierre and 
Nicolas-François also were urged to police their own.  Successfully honing manners 
of speech, writing, and self-presentation reinforced Pierre’s epistemic standing, while 
the failure to do so beyond a minimum threshold helped prevent Nicolas-François 
from establishing a reputation for anything more than unremarkable competence.  
More specifically, their commitment to the unique demands of administering fleets 
and ports encouraged them to identify themselves with the trappings of maritime 
knowledge.  Those trappings—paintings and maps, spyglasses, books and 
instruments—bolstered the family’s claims to authority over all affairs relevant to the 
navy and galleys.  In spaces and media ranging from the king’s cabinet to printed 
manuals to conseils de construction, the Arnoul, like provincial intendants and natural 
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philosophers of their day, drew on more than reasoned arguments to command trust 
and respect.127 
For Pierre, realizing Colbert’s ideal of the maritime intendant meant 
transforming himself into a carpenter, an architect, an engineer, a draftsman, a spy, 
and an accountant—in Nicolas’s words, a bon marin sur terre—an assortment of 
roles that no other royal servant had ever been asked to play.  For Nicolas-François, 
who enjoyed neither his father’s guidance nor his brother’s reputation nor the 
exacting protection of Colbert, the family’s turn toward the sea meant learning the 
basics of colonial and maritime affairs within the cursus honorum of naval 
administration that took shape toward the end of the seventeenth century.  Taken 
together, the Arnouls’ careers provide a means of humanizing the link between 
knowledge production and Louis’s empire at the moment of its making.  By mining 
the rich body of sources they left behind, we can follow the self-refashioning of a 
family that took advantage of French overseas ambitions to turn a would-be soldier, a 
would-be Jesuit, and a would-be captain of the galleys—landsmen all—into three 










                                                
127 Orest Ranum, “Courtesy, Absolutism, and the Rise of the French State, 1630-1660,” Journal of 
Modern History, 52 (Sep. 1980): 426-451; Shapin, A Social History of Truth; Shapin and Christopher 




























Chapter 2.  From Paris to the Plantation (and Back): Observing and 
Interpreting Colonization, c. 1663-c. 1700 
“I hope that [this book] will be useful to the Preservation of the French Colonies...Governors will learn 
by the conduct of those who preceded them, to avoid that which has been the ruin of some, & to 
practice that which has raised the fortune of others.” 
- Jean-Baptiste du Tertre, Histoire générale des Antilles habitées par les françois (1667) 
 
 In 1682, the intendant of the French West Indies, Jean-Baptiste Patoulet, 
submitted a memorandum to the Navy Ministry enumerating all of the “titles and 
articles” of the French civil code of 1667 “that are or should be observed in the 
Islands, those which cannot be, and those which we can modify for the good of the 
said islands.”1  Around 1684, an unnamed official who had “spent fifteen years in the 
Islands in the service of the King” produced a “discourse” purporting to survey “the 
past and present State of the French Islands in America” in order to determine “what 
should be...enacted there to make them flourish.”2  In 1686, the new intendant at 
Martinique asked the crown to clarify article 44 of the Black Code, researched by his 
predecessors and compiled by Colbert, which stipulated that slaves should be 
included in the community of property between husband and wife like any other 
moveable good.  Did ownership of a slave remain tied to the first marriage under 
which it was contracted, he wondered, or did it pass to subsequent marriages—so 
“frequent” in the islands—whose descendants surely would claim right of 
inheritance?  In either case, did the king wish him to enforce the article retroactively?  
A passage on page 174 of the fifty-fifth chapter of Claude Le Prestre’s Notable 
                                                
1 Jean-Baptiste Patoulet, “Mémoire des titres et articles de l'ordonnance de 1667 qui sont et doibvent 
estre observez aux Isles, de ceux qui ne le peuvent estre et de ceux ausquels on peut aporter quelque 
modification pour le bien desdites isles,” 3 September 1682, ANOM COL C8B, vol. 1, no. 65. 
2 Unsigned, “Discours sur l'estat passé et présent des isles françoises de l'Amérique et sur ce qu'il 
seroit du service du roy d'y establir pour leur accroissement,” c. 1684, ANOM COL C8B, vol. 1, no. 
75. 
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questions of law suggested that he should not, but the intendant said he would defer to 
the minister’s opinion on the matter.3 
 Each of these writings addressed a common problem: how to bring about a 
recognizable brand of order, prosperity, and public welfare in colonial settlements 
where conflict and corruption never seemed far away.  Since their very beginnings, 
the unnamed official complained, the French Antilles had been ruled by “individual 
seigneurs who were also governors, [and] who, properly speaking, behaved like 
sovereigns.”  The sad result was that now “each Island had its own different customs” 
forged by the “passion and interest” of its founding proprietor.4  Like Patoulet and 
other administrators who arrived in America in the decade after Louis assumed direct 
control of his Caribbean colonies, the official proposed a battery of reforms and 
regulations aimed at bringing the islands under royal authority and establishing the 
institutions needed to govern them well. 
This chapter asks how French officials and their collaborators described 
colonization, represented its stakes, and pushed for particular ways of achieving it in 
the first decades of crown rule.  The monarchy’s growing involvement in overseas 
expansion in the 1660s and 1670s triggered lively discussion over how its American 
dominions should be governed.  The founding of royal governments and the 
consolidation of long-distance trading companies inspired a variety of French 
observers to take stock of their colonial past: what could France learn from previous 
attempts to settle the New World?  Their conclusions ranged widely because their 
motives were diverse—to enrich themselves, attract patrons, glorify Louis, defeat his 
                                                
3 Gabriel Dumaitz de Goimpy to Seignelay, 18 December 1686, ANOM COL C8A, vol. 4, ff. 195-
196v. 
4 Unsigned, “Discours sur l'estat passé et présent des isles françoises de l'Amérique,” pp. 2-3. 
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European rivals, or convert African slaves and indigenous peoples, among others.  
But virtually all of them placed governance at the heart of the question.  As one 
petitioner in New France declared in 1663, “It is not sufficient to have planted 
colonies.  They are bodies which have their birth, their development and their 
end...They suffer from accidents and disease and have need of remedies.  Those who 
are charged with their administration must continually see to their sustenance, their 
preservation and their increase.”5  It followed that royal officers, as the king’s 
custodians of colonization, would lead the way in identifying the kind of 
administration most conducive to its success.   
In the pages that follow, I use case studies of three authors—one official and 
compiler in Paris, one governor of Cayenne, and one Dominican chronicler in the 
French Antilles—to show how French agents of expansion drew political lessons 
from the past and present state of the colonies.  Esprit de Cabart de Villermont’s 
newsprint and personal archive (1652-1707), Joseph-Antoine LeFebvre de La Barre’s 
pamphlet, A Description of equinoxial France, formerly called Guyana and by the 
Spanish, el dorado (1666), and Father Jean-Baptiste du Tertre’s four-volume General 
history of the Antilles inhabited by the French (1667-1671) worked within different 
genres and conventions, but all of them claimed to know better than others what the 
true course of colonization was and how it should be advanced.  They grounded their 
claims in what they touted as the most reliable sources available: oral testimony from 
credible witnesses, privileged access to primary documents, the critical and timely 
reading of letters, relations, and news from abroad, and their own experience 
                                                
5 Unsigned, “L’envoy et l’Etablissement des colonies,” 1663, reproduced in Cornelius Jaenen, ed.  The 
French Regime in the Upper Country of Canada During the Seventeenth Century (Toronto: Champlain 
Society, 1996), 34-36. 
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overseas.  In addressing their writings to an audience composed largely of royal 
officials and other educated elites in the metropole, they explicitly invoked these 
sources to bolster their own authority and discredit the claims of rival authors (many 
of whom, like themselves, had been to the colonies and wrote from direct personal 
experience).  Rhetorically speaking, then, their texts remind us that competing visions 
of colonization were anchored less in the canon of ancient philosophers, Church 
fathers, and Biblical patriarchs than in competing versions of the “facts” on the 
ground.6 
Yet their texts do more than remind us of the interpretive weight 
contemporaries gave to firsthand knowledge of the colonies: they tell us how 
authorities on the ground perceived the work of colonization at a formative moment 
of royal intervention.  The authors I examine here had different relationships to the 
crown, different experiences of the Americas, and different goals in writing.  What 
united them, despite their differences, was a shared conviction that colonies posed 
unique political problems that demanded solutions all their own—solutions that the 
king’s sovereign gaze and ultimate authority could help to administer.  They did not 
advocate a common body of laws or regulations for the colonies as Pierre Arnoul had 
done for the fleets and ports of France.  Rather, they perceived that the diverse 
climates, geographies, populations, customs, logistics, privileges, and aims of New 
World settlements made them too different from the metropole and each other to be 
ruled exactly alike.  Indeed, like other officials and observers of the time, they rarely 
wrote about the colonies as a collective whole, still less as an “empire.”  In their 
                                                
6 On truth-claims in early European accounts of colonization, see Anthony Pagden, European 
Encounters with the New World: From Renaissance to Romanticism (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1993), 51-56.  
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minds, each one had its own history, its own needs, and its own relationship to 
France.  They sought explicitly to document that history, identify those needs, and 
define that relationship for the individual settlements or groupings of settlements 
about which they wrote.  In that sense, their writings reveal what historian 
Christopher Tomlins has called “that aspect of colonizing that consists less in the 
brute achievement of ascendancy over a colonized ‘other’ than in developing the 
conceptual dynamics of one’s colonizing.”7  They show us, in other words, how their 
authors imposed an imagined order on the disorderly realities they perceived (or 
claimed to perceive) in the colonies. 
Why did these authors see the colonies as individual entities distinct from the 
metropole and each other?  What, in their minds, made colonizing the Americas 
fundamentally different from governing French provinces or conquered territories in 
Europe?  The three case studies in this chapter offer some answers to these questions.  
The first one uses the contents of Villermont’s archive to show how an official of the 
navy and colonies, residing in Paris, managed to track, record, and interpret the 
progress of colonization and maritime expansion over the course of several decades.  
The writings he left behind feature no specific proposals about how the colonies 
should be governed, but they do reveal how he and his collaborators repackaged the 
information they received from abroad into authoritative claims about where France’s 
settlements were, what they were like, and why the crown should promote them.  The 
second case examines Governor Joseph-Antoine LeFebvre de La Barre’s proposal to 
                                                
7 Christopher Tomlins has applied this formulation to colonial laws and charters, and here I argue that 
it applies as well to the printed texts of administrators and other agents of colonization.  Tomlins, “The 
Legal Cartography of Colonization, the Legal Polyphony of Settlement: English Intrusions on the 
American Mainland in the Seventeenth Century,” Law & Social Inquiry 26, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 316. 
 79 
colonize Guyana.  La Barre’s pamphlet, adapted from a memorandum he presented to 
the king, sought to attract investment in the notoriously intractable colony by 
advancing a vision of orderly and ethical exploitation grounded in the governor’s self-
proclaimed expertise as a planter.  The final case looks at how Tertre brought together 
eyewitness testimony and official documents to present the history of the French 
Antilles as a mirror for administrators.  By studying the good and bad qualities of past 
governors, he argued, royal officials could learn how to command the islands in a 
moral, peaceful, and prosperous fashion.    
 
News Empire: Overseas Reportage and Esprit de Cabart de Villermont’s Archive 
(1652-1707) 
 
In his 1867 dictionary of France’s most important historical figures, the naval 
historian Augustin Jal felt compelled to justify the inclusion of a relative unknown, 
Esprit de Cabart de Villermont.  “Why does M. de Villermont, with whom the 
biographers have not busied themselves at all, find a place in the list of men famous 
or obscure, known or unknown, who interest me and to whom I have devoted this 
Dictionary?,” he asked: 
Here is [the answer]: Monsieur de Villermont, because 
he was tasked by the Court to inform himself about all 
that occured in France and abroad, [and] even more 
because he drove himself to know and instruct himself 
well in things, created connections for himself 
everywhere, and in all subjects gathered interesting 
information that he used either for the writing of the 
Mercure [galant], or for some manuscript gazettes, or 
for a great personage at Saint-Germain, Versailles, or 
Paris.8 
 
                                                
8 Augustin Jal, Dictionnaire critique de biographie et d’histoire (Paris: Plon, 1867), 1271. 
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Jal’s explanation inspired no biographies, and Villermont has remained marginal to 
historians ever since.9  But Jal was right to identify him as a ubiquitous and 
instrumental presence in his own time.  As a royal councilor, he was close to France’s 
leading men of state and well informed of their affairs.  His particular interest in the 
navy and the colonies, coupled with his links to the print trade, brought dozens of 
merchants, missionaries, naval officers, printers, and gazeteers into his orbit and 
made him the kingdom’s leading broker of overseas news for nearly half a century. 
Villermont’s archive provides an opportunity to reconstruct the everyday flow 
of information that wound its way to and from a metropolitan official and promoter of 
colonies at a time when the crown was sailing more ships, fighting more naval battles, 
and staking greater claims to goods and territory abroad than ever before.  Maritime 
expansion strained the capacity of administrators to manage the flood of paperwork it 
generated, creating room for informed advocates of colonization to act as facilitators 
of state action.10  The ability of Villermont and his collaborators to gather and digest 
intelligence from disparate sources allowed them to frame events overseas within 
                                                
9 Villermont has more often been a source for histories of trade, colonization, and the navy than their 
subject, and when scholars have mentioned him they have usually done so in passing or in their 
footnotes.  He has received some attention as a published primary source.  See, for example, the 
extensive excerpts of his correspondence regarding La Salle’s expeditions (see below) in Pierre 
Margry, Mémoires et documents pour servir à l’histoire des origines françaises des pays d’outre-mer: 
Découvertes et établissements des français dans l’ouest et dans le sud de l’Amérique septentrionale 
(1614-1698) (Paris: Maisonneuve et Compagnie, 1879), vol. II.  Works that make some mention of 
Cabart as an influential compiler of information and curiosities include Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, 
Orientalism in Early Modern France: Eurasian Trade, Exoticism, and the Ancien Régime (New York: 
Berg, 2008), 108-112; Grace Lee Nute, Caesars of the Wilderness: Médard Chouart, Sieur des 
Groseillers and Pierre Esprit Radisson, 1618-1710 (Saint Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 2004 
ed.; orig. 1943), 159-161, 204, 242-244, 255-256; Rénald Lessard, “La Nouvelle-France comme 
aventure scientifique. La contribution d'Esprit Cabart de Villermont,” À rayons ouverts, no. 88 (Winter 
2012): 27-29. 
10 See, for example, Daniela Bleichmar, “Books, Bodies, and Fields: Sixteenth-Century Transatlantic 
Encounters with New World Materia Medica,” in Colonial Botany: Science, Commerce, and Politics 
in the Early Modern World, eds. Londa Schiebinger and Claudia Swan (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 83-99. 
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France’s broader pursuit of maritime supremacy, investing those events with grand 
stakes and assigning each colony a specific role in the drama.  Their habitual 
consumption and production of newsprint reminds us that printed ephemera were a 
common medium through which French elites imagined and appropriated foreign 
spaces.11  More important, the evidence they left behind gives us a rare glimpse into 
how literate people in the metropole made sense of colonization from a distance and 
as it unfolded. 
Before he became a newsmaker, Villermont gained firsthand experience of the 
navy and colonies during a well-traveled career in the king’s service.  In the early 
1640s, his father’s position as a parlementaire in Paris earned Villermont an 
appointment as a royal councilor and then as governor of the Îles d’Hyères, where he 
made connections with the merchants and officers of Toulon and Marseille.12  Shortly 
thereafter he sailed to the Caribbean as the king’s lieutenant-general at Cayenne, 
officially to collect rare plants for the royal gardens, unofficially to spy on the Dutch 
and English slave trades.  Again he made contacts, spending the spring of 1646 in 
Martinique with the d’Aubigné family (whose daughter Françoise, the future royal 
mistress, became a close friend) before mingling with planter elites at Guadeloupe.  
His return to Paris around 1648 with tales of New World wonders, numerous exotic 
goods, and an Antilles-trained cook in tow cemented his reputation in high society as 
a curieux (“curious man”) and authority on the Americas.13 
                                                
11 Gilbert Chinard, L’Amérique et le rêve éxotique dans la litterature française au XVIIe et au XVIIIe 
siècle (Paris: Hachette, 1913); Geoffroy Atkinson, Les nouveaux horizons de la Renaissance française 
(Paris: Droz, 1935). 
12 Jal, Dictionnaire critique, 1271. 
13 Veronica Buckley, The Secret Wife of Louis XIV: Françoise d’Aubigné, Madame de Maintenon 
(London: Macmillan, 2010), 27. 
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From Paris, curieux like Villermont could obtain overseas news in a variety of 
spaces known to produce it.  The city had no precise equivalent to London’s Royal 
Exchange, where English merchants of all trades gathered to share the latest 
commercial gossip, but for men like Villermont the shops of printers who specialized 
in travel literature were information entrepôts where trusted seekers could access and 
discuss manuscripts before they went to press, and of course buy them once they were 
published.14  (Gervais Clouzier, who printed Tertre’s history, even advertised his 
business on the île de la Cité with a street sign depicting a voyageur.)  For the well-
connected and influential, news more often came to them.  Villermont routinely 
welcomed naval officials to his apartment on the rue d’Enfer, where they haggled, for 
instance, over the outfitting of ships destined for New France.  When he clashed with 
René-Robert Cavalier de La Salle over La Salle’s expedition to the Gulf of Mexico, 
Villermont’s friend and collaborator, Eusèbe Renaudot, invited him to talk through 
the fall-out “this very day...I will be at my lodgings until three o’clock, and at the 
bibliothèque du Roy until six, if not I will go to your home after supper tomorrow.”15  
As Renaudot’s letter attests, the king’s library, too, was a place where learned men 
and royal servants met to discuss foreign lands and even to consult official 
documents.16  These spaces, like chambers of commerce and intendants’ residences in 
                                                
14 See Jean-Baptiste Du Tertre’s visit to Gervais Clouzier’s shop, mentioned below.  Gervais housed 
his business on the île de la Cité, off the staircase leading up to Saint-Chappelle; his brother François’s 
was located close by, in the Cour du Palais de Justice, near the home of the court’s First President. 
15 Renaudot to Cabart de Villermont, c. 1684 (Paris), Library of Congress, BnF Manuscrits français 
22799, ff. 78-79v.  The officials who met to discuss ships bound for Canada were Abraham Du 
Quesne, lieutenent-général of the king’s navy, Nicolas Denys, governor of Acadia, and an ensign 
named de Granges.  Cabart de Villermont to Denys fils, 10 April 1680 (Paris), LOC BnF Mss. fr. 
22799, f. 46. 
16 The bibliothèque du Roi sometimes served as a research center for active officials, such as Pierre de 
Girardin, who in 1685 hired copyists to hunt down and transcribe the official treaties and 
correspondence of his predecessors in preparation for his new post as ambassador at Constantinople.  
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the ports, hosted a regular spoken dialogue about the fleets, colonies, and maritime 
trade of which written sources offer only a partial glimpse.17 
In addition to these face-to-face communications, Villermont maintained a 
vast web of correspondence that stretched across Europe, the Mediterranean, and the 
Americas.  He exchanged a steady stream of letters with informants in Paris, Toulon, 
Marseille, Rochefort, La Rochelle, Rome, Québec, Michillimackinac, Basseterre, Fort 
Saint-Pierre, the Levant, and elsewhere, some of whom provided him with copies of 
third-party dispatches that extended his reach even further.  His web was dense, too: 
during the 1680s, his contacts in North America alone included the soldier-explorers 
Henri de Tonty and Pierre Le Moyne d’Iberville, the naval captain Le Gallois de 
Beaujeu, Governor of New France Louis de Buade de Frontenac, the naval 
commissioner Philippe Gaultier de Comporté, the former Jesuit superior Thierry 
Beschefer, the Illinois missionary Jacques Gravier, Governor of Acadia Nicolas 
Denys and his son, and the Montréal merchant and agent of the colony’s fur 
monopoly in Paris, Denis Riverin.18  Their reports ranged widely, but virtually all of 
them contained updates on the state of the ports and colonial settlements.  Some 
correspondents also sent him Native goods and wildlife specimens for his famously 
comprehensive cabinet of curiosities.19  The breadth and depth of Villermont’s 
                                                                                                                                      
John-Paul Ghobrial, The Whispers of Cities: Information Flows in Istanbul, London, and Paris in the 
Age of William Trumbull (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 61-64. 
17 See, for example, the allusions to this dialogue sprinkled throughout the Bégon-Villermont 
correspondence cited below. 
18 For Villermont’s correspondence, see LOC BnF Mss. fr. 22799-22815.  The Library of Congress’s 
collection contains only copies of his papers relevant to the Americas and to French activities overseas.  
His full, original archive is housed at the BnF. 
19 In the mid-1680s, Villermont and his son received several boxes of Caribbean tools and specimens 
sent by a planter and evangelist at Guadeloupe, Chasteau du Bois, who hoped that Cabart would pass 
along some of them to the King’s Gardener: “Presque toutes les graines et semences cy dessus 
viendroient a versailles dans le Potager et le Roy auroit peut estre du plaisir de voir une partie des 
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network was second only to that of the minister of the navy and possibly the intendant 
of Rochefort—indeed, they shared many of the same contacts—and at any given time 
he was nearly as well informed of events in the colonies as the minister himself.20  
His influence within the services was great enough that intendants and ministers sent 
him ministry paperwork, solicited him to recommend candidates for appointment, and 
asked him to connect members of his network whose collaboration would speed their 
work.21  
Villermont was an active informee, and he used his correspondents not only to 
keep abreast of developments abroad but also to corroborate accounts he had heard 
from travelers or read in the “six or seven hundred volumes of voyages” housed in his 
library.22  In 1671, for instance, he gave a questionnaire to the French merchant and 
orientalist Jean Chardin before Chardin’s departure for Persia, India, and China that 
posed 107 queries about the Far East.  “[Find out] what Troa is,” he asked, “its virtues 
                                                                                                                                      
Jardins de son Potager occupée des plantes estrangeres, et des fruits Bizarres et inconnus en france.  
Mr. de la Quintinie qui est de vos amis s’en feroit de l’honneur avec un peu de soin et je continuerois 
de vous envoyer pour luy de nouvelles curiositez, si l’essay que je vous envoye en estoit bien receu, 
toujours servira-t-il a Joindre aux Raretez de vostre Cabinet.”  Chasteau du Bois to Cabart de 
Villermont, undated (c. 1685), LOC BnF Mss. fr. 22799, ff. 275-277.  Beschefer shipped him dishes 
made of bark, watermelon seeds, local minerals, and Indian-made goods.  Beschefer to Cabart de 
Villermont, 22 October 1687, summarized in The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, ed. Reuben 
G. Thwaites (Cleveland: Burrows Brothers, 1899), vol. LXIV: 22-23. Michel Begon, lacking news to 
share from his intendancy at Rochefort, once sent Cabart an inventory of his own sizeable collection of 
oddities from Canada, asking him to “Mandez moy s’il vous plaist votre sentiment sur ce que vous 
jugéz a propos que je fasse venir l’année prochaine a fin qu’il ne manque rien dans mon cabinet aux 
curiosités qu’on peut tirer de ce pays la.”  Begon to Cabart de Villermont, 9 January 1689 (Rochefort), 
LOC BnF Mss. fr. 22799, ff. 186-187v. 
20 The letters sent to him were noticeably, but not substantially, less extensive and exact than those 
received by the Colbert or the Pontchartrain, and they were not screened or summarized for him by 
clerks.  
21 “Extrait de la relations des Avantures, et voyages de Mathieu Sageau,” 1701, in Recueil de pièces, 
mss. et imprimées, sur l'histoire d'Amérique, formé par le P. Léonard de Ste-Catherine de Sienne, 
Augustin déchaussé, BnF Mss. fr. 9097, f. 119 (margin note); Bégon to Cabart de Villermont, 1 
January 1700 and 16 June 1701, reproduced in Louis Delavaud, Archives historiques de Saintonge et 
de l’Aunis, T. I (1925): 48, 68; Cabart de Villermont to Denys fils, 10 April 1680, LOC BnF Mss. fr. 
22799, f. 46. 
22 Obituary of Cabart de Villermont, Mercure de France, no. 10 (1707), 299. 
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and its use, and if it is true, as [Jean Hugues de] Linschot, [François] Pirard, and 
various other authors who escape my memory say, [that] whoever receives a certain 
dose in his drink or food loses consciousness for 24 hours.”  He encouraged Chardin 
to learn what he could about Hyacinthe, “a smelly root from Tartary...common in 
Turkey and in Persia in the time when Pietro Della Valle was there, who says in the 
18th letter of his 1st volume that it was employed successfully...in perfumes.”  
Villermont also wanted to verify the word of a “Mr. Hoquenou” about the state of the 
Dutch catechu trade with Japan, assertions made by the voyager Jean-Baptiste 
Tavernier about medicine men who could hatch eggs from the earth and conjure fruit-
bearing trees, and rumors that time spent in the Indies caused European women to 
stop menstruating and European dogs to lose their bark.23  The array of questions he 
posed reflected his position as a voracious consumer of secondhand information who 
depended upon eyewitnesses to authenticate the many curious, surprising, or useful 
reports he received.  
Villermont did more than collect and compare information: he also curated it 
for future reference.  His approach to gazettes was especially meticulous.  Printed 
periodicals offering news from a particular city or state were a recent import to 
France—the earliest domestic one, Renaudot’s Gazette de France, debuted in 1631—
but for Villermont and other readers across Europe they were already a fixture of 
                                                
23 Cabart gave Chardin this questionnaire either on his own initiative or at the behest of the 
Compagnie des Indes orientales (the details are murky).  McCabe, Du bon usage du thé, 165-178.  For 
other interpretations of their exchange, see McCabe, Orientalism in Early Modern France, 108-112; 
Ghobrial, The Whispers of Cities, 19-22.  The works to which Villermont alluded were François Pyrard 
de Laval, Voyage de François Pyrard de Laval contenant sa navigation aux Indes orientales, 
Maldives, Moluques, et au Brésil (Paris: Thiboust, 1619); Jan Huygen van Linschoten, Histoire de la 
navigation de Jean Hugues de Linschot, Hollandois, aux Indes orientales (Amsterdam: Pierre, 1610); 
Pietro Della Valle, Viaggi di Pietro della Valle il Pellegrino (Rome: Mascaradi, 1650-1658). 
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communications alongside letters, broadsheets, and scribal nouvelles à la main.24  
Between 1659 and 1681 he kept yearly extracts of scribal and printed reports relevant 
to French activities overseas.25  His excerpts were dry tidbits of information, usually 
one to three lines long, from sites as disparate as Perpignan, Port de Vaudrer, 
Marseille, Toulon, Livorno, Genoa, Naples, Civitavecchia, Paris, Dunkirk, Brest, and 
Saint Christopher, to name just the places of origin he listed for 1680 and 1681.  Over 
time his record-keeping became more sophisticated: in the first year he made only a 
few entries into a single, undifferentiated column; as France’s maritime presence 
grew, so did the number of his entries, and eventually he organized them by location, 
assigning each extract a date and reference number that would allow him to recover 
the original source, if necessary.26  His references corresponded to individual pages of 
gazettes that he grouped by year in chronological order.  Given that by the end of 
each year these numbers reached into the high hundreds or low thousands for a mere 
four to thirty-six entries, he appears to have been sifting a very large total of pages for 
a very specific subset of information.27 
What was he learning?  Most of Villermont’s extracts detailed the movements 
of ships, personnel changes within the services, and the outcomes of naval battles and 
skirmishes.  He also noted the departures of missionaries and colonizing expeditions, 
                                                
24 Eugène Hatin, Les gazettes de Hollande et la presse clandestine aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris: 
Pincebourde, 1865), 16; Ghobrial, Whispers of Cities, 26-27, 30. 
25 LOC BnF Mss. fr. 22768, ff. 35-81v.  Extracts for the years 1676 and 1678 either are lost or were 
not recorded by Cabart.   
26 For example, “Brest: A flute from the squadron of the Comte d’Estrées has reported that since its 
departure from Martinique, he has anchored in the harbor of St. Domingue.  25 October 1680.  ^579.”  
LOC BnF Mss. fr. 22768, f. 75v.  Occasionally he added marginalia such as labels, corrections, or 
updates to help himself track developments over time and improve the accuracy of his notes.   
27 The numbers turned over at the beginning of each new year, presumably beginning at 1 for the first 
page of the first gazette of January (or occasionally the last gazette of the previous December) and 
continuing upward as high as 1300 (to cite the highest of any year) by the final entry of December. 
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the arrival of exotic merchandise at French ports, proclamations of commercial 
ordinances, and landmark occasions such as the inaugural meeting of the king’s 
Conseil du Commerce in August 1665.28  The vast majority of his entries (270 out of 
421, or 64%) focused on the Mediterranean, where French fleets were engaged in 
near-constant warfare with Barbary corsairs and rival European powers; the Ponant 
(102 entries, or 24%) received far less attention, while the colonies (29 entries, or 
7%) barely rated.29  These figures reflected the Mediterranean’s status as the chief 
theater of operations for the navy and galleys during this period, as well as a bias in 
Villermont’s sources: most of his gazettes came from Italy and Provence, and the 
American colonies, which had no presses of their own, depended entirely upon letters 
and word of mouth to disseminate their news.  Despite the imbalance of coverage, his 
systematic culling of published reports buttressed the information he gleaned from 
conversation and correspondence to give him a firm grasp of events overseas as they 
unfolded across a variety of theaters—not only in the present, but also in a recorded 
past that he could access at his leisure.  
 Villermont differed from the ministers and intendants of his day in that he 
made it a priority to broadcast the contents of his archive to others.30  A case in point 
                                                
28 See for example LOC BnF Mss. fr. 22768, f. 39v (arrival of whale oil at Havre via Compagnie du 
Nord and royal ordinances restricting its sale), f. 41v (departure of troops destined to combat “les 
sauvages” of Canada), f. 46 (Conseil du Commerce), f. 57 (Colbert named head of Compagnie des 
Indes orientales). 
29 Most of the extracts concerning the colonies and the Ponant coincided with the Second Anglo-Dutch 
War (1665-1667), which was fought mainly in the Caribbean and along France’s Atlantic coast.  The 
remainder of Villermont’s entries (20, or 5%) described events that cannot be assigned to a specific 
locale.  On the imbalance of coverage between the New World and the Orient in European gazettes, 
which continued throughout the eighteenth century, see Pierre Rétat, ed., La Gazette d’Amsterdam: 
Miroir de l’Europe au XVIIIe siècle (Oxford, UK: Voltaire Foundation, 2001), 240-259. 
30 A notable contrast being Colbert, who jealously guarded the contents of his “secret state intelligence 
system.”  Soll, Information Master.  See also the impulse toward discretion expressed by Pontchartrain 
and Bégon further on in this chapter. 
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is his unfinished history of the navy under Louis XIV.  The didactic tone of his 
manuscript suggests that he aimed to introduce readers to the institutional origins of 
France’s recent naval renaissance.  “The Navy was profoundly neglected by Monsieur 
Le Cardinal de Mazarin,” he began.  “The King was not content to restore it to the 
state in which it had once been, but [rather], under the ministries of Monsieur Colbert 
and Monsieur de Seignelay his son, he carried it further than it had been [taken] under 
any of the Kings who preceded him.  We shall speak first of the Marine as it concerns 
ships [of the line], and then of it as it concerns the Galleys...”  There followed an 
exhaustive series of lists: of the classes of vessels and their respective armaments and 
crew sizes; of officers’ ranks from admiral to ensign; of the evolution of each post 
since the king’s reform of the services in 1669; of every officer who had served in the 
fifteen years since, where, when, and at what salary; of their respective families and 
titles; and of the bureau’s administrative jurisdictions, complete with the ports and 
officers attached to them.31  In short, he distilled the substance of his archive into a 
thorough institutional portrait of the navy intended for public consumption.  The 
extensive information he could wield about naval personnel rivaled anything 
contained in the ministry’s dossiers; his ability to harness it toward a singular purpose 
may well have surpassed the minister’s own.32  
 Villermont never completed his history, but, as Jal noted, he had at his 
disposal a faster and more routine medium for broadcasting his information to others: 
printed gazettes.  His primary contacts in the periodical trade were Renaudot and 
                                                
31 Untitled manuscript, c. 1684, LOC BnF Mss. fr. 22768, ff. 81-236. 
32 The Marine’s archives did not take their current shape until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
In the seventeenth century, their contents were scattered among the papers of individual intendants, 
ministers’ libraries, and the Bibliothèque du Roi.  See Archives nationales, État général des fonds, vol. 
III: Fonds de la Marine, preface. 
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Father Claude Bernou, who, like Villermont, was a frequent contributor to La Gazette 
and the monthly Mercure galant, which ostensibly printed only court gossip and 
literary criticism but also featured lengthy dispatches from abroad.  All three men 
were ardent champions of colonization with close ties to the ministry.  Bernou, who 
advised the minister on Spanish and Portuguese claims in the New World, had once 
held a position in the service himself, wrote petitions on behalf of explorers and 
traders like La Salle and Pierre-Esprit Radisson, and together with Renaudot formed 
part of a circle that lobbied Seignelay in support of colonial ventures.33  With the help 
of their contacts, the trio monopolized official newsprint about the navy and colonies 
for nearly four decades.34  The individual articles that they researched and wrote were 
rarely signed, but the men’s correspondence with each other sometimes reveals which 
reports were authored by whom.35  Villermont almost certainly provided the bulk of 
their naval content, which included material seemingly drawn straight from his lists, 
such as a “General state of the officers of the Marine who are presently in the King’s 
Service” published by the Mercure in May of 1684.36  
The print culture in which Villermont operated was censored, monopolistic, 
and aimed toward a small group of readers in Paris and the provinces.  The primary 
                                                
33 This circle also included the cartographer and royal librarian Melchisédich Thévenot and the future 
governors of Saint-Domingue and New France Pierre de Cussy and Louis-Hector de Callières; the 
members sometimes referred to themselves as the Société de la Rue Victoire, after the street where the 
minister kept his offices.  Germaine Warkentin, Pierre-Esprit Radisson: The Collected Writings, vol. I: 
The Voyages (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), 69-70.  On Bernou’s 
contributions as a gazeteer, see Gilles Feyel, “Claude BERNOU (1638?-1716),” in Dictionnaire des 
journalistes, URL: http://dictionnaire-journalistes.gazettes18e.fr/journaliste/065-claude-bernou. 
34 Harcourt Brown, “History and the Learned Journal,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 33, no. 3 
(July-September 1972): 366-367.   
35 See his correspondence with Bernou and Renaudot, examined below. 
36 “General state of the officers of the Marine who are presently in the King’s Service,” Mercure 
galant, May 1684: 130-160; “Listes exactes des promotions de Marine,” Mercure galant, December 
1695: 172-190. 
 90 
publication for which he wrote and gathered news, La Gazette, essentially served as a 
royal mouthpiece.  Its editor, Eusèbe Renaudot, maintained the exclusive privilege of 
printing political news within the kingdom in return for discreet and favorable 
coverage of the crown.  His readership grew steadily during the final decades of the 
seventeenth century: between 1683 and 1699, La Gazette expanded beyond Paris, 
Bordeaux, Lyon, and La Rochelle to include franchised editions in sixteen more 
towns, and between 1670 and 1700 circulation more than doubled, from 4,000 weekly 
copies to roughly 9,000.  These figures compare unfavorably with more robust 
markets for gazettes in England and the Netherlands, but Renaudot and Villermont 
targeted a more exclusive audience of magistrates, merchants, financiers, foreign 
emissaries, and others who moved within the sphere of officialdom or stood at just 
one or two removes from it.37   
Their newsprint provided an account of affairs abroad that administrators on 
the ground consumed alongside correspondence, word of mouth, and foreign 
gazettes.38  Periodicals arrived annually at Québec and probably reached the Antilles 
throughout the year.39  In covering the latest movements of fleets and personnel, they 
                                                
37 For circulation figures and the market for newsprint in louis-quatorzian France, see Andrew 
Pettegree, The Invention of News: How the World Came to Know about Itself (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2014), 231-236.  On the nature of the “public sphere” and state-sanctioned print 
culture in France, see Pettegree, The French Book and the European Book World (Leiden: Brill, 2007); 
Adrian Johns, The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998). 
38 “Inventaire après décès du bailli de Poincy, lieutenant général aux Iles d’Amérique,” 12 April 1660, 
ANOM COL C8B 1, no. 6; Dubé, “Les intendants de la Nouvelle-France et la République des Lettres,”: 
42; For Arnoul’s “gazettes de bruxelles,” see BnF NAF 21403, fol. 225v (May 1683); Vaucresson to 
Vitalis, 18 October 1702, in BnF NAF 21410, ff. 266-267v. 
39 Gazettes began to reach Canada as early as the mid-1630s.  In his Relation of 1636, Paul Le Jeune 
observed of Québec, “The din of Palaces, the great uproar of Lawyers, Litigants, and Solicitors is 
heard here only at a thousand leagues’ distance.  Exactions, deceits, thefts, rapes, assassinations, 
treachery, enmity, black malice, are seen here only once a year, in the letters and Gazettes which 
people bring from Old France.”  The Jesuits Relations and Allied Documents, ed. Reuben G. Thwaites, 
vol. IX (Cleveland: Burrows Brothers, 1898), 138.  Also see Antoine Roy, “Ce qu’ils lisaient,” Cahiers 
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introduced royal officers to readers and each other, creating an ongoing directory of 
who was serving where and with what sort of distinction.40  Their reports helped meet 
the insatiable demand for news expressed by nearly every official in his letters, 
supplementing individual webs of correspondence with a common record through 
which far-flung readers could follow people and events elsewhere in Europe, the New 
World, and beyond. 
Villermont, Renaudot, and Bernou were uniquely well equipped to meet that 
demand not only because of their ample knowledge of the outre-mer, but also because 
their willingness to censor themselves or spin their reports ensured them privileged 
access to the state’s own intelligence.  Leading figures in government and even the 
king himself read the Gazette, fretted over its content, and employed whenever 
possible a mix of coercion and collaboration to shape its reporting in ways favorable 
to the crown.  Their concern extended to the navy and colonies.  Navy Minister 
Jérôme Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain once admonished Renaudot: 
I found in your latest Gazette a long article on 
Martinique and the return of some fugitive savages and 
slaves of St Vincent...as there often can be things in the 
circumstances you detail of which the public should not 
be so well informed, you must not include anything in 
your Gazettes concerning the Marine that I have not 
seen.  I take special care, for my part, to send you all that 
                                                                                                                                      
de Dix, vol. 20 (1955): 212-213.  The warmer waters of the Caribbean allowed ships from France to 
come and go year-round, which would have permitted more frequent deliveries. 
40 Loyal readers of the Gazette would have been able to track the achievements of the chef d’escadre 
d’Amblimont, for example, who received coverage for participating in battles off Martinique and 
Texel (20 December 1674 and 13 August 1689), earning promotion to commandeur de Saint Louis (16 
May 1693), and ascending to the governorship of Martinique (18 August 1696); his son, whose own 
distinguished career spanned most of the eighteenth century, appeared in its pages nine times.  Michel 
Vergé-Franceschi, Les chefs d’escadre marquis d’Amblimont (1663-1797) (Jonzac: l’Université 
Francophone d’Été, 1994), 29. 
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comes to me when nothing prevents me from giving it to 
you.41 
 
Despite their attempts at surveillance, ministers could not always control what French 
periodicals reported, but they did seek to co-opt them by selectively feeding their 
authors information they deemed suitable for publication, creating a direct pipeline 
that made the Gazette in particular “the principal center in France for the 
dissemination of news”—especially the news from abroad that Renaudot favored.42   
The trio’s coverage fed readers a regular, wide-ranging, and triumphalist 
account of French expansion.  Amid the more frequent news of marriages and 
monstrous births and diplomatic manoeuvres, news of the French in America 
appeared forty-seven times in the monthly Mercure between 1678 and 1700 and 
seventy-six times in the weekly Gazette in eight sample years during the same period; 
in most years they accounted for one or two reports in the Mercure and seven to ten 
in the Gazette.43  In general, the Gazette hewed to the terse style of Villermont’s 
extracts, tracking the movements of men and ships, but it sometimes published 
treaties, royal ordinances, and firsthand accounts of battles and voyages, often with 
commentary that invested their contents with broader strategic stakes.  “The complete 
destruction of the Colonies & Magazines of Cayenne, Ouyapogue, Apraouage, 
Tobago, & the Island of Gorée by the Comte d’Estrées,” concluded one typical 
                                                
41 Pontchartrain to Renaudot, 25 February 1708, ANOM MAR B 31, f. 28.  For more on press 
censorship, including comments regarding the Gazette made by leading men of state such as Richelieu, 
Vauban, Louvois, Colbert, Pontchartrain, and Colbert de Torcy, see Pierre-François Burger, “Eusèbe 
RENAUDOT (1648-1720),” in Dictionnaire des journalistes, URL: http://dictionnaire-
journalistes.gazettes18e.fr/journaliste/676-eusebe-renaudot.  
42 Brown, “History and the Learned Journal”: 366.   
43 These figures do not include reports concerning the activities of other European navies or colonies 
unless the French were explicitly involved.  The Mercure began operations in 1679, one year after 
Eusèbe Renaudot assumed direct control of the Gazette—formerly run by his father—which explains 
the start dates of my samples.  In the Gazette’s case, I chose the years 1678, 1681, 1684, 1687, 1690, 
1693, 1696, and 1699.  
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account, “costs [the Dutch] more than 5 millions, dashes their hopes, secures and 
improves our Trade, leaves us twelve hundred Prisoners, & carries the terror of the 
King’s Arms & Maritime power to America, while his Ships and Galleys remain 
masters of the Mediterranean.”44  The Mercure offered more in-depth reportage that 
consistently padded news from the colonies with details about their history and 
government.  It also reviewed the latest maps and travel literature for sale in Paris, 
explained what colonial terms such as boucaniers and créoles meant, announced 
promotions and honors within the maritime services, ran verses praising Louis’s 
conquest of the four corners of the globe, and eulogized the conduct of dead 
officers.45  In all of these ways the gazettes placed France at the center of an 
unfolding overseas drama whose missionary, merchant, and military protagonists 
were winning on all fronts against “barbaric” Indians and perfidious European rivals.   
In setting the scenes of that drama, the gazettes provided individualized 
descriptions of the colonies.  They padded their reports from each colony with 
reminders of when France had claimed it, where it was located, what it produced, 
what sort of peoples inhabited it, and what its continued possession would do for the 
kingdom’s commerce, religion, and military might.  Readers could learn, for instance, 
that the recapture of slave factories on the Gold Coast would buoy trade with the 
                                                
44 “Relation de la prise des Isles de Gorée au Cap-Vert & de Tabago, dans l’Amérique, sur les 
Hollandois...,” La Gazette, no. 19 (25 February 1678): 148.   
45 The main themes of the Mercure’s stories break down as follows: warfare/navy (23), personnel (8), 
nature/curiosities (6), geography/exploration (4), verses celebrating empire (3), piracy (2), and royal 
trading companies (1), missions (1).  For book and map reviews, see Mercure galant, no. 2 (February 
1697): 249-250 and no. 5 (May 1698): 253-254; for explanations of boucaniers and créoles, see 
“Histoire des Boucaniers ou Flibustiers,” no. 9 (September 1686): 171-185 and no. 4 (April 1683): 
209; for promotions and honors, see “Noms, surnoms, et qualités de tous les Chevaliers de l'Ordre de la 
derniere promotion,” no. 1 (January 1689): 219-251; for verses, see “Vers sur la fonction des deux 
Mers,” no. 9 (September 1681): 9-10; eulogies and death notices of colonial personnel and their 
relations are in no. 4 (April 1692): 30, no. 3 (March 1685): 158-159, and no. 10 (October 1707): 296-
299. 
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Antilles, where African captives were “indispensably necessary to the planting of the 
land”; that Martinique’s defense was critical because of its status as the most 
populous of the islands and the center of their governance; that Saint Domingue was 
an undercultivated nest of pirates, whereas Guadeloupe abounded in sugar, tobacco, 
and sea turtle meat; that Cayenne’s strategic position along the South American 
mainland made it both valuable to French provisioning and vulnerable to English, 
Dutch, and Portuguese invaders; and that Canada’s riverine trade in furs depended 
upon Native allies in the Great Lakes country who met with the governor annually 
and shared France’s Iroquois enemy.46  In investing each colony with a character all 
its own, the gazettes echoed the impression filtering back to Versailles in 
administrative reportage, whose authors focused consistently on the local affairs for 
which they were responsible rather than events occuring elsewhere in the Americas.47 
 To modern eyes, Villermont’s news archive and the reports of the periodical 
press project an orderly image of overseas information collection and dissemination, 
but his personal communications with Renaudot and Bernou reveal a messier and less 
rational process of reportage.  Their correspondence surrounding La Salle’s final 
expedition to the Gulf of Mexico in 1684-1687 provides a case in point.  In the years 
preceding La Salle’s departure, all three men were in contact with the explorer and 
each other—Villermont and Renaudot from Paris, Bernou from Paris and Rome, and 
La Salle from Paris, Rochefort, and America—creating a tidy communication circuit 
                                                
46 Mercure galant, no. 6 (June 1694): 31-49 (factories); no. 6 (June 1688): 279-280 and no. 7 (July 
1693): 252-267 (Martinique); Gazette, no. 82 (31 July 1678): 731 and “Histoire des Boucaniers ou 
Flibustiers,” Mercure galant, no. 9 (1686): 171-173. 
47 This administrative preoccupation with the local was reflected not only in the content of reports, but 
also in the way they were processed and preserved by the ministry, which began to assign particular 
clerks and files to each colony during these years.  See the personnel assignments and institutional 
histories compiled by the ministry later in the eighteenth century, in AN MAR C, vols. 120-121.  
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that nonetheless broke down in June of 1684 when La Salle became convinced that 
Villermont was plotting with the Jesuits and his co-commander, the naval captain 
Beaujeu, to ruin him.  Villermont not only met with Renaudot and Bernou to discuss 
the fallout in person, he also turned to Beaujeu for speculation about the secretive La 
Salle’s intentions for the voyage, which he then passed on to Renaudot and Bernou 
against Beaujeu’s wishes.48  When yet another indiscretion exposed their 
correspondence to La Salle, Beaujeu reproached Villermont:  
Yesterday M. de La Salle showed me a letter from M. 
l’abbé Renaudeau informing him that I write to you all 
that occurs here and numerous conjectures about our 
voyage, which you show to everyone.  I asked you to 
burn my letters about that, [and] I cannot help saying 
that I am angry with you, not because you make known 
my secrets, but because you show my letters which are 
scattered and sent off without my even reading over 
them...[but] do me the favor of showing them to this 
abbé [Renaudot], so that he will learn not to count 
conjectures upon conjectures as truth...M. de la Salle not 
having told me his secret, though M. de Seignelay 
ordered him to tell me, I am not obliged to keep it, and I 
am allowed as much as anybody, I believe, to make my 
conjectures on what I read about it in the Gazette de 
Hollande.49 
 
Beaujeu was less upset by Villermont’s betrayal of his confidence than by what 
Renaudot might do with his “conjectures upon conjectures”—namely, that he would 
represent them to others as fact.  (The risk of publication was high: not only was the 
                                                
48 La Salle, a fervent anti-Jesuit, suspected Beaujeu because Madame Beaujeu had ties to the order; he 
suspected Villermont by extension because Villermont was close to the Beaujeu.  Beaujeu to Cabart de 
Villermont, 10 July 1684 (La Rochelle), reproduced in Margry, Mémoires et documents, 451.  For 
Villermont’s meeting with Renaudot, see the encounter cited above.  For his attempts to meet with 
Bernou, see Cabart de Villermont to Bernou and Bernou’s same-day response, 7 July 1684, LOC BnF 
Mss. fr. 22799, f. 164.  Beaujeu’s request that Villermont not show anyone his letters, which he 
(rightly) feared would damage his relations with La Salle beyond repair, is in Beaujeu to Cabart de 
Villermont, June 1684 (La Rochelle), printed in Pierre Margry, Mémoires et documents, vol II, 426.   
49 Beaujeu to Cabart de Villermont, 29 June 1684 (Rochefort), reproduced in Margry, Mémoires et 
documents, vol. II, 440-442. 
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expedition being covered extensively by the Gazette de Hollande, but the Mercure 
had just run a fawning report on La Salle’s previous voyage, and Beaujeu knew that 
Renaudot was already touting the explorer in private as a French Cortez, Pizarro, or 
Almagro.50)  Nonetheless, the captain continued to feed Villermont news and to 
request it in return, even asking him for details of the expedition that might be 
swirling in Paris.51  Now firmly excluded from La Salle’s trust himself, he depended 
as much upon Villermont and printed periodicals for information, despite being at the 
center of events, as Villermont depended upon him. 
Villermont’s wide-ranging, sometimes messy activities as a collector and 
interpreter of overseas news and objects make us question assumptions about how 
officials of the Old Regime state learned about their empire at the moment of its 
making.  Historians of communications and empire typically depict information as 
something produced by correspondence “networks,” news “flows,” and bureaucratic 
“machinery.”  While it is understood that these abstractions were grounded in the 
everyday actions of individual people, we do not often see their labors up close or in 
their full compexity.52  What we lose in the process is an awareness that their 
                                                
50 Mercure galant, May 1684; Beaujeu to Cabart de Villermont, 29 June 1684, in Margry, Mémoires et 
documents, vol. II, 442.  As Villermont (among others) became disillusioned with La Salle, Bernou 
rose to the explorer’s defense, arguing that La Salle did not deserve the opprobrium heaped upon him 
and might one day be rehabilitated in the public mind much as Cortez had been.  Bernou to Cabart de 
Villermont, 11 September 1685 (Rome), LOC BnF Mss. fr. 22799, ff. 71-71v. 
51 Beaujeu to Cabart de Villermont, 21 May 1684 (Rochefort), LOC BnF Mss. fr. 22799, ff. 143-144v.  
52 Such a tendency goes back at least as far as Harold Innis’s pioneering study of the problem, Empire 
and Communications (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1950).  For examples of recent or 
influential scholarship on the problem in early modern France and England, see Ian K. Steele, The 
English Atlantic 1675-1740. An exploration of communications and community (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986); Kenneth Banks, Chasing Empire Across the Sea: Communications and the 
State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763 (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2002); James McClellan III and François Regourd, The Colonial Machine: French Science and 
Overseas Expansion in the Old Regime (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011); John-Paul Ghobrial, The Whispers 
of Cities: Information Flows in Istanbul, London, and Paris in the Age of William Trumbull (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2013); and on the modern period, C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: 
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activities frequently transcended our own neat conceptual boundaries between oral, 
scribal, and print cultures; texts, images, and material artifacts; “scientific” and 
political knowledge; and metropole and colony.  If we want to find broader patterns 
in the ways that premodern states produced knowledge about the overseas world, we 
first have to ask how individuals like Villermont made sense of the exotic ‘stuff’ they 
confronted in their own settings and according to their own motives.53 
 
Governing Guyana: Joseph-Antoine Lefebvre de La Barre, Chorography, and Estate 
Management 
 
In September 1665, the governor of the newly-founded colony of France 
équinoxiale, or Cayenne, Joseph-Antoine Lefebvre de La Barre, returned from 
America to Paris and met with the king.  After hearing “all that I had done for the 
glory of the French name and the augmentation of his monarchy,” which included 
retaking Cayenne from the Dutch and establishing a new settlement, Louis asked La 
Barre to produce an updated map of Guyana with a written explanation of the country 
(Figure 1).  A few months later the governor published both, in a pamphlet entitled A 
Description of equinoxial France, formerly called Guyana and by the Spanish, el 
dorado.54  He had ample incentive to make its contents public: the recently-formed 
                                                                                                                                      
Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996).  For a critique of the “network” model (and a defense of “flows”), see 
Ghobrial, Whispers, preface; for a critique of the “machine” model, see Paul Cheney and Loïc Charles, 
“The Colonial Machine Dismantled: Knowledge and Empire in the French Atlantic,” Past & Present, 
no. 219 (May 2013): 127-163. 
53 On the importance of individual reading and note-taking to the construction of knowledge about the 
material world during this period, see Deborah Harkness, “Clement Draper’s Prison Notebooks: 
Reading, Writing, and Doing Science,” in The Jewel House: Elizabethan London and the Scientific 
Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 181-210. 
54 Joseph-Antoine Lefebvre de La Barre, Description de la France equinoctiale, cy-devant appellee 
Guyanne et par les espagnols, el dorado.  Nouvellement remise sous l’obeissance du Roy, par le Sieur 
Le Febvre de la Barre, son Lieutenant General dans ce Païs.  Avec la carte d’iceluy, faite et presentee 
à Sa Majesté par ledit Sieur De la Barre.  Et un discourse tres-utile et necessaire pour Ceux qui 
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West Indies Company had just absorbed his old venture, the Company of Cayenne, 
and he was under pressure to recruit more colonists and investors to make its grand 
commercial ambitions a reality. 
In the centuries since, neither La Barre nor his pamphlet has received much 
scholarly notice.  The Description figures among several pieces of early French 
colonial propaganda studied mainly for their literary merit or their impact on 
migration.55  As for La Barre, his contemporaries thought little of him both as an 
officer and as a man, and historians have been no kinder to his memory.  His sudden 
withdrawal from a promising career in Paris as a parlementaire and master of requests 
for a tour as intendant in the provinces aroused suspicions of scandal.56  Colbert and 
Cardinal Mazarin found him woefully incapable as an administrator.57  When he took 
                                                                                                                                      
voudront établir des Colonies en ces Contrées; Qui les détrompera des Impostures dont tous Ceux qui 
en ont parlé ont remply leurs Ecrits; Et leur sera connoistre la force, le nombre, & le naturel des 
Indiens de cette Coste, & ce qu’elle peut produire d’avantageux pour le Commerce de l’Europe (Paris: 
Jean Ribou, 1666), 3, 8-10. 
55 Gabriel Debien and Marcel Châtillon, “La propagande imprimée pour les Antilles et la Guyane au 
XVIIe siècle: récrutement ou racolage?,” Annales des Antilles, no. 24 (1981): 79-82; Philip Boucher, 
“French Proprietary Colonies in the Greater Caribbean, 1620s-1670s,” in Constructing Early Modern 
Empires: Proprietary Ventures in the Atlantic World, 1500-1750, eds. L. H. Roper and B. Van 
Ruymbeke (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007), 176-177. 
56 Marc Chassaigne, “Un maître des requêtes lieutenant-général des armées du roi: M. de la Barre aux 
Antilles,” Revue des études historiques (1920): 322. 
57 In October 1659, following a tour of inspection in Nivernais, where La Barre was serving as 
intendant, Colbert wrote Mazarin, “Je suis à présent dans la visite du duché de Nivernais...M. de la 
Barre, intendant, n’est point un instrument propre pour m’en servir comme il est nécessaire, pouvant 
assurer Votre Éminence que jamais homme n’a été tant haï des peuples et n’a donné aux peuples tant 
de véritables raisons de le haïr que celui-là, par une conduite tout à fait abandonnée...Il faut 
commencer par leur ôter cet intendant et leur donner un plus homme de bien que lui”; Mazarin replied, 
“J’ai déjà écrit à M. Le Tellier [La Barre’s patron] de prendre au mot M. de la Barre s’il est vrai qu’il 
ait demandé son congé.  Et si cela n’est pas, en arrivant à Toulouse, je verrai ce qui se pourra faire, car 
je juge absolument nécessaire qu’il soit changé ; et ce n’est pas de cette heure que j’ai eu cette pensée, 
n’en ayant pas entendu bien parler en aucun temps,” quoted in Regis Roy, “Joseph-Antoine Lefebvre, 
sieur de La Barre, gouverneur de la Nouvelle-France en 1682,” Bulletin des recherches historiques 20 
(1914): 48.  Charles Colbert de Terron, intendant of Rochefort, a director of the Company of Cayenne, 
and Jean-Baptiste’s cousin, wrote after meeting La Barre that he “did not appear to me fit to command 
other men, and it is surely on his end that we have the most to fear, but with the precautions we have 
taken by means of [lieutenant-general of the West Indies] M. de Tracy, I hope that we will have the 
time to resolve anything that may arrive by fault of Monsieur de la Barre.”  Colbert de Terron to 
Colbert, 16 March 1664, quoted in Roy, ibid,  48-49. 
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the unusual step of trading his magistrate’s robes for a commission as capitaine de 
vaisseau, one of his subordinates complained that having to obey “a Master of 
Requests transfigured all of a sudden into an homme de guerre” would have been 
bearable only “if, in the absence of moral virtues, M. de la Barre had brought some 
military virtues to his position.”58  Tertre cast him as an adventurer of questionable 
motives whose cleverness and courage were undermined by incompetence, 
inexperience, and arrogance.59  In the next century he was recalled primarily as the 
great-grandfather of the Chevalier de La Barre, whose trial and execution for 
sacrilege in 1766 became a cause célèbre publicized by Voltaire and Linguet.60  
Canadian historians have long viewed him as a grasping bumbler whose brief tenure 
as governor of New France ended in a humiliating peace with the Iroquois that 
provoked his dismissal.61  As far as he is known today, he is remembered merely as 
one of many “desperate men and losers [who] would cross the ocean for another 
chance.”62 
                                                
58 The subordinate was Robert de Clodoré, who served as governor of Martinique during the Second 
Anglo-Dutch War, when La Barre was lieutenant-general of the West Indies fleet.  Clodoré, “Plaintes 
et Griefs présentées à Monseigneur de Colbert...contre Monsieur de La Barre, Lieutenant general en 
l’Amerique,” (c. 1670), 6-7.  According to Charles Baxter, between 1630 and 1670 only three 
intendants de l’armée made the transition from administrative to military service.  La Barre was the 
only one to enter the navy, though Jean Lauzon de Liré did serve overseas, as governor of Canada.  
Baxter, Servants of the Sword: French Intendants of the Army, 1630-1670 (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 1976), 50. 
59 Jacques François Artur, who served as médecin du roi at Cayenne in the eighteenth century and 
wrote an exhaustive manuscript history of the colony, opted to “imitate the discretion of [Tertre]...but 
without strictly demanding the same complacence from the reader.”  Jacques François Artur, Histoire 
des colonies françoises de la Guianne, ed. Marie Polderman (Guyane: Ibis Rouge, 2002; orig. 1778), 
195. 
60 J.-Edmond Roy, “La famille Lefebvre de La Barre,” Bulletin des recherches historiques 2 (1896): 
86-87; Chassaigne, “Un maître des requêtes,” 321. 
61 R. La Roque de Roquebrune, “Le Febvre de La Barre, Joseph-Antoine,” in Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography, URL: http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/le_febvre_de_la_barre_joseph_antoine_1E.html  
62 Philip Boucher, “French Proprietary Colonies,” 176-177. 
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But La Barre and his pamphlet deserve sustained critical attention: the 
Description was the first text resembling a manual for colonization ever published in 
France, and its pragmatic vision for planting Guyana broke from previous writings 
that had painted the colony simply as a paradise or a graveyard.  He was hardly above 
salesmanship—the title of his pamphlet referred suggestively to Guyana as El 
Dorado, and he consistently emphasized both the richness of the land and France’s 
unique ability to exploit it—but he was selectively frank about the difficulties of 
settlement and adamant that patience, hard work, and careful planning were necessary 
to overcome them.  The novelty of his pitch to would-be colons was that he 
acknowledged the pitfalls of planting and proposed ways to avoid them.  He had read 
the accounts of earlier, failed expeditions, analyzed their shortcomings, and, having 
acquired knowledge and experience of the land for himself, founded his own colony 
according to hard-headed principles that would guarantee its prosperity.  To prepare 
his recruits for the practical demands of Caribbean agriculture, he ostentatiously 
rejected the “chimeras” of the past in favor of “substance and facts [des solides et 
effectifs].”63   
The Description represented not only a shift in the marketing of Cayenne, but 
also the transmission to metropolitan readers of experiential knowledge then available 
only to resident planters and a handful of European visitors to the region.  Much of 
this knowledge consisted of a firsthand description and appraisal of Guyana’s 
potential for domestication that would discredit, he claimed, “the Deceptions with 
                                                
63 La Barre, Description, 11.   
 101 
which all Others who have written about it have filled their writings.”64  Equally 
important, he insisted, were his instructions about how to make the transatlantic 
crossing, where and how to found sustainable plantations, and how to maintain 
peaceful relations with the colony’s indigenous neighbors.  At a time when French 
ministers and planters were beginning to appreciate the value of sugar and other cash 
crops to European markets—and, consequently, to organize colonial ventures around 
their production—the need to disseminate such know-how to those who could 
capitalize large-scale agriculture seemed imperative.65  La Barre shared their sense of 
urgency: a near-fatal bout of tropical fever had prompted him to hasten his return to 
France “in fear of burying with my death the various connoissances I had acquired in 
my Voyage & during a thirteen-month stay in the Country.”66  By recording what he 
had learned, he hoped to find in print a more secure vessel for his knowledge than his 
mortal body, ensuring the enlightenment of his readers and the survival of his 
enterprise in the process. 
La Barre aimed to carve French territory out of Guyana by fusing a detailed 
description free of “vain hopes and fanciful rewards” with a specific plan of 
settlement and the connoissances necessary to effect it; but how did he make the land 
“knowable” to himself and his readers?  As a combined natural history, recruiting 
pitch, memorandum, guidebook, récit de voyage, and corporate origin story, the 
Description defined the past, present, and future of the colony.  It wove together two 
existing genres—chorography, and estate management literature—that had never 
                                                
64 La Barre, Description, 8. 
65 Philip Boucher, “French Proprietary Colonies,” 163-188. 
66 La Barre, Description, 8. 
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before been combined in France for the purpose of colonization.  Scrutinizing each 
one as it appeared in La Barre’s text makes it possible to understand how re-branded 
Guyana as a place that could be governed and exploited by the French despite their 
repeated failures to do so. 
As circulated in print, prior images of Guyana conveyed a sense of limitless 
economic possibilities but also a suspicion of the land as untenable.  Sir Walter 
Raleigh launched the first rush to explore the region by claiming that it contained “a 
greater quantity of gold than the best parts of the West Indies or Peru.”67  After 1612, 
the successful return of French scouting expeditions spawned a publicity boom that 
proclaimed Cayenne a new Eden, El Dorado, and a land of infinite abundance whose 
salutary climate cured all ills.68  Repeated attempts at colonization ended in disaster, 
however—one party was wiped out under a hail of Native arrows, another decimated 
                                                
67 Walter Raleigh, “La decouverture du beau, grand et riche empire de Guiana, avec un discours de la 
magnificque et opulente citté de Manoa, nommée par les Espagnols El Dorado,... parachevée en l'an 
1595 par sire Walter RAULEG [Raleigh],... traduit d'anglois en françois par Jacques De L’Obel, 
escuyer, sieur du Val, 1596, et de nouveau reveu et corrigé par le sieur Samuel De Beauvois,” c. 1598, 
BnF Mss. fr. 9670, f. 7v; Jean de Cilleuls, “Les grands voyages de Jean Mocquet, apothicaire du 
‘Cabinet des Singularitez’ de Louis XIII aux Tuileries,” Revue d’histoire de la pharmacie 49, no. 168 
(1961): 13.  The first printed edition of Raleigh’s Discovery of Guiana did not appear in French until 
1722, though the sources above suggest that his writings reached France shortly after his return to 
England. 
68 Boucher, France and the American Tropics to 1700: Tropics of Discontent? (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2008), 57-58.  In 1652 the crippled poet Paul Scarron, upon hearing of the 
virtues of Guyana from Cabart de Villermont, wrote a friend to say he was leaving France for the New 
World: “Mon chien de destin m’emmène dans un mois aux Indes Occidentales.  Adieu France!  Adieu 
Paris!...Je renonce aux vers burlesques, aux romans comiques et aux comédies pour aller dans un pays 
où il n’y aura ni Mazarins, ni faux béats, ni filous de dévotion, ni hiver, ni saisons, ni fluxion qui 
m’estropie, ni guerre qui me fasse mourir de faim.”  Scarron to Sarrazin, quoted in Debien and 
Châtillon, “La propagande imprimée,” 72.  According to Paul Boyer, migrants could expect to find a 
place of “perpetual spring” where “the vine bears grapes twice a year, all of the fruits and animals 
proliferate continuously in every season, and one never sees hail nor wintry weather that could harm 
them”; in such bounteous surroundings, “one man could do more work than four others could do in 
France,” and “people do not die but from extreme old age.”  Paul Boyer, Véritable narration de tout ce 
qui s’est fait et passé au voyage que Monsieur de Brétigny fit à l’Amérique Occidentale avec une 
description des moeurs et des provinces de tous les sauvages de cette partie du Cap de Nord avec 
dictionnaire de leur langue et un advis très nécessaire à tous ceux qui veulent habiter ce païs-là ou que 
désirent y establir des colonies (Paris: 1654), quoted in Debien and Châtillon, “La propagande 
imprimée”: 66. 
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by mutiny, famine, and Indian attacks—and by mid-century pamphleteers began to 
admit the hazards of settlement while invoking foreign accounts to corroborate their 
more enthusiastic claims.69  By the time La Barre published his Description, some 
still believed that Guyana was a paradise capable of yielding an easy fortune in 
brazilwood, tobacco, sugar, or gold, but skepticism was widespread enough that he 
made countering “Impostures” and proposing a realistic plan of settlement prevailing 
themes of his own case for colonization.  
Like many colonial writers, La Barre sought to free his readers of troublesome 
preconceptions of America by impugning the credibility of other sources while 
insisting upon his own bona fides as an observer and interpreter of his surroundings.  
His pamphlet contained only “things that I myself observed with care,” he claimed, 
“or which I learned from one of the most able Pilots of this age, who spent an entire 
year visiting all of the Rivers of this Coast.”  He distanced himself from previous 
authors by decrying “the lack of caution which all those who have talked of [Guyana] 
have brought to their writings...& the inclination they have had to amplify the 
smallest things, to silence the most considerable ones, or not to give them the esteem 
they deserve.”  The contrast was not simply one of integrity but of experience, since 
these writers’ misrepresentations stemmed in large part from “the lack of knowledge 
they have had of a Country where they have stayed [only] briefly or in which they 
remained like Prisoners in their Forts and Dwellings, without being able to educate 
themselves about the things of which they have written.”70  La Barre was not the only 
eyewitness to events in Guyana, but he claimed, as an intrepid representative of the 
                                                
69 Debien and Châtillon, “La propagande imprimée,” 65-79.  
70 La Barre, Description, 11-12. 
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king, to wield greater authority than anyone else by virtue of a clearer and better-
informed perception of the world around him.  He was particularly eager to discredit 
some members of his own party, whose “despair” at the sorry state of the Dutch 
colonists had promised “to do us more evil in one day than the service they could 
render in one month.”  Having immediately shipped these “weak Spirits [foibles 
Esprits]” back to France, he learned upon his return that they had been working ever 
since to prejudice the metropole against Cayenne.71  Their calumnies, like the “vain 
hopes and fanciful rewards” touted by dishonest authors, were both an obstacle to 
restoring public confidence in Guyana and a foil for the governor’s own pretensions 
to represent the colony faithfully.  
Between the Description and several memoranda to Colbert, La Barre invited 
his readers to see Cayenne as the linchpin of a new royal campaign to promote 
colonization in the New World.  The governor insisted that his company of some 
twenty investors—a tight-knit group of financiers, high-ranking officials, and Parisian 
merchants staked collectively at around 200,000 pounds—was merely the nucleus of 
a much larger venture.72  Within months of La Barre’s departure from France the 
                                                
71 “It is to [them] that Cayenne is indebted to the disgrace in which they have placed the Country 
during the entire year 1664 and up to May 1665 by the falsehoods they have spewed, & with which 
they have wished to conceal their cowardice and bury their shame.”  La Barre, Description, 5.   
72 “Car si tost que l’on sera maistre d’un poste que l’on y aura cinq ou 600 hommes establys et 
fortifiez la compagnie pretend en ce fortifiant...et faisant de nouveaux fonds mettre dix ou douze 
vaisseaux a la mer pour faire le commerce...des antilles de l’amerique et de la terre ferme qui n’est pas 
peu considerable et c’est a quoy il sera facile de parvenir car comme l’on ne risque que peu en mettant 
les effects sur des vaisseaux et que c’est ce que font chaque jour les negociants de toutte 
l’Europe...lorsque cette petite compagnie deviendra nombreux et puissant...il y aura une utilité...pour la 
grande compagnie.”  La Barre, “Mémoire sur les projets de la Compagnie qui se forme pour le Cap 
Nord et la Guyane,” ANOM FM, C14/1, ff. 85-85v (c. 1663).  See also La Barre, List of members of 
the Company of Cayenne, ANOM FM, C14/1, f. 84 (c. 1663) and “Mémoire des choses que la 
Compagnie demande à Sa Majesté pour l’entreprise de la Terre ferme de l’Amérique,” ANOM FM, 
C14/1, ff. 87-87v (1663).  The version of this scheme involving Africa and Canada was articulated in 
the edict of concession to the Company of Cayenne.  La Barre’s insistence that this company would 
give way to a larger one probably explains why Colbert, who normally distrusted small trading 
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West Indies Company indeed supplanted the Company of Cayenne, maintaining the 
same directors but adding five new shareholders and a sizable injection of royal 
funds.73  The same publicity campaign that would later produce the Description soon 
followed.74  By alluding implicitly to Colbert and explicitly to the new company, the 
governor’s pamphlet put forth a message that colonists and investors stood to join a 
vast enterprise, backed by the king, that would divert the New World’s wealth from 
English and Dutch coffers to French ones.75 
In contrast to charters and letters patent of the period, the Description 
mobilized no Christian or legal rhetorics of legitimation; instead, La Barre 
emphasized agriculture as the legitimating force behind his company’s possession of 
the land.76   Like some contemporary English colonizers, he was dismissive of any 
                                                                                                                                      
companies as inadequate to the task of carrying out overseas commerce, endorsed his proposal.  
Boucher, “Comment se forme un ministre colonial: L’Initiation de Colbert, 1651-1664,” Revue 
d’histoire de l’Amérique française 37 (1983): 441-444. 
73 The Compagnie des Indes occidentales, capitalized at approximately 7,000,000 pounds, bought out 
nearly every colonial proprietor in order to monopolize French trade with the West Indies.  Pierre 
Pluchon, Histoire de la colonisation française, vol. I (Paris: Fayard, 1991), 85-86.  Colbert may have 
embraced the Company of Cayenne as convenient cover for this imminent commercial coup.  See 
Mims, Colbert’s West India Policy, 63-83; Artur, Histoire, 195-197.   
74 The crown ensured that Renaudot’s Gazette of July 1664 announced the news that “Un des Navires 
que la Compagnie des Indes Orientales, a envoyez en l’Isle de Cayenne, vient d’arriver ici [La 
Rochelle], & nous apprend que le Sieur de la Barre y est tres bien établi: les Hollandois, & ceux des 
autres Nations qui s’en estoyent emparez, lui ayans volontairement remis le Fort, avec tout ce qui 
appartenoit aux François.  Il ajoûte qu’il y a desja trois villages composez de pres de 300 Familles de 
diverses Nations, qui ont cultivé les terres avec tant de soin, qu’outre les vivres qu’ils y recüeillent en 
abondance, ils ont, aussi, de grandes Habitations plantées de Cannes de sucre: tellement qu’il y a 
apparance qu’on pourra dans peu de temps, y faire un avantageux Commerce.”  Gazette, no. 93 (26 
July 1664), 761.   
75 La Barre claimed, alluding to Colbert, that the company was “sous la protection d’un des plus zelez 
Subjets que la France ait jamais veu posseder les bonnes grace de son Maistre.”  La Barre, Description, 
3.  
76 La Barre may have felt that the right of a Catholic prince to exercise dominion over heathen land 
was understood, and as for law, justifications of title might have seemed redundant when he already 
had in hand a royal concession, a notarized acte de prise de possession, and a treaty of capitulation 
from the colony’s Dutch, Native, and Jewish inhabitants.  For the articles of capitulation (18 May 
1664) and the acte de prise de possession (22 May 1664), see ANOM COL C14, vol. 1, ff. 74-77v and 
92-92v.  On the rhetoric of letters patent, see Tomlins, “Legal Cartography,” 321-322, 326-347. 
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claim to territory not based on direct cultivation of the land.77  He denounced the 
“languishing remainders” of the Dutch colony who cursed “a Land that they had not 
even deigned to cultivate, as if without any labor on their part, & without assistance 
from Europe, it would have provided them with all the necessities of life.”78  Previous 
French expeditions were no better, having consistently and short-sightedly neglected 
planting in favor of idleness, petty trade, and theft.  The English living nearby had 
“scattered dwellings” but not the “considerable Habitations” that comprised the new 
French settlement.  As for the “lazy” Indians, their agrarian lifestyle was restricted to 
subsistence farming.79  None of these groups held a valid claim to Guyana, he argued, 
because none had bothered to exploit its greatest resource—the soil—in a systematic 
way.   
In contrast, his own party of some 1,200 colonists, soldiers, and African slaves 
had embraced agricultural production as the organizing principle of their new colony.  
From the outset, each man had “willingly devoted himself to labor, from the Leader 
down to the smallest Boy.”  Their devotion to planting was impressive enough to earn 
them acceptance from their longtime foes: “The Indians who saw us as their old 
enemies, soon changed their minds...They told us that we were not of the Nation of 
those French who came before us, who did nothing but quarrel, fight, & kill each 
                                                
77 Pagden, Lords of All the World, 65-79; Tomlins, Freedom Boun: Law, Labor, and Civic Identity in 
Colonizing English America, 1580-1865 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 133-
189.  La Barre would adopt a similarly attitude in 1668 when, following the colony’s destruction at the 
hands of the English and their relocation of its Jewish inhabitants to Surinam, he would concede the 
Jews’ plantations to French bidders with the caveat that the original owners could reclaim title if they 
returned to work them within three years.  Artur, Histoire, 226. 
78 La Barre, Description, 5.  The Dutch may not have invested heavily in a settlement to which they 
held no right, but along with their Jewish cohabitants they established the first sucreries in Cayenne 
during the years preceding La Barre’s arrival, and both the terms of their capitulation and the accounts 
of Tertre and Artur suggest they had accomplished enough to leave “with pain in their hearts.” 
79 La Barre, Description, 5-7 (Dutch and French), 14 (English), 37-39 (Indians).   
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other; & who, instead of giving themselves over to labor and the planting of the Land, 
had no other occupation but to steal from [the Natives’] Gardens and Fields all they 
could take for their subsistence.”80  As a result they had become staunch allies.  La 
Barre’s expedition thus promised to overcome a fatal flaw that had bedeviled French 
settlements in America since first contact: the failure of migrants to commit to 
agriculture, which in turn produced starvation and conflict with indigenous 
neighbors.81  For him, the hard work of planting was not only necessary to the 
colony’s livelihood but also a source of optimism and moral purpose among the 
colonists, a cure-all for sickness, and a validation of the French presence in the eyes 
of its most inveterate opponents.  It followed from this notion of labor as redemptive 
and legitimating that what Cayenne needed in a leader was an administrator, like 
himself, with the capacity to manage its cultivation—not “a flashy captain, 
accompanied by trumpets, who only knows how to command soldiers,” as one of his 
informants put it, but rather “someone who knows how to command workers.”82 
In keeping with his role as planter-in-chief, La Barre envisioned a chronology 
of settlement that unfolded according to the demands of provisioning and market 
                                                
80 La Barre, Description, 6. 
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America (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984), 201-202.  Precisely a century before La Barre 
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82 Desbordes-Martin, “Mémoire sur l’établissement d’une nouvelle Compagnie pour Cayenne, avec 
description du pays, et de l’état où s’y trouvent les Hollandois,” 1662, ANOM COL C14, vol. 1, ff. 
190-194.  Brother Desbordes-Martin appears to have penned this memorandum shortly after meeting 
Paul Languillet, a ship’s captain who had lost everything in Royville’s ill-fated attempt to colonize 
Cayenne in 1651-1652 and then sailed there again in 1660-1661.  The two men agreed that previous 
expeditions had failed because their leaders had been too harsh and ostentatious, not knowing how to 
encourage settlers and make them work.  
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agriculture.  His party had spent the summer and fall burning away forest and 
building homes near the village of Cayenne (350 French, 50 slaves, a fort, a sugar 
mill), then passed the winter and spring planting foodstuffs and sugar cane.  The 
arrival of further supplies from France, he claimed, “spawned the desire among these 
new Americans to leave the confines of their Island, & to go into the mainland,” 
where fifty men settled along the coast at Kourou, in time to harvest 25,000 pounds of 
sea turtle meat to feed the rest of the colony.83  Soon the French founded, reinforced, 
or planned more settlements at Remire (60 Portuguese Jews with 80 slaves, 60 French 
with 25 slaves, a chapel, a sugar mill), Mahury (40 French, 40 slaves), Matoury (100 
French, 45 slaves), Sinamary (80 French), Comaribo (35 French), and Aprouaque, in 
addition to twenty-five or thirty isolated farms sprinkled throughout the island (60 
French, 20 slaves).  For La Barre, the features of these settlements worth stressing 
were their means of subsistence and production: population size and the presence of 
an enslaved African or free Indian workforce, available game and livestock, a sugar 
mill powered by oxen or water, and nearby moorings and waterways for transport.  In 
general, he defined first settlement as a process of “clearing forest and planting 
edibles”—not building mines or trading posts—since he felt that obtaining food and 
preparing farmland were critical to the ultimate goal of raising cash crops.84 
Chorography, or the detailed and systematic analysis of a region, was a natural 
means of expressing how this agricultural dynamic of colonization should play out 
spatially: if the overall peopling of Guyana conformed to the demands of cultivation, 
so its precise movements should follow the lay of the land on which that cultivation 
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 109 
depended.  The first two chapters of La Barre’s pamphlet therefore presented a 
comprehensive review of the area’s geography, topography, soil, climate, flora, fauna, 
and indigenous peoples.  Such intimate descriptions of foreign locales and their 
inhabitants were popular reading in France and the primary medium through which 
early-modern Europeans encountered unfamiliar spaces.85  Chorography’s narrative-
descriptive style was pervasive enough in the seventeenth century even to shape the 
language of legal documents, including colonial charters and letters patent, whose 
claims to territory read like “chorographic perambulations,” although they were 
increasingly glossed with precise measurements of latitude and longitude and other 
“scientistic impositions” that foreshadowed the conventions of Enlightenment 
cartography.86  In this respect the Description was no different—it, too, combined 
mathematical coordinates with topographical narrative to define space—but the 
comparatively lengthy format and loose conventions of a pamphlet allowed La Barre 
to engage in a thicker description of Guyana than legal paperwork would have done, 
affording him room to speculate as to how human, animal, and plant populations 
might be correlated with each other and the terrain to ensure a lasting and profitable 
colonization. 
La Barre’s description paid special attention to rivers, since at bottom the 
spatial pattern of settlement he envisioned for Guyana was fluvial: the principal 
means of connecting people and produce to ports and markets would be an abundance 
                                                
85 Chorographies and récits de voyage appeared regularly, for example, among the works published by 
the Clouzier brothers.  
86 Tomlins, “Legal Cartography”: 322-323, 345-346. 
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of waterways that had already channeled Europeans into specific sites of habitation.87  
Nearly every paragraph of his first chapter opened with the creeks and rivers that 
criss-crossed a given area.  Major rivers defined the boundaries of Guyana to the 
south (the Amazon) and to the north (the Orinoco), straddling perhaps 300 leagues of 
coastline veined by “an almost infinite number of Rivers, which provide a very great 
convenience to those who live there and would like to people this vast expanse of 
land, to which we place no limits in [the direction of] the interior.”88  France’s portion 
lay between the “Indian” and “Anglo-Belgique” Guyanas, bordered to the south by 
Cap d’Orange and to the north by the Marony River.  Relying on information gleaned 
from Native informants and the pilot he had hired to explore the region’s waterways, 
La Barre described the various harbors along the coast as well the width and depth of 
major tributaries, evaluating their potential as routes of transport.  His map (fig. 1) 
detailed their mouths, forks, and bends as far as these were known, along with the 
current state of the settlements that lined them.  In his account, water fundamentally 
defined promising and unpromising areas for colonization.  Indian Guyana was 
marshy and uninhabitable to Europeans, who suffered from its “bad and feverish air”; 
Anglo-Belgique Guyana hugged the Marony River, whose access to arable land did 
not begin until five or six leagues above a mouth cut perilously by sand bars; 
neighboring Surinam’s water-logged plains produced low-quality manioc and sugar 
and “barely enough food to feed its inhabitants.”  French Guyana, by contrast, 
boasted navigable streams that were accessible from the sea and bordered by rich 
                                                
87 On the ideological uses of chorography and potamography in contemporary French travel writing, 
see Tom Conley, The Self-Made Map: Cartographic Writing in Early Modern France (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 237-243. 
88 La Barre, Description, 13. 
 111 
highlands exposed to sunlight and salutary winds.89  Here “the Land is commonly 
fertile & abundant, & because heat and humidity are the principle causes of 
generation, one should not be surprised at the fine and frequent productions of a 
Country where these two qualities predominate.”90 
La Barre populated this well-irrigated landscape with flora, fauna, and 
indigenous peoples whose signal trait was a keen potential for exploitation.  
Unsurprisingly, his own study of local fruits, vegetables, pasture, seafood, and game 
had revealed enormous potential.91  As for the once-feared Galibi, Yao, Sapaye, 
Palicour, Aricaret, Marone, Paragotte, and Arrouague peoples, all were now “strongly 
diminished” and eager to obtain French protection and trade.  Their local knowledge 
made their friendship invaluable if France wished to explore the interior or develop a 
traffic in medicinal plants, he argued, and they were already prepared to help the new 
settlers with the more immediate work of burning forest and planting gardens.92  By 
emphasizing the Natives’ “small number,” commercial promise, and ongoing 
domestication, La Barre emptied Guyana of colonization’s greatest human obstacle, 
leaving only a rump contingent of willing allies who could facilitate the extraction of 
lucrative goods. 
                                                
89 La Barre, Description, 13-25. 
90 La Barre, Description, 29. 
91 La Barre, Description, 29-32. 
92 “They recognize at present that they must submit to Europeans,” he reassured his readers, “& are 
disabused of the notion that they can keep their Lands for themselves...They are lazy, & there is little 
service to be had from them.  Nonetheless it is good to maintain them as friends, & if they had the 
inclination to be more active, by their assistance we would have discovered Brazil, Aloes, Sadaux, & 
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have brought us some samples that have been found to contain a rare virtue.  Time will teach us more, 
[and] will supply us with the means to make a good trade of these things.”  La Barre, Description, 17 
(Mocquet), 34-41. 
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Once the terrain had been evacuated of hostile Indians and populated with 
edible plants and animals, La Barre was free to imagine how the French might profit 
from the land in ways similar to or better than other European states.  “If these things 
[plants and animals] are very advantageous for the feeding of our Habitants, the 
produce of the Earth for market will be no less so, since it gives to us all that Brazil 
supplies to the Portuguese, & of the same quality,” he promised.  The current state of 
each cash crop was promising.  Cayenne’s tobacco “is of much better quality than 
that of the islands,” its cotton “excellent,” and its rocou and indigo “under cultivation 
by our settlers.”  As for the colony’s sugar, henceforth it would be entirely “white and 
refined, & of an average price of 100 or 150 livres per hundred [weight], which we 
can accomplish with ease, & which is entirely impossible in the French Islands, as in 
the English, [since we have] rich Soil in abundance.”  The terre ferme also enjoyed a 
near-infinite supply of fuel, thanks to its immense forests, which would make the 
refinement of cane comparatively cheap.  And Guyana’s vast pasturelands would 
allow ranchers to generate “considerable profit” as well as a significant diminution of 
human labor.  Taken together, these advantages pointed to a future bright enough to 
outshine all other ventures:  
if it is true not only that an infinite number of 
inhabitants, French and English alike, have enriched 
themselves in the Antilles by [their] imperfect and 
defective goods, but [also] that the Towns of Flushing 
& Middelburg have profited several millions with them 
(of which we cannot doubt), what should we expect 
from our France Equinoctiale, after three or four years 
of settlement has given to our French the things 
necessary for their manufactures & to establish strongly 
their Sucreries & Refineries, which are barely begun 
 113 
since they planted their Colonies eighteen months 
ago?93 
 
In contrast to previous writers, La Barre framed Cayenne’s promise as contingent 
upon several years’ worth of labor and investment.  His pamphlet therefore cast the 
expert planter—not the conquistador, the missionary, the small freeholder, or the 
itinerant trader—as the leading protagonist of colonization. 
La Barre wrote in a chorographic idiom to make Guyana familiar and 
attractive to investors, but his plans to actually implement colonization drew upon 
another literature whose audience had grown dramatically over the previous century: 
estate management guides.  Since the outbreak of the Wars of Religion, an increasing 
number of Paris’s upwardly-mobile merchants and magistrates, including the 
LeFebvre family, had been “colonizing” the city’s outskirts, taking advantage of a 
buyer’s market occasioned by the wars to transform moribund fiefs and small 
holdings into sprawling domains adorned with chateaux and manicured parks.94  
Agronomic and horticultural manuals proliferated to meet the demand of new 
landowners for knowledge about how to improve their estates, cultivate gardens and 
orchards, and maintain a country house.95  By instructing readers to bring their lands 
under rational control, this literature nourished an improving agenda that men of 
state—including Henri IV and his Superintendant of Finances, the Duc de Sully, as 
                                                
93 La Barre, Description, 32-34. 
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95 On this horticutural literature in particular, see Chandra Mukerji, Territorial Ambitions and the 
Garden of Versailles (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 153-161. 
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well as Louis XIV and Colbert after them—embraced and applied to the realm as a 
whole.96  Although aristocratic observers remained ambivalent or hostile toward 
estate management as an effeminizing distraction from the masculine duties of public 
life, successive kings and the new men who served them were inspired by books such 
as Charles Estienne’s L’Agriculture et maison rustique (1574) and Olivier de Serres’ 
Le théâtre d’agriculture et mesnage des champs (1601) to see large-scale 
infrastructure projects, agricultural reform, and commercial regulation as beneficent 
tools of governance that promised to make France the leading economic power of 
Europe.97 
 Such works explicitly likened planting to politics.  The frontispiece of Serres’ 
Théâtre represented a monarch, perhaps Henri (to whom Serres dedicated the text), 
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for Modern Language Studies 49, no. 3 (Oct. 2012): 244-256.  For a list of non-academic editions, the 
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en agriculture au temps de Henri IV (Arles: Actes Sud, 2001), 309-311.  For Young’s comment, see 
Arthur Young, 20 August 1789, Travels in France during the years 1787, 1788 and 1789 (London: 
1790), quoted in Gourdin, Olivier de Serres, epigraph. 
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ruling over an orderly expanse of fields and formal gardens worked by his subjects, 
under which the phrase “Securitas Publica” was inscribed.98  According to Serres, 
careful and learned husbandry (bon mesnage) was the governing principle of both the 
well-managed estate and the well-ordered kingdom.  In both cases, peace and 
prosperity depended upon the ruler-patriarch’s moral and intellectual self-cultivation.  
Like the good king, the good landowner (bon mesnager or bon père-de-famille) must 
reside on his domain, surveille its dependents, and take an active role in its 
administration, which demanded a series of specialized connaissances treated 
thematically by Serres in separate chapters: he must know how to familiarize himself 
with the character of his lands and their soils, to choose and measure them wisely, to 
adapt his use of them to their natural qualities, to build and maintain a house suitable 
to his family’s needs, to conduct himself appropriately inside and outside the home, 
to design gardens and fields, to recognize what to plant and when, to manage his 
workforce, and to harvest, preserve, consume, sell, and distribute charitably the fruits 
of his labors.  Such “science...applied with Reason, led by Experience, & practiced 
with Diligence,” he claimed, would shield the tenderfoot landowner from the 
common pitfalls of avarice, sloth, and unrealistic expectations.99  For Serres, the 
estate was the state in microcosm, subject to the same improving vision of 
agricultural stewardship. 
 Whether La Barre ever read the Theatre d’Agriculture or any other guidebook 
is unknown, since evidence of his library has not survived, but both the Description 
                                                
98 Serres, Le théâtre d’agriculture, frontispiece and preface. 
99 Serres, Le théâtre d’agriculture.  For an analysis of the moral dimension of the Theatre 
d’Agriculture, see Patterson, “Avarice in the Moral Landscape of Olivier de Serres’s Theatre 
d’Agriculture et Mesnage des Champs (1600).”  
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and his own history of landholding suggest that he knew the challenges of estate 
management personally.  The LeFebvre were precisely the kind of urban neophytes to 
whom Serres had addressed his book.  In 1638 Joseph-Antoine’s parlementaire father, 
Antoine II, acquired the fief of La Barre, in Brie, providing his family for the first 
time with a provincial base to complement its residence in Paris.  Shortly thereafter 
he diverted water from the neighboring plain of Beaurose to irrigate the park, and it 
was probably on his initiative that a pond was transformed into a proper water feature 
divided into two parts separated by a bridge linking the château to the farm.  No 
evidence survives of Joseph-Antoine’s own involvement in the estate’s affairs either 
before or after his father’s death in 1669, but he was serving in province or overseas 
for many of these years; the large fortune and intact seigneurie he left behind at least 
suggest that he did not mismanage them.100  How well father and son fit Serres’ 
model of the bon mesnager, then, is difficult to say—as an absentee, Joseph-Antoine 
presumably did not—but their experience as landowners would have taught them the 
exigencies of governing a large estate and re-ordering the land to suit their needs, 
both fundamental themes of agricultural writing since at least the 1560s.101 
  La Barre extended the robe’s “colonization” of the Paris basin to Guyana.  
His own sizable plantation at Matoury, which he purchased in 1664 from the outgoing 
Dutch governor, appears to have turned a profit for him, his brother, and his son 
through at least the late 1680s.  Around 1672 it encompassed 30 livestock, two 
                                                
100 As of 1615 the estate had included a château, courtyard, garden, barn, cowshed, and walled 
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century as owners.  Michel Moresve, Ballade historique à Férolles-Attilly (Férolles-Attilly: 2004), 27-
29. 
101 See, for example, Estienne and Liébault’s text as well as Bernard Palissy, Recepte veritable (1563). 
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windmills, a fully-stocked sucrerie, and 78 African slaves—three times as many as 
there had been eight years before—in addition to the ten outbuildings, the main 
house, the kitchen, and the cane fields that had formed the original estate.102  As in 
the case of his father’s fief, La Barre’s precise role in the plantation’s success is 
unclear.  The vicissitudes of his career would soon take him to the West Indies, the 
Mediterranean, and Canada before his death in Paris in 1688, and he may not have 
returned more than once following the publication of his pamphlet.  But even if he did 
not embody the ideal landowner himself, he spent his first thirteen months in America 
surrounded by prosperous planters and seasoned informants who knew the demands 
of Caribbean agriculture.  If he consulted them, he would not have been the first 
colonial governor to appropriate the vernacular knowledge of planters.103  Whether 
his ideas originated in personal experience, word-of-mouth, or prescriptive literature, 
he formed definite opinions about how new arrivals to Guyana should manage the 
founding of their own habitations. 
                                                
102 By the terms of capitulation, La Barre’s company compensated the Dutch for their plantations, 
agreeing to pay the Dutch governor, Guérin Spranger, 21,850 florins for his plantation alone, which 
included ten houses, some ripe and immature sugar cane, a cane field, a crop of cassava, 26 
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India Policy, 67 and 67n30; Artur, Histoire, 203.  For the state of the plantation in the 1670s and 
1680s, see Compte et accord entre Antoine Joseph Lefebvre de La Barre et Cyprien Lefebvre de Lézy, 
Archives Nationales, Minutier Central, ETXII 179, ff. 1-1v (5 March 1680); “Inventaire des effets qui 
sont sur l’habitation de Mathoury appartenant a Messieurs de La Barre, de Lezy et de Thiene,” ibid, ff. 
2-4v (4 March 1679, orig. “devant la guerre des hollandois”); Sale of house, slaves, livestock, 
dependances, droits by Joseph-Antoine Lefebvre de La Barre to François Lefebvre de La Barre, AN 
MC ETXII, 202-203, ff. 1-3v (20 November 1687).  
103 A model in this regard was Longvilliers de Poincy, governor of Saint Christopher (1638-1660), 
who kept a copy of Estienne’s L’Agriculture et maison rustique on hand while building an 
incomparably-rich sugar plantation from the knowledge of Dutch immigrants.  “Inventaire après décès 
du bailli de Poincy”; Michel-Christian Camus, “Le général de Poincy, premier capitaliste sucrier des 
Antilles,” in Le sucre, de l’Antiquité à son destin antillais (Paris: CTHS, 2000), 77-84.  During a stop 
in Martinique on his way to Guyana in 1665, La Barre stayed with a rich planter, Samuel-François Le 
Vassor de La Touche, who may have introduced him to the methods of plantation agriculture there.  
Chassaigne, “Un maître des requêtes,” 335n6.   
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 La Barre expressed those opinions most fully in the final chapter of his 
pamphlet, “On the manner in which one must act to undertake these new Colonies, 
with the use of Embarkation timetables & things necessary to make them succeed.”  
The chapter served as an instruction manual for new colonists, whom La Barre 
understood to be city-dwelling and thus inexperienced men of means who wished to 
put down roots in Guyana after reading his account.  He assumed that his readers 
would bring their households and tenants with them (their “gens” or “monde”), that 
they would be tempted to overspend and overpack, and that they might not be 
prepared for the difficulties of the crossing, the climate, the food, and the hard labor 
of planting ahead of them.  “I do not believe I can refrain from teaching them the 
ways in which they must conduct themselves to succeed most profitably,” he 
declared, “since one can bear more fruit with a moderate expense, directing it toward 
useful things and taking advantage of the most suitable weather, than with a much 
larger one [if he were] not observing these circumstances.”104  His audience could rest 
assured that his instructions were drawn from “lessons that experience alone has 
taught us.”  He was in the midst of outfitting a sizeable fleet to return to the colony, 
he promised, and would be there himself to greet newcomers, whom he did not want 
“to have reason to complain once there that I had filled them with vain hopes.”105 
Much of La Barre’s advice focused on the details of outfitting and executing 
the transatlantic crossing, but always with the broader concerns of planting in mind.  
Colonists must leave France in spring to arrive in June, he urged, since “the foremost 
of all labors is that of felling & burning Woods, to ready the Land to be worked and 
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planted,” which could only be done in the dry season.  A late departure meant almost 
certain failure: those attempting to work during the “great rains” would “render their 
Gens useless, cause them great inconveniences, and even some sicknesses” as they 
were forced “to plant the cultivated Soil slowly and laboriously [de longue main],” all 
the while requiring nourishment at great expense and little return.  During the voyage, 
planters must see to their workers’ health, thereby ensuring their readiness to labor 
upon arrival.  Giving them wine instead of water to drink would prevent dysentery.  
Providing a year’s worth of flour would allow them to habituate themselves gradually 
to manioc, since indigestion, on top of the taxing change of climate, would cause their 
bodies great suffering.  Foodstuffs were the most important cargo, but migrants must 
be wary of “those who pressure them to burden themselves with delicacies, & to 
spend all of their tidy sum on Brandy, Hams, Jams, and other goodies”—brandy in 
particular being responsible every year for the deaths of “more than fifty People” who 
overindulge.106  La Barre also listed a few trade goods and farm tools that colonists 
should pack, warning them otherwise to avoid the useless and untradeable “Baubles 
that most People bring.”  In all of these cases, his recommendations ultimately sought 
to prepare future habitants and their dependents for the demands of agricultural 
production, with the strong implication that success or failure in planting hinged in 
large part upon choices made before departure from France. 
That was no less true of the planter’s choice of laborers, which for La Barre 
represented the most crucial set of decisions a prospective colonist would make.  “To 
enjoy a favorable success in his enterprise, one must above all observe the quality of 
                                                
106 La Barre, Description, 45-46, 48, 50-51. 
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the People he wishes to bring to establish new Colonies,” the governor warned.  Like 
Serres, he believed the surveillance and well-being of workers to be of paramount 
concern to the landowner; unlike Serres, he attributed this concern less to any moral 
imperative on the part of the planter than to the productive maintenance of morale.  
The worst mistake one could make was to hire “men whom one has filled with vain 
hopes or fanciful ideas,” he argued, since they would undoubtedly become afflicted 
with “the most dangerous sickness of this Country...which we call the stomachache 
[mal d’estomach], which comes but from an obstruction caused by regret and 
melancholy, leading those attacked by it to the grave within a few weeks.”  Like the 
“weak Spirits” he had shipped back to France, such men were convinced they would 
find all they desired in Guyana “without any trouble or work” and “are deeply 
stunned when one employs them at labors ruder than those to which our Peasants in 
Europe are normally accustomed.”  Coupled with the unfamiliar food and climate, the 
shock of hard labor became too much for them, with the result, beyond their untimely 
demise, that their passage and board became a sunk cost to the planter.  With the 
exception of skilled tradesmen, then, he must avoid hiring the young men of the 
towns (“debauched...the plague of new Colonies”) in favor of “Peasants and Gens 
accustomed to work, & to the sort of food that people of the Countryside ordinarily 
eat.”  It was essential, moreover, that he explain to them before departure the nature 
and extent of the labors ahead of them.  Without any cause for surprise or 
disappointment upon arrival at Cayenne, they would be primed to “give themselves 
over to the pleasure of their work, which is the most advantageous thing one can 
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procure for the preservation of their health.”107  La Barre thus connected the physical 
welfare, contentment, and moral character of laborers to their productive potential 
and, by extension, to the ultimate prosperity of the plantation. 
The number and “Nation” of a planter’s gens was likewise a critical factor in 
his success, one whose calculus La Barre expected to evolve over time.  He did not 
want colonists “to spend too much up front on their first establishments, nor to burden 
themselves with the passage of a great number of Men,” since a large work party 
would have to waste time and provisions constructing lodgings for themselves and 
shelter for their supplies instead of clearing land and planting food.  The successful 
colonist thus brought just “a small number of choice Men, perhaps ten,” who could 
build themselves one modest dwelling before swiftly turning their attention to 
deforestation and the growing of enough food to feed twenty more workers by the 
following year.  Fewer men also meant a lower risk of death from disease, which was 
a real danger mainly during the first twelve months or so.108  Only a limited portion of 
these men, moreover, should be slaves—no more than two-thirds.  “It is not that the 
blacks are not much better workers, & cost much less than the French,” he explained, 
“but it is important to establish one’s security upon those of his own Nation, & to 
prefer in the first year those who give it to you to those who could make you a greater 
                                                
107 La Barre, Description, 46-48.  Artur painted a more sympathetic portrait of those shocked by their 
first look at a new colony: “...men without experience, arrived in a country decried for its almost 
constant rains at precisely the height of the wet season, and who did not foresee that the rains would 
become more bearable as more land was cleared, who instead of well-built towns and cultivated fields 
saw only a heap of huts covered by a few palm fronds, endless woods filled with creeper and thorny 
plants and which they could not enter except by several tortuous paths—barely practicable—which led 
them into the muck and the mire, and past small clearings where they saw only nude slaves and some 
half-covered Whites, as it happens in the beginning of such settlements.  That alone could have 
strongly discouraged Europeans who perhaps had imagined something else entirely from the 
exaggerated descriptions and magnificent promises that similar companies had not failed to impose 
upon the public.”  Artur, Histoire, 203. 
108 La Barre, Description, 49-50. 
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profit, but in whom you cannot trust.”  Alluding to the specter of slave resistance in 
an undermanned colony, the governor warned his readers not to sacrifice safety to 
their lust for gain, reminding them “that it is rather agreeable to risk little up front, & 
that one does it more boldly when small beginnings have almost assured you the 
success of a greater enterprise.”109  The time to invest in more labor—and a greater 
proportion of enslaved labor—lay in the near future of larger, better-policed estates, 
stable revenue streams, and integrated commercial empire. 
The need for the planter to identify his long-range interests with a modest 
outlay and the good of his workers remained critical after arrival in the New World.  
Echoing Serres and other proto-agronomists, La Barre feared that his recruits would 
foolishly chase short-term commercial profits to the detriment of their laborers and 
the long-term prospects of their estates.  Their error would be compounded by a 
mistaken belief in the arability of freshly-cleared soil: “Once [the colonists] have 
arrived...may they apply themselves above all to growing vivres, before dreaming of 
whatever can bring them marchandises, since beyond the fact that newly-uncovered 
Land is not good for Cane nor for Tobacco, Cotton, Indigo, & Rocou, & that Labor 
and Sunlight must prepare it first, it is more essential to consider the subsistence of 
your Gens than to think of your profit.”  Edibles such as manioc, beans, potatoes, 
yams, corn, and wheat were vital to the subsistence of workers during the critical first 
                                                
109 La Barre, Description, 50.  He might have added that the three-year timeline of indenture contracts 
would expire around the same time that labor-intensive crops should overtake provisioning as the 
plantation’s primary activity (see below), conveniently allowing the embryonic corps of French 
peasants to give way to a larger, cheaper, more productive workforce of African slaves just as they 
were most needed.   
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stages of planting, he argued, and grew better in “new Land,” anyway.110  Growing 
indigo and cane in deficient soil was all the more pointless if only a half-starved 
workforce remained to harvest and refine them.  Eight decades before Samuel Martin 
and other “improving” planters began to tout the agricultural, financial, and 
humanitarian benefits of planting provisions, La Barre mobilized primitive soil 
science and a mercenary concern for the welfare of laborers to convince his readers to 
privilege their investment in men over quick and illusory riches.111  If mitigated by 
the right kind of knowledge and attitude, he suggested, the egoism that had 
undermined previous ventures could be redirected to serve the long-term interests of 
individual planters, dependent laborers, and the colony alike. 
La Barre’s case for a sustainable model of planting preceded and 
overshadowed his instructions about actually growing commodities for market.  Only 
when the risk of disease and starvation had abated and the land was sufficiently 
“cultivated and heated by the Sun,” he declared, should colonists begin to diversify 
their farming to include cash crops.  Yet his advice about how to proceed was sparse: 
“In rich Lands one can plant Corn, Beans, and Manioc in the same Field, but he must 
observe that the latter does better in elevated and dry Soils, & that Sugar Canes do 
best in lowlands, where Indigo does not grow at all, but rather demands Hills & Soils 
that are never waterlogged.  Cotton grows everywhere and Rocou Trees as well.”112  
Beyond these generalities, he offered no information about where, when, or how to 
                                                
110 With the exception of corn and potatoes, which “by our Observation...do not grow as well in new 
Land as in that which has already been cultivated & heated by the Sun.”  La Barre, Description, 51. 
111 Samuel Martin, An Essay Upon Plantership (Antigua: T. Smith, 1750 ed), 12-14.  On the context 
of Martin’s emphasis on provisioning, see Justin Roberts, Slavery and the Enlightenment in the British 
Atlantic, 1750-1807 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 43. 
112 La Barre, Description, 51-52. 
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plant these goods, where to acquire seeds, how to manage their growth, the nature and 
extent of the labor they required, or how and when to harvest, process, and sell 
mature product.  Such know-how was either limited to resident planters or did not yet 
exist outside of more advanced English, Dutch, and Portuguese settlements, where 
colonists would not begin to record it until the 1670s nor to synthesize it into printed 
manuals until the mid-eighteenth century.113  Given the limits of his own experience, 
La Barre may not have known more than he wrote.  Probably he assumed that newly-
arrived planters would learn all they needed from seasoned locals, as was customary 
elsewhere in the Caribbean.114  Whatever the case, his silence regarding production 
further emphasized foundations—the transatlantic crossing, provisional farming, and 
a sustainable long-term approach—over the later work of growing foodstuffs for 
market. 
Taken together, La Barre’s instructions fashioned an ideal planter-patriarch 
who, like the ideal governor, was “someone who knows how to command workers.”  
By training his readers to select, deploy, and value labor, he encouraged them to 
regulate their own conduct in ways that maximized the long-term productivity of their 
                                                
113 With the exception of private correspondence, of course, in which such knowledge circulated from 
the earliest years of colonization onward.  Even after planters had begun to record their knowledge for 
widespread use, experimentation and the influx of slave labor would generate a continuous revision of 
best practices.  In Barbados, for example, knowledge of planting initially spread by word-of-mouth, 
within and beyond the island, then began to be recorded in the 1670s by Henry Drax, whose 
manuscript “instructions” to planters were revised by fellow Barbadians as the island’s plantation 
culture evolved; eventually these instructions were appended to William Belgrove’s printed manual, A 
Treatise upon Husbandry or Planting (1755).  Thus individual knowledge distributed orally became 
“community knowledge” circulated in manuscript and eventually formal knowledge disseminated in 
print.  See Roberts, Slavery and the Enlightenment, esp. 42-43.  Belgrove (1755); Gibbes (1797); 
Préfontaine (1763). 
114 On the human transfer of planting knowledge between islands (Barbados and Jamaica), see 
Amussen, Caribbean Exchange, 73-74.  La Barre himself hoped to learn advanced sugar-refining 
methods from the Portuguese Jews of Brazil, who carried their knowledge to Guyana, Surinam, 
Martinique, Nevis, and other colonies in these years.  Mordehay Arbell, The Jewish Nation of the 
Caribbean: The Spanish-Portuguese Jewish Settlements in the Caribbean and the Guianas (Jerusalem: 
Gefen, 2002), 36-54.  
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estates.  To make a plantation colony succeed in Guyana where others had failed, 
those whom he held most responsible for past miscarriages—the principal colonists 
and proprietors—would have to take the lead in imposing order on the natural and 
moral wilderness of America.  In this respect they resembled the ideal landowners 
who oversaw the “improvement” of the French countryside.  A plantation, like a 
provincial estate, posed problems of financial, ecological, and labor management that 
were best met with a mixture of formal knowledge (science), practical wisdom 
(expérience), and determination (diligence).  La Barre’s innovation was to blend these 
principles into an ethic of colonization that explicitly linked individual planters’ 
economic behavior with the achievement of French commercial and imperial designs, 
much as Serres and Estienne had done for metropolitan landowners and the 
agricultural rebirth of the kingdom. 
La Barre’s Description produced no stampede to people Guyana, nor, if the 
sporadic course of planting over the following decades is any indication, did it serve 
directly as the basis of a permanent settlement there.115  But it did shape enduring, 
influential narratives of French colonization in the New World.  The Old Regime’s 
leading historians of the French Antilles, Jean-Baptiste du Tertre and Jean-Baptiste 
Labat, relied upon it to reconstruct the colony’s first years and the founding of the 
West Indies Company, and they echoed La Barre’s belief in the centrality of planting 
                                                
115 Cayenne was sacked by the English in 1667, seized temporarily by the Dutch in 1676, and 
otherwise subjected to attack or encroachment by France’s rivals to the point that by 1743, according 
to one visitor, its population had been reduced to 90 Europeans, 125 Indian slaves, and 1,500 African 
slaves, and there remained only 60 rocouries, 19 sugar plantations, and four indigoteries.  Despite 
these periods when the colony languished or appeared to fail, the same observer insisted upon a 
fundamental continuity of settlement stretching back to La Barre, the colony’s “founder,” as Artur 
would do thirty years later.  Barrère, Nouvelle relation, 45-46, 50. 
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to the future of France’s tropical possessions.116  His pamphlet helped to produce 
empire by appropriating foreign spaces to a particular vision of territoriality—a vision 
that Tertre, Labat, and others would promote through their own accounts of colonial 
expansion.117   
 
 
The Science of the Conqueror: Jean-Baptiste du Tertre, History, and the Governance 
of Caribbean Colonies 
 
French administrators brought books to America by the boxful.118  If the 
surviving evidence is any indication, History, which encompassed geography and 
travel writing, was well represented in their libraries.119  Within the genre, Antiquity, 
modern European states, and overseas voyages appear to have been the most popular 
subjects.  La Barre cited Jean Mocquet’s Voyages (1616) to Asia, Africa, and the 
                                                
116 Labat, Voyages, t. I: 150-299;  
117 Labat, Voyages, t. I: 150-299; Tertre, Histoire, t. IV: 122-128; Artur, Histoire. 
118 The Chevalier de Poincy, lieutenant général of the Antilles, kept more than 150 books and 
manuscripts in his home on Saint Christopher.  Governor of Martinique Phélypeaux du Verger housed 
hundreds of volumes in his cabinet.  Governor of Canada Montmagny left behind several texts when 
he returned to France in 1648.  “Inventaire après décès du bailli de Poincy”; Pontchartrain to Bignon, 6 
March 1714, ANOM COL B, vol. 36, f. 98; Antoine Roy, “Ce qu’ils lisaient,” Cahiers de Dix, vol. 20 
(1955): 202.  Although inventories after death have survived in only a handful of cases, and some were 
recorded after their subjects had retired to the metropole (where they presumably maintained larger 
libraries), administrators appear to have wielded among the most extensive collections of books in the 
New World.  By comparison with other literate colonists, intendants and governors such as Michel 
Begon (roughly 7,000 volumes), Antoine-Denis Raudot (1,500 titles in 2,000 volumes), Michel Begon 
de la Picardière (58 titles in 230 volumes), François de Beauharnois (88 in 205), Poincy (90 titles), 
Jacques de Meulles (140 volumes), and Jacques Raudot (83 volumes) all owned exceptionally large 
numbers of printed works—on par with the libraries of the Parisian robe nobility from which most of 
them came.  Duplessis, Michel Begon: un curieux du XVIIe siècle, 7; “Inventaire après décès...de 
Poincy”; Jean-Claude Dubé, “Les intendants de la Nouvelle-France et la République des Lettres,” 
Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française, vol. 29, no. 1 (1975): 42-43.  By comparison, the largest 
known library in New France between 1650 and 1700 was owned by Louis Rouer de Villeray (34 titles 
in 42 volumes), a notary and member of the Sovereign Council.  Patricia Fleming, Gilles Gallichan, 
and Yvan Lamonde, eds.  History of the Book in Canada: Beginnings to 1840 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2004), 204.  
119 Their reading varied according to personal taste, but fragmentary evidence suggests that histories 
occupied a substantial portion of their reading: 39 of Beauharnois’ 88 books were histories, as were 14 
of Poincy’s 90 and 10 of Begon de la Picardière’s 58.  The other most popular genres were theology 
and jurisprudence.  Dubé, “Les intendants”: 42-43; “Inventaire après décès...de Poincy.” 
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Americas in his pamphlet and probably read both Antoine Biet’s (1664) and Jean de 
Léry’s (1578) accounts of expeditions to Brazil and Cayenne.  Governor of New 
France Louis de Buade de Frontenac owned copies of Caesar’s Commentaries, 
Champlain’s Voyages (1632), and Jean de Lartigue’s La Politique des Conquérants 
(1662), the last of which aimed to teach rulers the “Science of the Conqueror” in the 
manner of Aristotle’s instructions to Alexander.120  Governor of Martinique Philippe 
de Poincy kept a copy of Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans on hand, 
along with numerous histories and descriptions of Malta, the Papacy, Madagascar, 
Brazil, Canada, and the West Indies in French, Spanish, English, and Dutch.  Whether 
or not these volumes were read and to what end is impossible to say, but at the very 
least, their owners considered them worth the trouble and cost of shipping. 
What is certain is that the authors of some of these works believed that 
colonial administrators would read them and apply the lessons they contained to the 
business of governance.  The three most popular and influential histories of the 
Antilles published in France under Louis XIV all professed to serve a didactic 
purpose.  Biet hoped that his firsthand account of Royville’s disastrous expedition—
which had been destroyed by greed, mutiny, and the assassination of its chief by 
would-be “petty Kings”—would “serve as a lesson to those who wish to undertake 
something similar, if they want to direct their enterprise to a happy end.”  Charles de 
Rochefort peppered his Histoire naturelle et morale des Antilles with moralizing 
asides about French and foreign officers.  Tertre opened his Histoire générale des 
Antilles with the “hope that [this book] will be useful to the Preservation of the 
                                                
120 “Inventaire après décès du Marquis de Frontenac,” (22 April 1699), in Nouvelles Archives de l’Art 
français, 3e série, vol. XV, Revue de l’art français ancien et moderne (Paris: Charavay, 1899), 225; 
Jean de Lartigue, La politique des Conquérants (Paris: Barbin, 1663 ed.), dedicatory epistle. 
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French Colonies...Governors will learn by the conduct of those who preceded them to 
avoid that which has been the ruin of some, & to practice that which has raised the 
fortunes of others.”121  All three authors were clerics, not royal servants, but each had 
been an eyewitness to events in the New World, and all felt that their writings could 
strengthen France’s empire by providing a mirror for governors.122 
They had reason to expect a favorable reception, since colonial officials had 
been instrumental collaborators in the production of their texts.  Rochefort received 
memoranda, maps, drawings, a Carib vocabulary, and glittering testimonials from 
Poincy and the Protestant leaders of colonies in Florida, all of which he appended to 
the second edition of his work.123  Biet wrote his account with the help of Royville’s 
                                                
121 Biet, Voyage de la France Equinoctiale en l’isle de Cayenne (Paris: F. Clouzier, 1664), preface; 
Charles [sometimes César] de Rochefort, Histoire naturelle et morale des Antilles, 2 vols. (Lyon: 
Fourmy, 1667 ed.; orig. 1658), 96-98; Tertre, Histoire générale des Antilles habitées par les françois 
(Paris: Jolly, 1667-1671), dedication.  Rochefort’s text became influential in England, where John 
Davies translated and plagiarized it, repackaging it in the process as a description of the English 
Caribbean—one of only two anglophone works on the English Caribbean to appear in the seventeenth 
century (the other being Richard Ligon’s 1657 A True and Exact History of the Island of Barbados.  
See Nicolas Canny, “French and English Contributions Compared,” in Migration, Trade, and Slavery 
in an Expanding World: Essays in Honor of Pieter Emmer, ed. Wim Klooster (Leyden: Brill, 2009), 
217-218.  Tertre’s history has been the most complete account of the seventeenth-century French 
Antilles since its debut.  It provided the foundation of nearly every eighteenth-century history of the 
French Caribbean, most notably Jean-Baptiste Labat’s Nouveau Voyage aux îles Françoises de 
l’Amérique (1722), and it remains a touchstone primary source for historians, historical 
anthropologists, and natural historians of the West Indies.  Garraway, The Libertine Colony; Stephan 
Lenik, “Carib as a Colonial Category: Comparing Ethnohistoric and Archaeological Evidence from 
Dominica, West Indies,” Ethnohistory 59, no. 1 (2012): 80-81; Frederick H. Smith, “European 
Impressions of the Island Carib’s use of Alcohol in the Early Colonial Period,” Ethnohistory 53, no. 3 
(Summer 2006); J. H. Galloway, “Tradition and Innovation in the American Sugar Industry, c. 1500-
1800,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 75, no. 3 (1985): 334-351; Wayne Burke 
and W. George Lovell, “Demise at the Edge of Empire: Native Depopulation in Dominica, 1493-
1647,” Conference of Latin American Geographers Yearbook 26 (2000): 1-16; Marco Masseti, 
“Anthropochorous Mammals of the Old World in the New,” International Journal of the Systematics, 
Biology & Ecology of Mammals 75 (2011): 113-142. 
122 Before the mid-1670s, every narrative history of the Antilles published in France was written by a 
cleric, with one exception: Guillaume Coppier’s Histoire et Voyage des Indes occidentales (Lyon: 
1645).  On this obscure text and the history of its reception, see Gerard M. Hunt, Desperate in Saint 
Martin: Notes on Guillaume Coppier (Bloomington, IN: Trafford, 2012). 
123 Poincy obtained the vocabulary from a local Dominican, Raymond Breton, who also supplied Du 
Tertre with information drawn from Carib sources.  Rochefort, Histoire, letters; Jacques de Dampierre, 
 129 
godson, the royal librarian Jerôme Bigot, whose assistance vouched for its accuracy 
and presumably gave Biet access to official papers.124  And Tertre used his own 
connections in Paris and the islands to acquire and reproduce in his history thousands 
of “authentic documents” of all kinds supplied by the crown, governors, intendants, 
lieutenants-general, churchmen, merchants, company directors, secretaries, and 
colonists, including the personal archive of Nicolas Fouquet, the king’s former 
Superintendant of Finances and a leading promoter of colonization throughout the 
1650s.125  The three authors were hardly like-minded—Tertre, a Dominican, accused 
the Huguenot Rochefort of plagiarism and outright fabrication, and he denounced the 
Jesuit Biet for his portrayal of Dominican missionaries as impious libertines—but in 
the same sort of feedback loop that characterized Villermont’s gazeteering, all used 
privileged access to administrative sources to interpret colonization for agents of the 
crown.126 
The unparalleled documentation, scope, and influence of Tertre’s narrative 
makes it a particularly useful window onto contemporary efforts to define a colonial 
science of governance.  He not only drew on greater experience of the islands and a 
wider range of sources than his rivals, he also devoted more space to analyzing the 
successes and failures of past governors, and his work was read by officials on both 
                                                                                                                                      
Essai sur les sources de l’histoire des Antilles françaises (1492-1664) (Paris: Picard, 1904), 120, 137-
145.   
124 Biet, Voyage, preface. 
125 Tertre excerpted long passages from these records or reproduced them in full in the midst of his 
narrative.  Tertre, Histoire, vol. I, preface and vol. III, preface. 
126 Tertre wrote bitterly of Rochefort’s work that “almost all [of it]...was so faithfully taken from my 
Book, that he did not even omit the mistakes I made.”  Tertre, Histoire générale, vol. I, preface. 
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sides of the Atlantic.127  His attempt to reconcile classical and contemporary models 
of rule with the unprecedented demands of New World settlements testifies to the 
intellectual ferment generated by the ongoing royalization of the colonies at the time 
of his writing.  By diagnosing the ills of some governments and celebrating the 
virtues of others, Tertre hoped to point a way forward for administrators whose 
primary frames of reference were classical or French rather than American.  Biblical 
patriarchs and Roman heroes were useful moral exemplars, he implied, but governing 
the islands well also required practical solutions tailored to unfamiliar New World 
problems. 
Tertre drew his lessons from a series of character studies of royal and 
proprietary governors spanning the first four decades of French settlement in the 
Caribbean.  Beginning with Belain d’Esnambuc in Saint Christopher and continuing 
through the sieurs d’Olive, Plessis, Aubert, and Houel in Guadeloupe, Parquet in 
Martinique, Le Vasseur at La Tortuga, and Poincy, Patrocles, La Barre, and Tracy as 
lieutenants-general of the Antilles, he defined a series of qualities that differentiated 
good officers from bad.  The composite good governor was courageous, wise, affable, 
civil, prudent, just, public-minded, pious, well-bred, wealthy, gentle, and masculine; 
the bad was weak, cowardly, rash, greedy, deceitful, licentious, tyrannical, bellicose, 
impious, cruel, and unjust.  These were stock political virtues and vices that lent 
themselves to classical or medieval parallels.  Esnambuc fought “like Alexander,” 
                                                
127 When Tertre made his second voyage to the islands in 1656, Governor of Martinique Parquet 
corrected him about some details of his earlier Histoire Générale des îles des Saint Christophe, de la 
Guadeloupe, de la Martinique, et autres dans l’Amerique (Paris: Langlois, 1654), which served as the 
basis for Tertre’s later, more comprehensive history.  Tertre, Histoire Générale des Antilles, vol. 1, 
192-193.  See also Pierre Arnoul’s purchase of Tertre’s history in “Despence faitte par boulliet a 
commencer du [blank] octobre apres avoir arresté les comptes du voiage d’Italie,” BnF NAF 21402, 
fol. 48v (Apr. 18, 1673); Poincy owned the Histoire Générale des îles des Saint Christophe.  See 
“Inventaire après décès...de Poincy.”   
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rendered justice simply and directly like Louis IX, and deserved the same adoring 
homage in death that Virgil had rendered to Caesar.  Olive’s and Plessis’s 
mismanagement of Guadeloupe created a famine worthy of Josephus’s Jerusalem.  Le 
Vasseur’s heresy, burdensome taxes, and overweening ambition to reign “more like a 
King than a Governor” were repaid at the point of a sword wielded by his own 
adopted son, to whom he cried out, “as Caesar once did to Brutus, Hé, so it is you, 
Tibaut, who kills me.”128   
Despite these analogies, Tertre portrayed the colonies as a unique test of 
character that posed special challenges rooted in their particular origins.  Their 
essential problem, he contended, was that they were states conceived in greed.  What 
had pushed Europeans to settle the Americas was “the desire to possess riches...which 
had never acted so powerfully upon the heart of Europe’s inhabitants than it has since 
1493.”129  Avarice had already doomed numerous expeditions by turning their leaders 
against each other and poisoning relations with indigenous peoples, as had been the 
case in Guadeloupe and Cayenne.130  Tertre found no precedent for the corrosive lust 
for gain inherent to colonization.  It was a new phenomenon, and it aggravated the 
“thousands of unexpected events” and “almost invincible obstacles” the French 
encountered by encouraging governors to disobey their orders and oppress the 
                                                
128 “The greatness of his virtues does not require this public recognition to render immortal the name 
of the GREAT D’ENAMBUC, & I can say of him what Virgil said of the great Caesar, In freta dum 
fluvii current, dum montibus umbro / Lustrabunt convexa ; Polus dum sydera pascet, / Semper honos, 
nomenque tuum, laudesque manebunt [While rolling rivers into the sea shall run; / And round the 
space of heav’n the radiant sun; / While trees the mountain tops with shades supply, / Your honor, 
name, and praise shall never die].”  Tertre, Histoire Générale, vol. I, 119-120.  In fact these words 
from The Aeneid were spoken by Aeneas in praise of Dido, not Caesar.  Virgil, The Aeneid, trans. John 
Dryden (New York: Collier and Son, 1909; orig. 1697), 96-97.  For the Alexander, Clovis, Jerusalem, 
and Caesar analogies, see vol. I, 77-79. 
129 Tertre, Histoire Générale, t. I: 1. 
130 Tertre, Histoire Générale, vol. I, 77-79; vol. III, 1-4. 
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weak.131  Inspired by his fellow Dominican Bartolomé de Las Casas, he described in 
graphic detail the decline of powerful men like Le Vasseur, Houel, and Poincy into 
“tyrants” willing to commit barbarities against slaves, Indians, settlers, and each other 
in pursuit of profit.132 
Historians have described Tertre’s work as a humanist history or as 
missionary propaganda in the Las Casas mould, but these readings overlook its 
practical implications for governance.133  He wanted his readers to be not only good 
Catholics but also good rulers, which demanded more than Christian virtues.  Past 
experience showed that there were concrete steps administrators could take to ensure 
the peace, productivity, and happiness of their colonies.  The success of Martinique, 
for example, was the direct result of d’Esnambuc’s careful planning.  The governor 
had selected 100 men from Saint Christopher to pioneer the settlement, all of whom 
were accustomed to the island air, fit to work, and experienced in the labor of clearing 
land, planting, and building habitations.  He provided them with the necessary arms, 
ammunition, tools, and seeds; personally oversaw their planting of manioc and 
potatoes; and left them in the care of an able lieutenant with orders to remain on good 
terms with the Caribs.  Tertre stressed the contrast between Esnambuc and Olive, who 
at the same time had failed to plan or provide for Guadeloupe and then compounded 
his error by waging a costly war against his Indian neighbors.134 
Tertre believed that his history could instruct governors at a pivotal moment in 
colonization, since it was in their youth that colonies were most vulnerable to 
                                                
131 Tertre, Histoire Générale, vol. III, 1-3. 
132 On Tertre and Las Casas, see Doris Garraway, The Libertine Colony, 52-53. 
133 For this sort of reading, see Garraway, The Libertine Colony, 50-58. 
134 Tertre, Histoire Générale, vol. I, 65-101. 
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disorder.  Unlike the historians who followed him, he still considered France’s 
settlements to be in their infancy.  They were “newborn Colonies” whose inhabitants 
required greater freedom “than people born under laws”—a condition that good 
administrators understood and respected.135  Like children, moreover, they were 
impressionable and assumed different qualities according to their paternity.  “If it is 
true that all of the infants who have come from the same mother are so different that 
no two are ever found to be alike,” he declared, “this proposition is no less true in the 
different peuplades issued from the islands of Saint Christopher, Guadeloupe, & 
Martinique, which I may call the three Mothers who have born all the Colonies of our 
Antilles.”136  The same difference held between colonies settled from France and 
those settled from the islands, since the material support and leadership experience 
available to them varied.  Saint Christopher had suffered early on from isolation and 
want, but d’Esnambuc’s wise conduct had rescued it from disaster, and he had used 
what he had learned to ensure a much smoother founding at Martinique, which in turn 
had produced peaceful colonies in Grenada and Saint Lucia.  The seasoning factor 
was decisive: because Esnambuc was not only “powerful, rich, [and] beloved by all 
the people” but also “greatly experienced in the building of Settlements,” he had 
“wisely avoided the reefs upon which others would have foundered.”137   
Tertre dwelled on d’Esnambuc’s example in part because it had already 
proven itself to be a successful model for others.  Parquet, the governor’s nephew, 
had been “raised under his uncle’s discipline,” and when he became governor of 
                                                
135 Tertre, Histoire Générale, vol. I, 109.  Cf. Labat, Nouveau Voyage, preface. 
136 Tertre, Histoire Générale, vol. I, 168. 
137 Tertre, Histoire Générale, vol. I, 99-100. 
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Martinique he “moulded his Government upon that of...his uncle, followed its 
method, and shaped his conduct after that of this Illustrious Founder of French 
Colonies so well that it seemed as if the same spirit animated their two bodies.”  Like 
d’Esnambuc, he exempted the original settlers from all taxes for three years, 
maintained peace with the Caribs, and attracted new inhabitants by his generous, 
affable, and disinterested ways.  The people of Martinique, “seeing Monsieur 
Esnambuc resurrected in the person of his nephew, resolved to be as happy under the 
Government of the one...as they had been under the command of the other.”  Having 
spoken to those who were there when Parquet arrived, Tertre could confirm that the 
governor’s “behavior, & the familiarity with which he carried himself with them, was 
the magnet that attracted everyone to him, & made it such that [Martinique] has 
become today the most populous of the French Islands.”138  In highlighting the 
“method” employed by d’Esnambuc and Parquet to make Martinique the wealthiest 
colony in the Antilles, he showed his readers the means to establish prosperous 
governments elsewhere. 
Even more pointedly than its successful transmission from uncle to nephew, 
the failure of this method to survive Parquet demonstrated just how dependent the 
island’s prosperity was on the specific actions and qualities of its governors.  His 
death in 1658 put his wife in command—in itself troubling to Tertre, who frequently 
used women in power as a symbol of disorder—and her attempt to levy new taxes 
with the help of a male outsider sparked a rebellion that spread when a copy of 
Machiavelli’s writings was discovered among her possessions.  (The rebels petitioned 
                                                
138 Tertre, Histoire Générale, vol. I, 104-114. 
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the colonial council to have it “burned by the Executioner as the rule of her 
conduct.”)  “Madame la Générale” was imprisoned immediately, and the island 
descended further into chaos after the rebels massacred several Caribs.  Only the 
arrival of Tracy in 1664 restored order, as he was able to broker peace and reimpose 
with “marvelous dexterity” all of the masculine virtues of firmness, integrity, justice, 
and wisdom upon the colony’s affairs that had been absent since Parquet’s death.  In 
revoking the new tax, moreover, he “revealed the means so sought after, so visible, 
and so little known, of consolidating and augmenting the French Colonies in these 
parts,” which was to favor the industry of the inhabitants by keeping duties low.  
Tertre took the opportunity to remind his readers “that the happiness of all those who 
are or who will be in future Seigneurs of these Islands, will always walk in step with 
that of the habitants.”139  By gendering the political vicissitudes of the colony, 
identifying Machiavelli and another male outsider as disruptive influences, and 
upholding Tracy as a new model of the benevolent patriarch, he powerfully 
reinforced his message that the right “method” of governing colonies was a known 
and repeatable process of good character (masculine, disinterested, caring) expressing 
itself through time-tested policies (low taxes, direct justice, peace with the Indians). 
There is no evidence that Tertre shaped the conduct of colonial officials, only 
that some of them owned his history.  That the colonies continued to supply, in his 
words, “more revolutions, more revolts, more intrigues, more persecutions against the 
Church, more innocents oppressed, more criminals absolved, and more tragic tales 
than a great empire could lament during an entire century” in the years following its 
                                                
139 Tertre, Histoire Générale, vol. I, 534-548; vol. III, 67-81. 
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publication suggests that his lessons were not applied as he had wished them to be.140  
But his text bears witness to the use of books as a medium through which chroniclers 
and administrators of colonization worked together to define a “Science of the 
Conqueror” for New World settlements.  In Tertre’s telling, that science rested less on 
Old World models than on a cumulative experience of governance in the islands.  
Classics and Scripture remained powerful frames of reference for political action, but 
a growing body of empirical evidence, grounded in firsthand observation and 
documentary sources, more often informed his judgment of what constituted the best 
“method” of rule.  At a time when colonial governments were still in their infancy, 
publishing what he had learned seemed like the surest means to reach those in 
position “to avoid that which has been the ruin of some, & to practice that which has 





 The cases studied here reveal how three disparate observers with experience 
of the colonies envisioned the progress of settlement and governance in the New 
World.  At a formative moment of royal intervention in the Americas, they sought to 
define the stakes, interpret the course, or guide the conduct of colonization.  They 
engaged in different forms of writing, supplemented their experience with different 
sources, and stood at different removes from the crown.  Nonetheless, they shared a 
conviction that the past and present state of the colonies could provide useful lessons 
to the king’s agents.  They portrayed French overseas expansion as a glorious, godly, 
                                                
140 Tertre, Histoire Générale, vol. I, 121. 
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and potentially profitable enterprise, if conducted by the right people and according to 
the right principles.  In identifying those people and outlining those principles, they 
remained emphatically focused on developments in individual colonies or regions, 
insisting on the specific needs, qualities, and histories of each one.  In the next 
chapter, we will see how a new perspective on colonization emerged within the 
ministry—one that sought to harness the collective potential of France’s New World 










































Chapter 3. A Glorious and Profitable Empire: Commercial Governance, 
Colonial Markets, and Antoine-Denis Raudot’s Cape Breton Scheme 
“[Colonial] Settlements produce nothing when we are building them, but rather always cost some 
upkeep...yet eventually, once they are well established, they produce ever-growing revenues.” 
– Antoine-Denis Raudot (1708) 
 
In the summer of 1686, the outgoing intendant of New France, Jacques De 
Meulles, submitted to Louis XIV and Minister of the Navy Jean-Baptiste Colbert de 
Seignelay an exuberant memorandum outlining his plan for a new colony at Acadia 
(Nova Scotia), that remote fog-enshrouded peninsula “which we have not known until 
now.”  Over the previous nine months, De Meulles had personally scouted the coasts 
and waterways of the area, commissioned maps and soundings of its harbors, and 
drawn up a census of its 885 scattered European inhabitants.  “The knowledge I have 
acquired since arriving here,” he declared, “will perfectly enlighten you...[about] a 
project we can make of it, which I imagine to be one of the most profitable and 
glorious things that His Majesty could undertake.”  The source of this extraordinary 
union of glory and profit was neither the land itself nor the people in it, but rather an 
“infinite manna” in which Acadia “surpasses all other countries in the world, without 
exception”: cod.1  At a time when much of Europe relied upon fish to provide a 
source of protein during religious fasts and to supplement the virtually meat-free diets 
of its peasants and slaves, the continent devoured somewhere between 200,000 and 
                                                
1 De Meulles to Seignelay, 24 September 1685, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 7, ff. 138-138v; De Meulles 
to Seignelay 18 July 1686, and De Meulles to Louis XIV, 19 July 1686, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 8, ff. 
307-315; “Mémoire instructif de la manière dont on fait la pêche du poisson sec à l’île Percée et 
ailleurs,” 1686, ANOM COL C11D, vol. 2, ff. 60-62; “Recensement fait par De Meulles, intendant de 
la Nouvelle-France, de tous les peuples...[des] costes de l’Acadie,” 1686, ANOM COL, Recensements 
et documents divers, vol. 466, pp. 14-57; “Mémoire touchant le Canada et l’Acadie,” juillet 1686, BnF 
Collection P. Angrand, pièce 1373, pp. 7-19.  This memorandum is a transcription of the original, 
which is located in ANOM COL C11A, vol. 8, ff. 273-310. 
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250,000 live-weight pounds of cod each year from Newfoundland shoals alone.2  A 
fortified entrepôt at Acadia, just off the Grand Banks, would allow Louis not only to 
become “absolute master of all the cod consumed in Europe,” De Meulles predicted, 
but also to provide an ice-free outlet for Canadian goods, stimulate commerce with 
the West Indies, protect French shipping, dominate the fur trade, pacify the Iroquois, 
ruin the colony of Massachusetts, annex New York, subjugate Florida and Virginia, 
purge the blight of Protestantism from the Americas, and establish “a universal 
monarchy in this continent”—all without firing a single shot.3  Despite the intendant’s 
fulsome pitch, however, the prospect of becoming King Cod failed to capture the 
imagination of Louis or his naval minister, who likely balked at the enormous outlay, 
and perhaps did not see the grandeur in making France the fishmonger to the world.4 
 Twenty years later, another memorandum, written by the new intendant of 
Canada, Antoine-Denis Raudot, arrived at the Versailles bureau of the ministry of 
Marine and quickly transformed the way French officials saw their overseas colonies.  
In previous decades, royal administrators had written extensively about the means 
necessary to rule the Americas in a way that would simultaneously exploit their 
resources, accommodate local exigencies, and uphold metropolitan conventions of 
public order; yet, as we have seen, they had remained resolutely focused on the 
relationship between France and the individual colonies they sought to govern.  
                                                
2 Jeffrey Bolster, “Putting the Ocean in Atlantic History: Maritime Communities and Marine Ecology 
in the Northwest Atlantic, 1500-1800,” The American Historical Review, vol. 113, no. 1 (February 
2008): 30. 
3 De Meulles, “Mémoire touchant le Canada et l’Acadie.” 
4 De Meulles, who had been recalled without explanation during his voyage to Acadia (probably due 
to accusations of financial malfeasance), received no response to his proposal from the ministry or the 
king, nor was he reimbursed for his expenses or even granted an audience upon his return to France.  
W. J. Eccles, “Jacques De Meulles,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, URL: 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/meulles_jacques_de_2E.html (accessed 15 April 2016). 
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Raudot had taken on a bolder task: to imagine how the king’s various overseas 
possessions might be integrated with each other and foreign markets to comprise a 
single, coherent trading empire, one whose commanding strategic position would 
bring about unequivocal French supremacy in Europe and the New World.  The 
unexpected linchpin of his plan, like De Meulles’s, was a fortified entrepôt in the 
heart of the Atlantic cod fisheries, this time at Cape Breton Island, a rock so obscure 
that his quizzical superiors would have to launch an expedition expressly to map it 
(Figures 1-3).5 
 Raudot’s “Memorandum on the Present Affairs of Canada and the Settlement 
at Cape Breton” helped inspire a renewed commitment to state-led colonization and 
propelled his long career as one of France’s preeminent thinkers on economic 
matters.  His project made the deplorable material and military conditions of turn-of-
the-century France and its colonies a reason to expand, rather than contract, the scope 
of royal intervention in overseas trade.  Seignelay’s successor, Jérôme Phélypeaux de 
Pontchartrain, pressed Raudot on several points yet staunchly voiced the crown’s 
enthusiasm for a plan that promised not only to “revive” Canada but also to “make 
His Majesty master of the Americas” at a time when years of defeat, depression, and 
declining revenues had sapped the regime’s confidence: “I disagree with your 
opinion,” he admonished a clerk who fretted over the “impossible” expense.  “We 
must not cower at the difficulties, we must overcome them in proportion to the utility 
                                                
5 That year the ministry commissioned an expedition to map the island and sound its harbors, because 
Pontchartrain could not tell from various written accounts where, precisely, the new colony should be 
situated.  Pontchartrain to Vaudreuil, 24 February 1713, ANOM COL B, vol. 35, f. 2, reproduced in 
Rapport de l’archiviste de la Province de Québec, 1947-1948 (Québec: Imprimeur du roi, 1948), pp. 
195-196; L’Hermitte, “Carte d’une partie de l’Isle du Cap Breton” and “Plan du Havre Ste. Anne,” 9 
November 1713 and 20 September 1713, in the series of six maps of the area contained in AN Marine 
3JJ, vol. 273, ff. 1-8. 
 143 
[of our goal], and it is important that we put everything in motion before the peace.  
You will see why.”6  Within less than a decade, the ministry would implement 
Raudot’s vision for Cape Breton Island (rechristened Île Royale) and establish a 
garrison port at Louisbourg that would indeed emerge as the axis of France’s New 
World empire. 
 Raudot’s proposal circulated far more widely, and for much longer, than most 
administrative records of its kind.  In 1744, the Jesuit priest and chronicler Pierre-
François-Xavier de Charlevoix, who had befriended Raudot during their voyages to 
and from Canada, printed the intendant’s memorandum virtually unabridged in his 
history of New France.7  From there the document found an avid readership in Boston 
and London, where pamphleteers touted it as incontrovertible proof that Britain must 
seize Cape Breton if it wished to secure its own empire against “the Arts and 
Intrigues of French Ministers.”8  “Raudot (about thirty two years ago) shewed the 
French Court the Expediency and Advantage of establishing a Staple or Magazine 
                                                
6 “Resumé d’un mémoire de Raudot, fils, sur l’île du Cap-Breton,” 1709, ANOM COL C11C, vol. 8, f. 
57. 
7 Pierre-François-Xavier de Charlevoix, Histoire et description generale de la Nouvelle-France (Paris: 
Rolin, 1744), t. XX: 388-397. 
8 The principal English pamphlets were authored either by William Bollan, son-in-law of 
Massachusetts Governor William Shirley and the colony’s agent in London between 1746 and 1762, or 
co-authored by Bollan with the Boston lawyer Robert Auchmuty, Sr. or with the commander of the 
Massachusetts militia, Sir William Pepperrell, who led the expedition that captured Cape Breton in 
1745.  For the reprintings and repackagings of Raudot’s memorandum, via Charlevoix, see Bollan and 
Pepperrell, The Importance and Advantage of Cape Breton, Truly Stated, and Impartially Considered 
(London: Knapton, 1746), 63-74, 77-81 (“French Ministers” on 77); “The Compiler” [Bollan], The 
Great importance of Cape Breton, demonstrated and exemplified (London: Brindley, 1746); 
Massachusettensis [attr. Bollan], The importance and advantage of Cape Breton considered, in a letter 
to a member of Parliament from an inhabitant of New England (London: 1746); Anonymous, Two 
Letters concerning some farther advantages and improvements that may seem necessary to be made on 
the taking and keeping of Cape Breton (London: 1746); Anonymous, An Accurate Description of Cape 
Breton...its Importance to France, but of how much greater it might have been to England (London: 
Cooper, 1755); Anonymous, Memoir of the principal transactions of the last war between the English 
and French in North America...containing in particular an account of the importance of Nova Scotia 
and Cape Breton to both nations, 3d ed. (London: 1758). 
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upon the Island of Cape Breton, for all Goods...passing between Old and New 
France,” one British advocate announced shortly after the first capture of Louisbourg 
by Massachusetts militiamen in 1745, “therefore we are furnished with a Hint, how to 
render this Island not only immediately useful, but also how to people, fortify, and 
enrich it in a short time [to become]...a Staple or Mart for all Goods and Traffick 
carried on between England and its American colonies.”9  The English translations 
quickly made their way into Dutch and German.10  As a reviewer from Amsterdam 
wrily observed, “Father Charlevoix gives us a Memorandum that he would have 
hidden away carefully if he had foreseen the consequences...We find in it all the 
reasons that Intendant Raudot proposed to the Court to establish a colony...[and] to 
make the English see Cape Breton as the most important conquest they could 
achieve.”11  The plan continued to resurface in histories of the New World well into 
the 1780s.  After the second and final conquest of Louisbourg in 1758, British 
officials still invoked Raudot’s proposal as the most compelling argument for 
retaining “this important spot of earth.”12 
                                                
9 Bollan and Pepperrell, Importance and Advantage of Cape Breton, 79. 
10 William Bollan, De Importantie en Voordeeligheid van Kaap-Breton (Delft: Boitet, 1746), 84-130; 
William Bollan and Robert Auchmuty, Die Wichtigkeit und Vorteil des Kap Breton (Leipzig: Schenk, 
1747), 96-138. 
11 Bibliothèque raisonnée des ouvrages des savans de l’Europe (Amsterdam: Wetstein & Smith, 
1746), 75-76. 
12 Thomas Jefferys, The Natural and Civil History of the French Dominions in North America 
(London: 1760), 121-122 (“spot of earth”); Anton Prévost, Histoire générale des voyages (Paris: 
Didot, 1757), t. XIV: 671-675; Pierre Joseph André Roubaud, Histoire générale de l’Asie, de l’Afrique, 
et de l’Amérique (Paris: Des Ventes de la Doué, 1775), t. V: 740-743.  Although not cited, Raudot’s 
memorandum may well have informed Samuel Hollingsworth’s 1786 survey of Cape Breton’s 
economic past and potential, which appeared in French the following year.  Samuel Hollingsworth, 
The Present State of Nova Scotia, with a Brief Account of Canada and the British Islands of North 
America (Edinburgh: Creech, 1786); Relation de l’état actuel de la Nouvelle-Écosse (Paris: Lagrange, 
1787).  See Jeffrey L. McNairn, “Meaning and Markets: Hunting, Economic Development and British 
Imperialism in Maritime Travel Narratives to 1870,” Acadiensis, vol. 34, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 6n17. 
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 What had Raudot seen in Cape Breton Island that so appealed to imperial 
thinkers in Europe and North America?  Why did his scheme, and not the strikingly 
similar one proposed by De Meulles, become a well-publicized blueprint for empire 
in the Atlantic world?  What have scholars had to say about his memorandum and its 
significance?  Raudot’s writings have not quite lapsed into obscurity.  In the 
nineteenth century, a French politician and descendant of Raudot fawningly reviewed 
the intendant’s proposal in the pages of an economic journal, proclaiming his forebear 
“an economist who did not know it.”13  Since then, the memorandum has played a 
recurring if minor role in histories of Nova Scotia, New France, and the French 
Navy.14  Remarkably, none of these scholars has noticed the essential value that made 
the scheme a compelling project rather than yet another harebrained plot for world 
conquest: the planned transformation of the metropole and its colonies into a chain of 
interlocked and potentially limitless zones of economic growth.  According to 
                                                
13 Claude-Marie Raudot, “Deux intendants de colonie sous Louis XIV: économistes sans le savoir,” 
Journal des économistes: Revue mensuelle de l’économie politique, des questions agricoles, 
manufacturières et commerciales, vol. 37 (1853): 355-357. 
14 Early historians, following Charlevoix’s lead, celebrated Raudot as a capable administrator whose 
scheme aimed to lift the fortunes of New France.  François-Xavier Garneau, Histoire du Canada: 
depuis sa découverte jusqu’à nos jours (Québec: Lamoureux, 1859 ed.), t. II: 66-68; Richard Brown, A 
History of the Island of Cape Breton (London: Low, Son, and Marston, 1869); Francis Parkman, 
France and England in North America (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1899 ed.), vol. II: 186-
188; J. S. McLennan, Louisbourg: From its Foundation to its Fall, 1713-1758 (London: Macmillan, 
1918), 9-10.  More recently, historians have used Raudot’s memorandum to paint a portrait of New 
France or Cape Breton in the early eighteenth century, to explain the founding of Île Royale, or to 
assess the naval and commercial strategies of Pontchartrain in this period.  Dale Miquelon, New 
France: 1701-1744: A Supplement to Empire (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987); Peter Moogk, 
“Île Royale: The Other New France,” Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical 
Society, vol. 21 (1997): 48-49; Christopher Moore, “The Other Louisbourg: Trade and Merchant 
Enterprise in Île Royale, 1713-1758,” Histoire sociale/Social History, vol. 12 (May 1979): 79-96; 
Charles Frostin, Les Pontchartrain, ministres de Louis XIV: Alliances et réseau d'influence sous 
l'Ancien Régime (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2006), 411-468; Brian Tennyson and 
Roger Sarty, Guardian of the Gulf: Sydney, Cape Breton, and the Atlantic Wars (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2000), 13-14.  In his entry on Raudot in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 
Donald Horton briefly acknowledges the innovative strategic thinking contained in the intendant’s 
proposals.  Horton, “Antoine-Denis Raudot,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online (1982). 
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Raudot, a reformed overseas trade centered on the Cape Breton entrepôt was the key 
to “unblocking” the latent commercial power of France’s New World dominions. 
 Raudot’s ideas, developed first in his memorandum and then elaborated in a 
flurry of letters and reports written between 1706 and 1710, established a lasting 
tradition of imagining overseas colonies as part of a closed economic circuit in which 
state administrators, with the right principles in mind, could intervene to foster 
integration, capture global markets, and create the conditions for endless profit.15  The 
appeal of his proposal depended in part on the ways in which he and his readers 
linked together heightened geopolitical anxieties with new attitudes about commercial 
expansion and the role of government in promoting it.  The implementation of his 
project represented an extraordinary confluence of administrative and mercantile 
concerns, of the politics of empire, privilege, and economic planning.  Unlike so 
many other bureaucratic schemes, Raudot’s memorandum had an enduring effect on 
how contemporaries measured and described the stakes of colonization, and it gave 
ammunition to those who wished to reform the commercial and imperial strategies of 
France and Great Britain.    
Raudot’s ideas help us to form a bridge between two distinct periods of 
economic thought.  Under Colbert and his immediate successors, most commentators 
believed that states should promote domestic industry and a favorable balance of 
trade in order to acquire as much silver and gold as possible, since precious metals 
                                                
15 Historians of Spain and Great Britain in the eighteenth century are currently investigating the 
origins of this line of political economic thought in those empires.  Fidel Tavarez, “The Commercial 
Machine: Reforming Imperial Commerce in the Spanish Atlantic, ca. 1740-1808” (PhD dissertation: 
Princeton University, 2016); S. Max Edelson, The New Map of Empire: How Britain Imagined 
America Before Independence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).  My thanks to both 
authors for sharing and discussing their work with me. 
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were taken to be the foundation of national wealth; in a world whose riches were 
finite, they reasoned, colonies offered a competitive advantage, furnishing raw 
materials to their mother countries while serving as markets for their finished goods.16  
Known retrospectively as “mercantilism,” this loose constellation of ideas remained a 
robust presence in eighteenth-century politics even as it encountered growing 
opposition from merchants, magistrates, and philosophes who saw the wealth of 
nations as a potentially boundless product of natural laws, civilizational “moeurs,” or 
individual enterprise and consumption—not the actions of states.17  The sinuous path 
from Colbertisme to liberalism deserves further investigation.18  So, for that matter, 
do the state-centered approaches to political economy that persisted despite (and 
within) the lively Enlightenment debates over free trade, luxury, and doux commerce 
that have received so much attention from scholars.19  As fodder for intellectual 
                                                
16 The seminal study of mercantilism is Eli Heckscher, Mercanilism (London: Allen and Unwen, 
1935).  The framework has recently come under renewed scrutiny.  See Philip Stern and Carl 
Wennerlind, eds., Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern England and its 
Empire (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
17 See, for example, Liana Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Gilbert Faccarello, ed., Studies in the History of French 
Political Economy: From Bodin to Walras (New York: Routledge, 1998), 1-227; Anoush Terjanian, 
Commerce and its Discontents in Eighteenth-Century French Political Thought (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); John Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, 
Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); Henry 
C. Clark, Compass of Society: Commerce and Absolutism in Old-Regime France (New York: 
Lexington Books, 2007); J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political 
Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1985); David Wootton, ed., Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776 (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 1994). 
18 Gail Bossenga, The Politics of Privilege: Old Regime and Revolution in Lille (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Philippe Minard, La fortune du colbertisme: État et industrie dans 
la France des Lumières (Paris: Fayard, 1998); Simone Meyssonnière, La balance et l’horloge. La 
genèse de la pensée libérale en France au XVIIIe siècle (Montreuil: Éditions Montreuil, 1989); David 
Todd, L’identité économique de la France: Libre-échange et protectionnisme, 1814-1851 (Paris: 
Grasset & Fasquelle, 2008). 
19 In their haste to find the origins of laissez-faire liberalism or to reconstruct the debates over luxury 
consumption and doux commerce, scholars have tended to portray the eighteenth-century monarchy as 
an ossified relic of “the age of mercantilism,” a gormless dupe of financial con-artists, or an aggressive 
but ill-fated enemy of free or clandestine trade.  Such portrayals leave little room for innovative 
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history, Raudot’s speculations about the impact of royal intervention upon 
commercial decline and progress allow us to track how the meanings of 
“mercantilism” were being reworked at a transitional moment. 
Yet on another, deeper level, Raudot’s proposal reveals how new economic 
ideas became embedded in crown policy and administration—from the workaday 
hum of affairs on the ground to the very summit of the state.  A pronounced 
commercial sensibility had inflected royal governance since at least the 1660s, when 
Colbert and his most enterprising clients, such as the Arnoul, had mobilized merchant 
habits of accounting and reportage to achieve unprecedented control over the 
chronically fractious fleets, ports, and provinces of the realm (Chapter 1).20  Raudot’s 
case shows that state approaches to overseas empire were fundamentally recast in one 
of the hottest political crucibles of the age.  Between 1689 and 1713, a protracted 
demographic and military crisis brought Europe’s leading superpower to its knees and 
provoked sweeping calls for fiscal and economic reform, just as the burgeoning trade 
                                                                                                                                      
thinking to emerge from within the state.  Whether drawing upon the new social and cultural practices 
of the period, or scrutinizing the printed works of recognizably “modern” thinkers such as François 
Quesnay and the Physiocrats, they overlook a great deal of evidence that the Old Regime monarchy 
could and did intervene aggressively to promote commercial and industrial growth, and that many 
contemporaries believed that it should.  For some important recent correctives that take seriously the 
dynamic and varied state responses to commercial expansion, free-market thought, and new patterns of 
consumption in this period, see Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World 
Economy in the Second Millenium (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 143-260; 
Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2010); Kwass, Contraband: Louis Mandrin and the Making of a Global 
Underground (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).  On the continuing public appeal of 
state-oriented frameworks of political economy in eighteenth-century Europe, see Sophus Reinert, 
Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2011) and the contributions by David Kammerling Smith, Simone Meyssonnier, Loïc 
Charles, and Julian Swann in Le cercle Vincent de Gournay: savoirs économiques et pratiques 
administratives en France au milieu du XVIIIe siècle, eds. Loïc Charles, Frédéric Lefebvre, and 
Christine Théré (Paris: Institut National d’Études Démographiques, 2011), 31-131.  On the Old 
Regime monarchy as a successful promoter of economic growth through selective regulation, see Jeff 
Horn, Economic Development in Early Modern France: The Privilege of Liberty, 1650-1820 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
20 On Colbert’s central role in this development, see Soll, Information Master; on the Arnoul, see 
Chapter 1. 
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of its rivals seemed to be leaving France behind.  In the long run, as historians have 
shown, the pressure produced no radical changes in government, only an unwieldy, 
opaque, and staunchly traditional system of state finances with zero royal 
accountability and, consequently, few mechanisms capable of generating the revenues 
needed to pursue commerce and warfare on a global scale.21  Nonetheless, the history 
of Raudot’s scheme suggests that the dreadful hardships of these years could give rise 
to momentous shifts in administrative ideas and practices of wealth-making.  Given 
wide reign over the affairs of one ruined colony, he sought to reform France’s entire 
empire in a conscious bid to extract tremendous untapped value from improved 
relationships between the colonies and the metropole, merchants and the crown, profit 
margins and public order.  Beyond allowing us to nuance the overdrawn opposition 
between free-trade liberalism and regulatory mercantilism, his experience reveals 
how royal officials absorbed the harsh lessons of the time to reimagine and then to 
remake France’s notoriously impecunious colonies as a single commercial dynamo, 
one whose guiding administrative principles would continue to hold sway for much of 
the century. 
Insisting that Raudot’s memorandum was about bringing a new sort of 
commercial logic to the governance of France’s large, diverse, and listless empire 
invites several questions: Why have other scholars not noticed the core “utility,” or 
value, of his proposal to the Crown?  To what extent did his ideas reflect earlier 
efforts, such as De Meulles’s, to think about colonial development in broadly 
strategic terms?  Why did his scheme resonate with his superiors in 1706, and with 
                                                
21 Gail Bossenga, “Financial Origins of the French Revolution,” in Thomas Kaiser and Dale Van Kley, 
eds., From Deficit to Deluge: The Origins of the French Revolution (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2011), 37-66. 
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audiences in Europe and America for decades afterward?  The four sections of this 
chapter offer some answers to these questions.  The first and second sections 
introduce Antoine-Denis Raudot and the political and economic settings of France 
and Canada in the early eighteenth century.  He conceived his proposal to satisfy the 
specific needs of a particular moment, so understanding the immediate context of its 
production and reception is crucial.  It helps to identify some of the administrative 
anxieties of his superiors that he ably addressed in his writings.  The third section 
provides a close study of the “Memorandum.”  It makes clear that Raudot saw a 
thorough reformation of both Canadian society and French colonial trade as essential 
to the long-term survival of France’s New World empire.  The final section offers a 
sequential reading of his revisions to the project between 1706 and 1710, in order to 
preserve the dynamic back-and-forth between Raudot, Pontchartrain, and agents of 
the ministry as they responded to rapidly shifting strategic and material concerns.  To 
highlight the mutual influence of administrative ideas and practices, I place their 
debate against the backdrop of the intendant’s vigorous efforts to remake the 
commercial complexion of New France.  In the conclusion I examine Raudot’s role in 
implementing the scheme after his return to France, before comparing some of the 
reprintings and translations of his memorandum from the 1740s and 1750s against the 
original.  I underscore a phenomenon rarely acknowledged by colonial historians: the 
abiding influence of experienced and expert administrators after their return from 
service abroad.  At the same time, I show that the administrative calculus 
underpinning Raudot’s plan had lasting consequences for the way European officials 
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perceived Cape Breton and the political economy of empire in the eighteenth-century 
Atlantic world. 
 
“One Great Poorhouse”: France, 1689-1713 
 
 Antoine-Denis Raudot led a long and prolific career in public life that spanned 
some of the most dismal and dynamic decades in the history of Old Regime France.  
And yet, for a man who reached the upper echelons of the king’s service in his early 
twenties and stayed there for nearly forty years, very little has been written about 
him.22  Descended from a Burgundian family of lawyers and tax farmers, he benefited 
from kinship ties with the Pontchartrains to obtain successive appointments in the 
Royal Marine, first as a scrivener and clerk at Dunkirk (1699-1704), then as co-
intendant of New France (1705-1710) with his irascible father, Jacques, a longtime 
judge in the kingdom’s principal tax court, the Cour des Aides.  In Canada, he and his 
father split their duties: Jacques handled judicial affairs and matters of public order, 
while Antoine-Denis tackled the colony’s nettlesome finances.  In less than five 
years, the good services and powerful connections of Raudot fils secured his 
promotion back to France, where he oversaw naval enlistments, the wounded, and the 
coast guard, and served as an advisor on colonial affairs at court.  His additional 
charge as head secretary of the Maison du Roi in 1713 brought him into the rarefied 
air of the king’s household.  The momentary political decentralization that followed 
Louis XIV’s death two years later only amplified his influence, initially as a director 
                                                
22 The only modern biographical study of Raudot that I am aware of is in Jean-Claude Dubé, Les 
intendants de la Nouvelle-France (Montréal: Fides, 1984), 71-73, 134-136, 148, 158, 170, 235.  As far 
as Raudot is known to historians, it is mainly in his capacity as intendant of New France—a post that 
occupied only four years of a forty-year career.  Horton, “Antoine-Denis Raudot,” Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography Online (1969); Claude-Marie Raudot, Deux intendants du Canada (Paris: 
Perriquet et Rouillé, 1854).   
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of the Compagnie d’Occident, then as a councilor on the regent’s Conseil de la 
Marine, and finally, under Louis XV, as a director of the mighty Compagnie des 
Indes.  Raudot died at Versailles in 1737, unmarried and childless, eccentrically 
leaving behind to his servants the entirety of an estate that included nearly 200,000 
pounds, 140 bottles of Caribbean liquors, a share in a coffee and tobacco plantation at 
Cayenne, an extensive collection of exotic maps and curiosities, and over two-
thousand volumes of books on “History and diverse subjects.”23  
 Raudot’s appointments gave him considerable authority over French 
commercial policy and administration.  His portfolio as a director of two colossal 
trading companies and a member of the Conseil de la Marine attests to the breadth of 
his labors.  In 1719 alone, his assignments included the West Indies, Louisiana, 
Senegal, the Africa Company, the tobacco and salt monopolies, customs duties on 
American goods, and the management of the Five Great Farms responsible for 
collecting royal taxes, as well as correspondence with the French towns and provinces 
of Châlons, Charleville, Saint Quentin, Soissons, Languedoc, La Rochelle, Guyenne, 
Metz, Sedan, Provence, Dauphiné, Riom, Limoges, Burgundy, Bresse, and Franche-
Comté.24  Each week, he and his fellow councilors met to advise the regent on the 
                                                
23 At its peak in the 1720s, his fortune probably hovered around 500,000 pounds.  Dubé, Intendants, 
134-136, 148, 235; Dubé, “Les intendants de la Nouvelle-France et la République des Lettres,” Revue 
d’histoire de l’Amérique française, vol. 29, no. 1 (1978): 41-44; Archives Départementales de la 
Seine-et-Oise, Notaires, 2 August 1737.  On Raudot’s cabinet of curiosities, see the undated 
“Collections confisquées au prince de Condé à Chantilly.  Transfert du cabinet d’Antoine-Denis 
Raudot à Chantilly,” Archives Nationales, AJ 15, vol. 836, dossier 6, caisse B, f. 1, summarized in 
Benoît Roux, “Les collections royales d’Amériques du sud au musée du quai Branly: (En)quêtes 
d’archives autour des pièces amazoniennes et caraïbes d’Ancien Régime” (Paris: Musée du quai 
Branly, 2012), 39-40. 
24 Départements des Messieurs les directeurs de la Compagnie des Indes, en conséquence de leur 
déliberation du 2 octobre 1719 (Paris: Saugrain & Prault, 1719), 2-3, 5-7; Le Nouveau Mercure, 
November 1719, 104-110; Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane française (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1966-1974), vol. III: 48 and vol. IV: 32, 35. 
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kingdom’s trade as a whole.  His work put him on familiar terms with some of 
France’s leading economic thinkers, including François Quesnay, the court physician 
whose writings laid the foundations of Physiocracy, and John Law, the Scottish 
adventurer whose ill-fated “System” of financial reforms enriched a handful of 
speculators (including Raudot) and ruined countless others.25  It also made him 
known—and odious—to many subjects, at least by name: for a time his signature 
appeared on every piece of cotton that entered France legally, part of the Compagnie 
des Indes’s rapidly growing and ever more ruthless campaign to stamp out 
competition from foreign or smuggled imports.26  Although consistently engaged with 
matters of trade and taxation, he never elaborated his own formal system of 
economics; apart from the posthumous life of his memorandum, he never published a 
word.  His thinking was confined to the paperwork generated by his daily duties, and 
it responded to the practical administrative problems that confronted him in France 
and North America. 
Raudot’s Cape Breton project reached his superiors with special force because 
it arrived amidst increasingly anguished calls for economic reform in the metropole 
itself.  Indeed, material scarcity and military defeat made the last quarter century of 
Louis XIV’s reign one long Calvary for the kingdom: except for a brief respite 
between 1697 and 1701, France suffered a virtually unbroken plague of harsh winters, 
                                                
25 A lady-in-waiting for Louis XV’s mistress, Madame de Pompadour, recalled a joke Quesnay once 
told about Raudot, who, according to Quesnay, “amused himself by speaking ill of medicine and 
physicians.”  “I wrote these lines to avenge Asclepius and Hippocrates,” he claimed: “Antoine se 
médicina / En décriant la médecine, / Et de ses propres mains mina / Les fondements de sa machine; / 
Très rarement il opina / Sans humeur bizarre ou chagrine, / Et l’esprit qui le domina / Etait affiché sur 
sa mine.”  François Quesnay, Ouevres économiques et philosophiques de François Quesnay, ed. 
Auguste Oncken (Frankfurt: Baer, 1888), 120-121. 
26 Joseph du Fresne de Francheville, Histoire de la Compagnie des Indes (Paris: Bure, 1738), 118-119, 
351.  On the campaign waged against smuggling by the Compagnie and the crown, see Kwass, 
Contraband. 
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failed harvests, and ruinous wars that all but crippled its agriculture, while foreign 
privateering, rampant speculation, and runaway prices brought trade to a standstill.  
Marriage and birth rates plummeted, infant mortality surged, and in the famine years 
1692-1694 alone perhaps 2.8 million people—or 15% of the population—perished 
from dearth or disease.  Nearly another million froze or starved to death during the 
“Siberian” winter of 1709-1710.  At the height of the crisis, onlookers deplored the 
wretched state of the king’s subjects, who were reduced to eating everything from 
cats and carrion to slugs and seed corn.  Peasants roamed the countryside for dozens 
and sometimes hundreds of miles in search of food.  Every day, people and livestock 
dropped dead on the roads, to be hauled away by corpsebearers or picked clean by 
crows “down to the lips.”  Beggars swarmed the well-to-do wherever they went.  In 
Paris and Versailles, where the price of bread rose more than tenfold, desperate 
crowds attacked officials and pillaged the homes and shops of suspected hoarders.27  
“It would not be wise to flatter ourselves,” Lieutenant General of Police d’Argenson 
warned ominously, “the privation of the people is endless.”28 
For administrators whose duty was to bring men and goods together in an 
orderly, predictable fashion that would ensure public tranquility, the sight of bread 
riots in the towns and bleached bones on the roadways showed just how fragile—and 
flawed—France’s economy was.  Some of the suffering could be attributed to acts of 
                                                
27 For the dire effects of the kingdom’s economic crisis, see Pierre Goubert, Louis XIV and Twenty 
Million Frenchmen, trans. Anne Carter (New York: Random House, 1972), 215-226, 254-263, 267-
268; Colin Jones, The Great Nation: France from Louis XV to Napoleon, 1715-1799 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002), 52-59; Jacques Saint-Germain, La vie quotidienne en France à la 
fin du Grand Siècle (Paris: Hachette, 1965), 177-190; Liselotte von der Pfalz, A Woman’s Life in the 
Court of the Sun King: Letters of Liselotte von der Pfalz, Elisabeth Charlotte, Duchesse d’Orléans, 
1652-1722, ed. and trans. Elborg Forster (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 174-180. 
28 D’Argenson to Desmaretz, 1710, quoted in Saint-Germain, La vie quotidienne, 179-181.  
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God, but officials increasingly blamed the kingdom’s woes on man-made political 
failures.  Diplomatic isolation, military requisitioning, ramshackle infrastructure, 
chronic indebtedness, ruthless profiteering, institutional paralysis, and squabbling 
among authorities hamstrung relief efforts at every turn.  “It is virtually impossible to 
bring together men who are even more divided by their maxims than by the natural 
antipathy of the corps from which they come,” d’Argenson grumbled, “The 
magistrates want to regulate everything, and the merchants want to leave everything 
free.”29   The people’s misery was compounded by a fiscal regime that critics decried 
with mounting frustration as rigid, unjust, and outmoded.  Taxes of all kinds fell 
disproportionately on the poor, who could no longer provide the resources necessary 
to keep Louis’s armies in the field.  Predictably, evasion rates soared, royal receipts 
plunged, and to stave off bankruptcy the crown engaged in colossal borrowing, erratic 
currency manipulations, and the mass sale of new venal offices.  For all its creative 
accounting and “extraordinary measures,” by 1715, the state’s debt would swell to a 
staggering 3.5 billion pounds, with 70-80% of revenues devoted to servicing it.30   
 The appalling material conditions of the kingdom provided reformers with 
problems in need of solutions.  The lopsided distribution of suffering between elites 
and the downtrodden had never been more visible, and it led critics to question the 
fundamental workings of wealth and privilege—workings which the king’s moral and 
political authority obliged him to improve.  Scandalized moralists and magistrates 
publicly blamed his belligerent diplomacy and regressive taxation for transforming 
                                                
29 D’Argenson, 1709, quoted in Saint-Germain, La vie quotidienne, 198. 
30 On state debt at the end of Louis XIV’s reign, see Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-
Laurent Rosenthal, Priceless Markets: The Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660-1870 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 70-71. 
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the realm into “one great poorhouse.”  “The people believe you have no pity for their 
sufferings, that you care only for your own power and glory,” admonished the cleric 
and royal tutor François Fénelon in an open letter to Louis, “Rather than take money 
from your poor people, you ought to feed and cherish them.”31  The provincial judge 
Pierre de Boisguilbert chided the crown for allowing tax farmers and excisemen to 
fleece the peasantry while the wealthy paid nothing.32  The Marquis de Vauban, who 
felt himself “obliged by my honor and my conscience” to speak out, begged Louis to 
reform his finances so that “the common people...who have always suffered the most 
and who still suffer the most” would shoulder a lighter share of the burden.33  Vauban 
claimed to speak for those who could not speak for themselves, but ordinary men and 
women manifested their own outrage by leading labor strikes, food riots, and tax 
revolts that further destabilized the realm in these years.34   
As prominent reformers, Fénelon, Boisguilbert, and Vauban agreed on the 
need for change, yet they clashed over the best means to place France’s economy on a 
firm footing.  Expressed in a small but incendiary group of texts printed between 
1695 and 1707, their differences stemmed from fundamental disagreements about 
wealth creation and the proper role of the state in economic affairs.  Fénelon, like a 
long line of Christian agrarians before him, counseled a rejection of the money 
economy and a return to farming as the source of plenty.  All wars were unjust, he 
argued, and the commercial profits that funded and occasioned them led otherwise 
                                                
31 François de Salignac de La Mothe-Fénelon, “Letter to Louis XIV (c. 1695),” in Selected Writings, 
ed. and trans. Chad Helms, (New York: Paulist Press, 2006), 201-202. 
32 Pierre Le Pesant de Boisguilbert, Le détail de la France (1695). 
33 Sébastien Le Preste de Vauban, Projet d’un dixme royal (1707), preface. 
34 William Beik, Urban Protest in Seventeenth-Century France: The Culture of Retribution 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 145-146. 
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godly subjects to abandon the land in favor of luxuries.35  If the king’s duty was to 
promote the well-being of his “children,” then he should leave them free to obey a 
divine order grounded in the pious cultivation of the soil.  International trade should 
be encouraged, but only insofar as it maintained peace among nations and did not 
distract from agriculture.  Although Fénelon offered no unified theory of production 
and exchange, he sketched a fiscal-economic vision of retrenchment that some 
reformers found compelling: abolishing wartime levies would allow the people to 
enjoy once again “the bread that they earn by the sweat of their brow,” thus fostering 
prosperity, the payment of just taxes, and the redemption of sin.36 
By contrast, Boisguilbert stressed markets over morals and the purchasing 
power of peasant-proprietors over the salvation of souls.  The crown had become so 
fixated on accumulating gold and silver, he claimed, that it had neglected the true 
wealth embodied by consumer goods.  To his mind, precious metals were “false 
idols” with no intrinsic value (“neither to feed a man, nor to clothe him”), but rather 
functioned as tools of exchange that merely symbolized the real riches provided by 
foodstuffs.  If the king would simply obey the “natural order” of things—by lowering 
or lifting internal duties and allowing grain to circulate freely within the realm—the 
                                                
35 Here Fénelon cited the Dutch War of 1672 in particular as “the source of all the others.”  The 
conflict, which had arisen in large part out of competition for commercial supremacy, prompted Louis 
and Colbert to decree a high tariff on imports in 1667 that provoked a lasting trade war between the 
two powers.  “All the merchants in the realm recognize that the decadence of our trade and of our 
manufactures began with the tariff of 1667,” observed François Le Blanc, historiographer to the 
dauphin, in 1697.  Le Blanc, “Lettre de Mr Le Blanc sur le commerce,” quoted in Lionel Rothkrug, 
Opposition to Louis XIV: The Political and Social Origins of French Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1965),, 284. 
36 Fénelon, “Letter to Louis XIV”; Télémaque.  For more on Fénelon’s agrarian ideals and how they fit 
alongside other economic visions of the period (including Boiguilbert’s and Vauban’s), see David 
McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism: A Reinterpretation (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1990), 75-76 and Amy S. Wyngaard, From Savage to Citizen: The Invention of the 
Peasant in the French Enlightenment (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 2004), 27-29; 
Rothkrug, Opposition, 391. 
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economy would stabilize itself.  General enrichment, healthy consumption, and a 
robust fisc would follow.  In boon years, the kingdom could even sell off its surplus 
crops to meet demand abroad (foreign imports, meanwhile, would be heavily taxed).  
Boisguilbert was far from laissez-faire: he intended his reforms to enrich the 
government, not shrink it, and to implement them he called for vigorous royal action 
to steamroll entrenched opposition.  But in the long run he envisioned something like 
a liberal, market-driven economy for France, which is why he would later be touted 
as an intellectual precursor to Quesnay and the physiocrats.37   
Vauban’s ideas were simpler yet even more radical.  Believing that 
Boisguilbert’s tax cuts did not go far enough, he called on the king to adopt a 
fundamentally new “system” of finances.38  In exchange for military protection, he 
argued, all subjects owed the crown taxes according to their means, not their position 
in society.  From this “fundamental maxim,” he proposed replacing France’s dense 
thicket of impositions with a single tax, the dîme royale, levied solely in proportion to 
wealth.  To compute and collect it, he contrived a military-style bureaucracy armed 
with exhaustive census and survey data.  Eschewing the traditional categories of 
“noble” and “commoner,” privileged and not, he sorted the king’s subjects into 
                                                
37 Boisguilbert, Détail de la France, sous le regne présent (1695); Traité sur la nature des richesses, 
de l’argent et des tributs (1707); Les causes de la rareté de l’argent (1707); Le Factum de la France 
(1707); Supplément au factum de la France (1707).  These works were reprinted multiple times 
throughout the eighteenth century.  The notion that Boisguilbert was the intellectual forerunner of 
economic liberals such as the physiocrats and Adam Smith lives on in modern-day scholarship as well 
as conservative think-tank culture.  For a recent example, see Félix Cadet, Pierre de Boisguilbert, 
précurseur des économistes (Paris: Institut Coppet, 2014).  My analysis of Boisguilbert’s and 
Vauban’s fiscal-economic proposals owes a debt to Michael Kwass, Privilege and the Politics of 
Taxation in Eighteenth-Century France: Liberté, Égalité, Fiscalité (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006 ed.), 224-231 and McNally, Political Economy, 78-83. 
38 Vauban read Boisguilbert’s works and even cited them in his Projet.  Boisguilbert had written him 
several letters in 1704, which the Maréchal passed on to Desmaretz, noting that “Sometimes the most 
foolish men give good advice to the wisest.”  Vauban to Desmaretz, 26 August 1704, reproduced in 
Antoine de Boislisle, ed., Correspondance des contrôleurs généraux des finances avec les intendants 
des provinces (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1874), t. II: 545. 
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shades of rich and poor, whose respective contributions could be assessed to the last 
decimal.  The marquis was no theorist of markets, and he drew no special distinction 
between commercial and agricultural wealth, but he predicted that the dîme would 
have important economic effects: under its rational dominion, the price of salt and 
other necessities would fall by half, the crown would receive a “certain and sufficient 
revenue,” and the realm would flourish thanks to “the improved cultivation of the 
land.”39   
The king’s ministers studied and even admired some of the solutions proposed 
by their critics, but they were besieged daily by audience-seekers touting all manner 
of wild schemes, and in the midst of war and financial collapse they were unwilling to 
contemplate lowering taxes or withdrawing the government from economic affairs.40  
In 1691, when Boisguilbert received an audience with Controller-General of Finances 
Louis de Pontchartrain (Jérôme’s father), the judge begged him to listen patiently to 
his proposal, because, he promised, “at first [Pontchartrain] would take him for a fool, 
[but] then he would see that his plan deserved attention, and finally he would approve 
his system wholeheartedly.”  The minister burst out laughing, told him he preferred to 
keep his first impression, and coldly turned his back, abruptly ending the interview.41  
                                                
39 Vauban, Dîme royale. 
40 The papers of Controller-General of Finances Louis de Pontchartrain (1689-1699) abound in 
harebrained proposals to rescue France’s trade.  “Monseigneur,” wrote one small-town physician 
named Blondet, “on my way to treat a soldier at Ambleteuse and passing along the coast, I thought of 
two or three ways to bring back the prosperity of trade, which I take the liberty of sending you.  If you 
find any to your taste, I ask no other recompense than a position for my son...”  An apothecary named 
Gaschet sent two long and almost unintelligible memoranda, one of which he said was written by 
another apothecary more than two decades before.  Quoted in Rothkrug, Opposition to Louis XIV, 
418n107. 
41 Saint-Simon, Mémoires, t. X: 28-35.  Pontchartrain’s successors as controller-general of finances, 
Michel Chamillart and Nicolas Desmaretz, studied both Boisguilbert’s and Vauban’s ideas and 
acknowledged their merits, but did not implement them.  See Boisguilbert’s letters to Desmaretz, 
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Royal officials were even less inclined to entertain direct public attacks on their 
policies and the patchwork of privilege that underpinned them.  (In the end, the 
writings of Fénelon, Vauban, and Boisguilbert were harshly condemned, and all three 
men were banished into exile.)  They were not averse to innovation, but their 
credibility depended upon the backing of financiers whose fortunes derived from 
precisely the sort of predatory lending, tax farming, and wartime profiteering that 
critics blamed for exacerbating the crisis.42  In a regime run by and for the wealthy 
and well bred, any reform that aimed to reduce the king’s spending or the immediate 
gains of the powerful in favor of the long-term recovery of the peasant millions was, 
as Pontchartrain confirmed, a fool’s errand. 
Where abstract laws of God and nature enjoined the king to guide the 
economy with a light hand, then, the pressing needs of the fiscal-military state 
demanded a mailed fist.  Facing disaster, Louis’s ministers opted for more 
intervention, not less, and higher taxes, not lower.  (Louis himself, whose royal touch 
reportedly cured more than 350,000 victims of scrofula during the course of his reign, 
otherwise took a hands-off approach to the suffering of his subjects, who greeted his 
death in 1715 with a collective sigh of relief.43)  Between 1689 and 1715, the 
government arbitrarily changed the value of coin nearly forty times.  In 1695, it 
introduced a head tax, or capitation, graduated according to rank, and fiercely 
                                                                                                                                      
whom he had known when the controller-general was intendant of Rouen, in Boislisle, 
Correspondance, t. II: 524-545. 
42 McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault, 146-150; Guy Rowlands, The Financial Decline of a Great Power: 
War, Influence, and Money in Louis XIV’s France (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
CITE.  The importance of individual financiers to the ministers is exemplified by the relationship 
between Samuel Bernard and Chamillart.  As soon as Bernard declared bankruptcy in 1709, after 
funding nearly all foreign transactions associated with the war effort for the previous five years, 
Chamillart’s political credit collapsed.  Jones, The Great Nation, 58-59.   
43 Peter Burke, The Fabrication of Louis XIV, 43; Goubert, Louis XIV, 276. 
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opposed by the aristocracy.  In 1701, the new controller-general of finances, Michel 
Chamillart, forced into circulation a form of paper money, which subsequently 
collapsed for lack of credit.  Meanwhile the crown imposed new duties on luxury 
items ranging from powdered wigs to playing cards.  In the final years of the war, 
Chamillart’s successor, Nicolas Desmaretz, closed numerous loopholes and decreed a 
universal income tax, the dixième, hoping to squeeze yet more money out of 
otherwise privileged subjects (many of whom paid dearly for exemptions in what 
amounted to a government shakedown scheme).  Desmaretz was inspired in part by 
Vauban’s dîme, but instead of cutting other taxes, he simply added the dixième to the 
rest—increasing rather than lifting the burden on the poor.44  Saint-Simon lamented 
the bitter irony of it: “You see how in France one must guard against the most just 
and useful intentions...this is a terrible lesson to put an end to even the best proposals 
in the realms of finance and taxation.”45  
 
Glory and Profit 
 
The radical ideas of Vauban, Fénelon, and Boisguilbert have received a great 
deal of scholarly attention, but for some powerful contemporaries, the means to 
restore French grandeur lay neither in a diminished fiscal state nor in a return to the 
land, but rather in aggressive action far beyond the kingdom’s borders—in Asia, 
Africa, and the Americas.  Despite the privations and hardships of the times, the 
horizons of French commerce expanded enormously in these years, encompassing 
new ventures in the Far East and the South Seas as well as ever greater shipments of 
                                                
44 McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault, 138-145; Jones, Great Nation, 55-57. 
45 Saint-Simon, Mémoires, t. X: 35. 
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African slaves and American coffee, tobacco, sugar, and indigo.  By the Peace of 
Ryswick of 1697, France reclaimed Acadia and Pondichéry, acquired Saint-
Domingue, and regained access to the world’s shipping lanes.  In 1698 alone, the first 
year after the Peace of Ryswick, the merchants of Saint-Malo sailed a dozen vessels 
to the Antilles, more than in the previous six years combined, while their counterparts 
in Nantes sent forty-two, twice as many as the year before.46  That same year the 
Amphitrite departed on what would become France’s first successful trading voyage 
to China.  Administrators predicted with growing conviction that supremacy in 
Europe would henceforth hinge on access to overseas markets and commodities.  In 
debating how the king should manage this burgeoning global trade, they reconsidered 
the relationship of the crown to the ports and the metropole to its colonies. 
To an unprecedented extent, officials were joined by leading members of the 
merchant community, who took on a much greater voice in government during these 
decades.  The merchants’ rising influence was a direct function of the state’s 
dependence upon them: many had Protestant connections abroad, and during the wars 
royal ministers relied on them to secure much-needed grain shipments, naval stores, 
and foreign loans.  Crucially, too, they lent their expertise to aristocratic officials who 
felt unprepared to negotiate the commercial provisions of peace treaties at Ryswick 
and Utrecht (1713).  “I beg you to confer immediately with the merchants,” 
Pontchartrain instructed the intendant at La Rochelle, Michel Bégon, in 1697,  
If we permit the entry of foreign merchandise...in order 
to obtain foreign markets for French products, will the 
Advantage thus earned be reciprocal and equal on one 
side and on the other?  Will not the kingdom’s trade 
                                                
46 Goubert, Louis XIV, 225. 
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suffer too considerably?...I beg you to give me the same 
advice regarding your proposals for the sale of 
merchandise from the American colonies to foreign 
countries, and the most certain and simple methods of 
considerably increasing trade.  I beg you to give me this 
as promptly as possible and in the greatest detail of 
which you are capable...You are aware of the extreme 
urgency of the matter and that there is not a moment to 
lose.47 
 
Under Colbert and Seignelay, the ministry had allowed the merchants little real input 
on commercial affairs.  But now that Pontchartrain was prepared to reconsider the 
crown’s protectionist stance toward overseas trade—a reversal of thirty years of 
policy and argumentation—he wanted Bégon to sound out those who knew the trade 
best.  In seeking their advice, he seemed to agree with at least one outspoken 
négociant that “to know what is good for commerce, one must have experience of 
it.”48 
The merchants took advantage of their new influence to obtain the sort of 
privileged freedoms that had formerly been denied to them.  Almost overnight, 
special requests that had once drawn curt refusals—to ship their merchandise on 
foreign vessels, for example—began to receive approval.  Meanwhile they made a 
fortune as favored financial go-betweens, charging colossal fees on royal transactions 
abroad and, with diplomatic cover, selling captured prizes back to the English and the 
Dutch.49  Several used their gains to buy shares in the half dozen new or reorganized 
trading companies that sprouted during the peace of 1697-1701.  Their enthusiastic 
investment heralded a transformation of these exclusive monopolies from the “forced 
                                                
47 Pontchartrain to Bégon, 8 May 1697, ANOM MAR B2, vol. 121, ff. 207-210, quoted in Rothkrug, 
Opposition, 414. 
48 “Mémoire du sieur des Casaux du Hallay, député de Nantes, sur l’état du commerce en général,” 4 
March 1701, reproduced in Boislisle, Correspondance, t. II: 483. 
49 Rothkrug, Opposition, 392-419. 
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service” of the Richelieu and Colbert years into genuine pressure groups whose 
directors controlled their own stakes and lobbied ministers from a position of 
strength.50  In 1700, Louis formalized the merchants’ advisory role in policymaking 
by reviving Colbert’s long-defunct Council of Trade and allowing chambers of 
commerce in Paris and the ports to elect its deputies.  Composed of a dozen 
prominent négociants and financiers as well as Chamillart, Superintendant of 
Commerce Henri d’Aguesseau, and Louis de Pontchartrain’s son and successor as 
minister of the navy, Jérôme, the Council met once per week to discuss the state of 
trade and to make recommendations to the king.51  Much like the Renaissance 
bankers who had once leveraged their wealth and expertise into institutional control 
over monetary policy, then, the leading merchants of Louis XIV’s France positioned 
themselves to shape the governance of a commercial sphere now considered vital to 
the kingdom’s economic future.52   
From the start, the deputies raised fundamental questions about France’s trade.  
In a series of memoranda that might better be characterized as cahiers de doléances, 
they debated numerous issues, including the ideal role of the king in commercial 
affairs (which imports should he tax, when, and how?); the fitness of the French to la 
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négoce (were they naturally suited to it, or did mercantile habits need to be 
inculcated?); and even the ultimate purpose of exchange (was it peace among nations, 
the enrichment of the state, or the profit of individual entrepreneurs?).53  The 
merchant deputies were virtually united, however, in excoriating what they saw as a 
glaring tension between the crown’s ham-fisted regulation of trade, on one hand, and 
the supple demands of an impatiently globalizing business, on the other.  In part they 
had in mind Colbert’s steep foreign tariffs, which had sparked a lasting and disastrous 
trade war with the Dutch.54  But they also denounced with particular force the 
countless internal customs duties, harbor fees, price controls, municipal excises, river 
and road tolls, venal inspectors, and other impediments France had heaped upon itself 
to the benefit of no one, it seemed, but a coterie of rapacious tax farmers.  (One 
deputy estimated that transporting merchandise along the Loire from Nantes to 
Orléans cost 15% of its total value—a figure that did not include the bribes extorted 
by the farmers’ haughty and crooked commis, who, “burning with insatiable desire for 
personal profit,” threw up “ready-made pretexts for irritating merchants.”)  Several 
others broadened their critique to include the special favors granted to some towns 
over others.  Why should Marseille have an exclusive monopoly over the Levant 
trade?  Why must all imported silk pass through Lyons?  Why were Dunkirk and 
Marseille the only duty-free ports?  Why, the deputies from Dunkirk and Saint-Malo 
                                                
53 The merchants’ views were solicited in November 1700 by d’Aguesseau, who asked each of them 
for “a memorandum on the general state of trade.”  Thomas Schaeper first likened the memoranda to 
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the rest of the world,” argued Jean Anisson of Lyon, “That would be to go against nature and the 
decrees of Providence, which has distributed its gifts to each people in order to oblige them...to engage 
in a mutual traffic with each other.”  “Mémoire du sieur Anisson, député de Lyon,” 4 March 1701, 
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wondered, was direct trade with the West Indies restricted to Rouen, Dieppe, Nantes, 
Bordeaux, Marseille, and La Rochelle?55 
The merchants’ frustrations led them to voice full-throated calls for freedom 
of trade.  “Liberty is the soul and element of commerce,” intoned the Nantais 
firebrand Descasaux du Hallay, “it excites the genius and application of merchants, 
who...operate a perpetual movement that produces abundance everywhere.  As soon 
as one bounds the genius of merchants by placing limits upon it, trade is destroyed.”  
Like most of his fellow deputies, he urged Louis to emulate France’s English and 
Dutch rivals, who treated commerce “like the heart of the State” and “have made it a 
law, which they observe scrupulously, to let complete freedom reign over it.”  Instead 
of squeezing money from his merchant subjects, Descasaux argued, the king need 
only relax his grip, and great riches would come to him through the natural ebbs and 
flows of exchange: “Wise traders know that by a necessary exit, what goes 
[eventually] comes back another way, and a movement well observed produces a 
benefit that remains in the country to enrich he who carries it out.”56   
The stifling proliferation of tariffs, regulations, and exemptions was bad 
enough, yet several of the deputies reserved their fiercest criticism for another 
impediment to commercial growth: exclusive trading companies.  France’s 
négociants were eager to traffic in the rich variety of Asian, African, and American 
goods they had seen stored in the holds of Dutch and English prizes, from tea and 
porcelain to ivory, gold, silver, silk, and calicoes.  But the monopolies that emerged 
after 1697, like the royal tax farms, were dominated by court favorites and financiers, 
                                                
55 Schaeper, Council of Commerce, 55-59. 
56 “Mémoire du sieur des Casaux du Hallay,” in Boislisle, Correspondance, t. II: 483. 
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which effectively barred most provincial merchants from these lucrative trades—a 
loss they felt all the more keenly after 1700, when Spain awarded France’s Guinea 
Company the exclusive right to supply its vast New World colonies with slaves.57  
Deputies from the Atlantic ports bitterly attacked the monopolies as an unnatural 
constraint upon the entrepreneurial spirit of merchants and, by extension, the 
kingdom’s revenues.  “It is a most certain Maxim that nothing but Competition and 
liberty in Trade can render Commerce beneficial to the State,” several fumed, “all 
Monopolies or Traffic appropriated to Companies exclusive of others are infinitely 
burdensome and pernicious.  What advantage can France receive from the Guinea 
Company?...Will they sacrifice their interests to those of the State?...Will they not 
rather choose to sell a Negro for 500 livres than 120 or 150?”  Some deputies who 
already held shares in the companies countered that only a privileged monopoly could 
bring the wealth, stability, and confidence necessary to such new and risky long-
distance ventures, but their opponents insisted that a small clique of merchant-bankers 
and royal hangers-on lacked the incentive to maximize France’s share of overseas 
trade.58  
In decrying the monopolies as tools of private interest that favored only a 
privileged few, the deputies identified the public good with the welfare of the 
merchant community as a whole (which is to say their own), and called on the crown 
to reform trade to their mutual benefit.  In this sense they asked the king to rule much 
                                                
57 Merchants in some of the ports, such as Saint-Malo, were able to participate in these trades as 
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like the English Parliament professed to do: on behalf of all merchants, rather than a 
handful of well-connected supplicants.59  “Private companies were good forty years 
ago, because back then the notions of overseas commerce were entirely lost in 
France,” Descasaux conceded, “[but now] it is of the utmost importance to lift all 
exclusions and let freedom reign, for the interest both of the King and of the State.”  
To prove his point, he contrasted the insatiable American demand for slaves with the 
Guinea Company’s incentive to restrict supply.  “The fundamental principle of 
private companies is entirely opposed to the public good, in that it is in their interest 
to limit their trade to a certain quantity,” he explained, “As for the Guinea Company, 
the indolence of its traffic in slaves...has prevented us from making great progress in 
the commerce and navigations we have with the peoples of the Americas.  It has 
limited the supply of negroes to these peoples to such an extent that there is not even 
one-tenth of the number necessary to clear the land [for planting].”  Revoking the 
company’s privilege would pave the way for a more robust exchange with Spain’s 
teeming New World colonies, he predicted, which in turn would ensure French 
dominance in the Americas.60  In short, he and other like-minded deputies argued that 
France’s renewed capacity for overseas trade, coupled with its newly favored access 
to Spanish colonial markets, should compel the king to lift all unnecessary restrictions 
on their commerce, even if it harmed the particular interests of his friends and 
financial backers. 
Such calls for reform were hardly confined to the metropole.  France’s 
colonies, too, experienced their share of suffering during these years, and resident 
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merchants and officials openly questioned a state of affairs that left them isolated and 
dependent for their survival on illicit trade with neighboring European settlements.  
The colonists bristled, moreover, at the customs duties levied by the Domaine 
d’Occident, one of the Five Great Farms controlled, almost entirely, by Parisian 
financiers.  In 1708, when Intendant Vaucresson asked Martinique’s merchants how a 
mutually profitable trade could be established between France, Canada, and the 
Caribbean, they unanimously recommended the abolition of all import and export 
duties between the colonies.61  Two years later, at Pontchartrain’s urging, Vaucresson 
tallied the accounts of a mock trading voyage for one 250-ton ship sailing from 
Nantes to the Antilles.  After deducting the costs of outfitting and taxation, he found, 
such a voyage could earn “no profit at all.”62  Vaucresson made no recommendation, 
but others on the scene concluded that removing the Domaine was the only way to 
unleash the massive commercial potential of the islands.  The Domaine’s former 
director at Martinique, La Brunelière, criticized the farm he had once served in stark 
terms:  
One must regard colonies as [places] where trade and 
planting are carried out freely....As for customs duties, 
they are so opposed to the liberty one has in the islands 
that as soon as we begin to impose them, the colonists 
believe that we will establish all the same ones there that 
we have in France!  The inhabitants of the French 
islands should be treated like their neighbors.  Neither 
offices, nor fees, nor duties are known in the other 
islands.  A perfect liberty reigns there, and the aim of the 
nations of Europe who have [colonial] settlements is to 
govern them in a way that makes them useful, that they 
may extract commodities from them appropriate to their 
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States and to the other nations of Europe.  And it is only 
by leaving these [colonists] free that [states] gain all 
these advantages. 
 
La Brunelière went on to denounce tax farms and exclusive companies as wholly 
unsuited to the colonies, warning that if resident planters and merchants were not left 
free to pursue their interests (as the English and Dutch supposedly were), they would 
abandon the Americas and ruin the trade of France’s Atlantic ports.  As rich but 
fledgling sites of economic activity, he suggested, colonial settlements must not be 
governed by the sort of bloated fiscal regime that encumbered the metropole.  Instead 
of farming out their trade to monopolies in exchange for a certain but limited return, 
the crown should liberate them to pursue the potentially limitless profits afforded by 
free trade with France and, under its aegis, direct competition for European markets.63 
 The irony of such appeals is that the rhetorical link between free trade and the 
public good had originated not with traders, merchants, or planters, but with the 
crown itself.  In his fiercely contested efforts to reform overseas commerce, Colbert 
had defended the king as the sole guarantor of commercial liberty.  The 1669 edict 
that proclaimed Marseille a duty-free port, for instance, portrayed Louis as the 
liberator of a town “overburdened with import and export duties more than any other 
place in the kingdom, although ours [i.e. the crown’s] were not established there.”  
When local civic and commercial leaders opposed the measure, Colbert contrasted the 
liberal, “universal,” and “public”-minded aims of the edict with the “small-minded,” 
short-sighted, and particularistic motives of its overprivileged opponents.64  He 
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frequently invoked “freedom” as “the soul of trade”—by which he meant, trade could 
not flourish in the ways he imagined it should if merchants impeded salutary 
measures guided by the king’s sovereign gaze.65  His successors understood 
commercial liberty somewhat differently, but not radically so.  For them, as for 
Colbert, free trade could not be free without royal regulation; for merchants, free 
trade simply meant freedom from any outside intrusion that damaged their interests.66 
What turn-of-the-century reformers wanted, then, was not to establish 
complete liberty of exchange as laissez-faire liberals would later understand it, but 
instead to make colonial trade a zone of free enterprise within the checkered 
landscape of royal privilege.  In this sense their desires were both novel and utterly 
familiar: to make the existing system work for them, they asked the king to treat the 
Atlantic ports and colonies as privileged entrepôts—commercial hubs whose 
importance to France’s welfare merited special consideration.67  They blended 
conventional absolutist rhetoric with new utilitarian arguments to rebrand commercial 
liberty from a public danger to a public good.  Despite their fulsome language, 
however, they were scarcely ideologues.  (Several of the same deputies who deplored 
the abuses and inefficiencies of monopoly companies, including Descasaux, later 
became enthusiastic shareholders, while merchants who had once villified Colbert as 
a regulatory bête noire invoked him posthumously as a champion of free trade).68  
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The language of deregulation, individual enterprise, and public “utility” resonated 
with them because it spoke to their hopes and fears for trade at a moment when the 
older way of describing commerce—as a marginal, vulgar activity that should be 
rigidly directed by the crown to serve the traditional aims of military glory, public 
order, and courtly patronage—no longer fit their experiences.  They did not need 
Boisguilbert or Vauban to tell them that royal policy was out of step with economic 
realities; they could see it all around them and feel it in their pocketbooks.  The 
demand for exotic luxuries and staple goods had risen so dramatically since the mid-
seventeenth century that overseas trade appeared capable of enriching individuals and 
states on a scale unimaginable even a generation before.  As a result, it now formed a 
crucial front in the broader struggle for European supremacy.  In the maritime 
communities where these developments were particularly visible, officials and 
négociants alike increasingly viewed commerce as a force of nature shackled by 
unnecessary and counterproductive restraints.  Pace d’Argenson, magistrates and 
merchants could agree that when it came to global trade, at least, not everything (or 
everyone) should be regulated—certainly not in a way that favored Parisian financiers 
over the vanguard of French commercial expansion. 
 That circumscribed vision of commercial liberty did not extend beyond the 
boundaries of the empire.  No one in the merchant community or in officialdom 
called for an end to the Exclusif, the exclusive right of the metropole to trade with its 
overseas possessions.  Direct commerce between colonial settlements and foreign 
powers, although common in practice, was formally proscribed, and would remain so 
throughout the eighteenth century.  All sides believed that colonies existed to 
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supplement and enhance metropolitan trade, not compete with it (although many 
colonists would come to see the Exclusif as a tyranny equal to the despotism of the 
trading companies).  As Raudot put it, “Colonies should be perceived in relation to 
the Kingdom that founded them and, consequently, must not engage in any 
Commerce that could prejudice that Kingdom by drawing to themselves money that 
would otherwise come to it.”69  What commercial reformers wanted was to create 
conditions in which the ports and colonies would better enrich themselves as well as 
the crown.  By removing impediments to trade within an imperial framework of 
exchange, they reasoned, the king could out-compete his European rivals without 
ceding absolute control over the wealth of his ultramarine dominions.  How, exactly, 
this aim should be achieved was the subject of Raudot’s proposal. 
 
Raudot’s Solution: The “Memorandum on the Present Affairs of Canada and the 
Settlement at Cape Breton” (7 August 1706) 
 
 When Raudot received his appointment to Canada in January 1705, he had 
already witnessed firsthand the mighty shifts underway in French political and 
commercial life.  As a naval scribe and commissary at Dunkirk from 1699 to 1704, he 
saw that town transformed into a duty-free port by order of the king.  He would have 
noticed how local merchants welcomed their new freedom but also struggled to wrest 
control of their own trade from foreign competitors who eagerly exploited the lifting 
of customs barriers.  He would have observed the foundation of a chamber of 
commerce—the kingdom’s second, after Marseille—which allowed the leading 
négociants to assemble weekly to discuss their business, form partnerships, and 
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represent their grievances to municipal and royal officials.  And from his privileged 
perch along the Canal de Bergues, he would have watched as the outbreak of war in 
1702 brought a parade of English and Dutch prizes to France’s cradle of corsairs 
(some 1,600 total by the end of the war, worth an estimated thirty million pounds).70  
The memoranda submitted by Dunkirk’s merchants to the Council of Commerce 
echoed the refrain of other deputies from the ports, calling on the king to liberate 
them from outside regulations and monopolies in the name of free trade, on one hand, 
while begging him to protect their industry, finance their infrastructure projects, and 
privilege their commerce, on the other.71  For Raudot, who had an extraordinary 
mandate to review all of the intendant’s paperwork and to “act in concert” with him 
(part of Pontchartrain’s effort to train up his young protegé in “every detail of the 
port”), these years would have provided a crash course in the new and often 
conflicting demands of commercial governance at the turn of the century.72   
Whatever lessons he took from his time at Dunkirk, Raudot brought to his 
new post a studied familiarity with Canada’s particular commercial woes.  Even 
before leaving France, he likely joined his father for an interview with two prominent 
Canadian merchants to discuss the dire state of the beaver trade.  Soon afterward, 
father and son received a post-mortem analysis of the trade submitted to Pontchartrain 
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by Denis Riverin, the agent of the colony’s fur monopoly in Paris.73  Riverin was 
responsible for ordering goods and supplies, leasing warehouse space, and securing 
loans on behalf of his fellow shareholders; like La Brunelière, he had become 
disillusioned with the company he served.  He concluded from his long experience as 
a trader and official in New France that the creation of a fur monopoly in 1674 had 
“caused all of the ills which have afflicted [Canada] for so long”: excessive 
monoculture, perpetual scarcity, chronic indebtedness, boundless cupidity, 
administrative corruption, unrelenting warfare with the Iroquois, and the scandalous 
libertinage of the coureurs de bois.  When royal administrators first arrived in New 
France in the 1660s, he explained, they had found what appeared to be an endless 
supply of beaver, and at the time there was such a vogue for felt hats in Europe and 
Russia that demand, too, seemed infinite.  Observers on both sides of the Atlantic 
quickly came to see North America as a land where the makings of civilization—
wealth and industry—were literally carried on the backs of its ubiquitous rodent 
colonizers (Figure 4).  As Raudot himself would later conclude, the result was that 
“the Colony of Canada was founded upon the Trade in Beaver,” which lodged itself 
ever more tightly in the minds of the French as a “goldmine...that would never run 
dry.”74  
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Yet as Riverin pointed out, beaver pelts were not like gold, and New France 
was no El Dorado.  By the early 1670s, fur fever had glutted the market.  Officials 
decided that the only means to lower production and raise prices was to unify the 
trade under monopoly control, which eventually passed into the hands of the 
Domaine d’Occident (the same tax farm later denounced by La Brunelière in 
Martinique).  “This,” however, “was to fall back on Remedies worse than the 
Problem.”  The Domaine, headquartered in Paris, engaged the colonists to collect 
pelts in exchange for a guarantee to buy them at fixed rates.  Far from limiting supply 
and controlling prices, the promise of payment sparked a frenzy of overproduction 
that progressively ruined the company, which was obliged to purchase every pelt 
brought to its storehouse in Québec even as the value of furs collapsed.  In 1700, the 
Domaine’s principal backer, Louis Guigues, begged the king to bail him out.  The 
crown agreed to buy more than three million pounds’ worth of surplus pelts from 
Guigues and to mediate a transfer of his monopoly to the colonists, who, led by 
Riverin, chose to go into business for themselves rather than sell off their own supply 
at a steep loss.  The king’s massive purchase temporarily buoyed the price of beaver, 
but by 1705, the colonists’ meager resources had buckled under the combined weight 
of inherited debt and an oversaturated market.75 
For Riverin, the epic commercial decline of New France ultimately stemmed 
from a poverty of theory in its administration.  “If the Commerce in Beaver was once 
the primary purpose of a French Colony in Canada,” he argued, “one can say that the 
bad use we have made of this trade has reduced the colony to the sad state in which 
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we see it today.  Naturally, the Beaver were the object of a free Commerce, just like 
Wool, Silk, furs, and all other goods.  At the time we thought there were good reasons 
to make it exclusive...[but] We mistook ourselves in the principles.”76  Namely, 
officials had misunderstood both the nature of beaver pelts as a commodity and the 
behavior of markets.  Monopolizing the trade presupposed a “total consumption” of 
supply that simply could not exist beyond a modest threshold.  “Beaver pelts are good 
for nothing but making Hats,” he explained, “if we except the portion sold in Holland 
each year [and destined] for Muscovy, that is the sole end of their consumption.  All 
that is needed for these two uses is confined to a certain amount that must not be 
exceeded.”  The presence of a monopoly had encouraged overproduction where 
market forces by their nature would have limited supply.  In a free market, “This 
Trade, like others, would have its revolutions—furs would be expensive or cheap in 
proportion to their quantity and consumption, in response to which each [trader] 
would take his own measures.”77  Instead of embracing and accounting for those 
revolutions, the authorities had sought to squelch them, defying inexorable laws of 
nature that eventually wrought the company’s downfall. 
Restoring freedom of trade, Riverin argued, would harmonize the fluctuations 
of supply and demand and provide a panacea to Canada’s ills.  “The liberty and ease 
of exchange would inspire Emulation among the merchants,” he predicted, “the hope 
of profit would excite them to undertake Enterprises that would bring abundance to 
the country and provide it with income from the other goods it produces.”  More 
broadly, “order would be restored to all things”: the Iroquois would have no reason to 
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renew hostilities, administrators would no longer treat the trade like their “birthright,” 
France’s Native allies would no longer see their women and children suborned by 
licentious coureurs de bois, missionary campaigns would advance, navigation would 
flourish, and the colonists would take up agriculture, fishing, and ship-building in 
earnest.  Even the French hat trade, “which has visibly fallen off because of the old 
Furs one is obliged to use in order to get rid of them,” would recover thanks to the 
improved quality of raw material.  With England and the Netherlands clearly in mind, 
Riverin wagered that “if the meanest countries in the world, which produce nothing, 
are making themselves considerable by the work and industry of the people who 
inhabit them, we cannot doubt that Canada can become advantageous, producing by 
itself an infinity of Goods suitable to Trade and the maintenance of its own 
inhabitants.”  All that remained “to give them the taste for it” was “to remove the 
pernicious fixation on beaver by doing away with its [monopoly].”78 
 Riverin’s faith in markets took him far from the thinking of men like Raudot.  
Royal administrators typically harbored an instinctive fear of market forces, which 
they regarded as antisocial, vicious, and driven by self-interest.  Like other aristocrats, 
they tended to associate free trade with the odious figure of the merchant—a vulgar, 
vaguely Semitic villain who trampled over the public good in his reckless pursuit of 
profit.  Officials worried that allowing complete liberty of exchange would expose the 
king’s subjects to the predations of such “parasites.”  Some goods, especially grain 
and flour, were so fundamental to the people’s livelihood (and obedience) that even 
the slightest hint of hoarding or price gouging could not be risked.  In practice, of 
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course, authorities saw that excessive regulation stifled commerce, and that some 
trades permitted more freedom than others; as overseers of the marketplace, they 
worked to reconcile the merchants’ need for liberty with the expectation of consumers 
to receive certain commodities at a just price.  Nonetheless, they took it as axiomatic 
that commercial problems should be resolved by police measures, not by markets—
precisely the opposite of Riverin’s position.79 
 From this perspective, Raudot’s social background and administrative duties 
might seem to balance out his immersion in the world of trade enough to make him 
reject out of hand the sort of market-based solution proposed by Riverin; but in fact 
these qualities combined to make him unusually capable of seeing commerce and 
public order as dynamic, interwoven problems, and together they conditioned the 
creative approach of his “Memorandum” to the sheer desperation that confronted him 
at Québec.80  If the intendant arrived to find that “misery and necessity” had finally 
forced some of the “lazy and frivolous” inhabitants to abandon trapping in favor of 
planting, he bemoaned the scarcity that left many facing the long and harsh Canadian 
winter with little to eat and nothing on their backs but tattered deerskins.  The country 
was so “beaten down” that morale had become virtually impossible to lift.  Six 
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hundred of its strongest young men remained lost to a life of “savage idleness” in the 
woods.  The military and judicial officers, who should have been paragons of public-
mindedness, were flagrantly out for themselves.  As for the merchants, he 
complained, “the envy they have for one another” had almost entirely corroded “the 
courtesies, friendship, and good faith that are the foundations of commerce.”  
Exploiting the ministry’s longstanding jealousy of British prosperity in New England, 
he unfavorably compared the beggared Canadians with their industrious English 
neighbors, who “exploit and apply themselves to everything their lands can provide 
for them, and have never seen the Trade in Beaver pelts as anything but an accessory 
to [the commerce] they should conduct.”81 
If the colony’s political and commercial affairs were disordered, its finances 
were a downright shambles.  Raudot reported that even in boon times, when New 
France had received generous royal subsidies and produced between 800,000 and a 
million pounds’ worth of fur each year, the colony had run a deficit; now it subsisted 
on an annual income of approximately 650,000 pounds, almost half of which came 
from the king’s treasury, and spent nearly twice as much on the war effort and 
supplies from France.82  The yearly shortfalls had siphoned off virtually all of the 
colony’s currency to the metropole, where merchants were no longer willing to ship 
supplies, at great risk and heavy cost, to cash-poor consumers who could pay them 
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only in worthless letters of exchange.  Local shipping might have offset the decline in 
vessels from France, but cutthroat insurance fees, wage and price inflation, and an 
absence of skilled workers stymied the effort.83   Under such bleak conditions, 
Canada’s négociants were scarcely able to feed themselves and their 20,000 fellow 
colonists, let alone undertake the sort of large-scale ventures that Raudot believed 
necessary to revive the colony’s flagging fortunes. 
 It was common for colonial officers to paint such dark portraits of local 
conditions—punctuated, of course, by confident reassurances—but Raudot’s 
“Memorandum” took the unusual step of exploring the underlying causes, beyond the 
fur trade fiasco, of Canada’s utter poverty and dependence upon France.84  How could 
such a vast and fertile colony be so unproductive? he wondered.  The soil was good, 
yet the colonists barely grew enough crops to feed themselves.  The forest was 
endless, yet they could not build and maintain their own fleet of ships.  There was 
ample pasturage and a temperate climate, yet livestock were scarce.  The waterways 
abounded in fish, seals, and whales, yet few were caught and sold.  Like sugar and 
cod—and notably unlike beaver pelts—“the consumption of these commodities is 
infinite,” he observed.  When their values fell, a merchant could lower their price and 
still turn a profit, because the sale of one stock did not affect the rest.  With such an 
abundance of infinitely consumable goods, New France should have been not only 
self-sufficient, but rich, and able to provide the metropole with fish, wood, hemp, and 
other supplies that French merchants currently bought from other nations.  If Raudot 
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could convince the Canadians to see furs as a mere “accessory” to a diverse trade in 
foodstuffs and natural resources, what would prevent the colony from flourishing?85 
 The answer was ice.  Every year, from October to May, the Saint Lawrence 
River froze over, cutting off access to Québec and trapping all large vessels anchored 
in its harbor, where the damaging crush of snow and ice incurred serious repair costs 
on top of the wages and provisions that shippers were obliged to pay crews forced to 
winter in port.  The brief sailing season depressed not only the number of incoming 
voyages but also the fishing industry, Raudot explained, because ships trawling the 
Grand Banks could not continue to France without first returning to re-supply at 
Québec, where, if stuck over winter, they were unable to sell off most of their catch 
(chronic salt shortages having long made preservation hopeless).  Simply put, the 
location and climate of New France effectively shut down its trade with Europe for 
two-thirds of the year.  To “unblock” its commercial potential, he argued, the colony 
required a means of supplementing trans-Atlantic voyages with transportation “from 
near to near.”  In other words, it needed an entrepôt.86 
 If he had contented himself only with these observations, Raudot would have 
remained an incisive but otherwise unremarkable thinker.  After all, the problems he 
identified in Canada’s economy were hardly new.  Since the earliest years of royal 
rule, intendants had been calling for more robust agriculture, improved shipping, and 
a diversified trade.  There was nothing revolutionary about lamenting the colony’s 
dearth of money or its dismal financial outlook, nor would Pontchartrain have been 
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surprised to learn that the exportation of beaver pelts alone was “insufficient to 
support an entire Colony.”87  Even the idea of an ice-free entrepôt that would promote 
trade between New France and the outside world was well established: not only had 
De Meulles proposed it in 1686, but as early as the late 1660s, Colbert had ordered 
Intendant Jean Talon to devise plans for a post at Acadia or Cape Breton, “being 
certain that there is nothing more advantageous than to found Entrepôts, where we 
could make two voyages per year.”88 
What set Raudot apart from his predecessors is that he sought to resolve 
Canada’s immediate and local problems with systemic, far-reaching solutions that 
harnessed deep structural forces.  He mobilized both abstract principles of exchange 
and the observed social, demographic, and geographic realities of America to show 
how France and the colonies could be transformed into a common market greater than 
the sum of its parts.  In making his case to Pontchartrain, he painstakingly reviewed 
the past and present state of a series of settlements and commodities, both French and 
foreign, identifying specific areas of inefficiency and opportunity and proposing steps 
to improve and exploit them.  He blended the short-term material needs of Canada, 
the Antilles, and the metropole with long-term military, diplomatic, and fiscal goals 
to present a common vision of economic recovery and expansion.  That is to say, he 
absorbed the momentous political and commercial developments of his time to 
reimagine France’s economy in broadly imperial terms. 
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From his opening analysis of Canada’s misery and the structural limitations of 
its trade, Raudot pivoted to a defense of the Cape Breton entrepôt as the “sole means” 
to revive French power in America.  He invited the minister to see the new waystation 
as a mutual benefit to France and New France.  One of its cardinal virtues, he 
claimed, would be to promote a native shipping industry, based on safe and speedy 
light-vessel transport, that would improve the circulation of goods between Québec 
and Cape Breton and hence between New France and Europe.  No longer would 
heavy ships have to risk the 120-league voyage up the ice-choked Gulf of Saint 
Lawrence.  An improved market for Canadian foodstuffs in France, meanwhile, 
would allow the colonists to enrich themselves instead of merely scraping by.  
Perhaps mindful of the endless jockeying for privilege among metropolitan 
merchants, he expected Pontchartrain to see the idea in zero-sum terms: any gains for 
Canada’s settlers and négociants must come at the expense of French merchants.89  
But far from benefiting New France at the cost of France, he contended, local profits 
from fishing and intercolonial shipping would give Canadians the means to buy more 
French products.  Drawn by the prospect of greater purchasing power from the 
metropole, Canadians would make themselves useful as seasonal laborers in the 
fisheries, the coureurs de bois would abandon the woods to become sailors, and “the 
colonist, instead of wearing his deerskin clothing as he does now...will wear a French 
outfit.”90  Attentive to the transformative potential of dress as a marker of status and 
identity, Raudot suggested that the economic integration made possible by Cape 
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Breton would entail a corresponding cultural effect, as the increased consumption of 
metropolitan goods civilized the “savagery” of Canada’s European population. 
According to Raudot, the mutual growth of French and Canadian commerce 
would open up a wealth of new possibilities in Europe and America.  With Canada as 
a breadbasket, France could sell off its excess grain to other European nations.  The 
corresponding drop in food prices would attract an influx of foreign workers, who 
could provide cheap labor and an ever-growing consumer base for domestic and 
colonial goods.  In Canada and Cape Breton, a “continuous trade” with the rest of the 
empire would lower the costs of labor and imports, freeing up the capital necessary 
for local merchants to partner with each other and their metropolitan counterparts to 
undertake new ventures such as coal mining, shipbuilding, and rope and tar 
production that would rescue France from its dependence on foreign suppliers.  New 
Spain and the West Indies, meanwhile, could obtain wood and provisions more 
cheaply from Cape Breton than anywhere else, which would raise the profit margins 
of French armateurs who controlled Caribbean shipping.  And of course the new 
entrepôt would prise control of the invaluable whaling and cod trades from the Dutch 
and the British, enormously expanding France’s market share in Spain and the 
Levant.  Ultimately, all of these developments would bring foreign money into France 
and discourage French currency from leaving the kingdom.91    
But the Cape Breton entrepôt would not only bring great benefits to France 
and its colonies, Raudot claimed, it would also do “grave harm” to their enemies.  
Cutting off access to the Newfoundland shoals would deal the British a devastating 
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blow, he claimed, since the coasts of England could scarcely supply more than three 
shiploads of cod per year.  Nor would New Englanders be able to furnish Britain’s 
Caribbean islands with precious Acadian coal.  In a delicious inversion of their 
customary roles, the British American colonies—and by extension the British, Dutch, 
and Spanish Caribbean colonies who relied upon them for supplies—would become 
dependent upon clandestine trade with France.  “From [Cape Breton], we will provide 
New England with Wine, Brandy, canvas, ribbons, and taffeta.  For the Kingdom this 
will be an infinite outlet for these goods, because the English carry them to all their 
Islands on this Continent as well as those of the Dutch...even if the Entry of this 
merchandise is forbidden, we will find a way to carry their goods to France and they 
will do the same with ours.”  Insidiously and by degrees, Britain’s vast merchant 
marine would be co-opted to serve French interests.  France “would seize all the 
money of [Massachusetts],” and by extension “we will seize [the money] of all the 
peoples of the Americas.”92  Money that did not flow into France with the tide of this 
state-sanctioned contraband trade could be taken by force, for in wartime the new 
entrepôt would serve as an ideal base for privateers to prey upon British and Dutch 
ships, which were obliged by the North Atlantic current to sail along the Grand Banks 
on their return to Europe.  At a time when British naval supremacy was so absolute 
that France’s home fleet had not put out in anger in nearly two years, he foresaw a 
tantalizing future in which “these Corsairs will enrich His Majesty’s subjects and 
oblige [the British and Dutch] to have large convoys for their flotillas and ships-of-
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the-line...which will proportionally diminish their maritime forces in Europe and 
greatly hamper their Commerce in this part of the world.”93  
Where there was misery, then, Raudot saw markets; where there were 
enemies, he saw consumers.  Having outlined his plan for Cape Breton and sketched 
its stakes, he closed his memorandum with a grand vision of French commercial 
supremacy in the maritime Northeast.  “This Island, well Settled, would be the basis 
and foundation of His Majesty in the Americas, within reach of Newfoundland, 
Acadia, [and] Canada, and not too far from the [Caribbean] Islands to give them all 
the support they may need,” he concluded: 
The Settlement of this Island, which will soon become 
considerable by the trade that abounds there, will make 
the English tremble to have a neighbor so well-
positioned and Powerful as the King of France.  It is by 
founding a great Post in that Place...that we will be able, 
in time, to harry the English from Newfoundland and 
make France the sole master of the cod fisheries in 
America, which will bring infinite benefits to the 
Kingdom by the trade with its Neighbors that [France] 
alone will control. 
 
It was essential to Raudot’s vision that a “well Settled” entrepôt be one whose 
foundations matched the spatial, environmental, and ecological qualities inherent to 
Cape Breton, for his intricate series of assumptions and outcomes made sense only if 
colonial trade were channeled by timeless (“infinite”) incentives and constraints.  For 
the moment, he left the crown’s role in manipulating those forces unclear, aside from 
a parting insistence that “If we wish to establish this Island in a way that will make 
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Commerce flourish, we must allow it to trade with all the ports of France, Spain, the 
Levant, the French Islands of America, and new England.”94 
 
Designing Cape Breton, Remaking New France (1706-1710) 
 
 Raudot’s “Memorandum” sparked an extraordinary, years-long debate within 
the ministry about whether, when, and how to implement his scheme.  But when it 
reached Versailles in the fall of 1706, it received the ordinary treament given to all 
colonial correspondence: a clerk read through it, summarized its main points, and 
delivered the resumé to Pontchartrain, who recorded his views in terse marginalia 
ranging from a single word (“good”) to several sentences.  The minister then took the 
less common step of soliciting a second opinion, in this case from Riverin.  Once he 
had annotated Riverin’s views, he sent the collective wisdom of the ministry back to 
Raudot, who proffered objections or revised his memorandum accordingly.  The same 
process repeated itself twice over the next four years.  By 1710, all sides had 
thoroughly debated the ways and means necessary to build an entrepôt at Cape 
Breton.  In the process, they grappled with some of the same fundamental questions 
about commerce and colonization that had been raised by the Council of Trade five 
years earlier, only this time their answers responded to the specific demands of 
founding a new settlement and potentially restructuring France’s entire overseas 
commerce.   
 What is immediately striking about the ministry’s response to the 
“Memorandum” is how much consensus there was between Raudot, Riverin, 
Pontchartrain, and his clerks.  Although they clashed over key matters of cost and 
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implementation, no one ever questioned the ultimate wisdom or success of the 
scheme, even though everyone, including Raudot, conceded that the crown was in no 
state to undertake it anytime soon.  Possibly no one dared to criticize the young 
intendant, who clearly held the minister’s favor.  Or perhaps Raudot and Riverin, 
having made a pact to exploit the cod fisheries with the benefit of royal subsidies and 
Pontchartrain’s protection, engaged in a charade of consultation.95  But more likely all 
sides genuinely believed in the soundness of Raudot’s thinking: there was a core 
“utility” in his ideas that justified “impossible” levels of royal expense.  Their 
unanimous embrace of his plan in the face of enormous logistical challenges, and 
despite the different commercial, fiscal, colonial, and metropolitan interests in play, 
invites us to ask what, exactly, that utility was.   
 Part of the answer lies in Raudot’s way of evaluating colonies as long-term 
investments in France’s future.  In his original memorandum, he had insisted that 
Pontchartrain “must see...Canada as a Colony that no longer has any commerce, and 
to which Beaver, should it become sellable again, cannot provide the means of 
subsistence...All the trade that the inhabitant can do and will do in future will give 
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him only enough to survive on and will not enrich him at all.”96  The intendant 
denounced Canada’s fixation on furs because it provided no room for growth; to 
Pontchartrain’s satisfaction, he proposed a solution that would make the colony’s 
commerce expansible and self-sustaining.97  In reciprocal commentary that the 
minister could read side-by-side, Raudot and Riverin echoed each other’s belief that 
the true revival of New France could not be achieved without the new entrepôt, which 
therefore should be undertaken as a royal project worthy of heavy sacrifices even if 
the pay-off would not be felt for some years.  “This Enterprise is...an affair of state 
that has no other aim but the public good and the improvement of commerce,” 
Riverin asserted.  “Nothing is truer than [the idea that] the Post at Cap Breton is an 
affair of state,” agreed Raudot, “by virtue of the benefits that it will eventually 
produce for the Kingdom of France, for Canada, for the French Islands...and by the 
harm it will do to the English Colonies.”98  Their reasoning elevated colonization to 
an affair of state on the order of diplomacy, justice, and military conquest, all of 
which likewise called for vast and continuous expenditures in the name of glory, 
salvation, and public order.  Indeed, the new entrepôt aimed to accomplish the same 
goals: commerce was simply warfare by other means, after all, and a flourishing 
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overseas trade would eventually bring power, plenty, and peace to all of the king’s 
dominions. 
 This way of looking beyond past failures and present obstacles to see the 
tremendous untapped value in colonies both justified and obliged royal intervention.  
If the settlement of Cape Breton were viewed as a down payment on the public good, 
then no one but the king should carry it out.  From this perspective, the cheaper, safer, 
and less onerous alternative of farming out the scheme to a private company was 
inconceivable, since bitter experience had amply demonstrated that trading 
monopolies, by their very “spirit,” promoted neither the public interest nor 
commercial growth.  Riverin and Raudot explained their logic in nearly identical 
terms that repeatedly hammered the point home: 
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Means (Riverin), 4 December 1706, Paris Responses (Raudot), 16 July 1708, 
Québec 
This Enterprise being properly an affair 
of State that has no other aim but the 
public good and the improvement of 
commerce, It is not suitable to give its 
Management over to any Company 
whatsoever.  The Spirit of Companies is 
to make a lot of money in a short amount 
of time, to abandon affairs that do not 
earn great profits quickly enough, and to 
be opposed to the liberty of the 
inhabitants. 
Nothing is truer than [the idea that] the 
Settlement at Cap Breton is an affair of 
state, by virtue of the benefits that it will 
eventually produce for the Kingdom of 
France, for Canada, for the French 
Islands...and by the harm it will do to the 
english Colonies...It is not suitable to 
give its management over to any 
Company, [for companies], being obliged 
to make great expenses in order to exploit 
these new posts, seek only the means to 
recoup their costs and earn great profits 
without taking any trouble at all to Build 
[the posts] solidly.  The excessive profit 
they wish to make is entirely opposed to 
a new Settlement where one must work 
to convince the inhabitants to come 
settle. 
Here we are not talking about short-term 
gains, but about building and laying the 
foundations for a Settlement that can 
produce, in the course of time, ever more 
favorable fruits for everyone.  Only His 
Majesty can take it in hand, once it has 
pleased God to bring Peace to Europe. 
Only His Majesty can take this 
Settlement in hand and, by giving it a 
form of government that will be lucrative 
to Him, find the means to compensate the 
outlay that he will expend upon it 
through the revenues that it will bring to 
Him.  These are not revenues that will 
come in a day, since [colonial] 
Settlements produce nothing when we are 
building them but rather always cost 
some upkeep...yet eventually, once they 
are well established, they produce ever-
growing revenues.99 
 
By now such language was utterly familiar.  The same rhetoric about private 
companies as a nuisance to the public good had surfaced repeatedly in merchant pleas 
to the Council of Trade, not to mention Riverin’s own memorandum on the fur 
monopoly; similarly, Raudot and Riverin couched their opposition to companies in a 
pragmatic assessment of colonial needs rather than a principled aversion to privilege 
                                                
99 Riverin and Raudot, “Moyens” and “Réponses,” 4 December 1706 and 16 July 1708, NL Ayer mss. 
293, vol. 1, pp. 28-30. 
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per se.100  Yet even as they echoed the merchant deputies’ claims, they broke with 
them in a fundamental way: instead of mobilizing anti-company arguments to 
promote “liberty” as the true agent of commercial progress, they used them to make a 
case for the state as the only force capable of undertaking an enterprise as expensive 
and far-reaching as overseas colonization. 
 This state-centered logic gave renewed strength and purpose to an old line of 
thought.  In 1663, when Louis XIV had revoked the charter of the Compagnie des 
Cent Associés and declared New France a royal colony, he had done so, he claimed, 
to rescue the trade of Canada and the kingdom, “the establishment of Commerce 
being the source and principle of the abundance that we strive by all means to provide 
for our people, and the principal and greatest portion of this commerce consisting in 
overseas colonies.”  In one sense, Raudot and Riverin were simply asking Louis to 
honor that commitment.  But in another sense they wanted him to break his word.  In 
the same declaration, the king had announced that “before establishing any new 
[colonies], we have deemed it necessary to think of maintaining, protecting, and 
augmenting that which is already established, which is what has led us to inquire 
especially about the condition of New France.”101  In urging Louis to invest 
unprecedented sums of his own money in a new colony at Cape Breton, Raudot and 
Riverin invited him to see more colonization, and even greater royal initiative, as the 
true means to bring abundance to both New France and the rest of his empire. 
                                                
100 Despite his criticisms of the fur monopoly, Riverin jealously defended his privilege as the director 
of an exclusive fishing company, while Raudot would later oversee and invest in two of the kingdom’s 
largest farms.  Louis XIV to Denonville and Champigny, 1 May 1689, AN Marine B, vol. 15, f. 60v; 
“Mémoire du sieur Riverin à Monseigneur de Pontchartrain sur les pêches sédentaires du Canada,” 28 
January 1696, ANOM COL C11D, vol. 3, ff. 3-8v; Nish, “Riverin.” 
101 Déclaration du Roi, March 1663, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 2, f. 5v. 
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 It is worth pausing to ask why Raudot and Riverin were so insistent that Cape 
Breton should be colonized by the crown rather than a private company.  After all, the 
king was no less interested in certain and immediate revenues than merchant-bankers 
were, and he already farmed out most of his affairs to privileged monopolies or venal 
officeholders who treated their public functions like personal assets.  The proprietary 
venture had long been a common and useful model for new government enterprises, 
and would remain so through the fall of the Old Regime.  With apologies to Vauban, 
there was no groundswell of support for the king to actually replace tax farms and 
trading monopolies, only to reform their abuses and punish the evildoers responsible.  
If private companies were good in theory, and often met the crown’s needs in 
practice, why were they ill suited to overseas colonization?  And why should anyone, 
including Raudot, think that the king would succeed where so many companies had 
failed?   
 It was not simply that private companies were by their very “spirit” self-
interested, impatient, and oppressive, but also that Raudot believed in the power of 
the state to manipulate the forces of man and nature in a way that no individual or 
company could do.  According to his revised “Memorandum to Lay the First 
Foundations of the Settlement Proposed for the Island of Cape Breton,” written in 
1708, no colonial venture could succeed without the proper incentives, constraints, 
and attitudes in place.  He argued that Louis alone could bring about the “Species of 
attractions” necessary for a new colony “to grow and fashion itself” in a way that 
would encourage the right sort of settlement and trade.  Under company rule, by 
contrast, the worst aspects of the French character held sway: 
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The French have never been regarded as a people suited 
to [colonial] Settlements.  They wish to sow and reap at 
the same time, which is impossible.  In addition, they 
wish to take [only] the gist of everything and enrich 
themselves quickly.  This is the conduct and the Mindset 
of the majority of them.  There are even those who are 
so wretched that they do not scruple to sacrifice an entire 
country so long as they can make themselves wealthy.  
These sorts of people are a plague upon new settlements 
and we must not suffer them.  Instead we must have 
people who sow in order to reap and who, in re-sowing 
each year, await the harvest time and do not rush it.102 
 
Companies imprinted such attitudes ever more deeply upon the minds of the 
colonists; the king made it his business to root them out.  His unparalleled resources, 
unquestionable motives, unassailable authority, and unclouded perception of the 
public good, if properly expressed in the colony’s constitution, could make the 
inhabitants apply themselves to the kinds of commercial activities best suited to their 
surroundings and to the needs of the empire.  In other words, by investing heavily in 
Cape Breton and moulding its government according to a clear-eyed estimation of its 
potential—the sort of estimation Raudot claimed to offer—Louis would create the 
conditions necessary for everlasting growth.  
 Raudot was particularly mindful and meticulous about the constitution of 
Cape Breton because he was already engaged in a root-and-branch reform of New 
France.  In the wake of his 1706 memorandum, he had received orders not only to 
research and revise his proposal, but also to prepare Canada for its future role in the 
scheme.  “I believe, as you do, that we cannot work on [Cape Breton] until the 
peace,” Pontchartrain instructed, “[but] it is still good to take measures [now] so that 
                                                
102 Raudot, “Memoire pour jetter les premiers fondements de l’Etablissement proposé dans l’Isle du 
Cap Breton,” 20 August 1708, Newberry Library, Ayer ms. 293, vol. 1, pp. 74-75.  The original 
document is in ANOM COL C11G, vol. 6, ff. 39v-58v. 
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we are able to begin as soon as we can....Continue to examine carefully everything 
that can be done to place the colony of Canada on a better footing than it is, by 
rendering it richer, more useful to the State, and less expensive to His Majesty.”103  
Alone or in tandem with his father, Raudot issued a battery of ordinances aimed at 
removing impediments and enhancing incentives to trade.  He intervened to resolve 
commercial disputes before they went to court, set regulations for butchers and 
tanners, imposed new terms on land use and seigneurial contracts, established twice-
weekly markets at Québec and Montréal, cleared “filth” from the streets, razed old 
structures, built new thoroughfares, developed urban lots, and policed the dimensions 
of roads, the salting of meat, the export of flour, the price of wheat, the sale of liquor, 
the keeping of pigs and horses, and the exchange of brandy and beaver pelts with 
Natives.  Perhaps inspired by his experience at Dunkirk, he encouraged local 
merchants to found an exchange, or bourse, which he hoped would “reconcile the 
minds of all these traders and make them undertake new enterprises,” and to set an 
example he invested his own money in a joint privateering venture against the 
English.  To encourage farmers to clear forest for planting, he proposed a system of 
royal grants that would be funded by the reintroduction of fur-trading permits—co-
opting fur fever to advance agriculture.  In the absence of adequate credit and 
currency, he enforced circulation of the colony’s makeshift card money.  His efforts 
to stimulate commerce extended to a vigorous defense of private property, which 
ranged from forbidding the colonists to collect nuts, raisins, and tree cuttings from 
their neighbors’ lands to upholding slavery.  He drew inspiration from the plantation 
                                                
103 Pontchartrain to Raudot, 6 June 1708, ANOM COL C11G, vol. 2: ff. 190-191; Pontchartrain to 
Raudot, 30 June 1707, C11G, vol. 2, ff. 113-114v. 
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economy of the Antilles: having received complaints that African and Indian captives 
were fleeing the colony en masse “out of a notion of liberty inspired in them by those 
who have not purchased them...[and] under the pretext that there are no Slaves in 
France,” he declared that all were legally enslaved and “belong as plain property to 
those who have bought them,” because, he argued, “all of the Colonies should be 
perceived on the same footing” and Indian slaves “are as necessary to the inhabitants 
of this Country for the Cultivation of lands and other tasks...as the negroes are to the 
islands.”104  Administered over the course of just four years, Raudot’s numerous 
remedies sought to alleviate what he viewed as decades of bad habits and 
countevailing impulses that had wormed their way into the colony’s core 
relationships and institutions.  To make labor cheaper and more accessible, 
production more stable and diverse, and trade more frequent and frictionless, he 
engaged in an aggressive overhaul of Canadian society that combined heavy-handed 
paternalism with a mercantile outlook. 
Raudot’s immersion in a simultaneous project to remake New France helps to 
explain why his prescriptions for Cape Breton drew first and foremost upon the 
cumulative experience of the colonies, not the metropole, and why he believed that 
the new settlement should be built and governed by the state rather than a private 
company.105  The lessons he took from Canada fundamentally shaped the “First 
                                                
104 For a comprehensive list of the ordinances passed by Raudot and his father, see Pierre-Georges 
Roy, ed., Inventaire des Ordonnances des Intendants de la Nouvelle-France (Québec: L’Eclaireur, 
1919), vol. I: 1-114.  On Raudot’s defense of slavery, see his ordinance of 13 April 1709, ANOM COL 
C11A, vol. 30: ff. 334-335 and Brett Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries 
in New France (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 136-139.  On the merchants’ 
assembly, see Raudot to Pontchartrain, 15 November 1708, ANOM COL C11G, vol. 3, f. 193v.  For 
his other efforts to improve commercial life in the colony, see Horton, “Antoine-Denis Raudot.” 
105 One notable exception to this pattern was his emphasis on privateering, which probably drew upon 
his experience at Dunkirk (indeed, Louisbourg would come to be known as the Dunkirk of North 
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Foundations” he proposed for the island.  The crown should appoint a naval 
commissaire responsible to the intendant of New France, he recommended, and a 
governor who understood and believed in the purpose of the colony, as well as 
magistrates, priests, nuns, physicians, bakers, engineers, carpenters, and Native 
translators—all of whose cost to the state he neatly tallied in the margins.  The 
intendant was equally adamant that there should be no lawyers (who always perverted 
justice), no urban fiefs (which had hindered development in Québec), no exclusive 
rights to fishing or trade (which invariably drove away settlers), and, in the first years 
of settlement, no duties on cod (which were known to deter metropolitan merchants).  
To keep the affairs of the waystation humming, he proposed that several of his 
Canadian ordinances be applied there, as well.106   
If sound institutions and appropriate personnel were crucial, naturally, so were 
the people.  Raudot believed that the colonists, like cattle, must have good traits not 
only inculcated by their environment but also bred into them across generations.  
Hence the settlers should consist primarily of transplanted Canadians and Acadians, 
“who are accustomed to the country” and “are made to clear land, chop wood, saw 
logs, walk in snowshoes, sail, [and] hunt.”  Joined by French soldiers, he reasoned, 
these Americans “will form a hard-working, industrious, and indefatigable people 
capable of undertaking everything.”107  To preserve those virtues, he insisted that the 
crown should send only young foundling girls as marriage partners for the soldiers, 
since they would more readily adopt local ways than the all-too-common women 
                                                                                                                                      
America).  Another was his insistence on the importance of establishing bourses in New France and 
Cape Breton, which likewise may have been inspired by what he observed of the Chamber of 
Commerce at Dunkirk. 
106 Raudot, “Fondements,” 20 August 1708, pp. 76-98. 
107 Riverin and Raudot, “Moyens” and “Réponses,” 4 December 1706 and 16 July 1708, pp. 40-42. 
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“raised in disorder” who “always work evil, and...being all very lazy and haughty, 
inspire arrogance and sloth in their Children as they have done in Canada.”108  Raudot 
made the equivalence between people and livestock quite explicit: even the colony’s 
oxen, pigs, poultry, and sheep must be locally sourced, such that “one could say that 
Canada and Acadia alone will give shape to this Settlement.”109  In this most 
comprehensive and programmatic version of his memorandum, he made the past 
successes and failures of French colonization in North America the touchstone 
reference for Cape Breton’s development. 
 Raudot’s plans for implementation encountered little opposition from the 
ministry, but the calculative sensibility underpinning them drew scorn and 
consternation; the interplay of short-term cost and long-term value, public interest and 
private capital became a major sticking point with Pontchartrain.  For one thing, all 
sides haggled over the outlay.  Whereas Riverin believed that Cape Breton could be 
self-sufficient within three years, enough to reimburse a royal advance of some 
350,000 pounds and even “to grow...to the point of attaining great rank in the world,” 
Raudot felt that such a timeline would be “difficult not to say impossible” to meet, 
and argued for a much heftier budget: 300,000 pounds in the first year, plus 150,000 
in each of the two years after that.  To make money, he argued, the king would have 
to spend—a lot.110  One clerk sarcastically observed of the intendant’s projections, 
“All of this means, in good French, that this settlement is impossible right now.  After 
                                                
108 Raudot, “Fondements,” 20 August 1708, p. 101. 
109 Riverin and Raudot, “Moyens” and “Réponses,” 4 December 1706 and 16 July 1708, p. 42. 
110 Riverin and Raudot, “Moyens” and “Réponses,” 4 December 1706 and 16 July 1708, NL Ayer 
mss. 293, vol. 1, pp. 30, 43-44. 
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the peace we can examine if there are less onerous ways to achieve it.”111  
Pontchartrain disagreed about putting off the plans, but he was furious with Raudot 
for quoting such inflated figures.  “I have reason to believe...that you are not 
persuaded yourself of all that you say about the utility of [the project], because you 
render its execution impossible by the immense expenditures you propose to make,” 
he fumed.  “Could you have thought, especially given all that I have written to you 
about the state of affairs [here], that His Majesty could take on an added expense of 
100,000 crowns per year, or that we could ever engage individuals to invest in it?”112   
More than a simple dispute over numbers, Pontchartrain’s rebuke signalled 
that he did not yet accept the developmental calculus that guided Raudot’s thinking.  
And why should he?  The minister faced his own dense and pressing thicket of 
financial problems, not to mention the delicate task of justifying any considerable 
new expenditure to the king, and in the midst of warfare and famine he was at pains 
to perceive the colonization of Cape Breton—a distant rock scarcely visible at the 
margins of even his best maps—as a long-term investment that absolutely must be 
underwritten by massive royal subsidies.  When he read the summary of Raudot’s 
memorandum and responses to Riverin, Pontchartrain noted, next to a passage 
explaining the necessity of state backing, that “a Company could supplement this.”   
He went on to reject entirely Raudot’s claim that a trading company was unfit to carry 
out the project.  “All the rest proves that [Raudot] is wrong, and that a Company is 
the sole means to succeed and to build a settlement as essential as this one,” he 
concluded.  “We must seriously consider it, first of all because confidence will be 
                                                
111 “Résumé d’une lettre de Raudot, fils, sur l’établissement de Cap-Breton,” 1708, ANOM COL 
C11A, vol. 29, f. 384v. 
112 Pontchartrain to Raudot, 6 July 1709, ANOM COL C11G, vol. 4, f. 183. 
 201 
infinite.  This is much more solid, more capital, more useful, and Essential for the 
State as well as for the Colonies, at least in my opinion.”113  Having thus echoed the 
arguments made by pro-company deputies to the Council of Trade several years 
before, the minister resolved in a follow-up letter that “it would be useless to pretend 
to make this settlement other than by way of a Company.”  He ordered the intendant 
to draw up a new memorandum that the ministry could sell as a joint crown-company 
venture, one in which investors could have “some certainty [of profit], or at least the 
appearance of it,” and where, “in reducing expenses, we can do without those which 
might frighten away [investors] in the first years, and [instead] make them perceive 
the utility that will come to them from the Commerce of this colony.”114 
Raudot’s subsequent “Memorandum on the Settlement of Cape Breton” was 
the shortest version of his proposal but in some ways the most interesting.  He 
responded to Pontchartrain’s order with the lukewarm enthusiasm of an aggrieved 
subordinate: “Permit me to represent to you, my lord, that affairs will change face,” 
he pleaded, “[but] if His Majesty does not want to take charge of [Cape Breton], a 
company will do it well.”115  Nonetheless, he delivered precisely the sort of confident, 
sweeping, and economical sales pitch the minister had demanded.  The tone of his 
previous writings had been optimistic about what his scheme would accomplish for 
the king, but also fully attentive to the heavy expenses and numerous logistical 
challenges involved.  Now, he was relentlessly bullish about the gains to be made and 
virtually silent about the costs.  No longer concerned with the settlement’s 
                                                
113 “Résumé d’une lettre de Raudot, fils, concernant l’établissement de Cap-Breton,” with annotations 
by Pontchartrain, 1709, ANOM COL C11C, vol. 8, f. 53v.  This is an annotated version of the résumé 
written the previous year (cited above). 
114 Pontchartrain to Raudot, 6 July 1709, ff. 183v-184. 
115 Raudot to Pontchartrain, 1 November 1709, ANOM COL C11G, vol. 4, f. 186. 
 202 
constitution beyond a few lines devoted to personnel and fortifications (all of which 
would pay for themselves, he promised, thanks to the company’s exclusive right to 
supply them), his memorandum concentrated on the certainty of profit and where 
metropolitan backers would find it.  He described more starkly and succinctly than 
ever before the circular, integrated trade made inevitable by the new entrepôt.  North 
Atlantic cod, herring, sole, fish oil, sealskin, porpoise teeth, iron, masts, rope, plaster, 
planks, and boards would go to France and Spain; flour, peas, seal oil, fish, butter, 
wood, salted meats, and iron would make their way to the Antilles, Cuba, and 
Mexico; French wines, brandy, clothing, and luxuries would find eager markets in 
Canada, Cape Breton, and New England.  Knowing how enviously French merchants 
regarded the prosperity of their British and Spanish competitors, he pledged that 
unfettered access to the cod fisheries would reward investors with riches “greater than 
the mines of Peru or Mexico,” and that French North America “could do the same as 
new England and new York do with Jamaica and the other English islands.”  Whether 
legal or clandestine, the company’s commerce with the various French, Spanish, and 
British colonies “will supply...infinitely-consumable Goods with a guaranteed outlet.”  
French ships would never lack cargo to sell, moreover, for Cape Breton’s iron ore 
would always provide a high-demand merchandise of last resort.  If his readers still 
had any doubts about the security of their investment, Raudot reminded them that 
local rents and privateering would offer stable sources of income, and that shippers 
would always find in the entrepôt a reliable source of water, rations, and safe harbor.  
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The message was clear: “The more one carries on Trade with this Island, the more 
profit he will make.”116 
 Essentially, Raudot reworked his memorandum’s style and content to appeal 
to an audience of merchants and bankers rather than the minister, and in the process 
he abandoned the state-centered logic that had previously framed his vision.  In the 
absence of considerable royal advances, there was no need to appreciate what the 
crown could accomplish, nor to examine the various social, demographic, and 
economic forces that the king alone had the power to manipulate.  The question of 
how the colony would be composed and policed not only faded into the background, 
but disappeared almost entirely.  Naturally, there were no meditations on the 
iniquities of private trading companies or the profound shortcomings of French 
settlers, but there was no talk of the sort of men needed in positions of power to 
ensure the long-term success of the settlement, either, nor any discussion of salaries, 
laws, ordinances, or the “public good.”  The “utility” Raudot put on display was 
certain, immediate, and easy profit to private investors, not imperial grandeur, the 
revival of Canada, or the expensive and patient extraction of maximum value from 
the colonies as a whole.  Rhetorically, Pontchartrain’s order required Raudot to write 
persuasively for moneyed interests, to think and to argue in the terms he believed 
were most compelling to them.  The result was a very different text, even if the 
broader commercial and strategic contours of his scheme remained largely the same.   
 We do not know how metropolitan investors responded to Raudot’s final 
memorandum, or even if any read it, because in the end Pontchartrain changed his 
                                                
116 Raudot, “Memoire sur l’Etablissement du Cap Breton,” 27 Feb 1710, ANOM COL C11G, vol. 6, 
ff. 72-79v. 
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mind.  Why he reverted to a state-led effort is not entirely clear, but on the same day 
that he notified Raudot of his promotion back to France in May 1710, he also 
requested a report on the history of European claims to Cape Breton and ordered 
Raudot’s father and Governor Vaudreuil to occupy the island quietly before the 
English could beat them to it.117  It is possible that the minister simply could not find 
any willing backers at a time when money was scarce (a problem to which Raudot 
alluded in his letter pleading that “affairs will change face”).  The surviving evidence 
suggests, however, that wartime contingencies played a decisive role: the British 
conquered Port Royal just a few months later, and by 1712 it was clear that France 
would have to cede all of Acadia and Plaisance by the terms of the next peace.  From 
that point forward Pontchartrain consistently described the maintenance of a foothold 
near the cod fisheries as an affair of the utmost urgency to the crown.118  His resolve 
may well have been strengthened by the presence of Raudot, who continued to act as 
midwife of the project from within the ministry, but in all likelihood the intendant’s 
greatest contribution was to offer a compelling royal alternative to a private option 
that events had made impractical, undesirable, or both. 
 
Conclusion: Seeing the Value in Colonies 
 
 Even before the peace was signed at Utrecht in 1713, a thoroughly depleted 
and debt-ridden France launched a rapid colonization of Cape Breton.  In 1712, 
                                                
117 Pontchartrain to Raudot, 10 May 1710, ANOM COL B, vol. 32, f. 30; Pontchartrain to Jacques 
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Pontchartrain solicited opinions on the best site for a settlement, and several months 
later a royal expedition produced extensive soundings, surveys, and maps of the 
island.119  The maps reflected the ministry’s new ambitions for Cape Breton as well 
as their pedigree: Jacques L’Hermitte, the king’s engineer, drew the first detailed 
views of its coastline, including today’s Scatarie Island, which he dubbed “Isle 
Raudot” (Figure 5).  A widespread consensus quickly emerged that Louis should 
hasten to protect and promote a place that now represented the future of French power 
in the maritime Northeast.  One memorandum to the king’s council stated plainly that 
the crown must build up the outpost “since it is necessary that France have a 
permanent settlement in the cod fisheries.”120  An unsigned missive to Pontchartrain 
warned him not to give away Acadia and Cape Breton, which, like “the two eyes” of 
New France, were so “absolutely necessary” to it that “we must never separate them 
or cede them to foreigners,” who would eagerly usurp the “20 million pounds 
annually” that these three colonies together could provide.121  Another brief simply 
took it for granted that the king would invest heavily to keep and fortify the island.122  
In late 1713, the ministry indeed established a royal garrison and government at Cape 
Breton, and began to people it with subjects repatriated from Acadia and Plaisance.  
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 In the following decades, Île Royale and its capital, Louisbourg, would realize 
much of Raudot’s vision (Figure 6).  By the 1720s, the island served as a bustling 
entrepôt between France, Canada, and the Antilles.  Small boats carried wood, flour, 
meat, grain, and peas from Québec to Louisbourg, which consumed some and re-
exported the rest to Martinique in exchange for sugar, rum, and other tropical 
merchandise.  The same light vessels brought French and Caribbean goods back to a 
revived (if not rich) New France.  Meanwhile, the waystation engaged in a healthy 
clandestine trade with the English colonies, especially Massachusetts, which 
exchanged livestock and grains for iron ore and French finished products—all with 
the tacit consent of royal officials, who believed it opened up new markets to France 
and prevented a more serious contraband trade from flourishing.  Île Royale never 
directly profited from its role as an entrepôt, since almost all of its shipping was 
controlled by French and Canadian merchants, but thanks to the great international 
demand for its fish, the colony managed to run a surplus balance of payments every 
year through the end of the 1730s.123 
The “Memorandum” that projected so much of this success conformed to a 
well-established genre of administrative writing conditioned by mercantile habits and 
concerns, but it also pioneered a new way of seeing profound strategic and 
commercial value to the state in seemingly under-exploited spaces.  By undertaking 
colonization directly, Raudot believed, the crown could recoup the considerable time 
and resources France had already spent on American settlements and guide their 
future development in ways that would maximize profits, maintain public order, and 
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master the territories most essential to French aims.  To his mind, the high stakes 
involved not only justified but demanded great public expense, because only the king 
could reliably perceive and accomplish what was best for his empire as a whole.  This 
did not amount to forcing a particular kind of commerce onto his subjects.  Rather, it 
meant cultivating the human relationships and institutions necessary to harvest the 
benefits God and nature had provided for them.   
Raudot’s continued oversight of North American affairs following his return 
to France gave him ample opportunity to put his ideas into practice.  In 1716, under 
orders from the newly formed Conseil de la Marine, he sent the governor and 
intendant of Canada instructions for how to better harness the resources of New 
France and channel them through the new waystation.  “Of all the French colonies,” 
he began, “Canada is the best provided with people capable of work and yet the least 
useful to the State, by the few goods it produces from this vast country; and at the 
same time it is the one most costly to the King, by the great expenditures His Majesty 
is obliged to make for its survival and defense.”  Such a state of affairs was untenable 
but hardly hopeless.  Raudot insisted that New France “could become very valuable” 
if the colonists would at last devote themselves to planting crops, raising livestock, 
and engaging in a “useful commerce” of wood and foodstuffs for metropolitan goods, 
which the king had facilitated for them “by building up Île Royale powerfully to serve 
as their entrepôt.”  To “excite and invite” them to follow through, he and the Conseil 
proposed to teach them “the means to enrich and make use of themselves in future” in 
a way that would be “equally useful to the inhabitants of Canada and the Kingdom’s 
Merchants.”  The governor and intendant were to assemble the colony’s political and 
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commercial elites and read out to them an attached memorandum, which explained 
which of their country’s products French negociants were keen to have, in what 
quantities and at what prices they were willing to buy them, and which finished goods 
they were prepared to sell in return.  The document also advised the colonists to 
confine all new plantations to the banks of the Saint Lawrence opposite Québec, so as 
to build one continuous chain of settlement closer and closer to Île Royale.  On behalf 
of a state poised and motivated to see what was in their best interest, Raudot stressed 
that the Canadians “should regard all that the Conseil proposes to them as a Certain 
profit...[and] if they furnish annually the amounts of each item contained in the 
attached memorandum, they will earn 400,000 to 500,000 pounds each year, and...the 
traffic between France and Canada will be able to occupy forty to fifty ships instead 
of three or four.”124 
Although Raudot developed his ideas in response to the particular needs of 
New France and Cape Breton, they were quickly embraced by contemporaries who 
applied them to other colonies.  In 1717, when the settlement of Louisiana threatened 
to collapse under the weight of accumulated debt and years of mismanagement, its 
proprietor, Antoine Crozat, solicited a royal bailout and takeover of his company’s 
affairs, declaring that the crown should intervene to rescue an enterprise that could 
not be achieved “without much time and patience and...immense expenditure.”  
Indeed, he argued, Louisiana’s tremendous potential as a counterweight to Britain’s 
                                                
124 Raudot, “Instruction pour le gouverneur et intendant du Canada,” 1716, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 
36, ff. 47-50v; Raudot, “Instruction dressée par Raudot fils pour le gouverneur et l'intendant du 
Canada, concernant le commerce," 1716, LAC, Microfilm reel C-13998, vol. 6, pp. 69-74.  The second 
of these two versions of the same text, which contains some different phrasing and structure, is the 
more polished, and lacks the annotations of the first, suggesting that it was the one eventually sent to 
New France. 
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New World colonies and an alternative source of American tobacco made it 
imperative.125  Father François Le Maire, a friend and correspondent of Raudot 
stationed at Mobile, pleaded with the Conseil to assume control of the colony because 
“the preservation of Canada, which has cost France so much, depends on the 
settlement of Louisiana.”  Anxious that members of the Conseil might prefer to 
unload the burden onto another company, he echoed, in strikingly similar terms, 
Raudot’s argument that revenues would one day reward the king’s sacrifices: “One 
must sow before he can reap, and the hope of a harvest must make him risk 
something.”126   Such pleas emerged from different motives—Crozat sought to extract 
some return from his sunken investment, while Le Maire wished to continue God’s 
work in his “barbarous” surroundings—but they shared an insistence that colonizing 
North America had become a business too big and important to fail. 
 One of the most striking and unexpected legacies of Raudot’s “Memorandum” 
is that it reinforced ways of thinking about colonization and economic privilege that 
later arose independently across Europe and North America.  When Charlevoix 
printed it in 1744, he not only celebrated “a project so fine, so well designed, 
&...equally advantageous to Old & New France,” but also its sharp criticism of 
colonial trading companies.  What had made his friend so critical of proprietary 
ventures, the priest explained approvingly, “was the experience of those which up to 
then had held the Domaine, or exclusive Commerce, of New France & the West 
Indies.”127  By the mid-eighteenth century, that bitter body of experience had only 
                                                
125 Various memoranda of Antoine Crozat to the Conseil de la Marine, 1717, quoted in Giraud, 
History of French Louisiana, vol. 1: 66, 68. 
126 François Le Maire, “Mémoire de la Louisiane,” BnF Manuscrits français 12105, f. 13. 
127 Charlevoix, Histoire, t. XX: 395-397. 
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grown: the disastrous crash of the South Sea and Mississippi Bubbles, the royal 
takeover of Louisiana, the spread of liberal theories of economic growth, and 
simmering resentment toward repressive institutions like the Compagnie des Indes 
combined to make commercial privilege anathema to many learned and ordinary 
subjects alike.128  That feeling would continue to hold wide sway in the next century, 
when political figures ranging from the Québécois liberal François-Xavier Garneau to 
the French reactionary Claude-Marie Raudot draped the intendant’s indictment in the 
unlikely mantle of their own (mutually opposed) economic visions.129 
Alongside its enduring appeal to critics of commercial privilege, the 
“Memorandum” buttressed attempts by eighteenth-century officials in Great Britain 
and America to make Cape Breton the focal point of an imperial strategy bent on sole 
possession of the Northeast American seaboard.  To be sure, the British arrived at the 
strategy on their own, having become increasingly exasperated after 1713 to find a 
weakened rival still harassing their settlements, siphoning their trade, and blocking 
their access to the precious Newfoundland cod that William Pitt the Elder would later 
call “British gold”—all thanks to the wicked build-up of a “spot of earth” that 
                                                
128 The political economist François de Forbonnais’s entry on “Compagnies de Commerce” in the 
Encyclopédie, for instance, located the origins of exclusive trade in “barbarism & ignorance,” and, 
while conceding that in some cases the state should encourage new enterprises by granting restricted 
commercial rights, concluded that they were “useful” and “worthwhile” only in dealings with 
“barbarous” and un-Christian nations—a category from which Europe’s New World colonies were 
explicitly exempt.  François de Forbonnais, “Compagnie de Commerce,” in L’Encyclopédie (1753), 
vol. 3: 739-743.  URL: http://artflsrv02.uchicago.edu/cgi-
bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.2:1661:7.encyclopedie0416.7640085 (accessed 18 June 2016). 
129 Garneau, Histoire du Canada, t. II: 66-68; Claude-Marie Raudot, “Deux intendants.”  On Claude-
Marie Raudot’s conservative economic thought, see Raudot, De la décadence de la France (Paris: 
Amyot, 1850); Koenraad Swart, The Sense of Decadence in Nineteenth-Century France (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1964), 89-90. 
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Providence had manifestly intended to be theirs.130  But they found in Raudot’s plan 
flagrant and undeniable proof that France had dealt in bad faith, as well as a detailed 
account of the tremendous value its government placed upon an outpost located 
within easy striking distance of their own colonies.  Both seemed like compelling 
reasons to seize and maintain control of the island.  When imperial agents such as 
Massachusetts Attorney-General William Bollan and the royal geographer Thomas 
Jefferys sought to convince the British public of Cape Breton’s “Advantage and 
Importance,” they happily discovered that Raudot had already made the case for them 
decades before.131 
But why translate and reprint the “Memorandum” itself, at length, annotated, 
virtually verbatim?  True, it might have been quicker and easier than drawing up a 
case from scratch, but the pamphlets by Bollan, Jefferys, and other writers contained 
many more words of their own.  The temptation to broadcast the confidential papers 
of “French ministers” for all to see must have been irresistible, of course, not to 
mention rhetorically shrewd.  Yet I would suggest that reprinting the memorandum 
was appealing for another reason: British officials had come to share the same 
calculative approach to empire that underpinned Raudot’s thinking.  His logic made 
sense to them because, in ways that conformed to an administrative “script” all their 
own, they had begun to make similar arguments about the stakes of colonization and 
                                                
130 Pitt quoted in Rajani Sudan, The Alchemy of Empire: Abject Materials and the Technologies of 
Colonialism (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 124.  On British designs for Cape Breton 
after 1713, see S. Max Edelson, New Map of Empire, ch. 3.  My thanks to Dr. Edelson for permitting 
me to read and cite his draft chapter. 
131 Bollan, “Importance and Advantage”; Jefferys, “Importance of Cape Breton.” 
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the role of the state in promoting it.132  “The above Memorial has pointed out to us so 
many of the Advantages which [Britain] may reap from this Important Conquest, that 
it has in great measure cut short our work in enumerating them,” Bollan observed in 
1746, “[Cape Breton] is, in all Respects, so situated, as if Providence intended it 
should make a part of the British Dominions, as it really and in Fact is the Key to all 
the rest.  If this be the case...can any Care be employed, any Money expended, that is 
too considerable for the Preservation of it?”133  He went on to elevate Raudot’s 
project into a blueprint for “Our King, Our Ministers, Our Legislators and Our 
People”: 
From the Arguments and Reasons given by [him]...it is 
very evident that nothing could turn to greater 
Account...we are therefore furnished with a Hint, how to 
render this island not only immediately useful, but also 
how to people, fortify, and enrich it in a short time...For 
where a Staple or Mart is established, thither, of Course, 
will resort great Numbers of Merchants, and Traders.  
These bring Money, and Money produces Industry: By 
Money, Industry, Numbers of People, and 
Encouragement, what is too difficult to be effected?  The 
most barren and desart [sic] Spot of Ground in the 
Universe, would in these Circumstances, be rendered 
fertile...Every Difficulty would be turned into some sort 
of Advantage; and what is now a Horrour, would be 
converted into a Beauty.134 
  
By placing Raudot’s “Memorandum” at the beginning of a tradition of seeing 
colonies as interconnected and richly calculated affairs of state, we can get back 
behind the complex dynamics between commercial, fiscal, and administrative politics 
in modern European empires. 
                                                
132 On the renewed strength of state-led approaches to colonization within the Board of Trade in this 
period, see Edelson, New Map of Empire, ch. 3. 
133 Bollan, “Importance and Advantage,” 74-77. 
















































Figure 2. Section of Nicolas Denys’s 1672 “Carte de l'Acadie et des Pays compris entre le Rivière 
Pentagouet, le Cap-Breton et le Saint-Laurent.”  Denys’s map, published in 1672, included only an 












Chapter 4. Masks of the Colonizer: “Personas” and Native Diplomacy in New 
France 
“Now I am an Iroquois, & you will permit me to show you a few facts about my Nation.”  
– Claude-Charles le Roy Bacqueville de La Potherie, Histoire de l’Amérique septentrionale (1702) 
 
“As serious as this ceremony was for the Savages, it was for the French a sort of comedy, which they 
enjoyed very much.” 
– Pierre-François-Xavier de Charlevoix, Histoire et description générale de la Nouvelle France (1744) 
 
In August of 1690, Louis de Buade de Frontenac, governor-general of New 
France, addressed an urgent council of more than five hundred Native emissaries at 
Montréal.  The colony was at war against the joint forces of New England and the 
Five Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy—the Oneidas, Mohawks, Onondagas, 
Cayugas, and Senecas—and Frontenac hoped to persuade his Algonquin, Odawa, 
Huron, Wabanaki, Nippissing, and Mission Iroquois allies to launch a surprise attack 
on the Confederacy’s homelands in western New York (Figure 1).  As Onontio, or 
“Great Mountain,” the governor wielded the ritual authority to call together his 
“savage children,” to provide them with gifts and arms, and, if they were so inclined, 
to mobilize them for battle.  But this time Frontenac knew they were dubious.  His 
allies were eager to fight, they assured him, yet some questioned his resolve: did 
Onontio truly want war, or would he abandon his children for a separate peace at the 
first opportunity?   
As the governor concluded his speech with an impassioned call to arms (“I 
now put the tomahawk back in your hands...& I have no doubt that you will know 
what to do with it!”), he sensed that words alone would not dispel their doubts.  
“They asked me to explain myself clearly,” he reported afterward, “which I did...in a 
way that fully satisfied them, by taking up the tomahawk myself and singing the war 
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song, in order to accommodate their way of doing things.”1  The colonial official and 
chronicler Claude-Charles Le Roy Bacqueville de La Potherie later described the 
scene:  
Monsieur de Frontenac, Hatchet in hand, began the War 
song; the principal French Leaders, with similar 
weapons, joined him, [and] all sang it together.  The 
[Mission] Iroquois...the Hurons & the Nippissings also 
joined the sway.  One would have said...that these 
Actors were possessed by the gestures & the 
contortions that they were making.  The Sassagouez, or 
cries & howls, that Monsieur de Frontenac was obliged 
to make in order to conform to their ways, added still 
further to the Dionysian fury.  Then they held the war 
Feast, which was more of a pillage than a meal.2 
 
In La Potherie’s telling, the French used what they knew of Native customs to 
produce “gestures & contortions...cries & howls” convincing enough not just to incite 
the Indians to war, but even to persuade a European observer that the “Actors” 
themselves were “possessed” by a “Dionysian fury” of their own making.  To stir 
their allies’ passions, he claimed, Frontenac and his officers were “obliged” to 
“conform to their ways.” 
This chapter examines how the embodiment of Onontio drew together two 
branches of learning: the administrative ethnography of Indians, and the performance 
of Native passions.  To French officials, Natives were both objects of study whose 
“nature” could be defined and routine interlocutors whose feelings must be 
“managed” in face-to-face settings.  Securing their compliance required not only a 
working knowledge of their traditions and values, but also a diplomatic persona 
                                                
1 Frontenac to Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain, 12 November 1690, reproduced in Rapport de l’archiviste 
de la province de Québec (1927-1928), ed. Pierre-Georges Roy (Québec: Proulx, 1928), 38. 
2 Claude-Charles le Roy “Bacqueville” de la Potherie, Histoire de l’Amérique septentrionale (Paris: 
Nyon, 1753 ed. [orig. 1702]), t. III: 96-98. 
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whose deportment would inspire their respect and affection.  In their efforts to 
understand and manipulate Native peoples, I argue, royal officers fused aristocratic 
habits of performance nurtured in metropolitan schoolrooms, at court, and in public 
life with the expertise of missionaries and other go-betweens who had lived among 
the Indians and knew—or claimed to know—how to accommodate them.  The 
unfamiliar demands of Native diplomacy encouraged them to observe their allies 
closely, to record their customs and behavior, and to construct an essential idea of 
their character that could be used to better control them.  In short, by adopting a 
Native persona as the face of their diplomacy, the French made both “knowing” 
Indians and performing “Indianness” central to the governance of their North 
American empire. 
Playing the part of a Native alliance chief was not altogether farfetched for 
aristocratic officials who treated their lives as one long theatrical display.  Indeed, for 
noblemen throughout the French Atlantic world, the temporary and deliberate 
embodiment of multiple personas through changes of dress, deportment, or affect was 
a fixture of life from an early age and across a variety of social situations.  
Incorporating their “habit of alterity” into the history of Franco-Native diplomacy 
reveals the performative baggage they brought with them to the council fire.3  If, as 
historians have often observed, early modern noblemen behaved as if on a stage, 
practiced the art of strategic dissimulation, and channeled the words and feelings of 
classical orators, they were also primed to personify Onontio. 
                                                
3 For “habit of alterity,” see Lynn Enterline, Shakespeare’s Schoolroom: Rhetoric, Discipline, Emotion 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 7-8. 
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 The strategic imitation of Native customs was vital because no other European 
empire depended more heavily upon indigenous allies than France.  The French were 
never able or willing to establish a large settler colony in the New World, nor did they 
ever manage to subjugate or assimilate more than a handful of Natives.  By 
maintaining a delicate suite of alliances with the Iroquoian- and Algonquian-speaking 
nations of the Great Lakes and the Saint Lawrence Valley, however, officials in New 
France were able to project an imperial presence that stretched, at its zenith, from 
Biloxi to Hudson’s Bay and from Acadia to the Mississippi Basin—challenging the 
more populous colonies of Great Britain for access to the peoples, furs, and territories 
of the North American interior.  Those alliances were forged according to diplomatic 
protocols that were fundamentally indigenous.  As a result, their survival rested in 
part upon the ability of French negotiators to perform the ritual role assigned to them 
by their allies—“to accommodate their way of doing things,” as Frontenac put it.4  
 Imitation, as both a practice and a concept, has preoccupied scholars of empire 
for more than half a century, and their work has approached it primarily in one of two 
ways: first, as a source of ambivalence to colonizers, or second, as a strategy of 
resistance or identity formation among the colonized.  For imperialist thinkers, having 
“savage” peoples imitate “civilized” customs was at once an effective way to 
assimilate them and a potentially subversive practice that blurred the very distinctions 
on which European superiority was founded; for their colonial subjects, it offered a 
means of claiming citizenship, mocking imperialist pretensions, or otherwise 
                                                
4 On the particular importance of intercultural diplomacy to the survival of France’s North American 
empire, see Paul Cohen, “The power of apprehending ‘otherness’: cultural intermediaries as imperial 
agents in New France,” in Encountering Otherness: Diversities and Transcultural Experiences in 
Early Modern European Culture, ed. Guido Abbattista (Trieste: Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2011): 
223-237. 
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reappropriating elements of a foreign culture to serve their own purposes.5  In both 
cases, the descriptive vocabulary invoked by scholars has varied—from “mimesis” 
and “mimicry” to “copying,” “counterfeiting,” “incorporation,” “surrogation,” and 
“emulation,” each of which conveys different shades of meaning according to its 
precise use.  Yet all of these terms form part of a single constellation of ideas 
surrounding imitation as a cultural phenomenon that took on special significance in 
the context of Western imperial expansion and decline.6 
Historians and social scientists have devoted far less attention to imitation in a 
third guise: as an everyday tool of domination used by colonizers living among their 
subjects and allies.  Recently, however, a handful of scholars has recast “mimesis and 
imitation...as practices through which colonial agents organized their social lives, 
daily routines and strategies in relation to the local worlds they encountered.”7  
Servants of empire, they find, appropriated indigenous customs out of holy zeal, 
commercial interest, academic curiosity, personal taste, political protest, a sense of 
duty, or the instinct to survive.  European officials “could fear its dangers”—namely, 
degradation and “indigenization”—“but they could also manipulate its virtues” to 
                                                
5 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove, 2008 ed. [orig. 1952]); Homi K. Bhabha, 
“Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,” in The Location of Culture (London: 
Taylor and Francis, 2012 ed. [orig. 1994]); Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular 
History of the Senses (London: Routledge, 1993); Emanuelle Saada, “Entre ‘Assimilation’ et 
‘Décivilisation’: L’Imitation et le Projet Colonial Républicain,” Terrain, vol. 44 (2005): 19-38; 
Barbara Fuchs, Mimesis and Empire: The New World, Islam, and European Identities (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Joseph Roach, Cities of the Dead: Circum-Atlantic 
Performance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Ricardo Roque, “Mimesis and 
Colonialism: Emerging Perspectives on a Shared History,” History Compass, vol. 13, no. 4 (2015): 
201-206. 
6 Roque, “Mimesis and Colonialism”: 201. 
7 Roque, “Mimesis and Colonialism”: 208.  Also see Robert J. Gordon, “Unsettled Settlers: Internal 
Pacification and Vagrancy in Namibia,” in Ethnography in Unstable Places: Everyday Lives in 
Contexts of Dramatic Political Change, eds. Carol J. Greenhouse et al. (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2002), 61-84. 
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make their authority legible and legitimate.8  Their imitations allowed them to learn 
about local societies and then to use that learning to refine their own “repertoires of 
power.”9 
Historians of New France have long known that French officers adopted 
Native customs of oratory, ceremony, and kinship in their diplomacy, but most have 
characterized these accommodations as spontaneous and isolated responses to 
dynamics on the ground, rather than self-conscious performances conditioned by 
cultural currents in France.  In perhaps the most influential study of cross-cultural 
encounters in colonial North America, Richard White argued that Europeans and 
Natives arrived at a “common conception of suitable ways of acting” through mutual 
observation, “misunderstandings,” and spontaneous “invention.”  For White, the Old 
World baggage of European officials was largely irrelevant to this “middle 
ground...in between cultures” where neither side could fully impose its own norms on 
the other.10  Subsequent scholarship has challenged his vision as overly consensual, 
static, inattentive to the complexities of Native agency, or unable to explain the 
increasingly coercive presence of European empires in North America, yet few 
historians have questioned the underlying notion that Franco-Native relations were 
shaped by forces that were fundamentally local.  There remains a pervasive 
assumption that metropolitan practices and preconceptions were marginal to Native 
                                                
8 Roque, “Mimesis and Colonialism”: 207-208. 
9 See, for example, Ananya Chakravarti’s study of Jesuit imitation and accommodation in southern 
India.  Chakravarti, “The Many Faces of Baltasar da Costa: Imitatio and Accommodatio in the 
Seventeenth Century Madurai Mission,” Etnográfica, vol. 18, no. 1 (2014): 135-158.  For “repertoires 
of power,” see Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics 
of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 3. 
10 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010 ed. [orig. 1991]), preface.   
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diplomacy and, consequently, that French sources have little to add to a story best 
told through colonial and ethnographic records.11  
Scholars of late, however, have taken a closer look at the ingrained cultural 
habits that shaped the personas who faced each other across the council fire.  Gilles 
Havard has argued that episodes of mimesis, such as Frontenac’s war dance, were 
crucial scenes in an imperial “theater of power” where the French, blessed with a 
“greater intellectual distance” from their own norms, outperformed Natives whose 
worldview was “hostile a priori to any self-critical stance.”  For Havard, the Old 
World habitus of noble officers was advantageous because its stress on theatricality 
prepared them to mimic the modes of dance, speech, and warfare practiced by their 
allies.12  On the Native side, Michael Witgen has found that Nippissing, Odawa, 
                                                
11 Histories of the simultaneous Catholic missionary campaigns in France and New France, 
meanwhile, provide an illustration of how much more we can learn about European-Native encounters 
when colonial and metropolitan sources are studied together.  See Axtell, The Invasion Within: The 
Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1986); 
Dominique Deslandres, Croire et faire croire: les missions françaises au XVIIe siècle (Paris: Fayard, 
2003); Allan Greer, Mohawk Saint: Catherine Tekakwitha and the Jesuits (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005).  Recently, Peter Cook, Gilles Havard, Sahlia Belmessous, Brett Rushforth, 
Robert Michael Morissey, and Alexandre Dubé, in various ways, have shown how a confluence of 
subtle and long-term shifts in demography, diplomatic rhetoric, Native political strategies, and French 
conceptions of sovereignty and assimilation served to amplify French influence on Native ground, 
even as Indians manipulated negotiations to achieve their own ends.  Their works have expanded the 
field of Native history in New France by linking it more closely to slavery in the Caribbean and to 
administrative and political developments in the metropole.  Peter Cook, “Onontio Gives Birth: How 
the French in Canada Became Fathers to Their Indigenous Allies, 1645-73,” The Canadian Historical 
Review, vol. 96, no. 2 (June 2015): 165-193; Havard, “‘Protection’ and ‘Unequal Alliance’: The 
French Conception of Sovereignty Over Indians in New France,” in Englebert and Teasdale, eds., 
Robert Englebert and Guillaume Teasdale, eds., French and Indians in the Heart of North America, 
1630-1815 (East Lansing and Winnipeg: Michigan State University Press and University of Manitoba 
Press, 2013), 113-137; Robert Michael Morrissey, “The Terms of Encounter: Language and Contested 
Visions of French Colonization in the Illinois Country, 1673-1702,” in ibid, 43-75; Alexandre Dubé, 
“Les Amérindiens sous le regard des bureaux de la Marine (1660-1760). Quelque pistes de réflexion 
sur un objet administratif,” in Un continent en partage: cinq siècles de rencontres entre Amérindiens et 
Français, eds. Havard and Augeron, 153-175; Sahlia Belmessous, “Assimilation and Racialism in 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century French Colonial Policy,” American Historical Review, vol. 110, 
no. 2 (2005): 322-349; Brett Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New 
France (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2012). 
12 Havard, “Le rire des jésuites : une archéologie du mimétisme dans la rencontre franco-amérindienne 
(XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle),” Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 62e année, no. 3 (2007): 542-544.  See 
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Ojibwe, and Algonquin headmen deployed supple forms of “shape-shifting” to 
engage in strategic posturing of their own.  Drawing on a mythology rich in tricksters 
and a “habit of mind” that privileged “the potential for interconnection between 
different groups of peoples,” these Anishinaabeg used ritual “metamorphoses” to 
build and break fictive kinships with the French, to slide seamlessly between Native 
and Christian identities, and to create flexible social ties with the Dakota and other 
nations in ways that enhanced their power along the Great Lakes.13  While Havard 
and Witgen disagree about the relative adaptability of French and indigenous cultures, 
both recast Native diplomacy as a strategic interplay of personas.  Their work invites 
us to situate those personas more deeply within the cultural hinterland of negotiators 
on all sides.  In the case of the French, it raises the question of how the experience of 
performing “Indianness” informed enduring administrative ideas about how to govern 
a “savage” empire. 
To that end, it is worth knowing more about the kind of men who embodied 
Onontio.  To be an aristocratic man in late seventeenth-century France implied a 
place of honor, authority, and stewardship over the rest of society that applied 
anywhere he went.  Nobles were bred to dominate—indeed, by mid-century, most 
took it for granted that nobility was a social order defined by birth rather than a mere 
“profession” exercised by the virtuous—and they increasingly viewed themselves as 
reformers of a rough-hewn, vulgar, and violent common people whose culture they 
                                                                                                                                      
also Havard, Empire et métissages: Indiens et Français dans le Pays d’en Haut, 1660-1715 (Paris: 
Septentrion, 2003) and The Great Peace of Montréal of 1701: French-Native Diplomacy in the 
Seventeenth Century (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001). 
13 Michael Witgen, An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 
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had shared only a few generations before.14  As the kingdom’s leading landowners, 
clerics, and royal servants, they understood their command of the “lower orders” to 
be a natural, even divine state of affairs that required them to exercise not only 
coercive force but also persuasion and condescension.  Knowing how to behave 
toward one’s inferiors in any given situation was considered an essential quality of 
nobility, and conduct books of the period lingered over the day-to-day habits that 
would inspire affection and obedience among one’s tenants, troops, parishioners, and 
retainers in sites as disparate as the royal court and the country estate.15 
To modern eyes, aristocratic attempts to reform the common people of Europe 
seem worlds away from their efforts to govern and “civilize” the Indians of North 
America, and scholars have tended to study them as separate problems of class 
formation, on the one hand, and racialization, on the other.  But contemporaries drew 
no such clear distinction.  In the late sixteenth century, scandalized Jesuits preaching 
west of Seville complained that the villagers of Huelva “resembled Indians rather 
than Spaniards.”  Sir Benjamin Rudyerd, speaking to the House of Commons in 1628, 
derided parts of northern England and Wales “which were scarce in Christendom, 
where God was little better known than amongst the Indians.”16  Such critics knew 
full well that peasants and Natives were not the same—most important, Indians had 
not yet heard the Word of God—but the differences were fine enough that both were 
                                                
14 On ideas of nobility in this period, see Ellery Schalk, From Valor to Pedigree: Ideas of Nobility in 
France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014 ed. 
[orig. 1986]), 115-116.  On aristocratic attitudes toward popular culture and the policing of the lower 
orders, see Peter Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan, 1978), 270-281; Robert Muchembled, L’invention de l’homme moderne (Paris: Fayard, 
1988). 
15 See, for example, the anonymous pamphlet intended for schoolboys of the Collège de La Fleche, 
Maximes de la bienseance & conversation ordinaire entre les hommes (Lyon: Morillon, 1618), Serres’ 
Théâtre d’Agriculture (discussed in Chapter 2), and the later works by Faret et al examined below. 
16 Quoted in Burke, Popular Culture, 208. 
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subjected to nearly identical missionary campaigns, run by many of the same 
people.17  In both cases, reformers used a rhetoric of “savagery” to denote the 
unrestrained passions, impulsive behavior, barbarous language, and appalling 
ignorance of laws both human and divine that seemed to prevail among peoples who 
lived “more like beasts than like men.”  Crucially, too, both types of “savage” were 
thought capable of redemption and refinement, since they were taken to be immature 
versions of civilized men, not unknowable Others imprisoned within fixed and 
intrinsic categories of race or class.18   
The impersonation of Indians in diplomatic settings, like the parallel missions 
to civilize the “savages” of Europe and America, make us question broader 
assumptions about the supposedly corrosive effect of Native encounters upon French 
identity.  Over the past two decades, historians of the Atlantic world have cast 
imperial frontiers and borderlands as crucibles of a creolized selfhood in which ideas 
of “Europeanness” (and “Indianness”) were tested and reforged.  Traders, 
missionaries, soldiers, captives, colonists, and interpreters, they find, borrowed 
liberally from indigenous languages and traditions and in some cases married into 
Native communities.19  For some scholars, the inability or unwillingness of these men 
                                                
17 On the connections between missionary campaigns in France and New France, see Deslandres, 
Croire et faire croire; Greer, Mohawk Saint, 79-84. 
18 Anthony Pagden, European Encounters with the New World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1993), 117-140; Carole Blackburn, Harvest of Souls: The Jesuit Missions and Colonialism in North 
America, 1632-1650 (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 45-46; 
“Sauvage,” in Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (1694). 
19
 The relevant literature is vast, encompassing imperial, borderlands, and New Indian histories of 
encounter across a variety of colonial contexts.  For some useful surveys and touchstone works, see 
White, The Middle Ground; Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden, eds., Colonial Identity in the 
Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); John D. Garrigus, ed., 
Assumed Identities: The Meanings of Race in the Atlantic World (College Station, TX: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2010); Gilles Havard and Mickaël Augeron, eds., Un continent en partage: cinq 
siècles de rencontres entre Amérindiens et Français (Paris: Les Indes savantes, 2013); Havard, Empire 
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and women to strictly maintain the trappings of Frenchness in the face of indigenous 
ways of life reveals the “fragility of Western Culture” in American spaces.20  While 
most historians have been careful to emphasize that few Europeans ever fully “went 
Native,” their overwhelming emphasis on hybridity, borrowing, and creole 
ethnogenesis gives the impression that French identity was a flimsy construct subject 
to erosion by the experience of empire.21 
Yet this impression can be misleading.  It becomes manifestly overdrawn, in 
particular, in reference to those French who did not stray far onto Native ground.22  
Most colonists who remained within French settlements in Canada or the Caribbean, 
and who left behind evidence of their private lives, seem to have clung tenaciously to 
their metropolitan customs and connections.  Their practices of correspondence, 
consumption, reading, religion, dress, décor, and sociability remained 
overwhelmingly European, and consciously so.  Their spoken French even drew 
praise for its “purity.”23  When abroad, they recreated their former lives as best they 
                                                                                                                                      
et métissages; James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in North America (New 
York: Oxford University Press USA, 1986); Philip P. Boucher, Cannibal Encounters: Europeans and 
Island Caribs, 1492-1763 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); Juliana Barr, 
Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Guido Abbattista, ed., Encountering Otherness: Diversities 
and Transcultural Experiences in Early Modern European Culture (Trieste: Edizioni Università di 
Trieste, 2011); Jacqueline A. Peterson and Jennifer S. H. Brown, eds, The New Peoples: Being and 
Becoming Métis in North America (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985); Anne F. Hyde, 
Empires, Nations, and Families (2011).   
20 See, for example, Gilles Havard, “Le rire des jésuites,”: 573. 
21 On the French case in particular, see the recent works of Sophie White, Wild Frenchmen and 
Frenchified Indians: Material Culture and Race in Colonial Louisiana (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Doris Garraway, The Libertine Colony: Creolization in the Early French 
Caribbean (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); Belmessous, “Assimilation and Racialism”; 
Shannon Lee Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
22 Though even the coureurs de bois, whose propensity to live among Natives so scandalized French 
administrators and churchmen, did not cease to be “French.”  See White, The Middle Ground. 
23 Observers consistently remarked upon the purity of French spoken in New France.  “We speak 
perfectly well here in Canada, without any bad accent,” observed Claude-Charles le Roy “Bacqueville” 
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could.  “I would never have believed there were so many persons of Condition living 
here,” Intendant Jacques De Meulles confessed to his counterpart at Rochefort, “...We 
live in Quebek as we do in france.”24  As De Meulles’ observation suggests, 
adherence to metropolitan norms was all the more pronounced among nobles and 
bourgeois who did not expect to remain in the colonies for long.25  The writings of 
prominent colonists and officials such as the Dessalles and d’Aubigné families at 
Martinique, Lucie de La Tour du Pin in upstate New York, the merchants of Québec, 
and the administrators studied here all speak to the close and abiding identification 
that those in the New World felt with France throughout the period of colonization.  
There is an extent to which all of them behaved differently in colonial settings, but 
upon returning to the metropole, they slid seamlessly back into French society as if 
they had never left.26   
                                                                                                                                      
de la Potherie in 1702.  “One could send an opera to Canada,” claimed the grammarian Pierre-Joseph 
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Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1978); Lloyd Kramer, Lafayette in Two Worlds: Public 
Cultures & Personal Identities in an Age of Revolutions (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1996); François Furstenberg, When the United States Spoke French: Five Refugees Who Shaped 
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 The notion that French identity was a fragile construct is problematic not only 
because it discounts the resilience of colonists’ Old World “selves,” but also because 
it presupposes fixed notions of Frenchness at a time when that category itself was still 
emerging.  How can we measure the loss of French identity when the meaning of 
“French” had not yet become a subject of extended study and reflection, as would 
happen from the middle of the eighteenth century onward?  If anything, the 
experience of empire seems to have done as much to reinforce burgeoning national 
identities as it did to weaken them.27  In this context, historians would do better to 
“[reconstruct] individual cultural adaptations” on their own terms, “without any 
forced recourse to identity.”28   
In the case of those French who, like Frontenac, accommodated indigenous 
customs without “going Native,” persona (literally: “mask”) offers a more useful 
analytical concept than identity.  As shorthand for an alter ego temporarily assumed 
to achieve a social or political end—as opposed to a more or less cohesive and 
abiding interior sense of self—persona aptly captures the tendency of seventeenth-
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century aristocrats to define themselves by the scrutiny of others.29  Royal 
administrators quite consciously adjusted their speech and behavior to appeal to 
Indian audiences, but their conformity to Native norms did not amount to lasting 
identification or even acceptance; rather, it was instrumental and often begrudging.  
To exercise some measure of influence over their powerful but alien allies, the king’s 
men learned to imitate them.  In doing so, they extended an aristocratic habit of 
performance rooted in Old World practices of rhetoric, drama, dance, diplomacy, and 
courtly dissimulation to the New World.   
Strategic impersonation did not mean successful manipulation.  Successive 
wars with the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) and the Mesquakie (Fox) were too 
multifaceted, and the French too weak or inflexible or underinformed, for even the 
most competent diplomacy to realize the king’s vaunting ambitions to defeat the Five 
Nations, dominate the fur trade, and isolate the English along the Atlantic seaboard.  
French negotiators, moreover, could not always reconcile royal policy or their own 
self-interest with the competing agendas of their Indian allies (which, however 
difficult to extract from French sources, were plainly just as various and changing).  
In examining diplomatic performances in this period, the following pages will explain 
not how France’s diplomacy succeeded or failed, but how officials acquired, 
deployed, and disseminated the knowledge and skills they believed necessary to 
accommodate the Native “way of doing things” in their encounters. 
                                                
29 On distinctions between “self” and “persona” as categories of (literary) analysis, see Barry N. 
Olshen, “Subject, Persona, and Self in the Theory of Autobiography,” Auto/Biography, vol. 10, no. 1 
(1995): 5-16.  For an analysis of the early modern “self” as a sense anchored in one’s external 
surroundings and social relations, see Guido Ruggiero, Machiavelli in Love: Sex, Self, and Society in 
the Italian Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).  For a critique of persona 
as a “pallid” category of analysis that fails to capture the rich emotional experience that lay behind the 
theatrical habits of early modern people, see Enterline, Shakespeare’s Schoolroom, 29. 
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Aristocratic Actors: Cultures of Persuasion and Performance in France 
 
Well before they arrived on American shores, French administrators were 
extensively trained in the play of personas.  Indeed, pretense and performance were 
fixtures of life in the aristocratic social circles from which most royal officers came.  
From a tender age, noblemen were taught to speak and behave like self-composed 
adults.  Their schooling demanded personation and identification.  In the Jesuit 
collèges that many of them attended, they learned to debate both sides of every 
question, and they were enjoined, following Cicero, to move their listeners by first 
feeling themselves what they would have others feel.30  Extensive training in rhetoric 
“[transported] them to other countries and other times,” where an orator’s gestures 
and expression were as important as his words, since “gestures are understood by all 
nations.”31  The animating principle behind classical oratory was that a good speaker 
crafts every phrase and every movement to the needs and passions of his listeners.32  
In imitating the style of Demosthenes, Seneca, and other Ancient orators, collégiens 
practiced persuasion “much less by the truth of the facts...than by a sort of 
charismatic momentum, one would almost say drunkenness.”33  Like the “Dionysian 
fury” incited by Frontenac and his men, this “charismatic momentum” was calculated 
to win the hearts of those who could not be swayed by words alone. 
                                                
30 On the instruction of young noblemen, see Mark Motley, Becoming a French Aristocrat (Princeton, 
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The collèges likewise taught their pupils to reach audiences through the 
dramatic momentum of the stage.  From the late sixteenth century onward, theater 
held an increasingly prominent place in the Jesuit curriculum, and by 1650 the order 
had established roughly 500 theaters across Europe.  Plays flavored with 
pyrotechnics, pantomimes, falling idols, and soaring saints gave students an 
immersive outlet for their talents.  (It is no accident that the century’s leading French 
dramatists, Pierre Corneille and Molière, received their first taste of theater in the 
collèges.)  The Jesuits believed that public plays, like pageants, poetry contests, and 
disputations, excited healthy competition among boys while reinforcing rhetorical and 
moral lessons: pupils learned to experience vicariously the inner lives of characters 
both Ancient and Modern, to convey their emotions believably, and to see their 
positive and negative qualities as models for action.  Jesuit pedagogues considered 
performative skills essential to young men who would one day be leaders.  “Whereas 
an ordinary peasant is nearly invisible to society,” the thinking went, “to be a leader is 
to be looked up to and therefore to be looked at, to be scrutinized, by those one 
leads.”34   
The studied play of affect and persuasion in the collèges thus aimed to prepare 
young noblemen for the everyday demands of public life.  The social and political 
legitimacy of aristocratic power turned upon the possession of honor, and honor was 
something claimed and contested in a variety of “scripted” performances ranging 
                                                
34 Gustave Dupont-Ferrier, Du Collège de Clermont au Lycée Louis-le-Grand (1563-1920) (Paris: 
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from duels and alms-giving to deathbed confessions.35  In an increasingly stratified 
society where status was measured by ritualized courtesies exchanged or withheld in 
face-to-face encounters, hiding one’s true feelings behind a polite façade became a 
practiced art.  “This talent of being a good actor,” noted the Chevalier de Méré in his 
treatise on manners, “seems to me quite necessary for people of high society.”36  By 
mid-century, the dizzying array of salutations, regards, bows, bisous, deferences, 
doffings of hats, and other politesses due between individuals of rank were so 
complex and refined that leading authorities considered them to be a field of 
knowledge (science) in their own right.37  The proliferation of civilities, combined 
with a rising tide of new and minor nobles seeking their fortunes in town or at court, 
fueled a boon market for etiquette manuals, which accounted for twenty unique 
editions in France between 1690 and 1699 alone.38 
Such knowledge was thought vital to élite men whose duties would introduce 
them to all manner of people in arenas ranging from the battlefield to the boudoir.  In 
one of the century’s leading guides to gentlemanly conduct, Nicolas Faret stressed the 
necessity of flexibly adapting one’s deportment to every possible situation.  “He who 
has a well-formed mind adjusts himself to all that he encounters,” Faret instructed, 
“he is so accommodating and does everything in such a way that he seems to have a 
                                                
35 See, for example, James Farr, “The Death of a Judge: Performance, Honor, and Legitimacy in 
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particular inclination for all that he does.  There are no humors so extreme that he 
cannot live without challenging them, nor any so strange that he cannot find 
sympathy with them.”  Like other commentators of the time, Faret took care to 
distinguish judicious dissimulation from rank deception, but he took some measure of 
pretense to be essential to social intercourse, and he believed that an ideal gentleman 
could discover enough of himself in anyone he met to produce a mutual 
“sympathy.”39 
For aristocratic men, moving through the drama of life required more than the 
correct words and gestures: it also demanded the right steps.  The same masters who 
drilled young noblemen in social etiquette also taught them proper posture, poise, 
grace of bearing—and dance.  As one instructor declared, dance was a means of 
“disciplining all of the body’s movements, & fixing them in their proper positions.”40  
Another declared it “a beautiful art & necessary to public life.”41  Dance at once 
cultivated and displayed all of the classical virtues of serenity, grandeur, and self-
possession associated with good breeding.  It also encoded the social and political 
hierarchies of the court, where the king himself participated in over thirty ballets and 
countless masked balls.42  Louis XIV masqueraded as a muse, a Fury, a nymph, a 
shepherd, Apollo, Mars, a slave, a bacchante, and of course the sun, while his 
courtiers dressed as lawyers, peasants, foreigners, infants, Amazons, harlequins, and 
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ironic, topsy-turvy versions of themselves.43  Contemporaries took it for granted that 
dance involved the play of personas.  Louis’s appearances in female roles, for 
example, like his brother Philippe’s penchant for cross-dressing, were understood by 
observers to be representational or recreational affairs, not evidence of a 
compromised “inner” masculinity.44 
For the sword nobility that staffed France’s military officer class, war was yet 
another stage for the performance of grandeur.  In early modern Europe, no strict 
separation existed between the military and civilian spheres, and aristocratic men 
passed easily between them—often in the same finery, with their wives, children, 
servants, and mistresses in tow.  During a century when the continent was at peace for 
all of perhaps two years, warfare was a routine part of life, and officers were expected 
to demonstrate the same qualities of poise, magnificence, and condescension on the 
battlefield as they did elsewhere.45  Summing up conventional wisdom, the military 
engineer Jean de Laon d’Aigremont noted that a general must have, in addition to 
courage and zeal, “a readiness of speech, a good countenance, [and] the dexterity to 
live well among men of war.”46   
Living well among men of war meant knowing how to command the emotions 
of ordinary troops.  “The faith that Soldiers have in [a general] makes it easy for them 
to imitate him,” Laon explained.  “If his actions reveal that he is hesitant to risk 
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himself, he will inspire in them his softness, but if they see him carry himself with 
heart, they will follow him cheerfully [into battle].”  The ease with which an officer 
mastered his men’s feelings implied a great responsibility to govern his own: “he 
must not make use of these passions but as the wise Navigator uses the wind, which 
he takes into his sails only as much as he judges necessary to steer his Vessel.”47  
Noblemen at war knew that the king, their fellow officers, and their soldiers were 
watching them, and they deliberately patterned their conduct after heroic warriors of 
the past.  Today their actions seem vainglorious and foolhardy—they routinely rode 
into battle at the head of their troops, and many wore red to mark themselves out for 
enemy fire—but they were not “play-acting.”  Rather, the ostentatious splendor, 
recklessness, and sang-froid they displayed were typical expressions of their 
aristocratic sense of honor.48 
The noble culture of performance reached its apogee at Louis’s court, where 
increasingly baroque codes of courtesy were enforced under pain of social exclusion 
and political isolation.  Led by the king himself, members of the royal entourage 
policed even the most minor breaches of etiquette, since an unguarded word, glance, 
or gesture might betray weakness or disrespect.  In their dogged pursuit of prestige 
and favor, courtiers such as the Duc de Saint-Simon learned that at Versailles, “one 
never judges things by what they are”—a seating arrangement, an unexpected 
absence, the color of a hat—“but by whom they concern”—a minister, a royal 
favorite, even the king.  Saint-Simon praised Louis as the epitome of the self-
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possessed public man, “completely master of his face, manner, and bearing.”49  “A 
man who knows the court is master of his gestures, of his eyes and of his face,” 
agreed the court observer and moralist Jean de La Bruyère, “he is profound, 
impenetrable; he dissimulates bad offices, smiles at his enemies, controls his 
irritation, disguises his passions, belies his heart, speaks and acts against his 
feelings.”50  When appearing in public the courtier, like the king, was expected to 
“compose his attitude and assume another expression as if he should appear upon a 
stage.”51  The crown never fully succeeded in transforming court politics into politics 
tout court (“domesticating” the nobility in a “gilded cage” of courtly ceremony), but 
Louis’s decided preference to bestow favor through rituals of courtesy and protocol 
surrounding his person made a contrived front increasingly necessary to advance in 
his service.52   
The intensified social and political pressure to disguise one’s feelings behind a 
perpetual mask fueled a cultural obsession with the interplay of outward appearances 
and inner passions.  Seventeenth-century poets, painters, philosophers, and physicians 
produced a flood of works on the nature of emotions and how to control them.  
Writers and artists alike saw the passions as “an overbearing and inescapable element 
of human nature, liable to disrupt any civilized order...unless they were tamed, 
outwitted, overruled, or seduced.”53  For most mortals, naturally, that was easier said 
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Elias, The Court Society (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2006 ed.),105. 
51 Primi Visconti, Mémoires sur la vie de Louis XIV: 1673-1681 (Paris: Perrin, 1988 ed.), 28 (“stage”). 
52 Elias, Court Society; Ranum, “Courtesy and State Formation”; Muchembled, La société policée, 
123-186. 
53 Susan James, Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 1-4. 
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than done.  The unfailing self-mastery that Saint-Simon celebrated in Louis was 
praiseworthy not only because it signalled a broader mastery of the kingdom, but also 
because it was a quality that eluded less exalted beings—an all-too-human 
shortcoming that supplied endless fodder for humor and tragedy. 
As preternatural self-control became a cultural ideal, French theorists of 
performance-practice began to mine the tension between pretense and passion.  They 
called for a “naturalness” of speech and gesture that implied not just the dexterous use 
of the tongue, the face, and the hands, but also the selective bearing of the soul.  “One 
must animate himself,” instructed the rhetorician Bernard Lamy, “his heart must be 
ablaze.  May it be like a roaring furnace, from which our words emerge aflame with 
this fire that we wish to light in the hearts of others.”54  Dramatists came to believe 
that good actors moved audiences by truly inhabiting the roles they played: like good 
orators, they first felt themselves the passions they wished to inspire.  As one devotée 
of Molière put it, 
The Actor must think of himself as an Orator, who 
delivers a public speech designed to move the Listener.  
Two elements are necessary to his success: accent and 
gesture.  Hence he must study his outward appearance 
and cultivate his pronunciation in order to know how to 
vary his delivery and diversify his movements 
appropriately...How is it that we see Actors who seem 
calm when they argue, angry when they exhort, 
indifferent when they show [feeling], and cold when 
they hurl abuse?  That is what we commonly call not 
knowing or not feeling what one is saying—not having 
heart.55 
                                                
54 Bernard Lamy, La rhétorique, ou l’art de parler (Paris: A. Pralard, 1688), 346-347. 
55 Jean-Léonor Le Gallois de Grimarest, La vie de M. de Molière (Paris: Liseux, 1877 [orig. 1705]), 
223-224.  Although Molière’s plays were satirical, caricatured portraits of petty vanities in action, they 
were particularly celebrated for their lack of affectation.  One critic praised the playwright’s wife, 
Armande Béjart, and her veteran acting partner, La Grange, for the verisimilitude of their 
performances in Le Malade imaginaire: “They know how to touch the heart and paint the passions.  
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Dramatists drew a direct connection between the self-conscious movements of the 
hands and the face, on one hand, and the corresponding movements of the heart, on 
the other.  For them, affectation wielded no persuasive power without genuine affect 
to inspire it.  One of the century’s leading playwrights, Georges de Scudéry, 
concluded that acting must be an immersive experience for the actor: “It is necessary, 
if possible, that [actors] metamorphose into the characters they play.”56  While it is 
unlikely that actors and orators always obeyed such prescriptions in practice, the idea 
behind them was taken seriously enough to become conventional, and we know that 
performance culture had a profound influence upon the way early modern Europeans 
actually moved, gestured, and spoke.57 
Enemies of the stage testified to the power and pervasiveness of the “natural” 
technique when they denounced its sinful display of base emotions.  Bishop Jacques-
Benigne Bossuet, a court preacher best known today as the century’s leading 
apologist for royal absolutism, inveighed against “what an actor does when he wants 
to play a passion naturally: as much as he can, he recalls the passions that he has felt 
and for which, as a Christian, he should have drowned in tears of penitence so that 
they might never return.”  Bossuet compared plays to “nudes and immodest 
paintings” which “naturally cause that which they express.”  But theater was even 
more dangerous, he argued, since it presented “not at all lifeless characteristics and 
                                                                                                                                      
Their portrayal is so believable and their acting so well hidden in naturalness [of character] that one is 
unable to distinguish between the truth and mere appearance.”  Entretiens galans (Paris: Ribou, 1681), 
t. II: 91-92.  For more on the connections between rhetorical theory and Baroque drama, see John S. 
Powell, “Music and French Baroque Gesture,” Early Music Performer, no. 30 (April 2012), URL: 
http://www.personal.utulsa.edu/~john-
powell/JOHN%27S%20ARTICLES/Gesture%20Article%20in%20Early%20Music%20Performer.pdf 
(accessed 22 November 2015). 
56 Georges de Scudéry, L’Apologie du Théâtre (1639). 
57 Peter Burke, The Art of Conversation (New York: Wiley, 2013), 95-120; Adam Fox, Oral and 
Literate Culture in England, 1500-1700 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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colorless complexions...but living characters, real eyes...real tears in the actors, who 
cause real tears to flow in those who look at them.”58  The Jansenist theologian Pierre 
Nicole agreed that drama obliged the players “to excite [vicious passions] in 
themselves...to impress them upon their souls, in order to express them outwardly by 
gestures and words.”  “We must not imagine that one can wipe from his character this 
impression,” he warned, “and that it does not leave behind in us a great inclination 
toward the same passion that one has wished to feel.”59  Those who described politics 
and society as a kind of theater shared Nicole’s and Bossuet’s assumptions about the 
acting process, if not their moral concern.  Although his performances were 
calculated and ephemeral, the ideal public man, like the ideal actor, identified on an 
emotional level with the persona he projected to others, which is precisely what made 
that persona believable.  
It made perfect sense to think of public life as a stage because contemporaries 
considered the “real” world to be a mere sideshow, or screen, to the more profound 
reality of an existence governed by God.  To elites who understood this life to be 
transient and illusory, theatrical metaphors captured the deceptive shallowness of 
temporal affairs.  The very elements of Baroque drama—masks and costumes, 
metamorphoses, mistaken identities, deceit, clothing switches, trompe l’oeil, double 
                                                
58 Jacques-Benigne Bossuet, Maximes sur la comédie (1694), quoted in Paul Friedland, Political 
Actors: Representative Bodies and Theatricality in the Age of the French Revolution (2002), 17.  For 
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entendre, and plays-within-the-play—at once reflected and reinforced a widespread 
belief that the things of this world obscured the underlying “truth” of the next.  
According to churchmen and moralists, the knowledge that everything around him 
was simply appearance liberated the Christian from attachment to this life and helped 
him to move more effectively through it, just as the consciousness of the actor that he 
was acting allowed him to perform his role all the more convincingly.60 
 
The New World is a Stage 
 
The leading officers who served in North America were hardly untouched by 
these cultural currents.  Nearly all of them had received a classical education, either in 
the collèges or elsewhere.  Most of them were veterans of the court, knew its 
protocols, and had participated in its festivities.  They generally obtained their 
appointments after long careers of administrative or military service in Europe.61   In 
North America, where they and other observers frequently compared Native song and 
dance to balls, ballets, and opera, the appropriation of indigenous rhythms of 
movement as political spectacle would have seemed only natural.62  The precise 
content of their reading is largely unknown, but Frontenac’s library included copies 
of Ovid’s Metamorphoses and Jean de Lartigue’s La politique des Conquérants (see 
below), both of which stressed themes of transformation and disguise.63  The récits de 
                                                
60 Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 134-135.  The classic formulation of these ideas can be found in Richard 
Alewyn, Das große Weltheater: die Epoche der höfischen Feste (Munich: Beck, 1985 ed.). 
61 Saint-Simon, who had a keener eye for men’s failings than their virtues, nonetheless praised 
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Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, and the biographies cited elsewhere in this dissertation. 
62 See the examples cited in Havard, “Le rire des jésuites”: 548-552. 
63 “Inventaire après décès du Marquis de Frontenac,” (22 April 1699), in Nouvelles Archives de l’Art 
français, 3e série, vol. XV, Revue de l’art français ancien et moderne (Paris: Charavay, 1899), 225.  
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voyage, missionary epistles, and other printed exotica that circulated widely at court 
and in officialdom often represented the New World as a stage, to the point that one 
leading specialist has dubbed these works a “theater” whose literary conventions 
hewed closely to those of Baroque drama.64   
From the earliest years of colonization, moreover, New France itself was both 
a site and a subject of theater.  In 1606 the lawyer and poet Marc Lescarbot celebrated 
the safe return of Samuel de Champlain and Governor Jean de Poutrincourt to Port 
Royal, Acadia by staging a nautical masque, in which four costumed “savages,” 
mimicking the pageantry of royal entry ceremonies, recognized the sovereignty of the 
French over their people.65  Three decades later Governor Charles Huault de 
Montmagny brought the stage to Québec, where his secretary played the starring role 
in a “Tragi-comedy” whose demon characters spoke Algonquin (the better to “strike 
[the Natives’] eyes and their ears”).66  When Governor Pierre de Voyer d’Argenson 
                                                                                                                                      
The craze for Ovid in France reached its apex under Louis XIV, when the Metamorphoses inflected the 
work of numerous writers, painters, and dramatists.  The interior paintings ordered by the king for the 
Marble Trianon at Versailles in 1688 drew heavily on motifs from the Metamorphoses; Molière 
admired the poem so much that he always kept a copy at hand in his bedroom at Auteuil; Racine, who 
planned to write a play based on Ovid’s life, read and extensively annotated his collected works in 
1661.  L. P. Wilkinson, Ovid Recalled (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 439.  
Frontenac was not the only colonial official to own a copy of the Metamorphosis, which appears 
among the 36 volumes of books listed in the inventory after death of Claude Bermen de la Martinière 
(1636-1719), judge, First Councillor of the Superior Council, and subdelegate of Intendant Michel 
Bégon.  John A. Dickinson, “Un aperçu de la vie culturelle en Nouvelle-France: L’examen de trois 
bibliothèques privées,” Revue de l’université d’Ottawa, vol. 44, no. 4 (octobre-décembre 1974): 458. 
64 Those conventions include their stage design (“mises en scène”), scripts (“manuscrits d’acteurs”), 
and unity of setting (“unités de lieu”).  François Moureau, Le théâtre des voyages: Une scénographie 
de l’Âge classique (Paris: Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2005).  
65 Kathleen Lynch, “Staging New Worlds: Place and ‘Le Theatre de Neptune,’” Journal of Medieval 
and Early Modern Studies, vol. 38, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 315-344.  
66 Six years later the governor oversaw a production of Corneille’s Le Cid.  He and Corneille had been 
schoolmates.  Jean-Claude Dubé, The Chevalier de Montmagny (1601-1657) (Ottawa: University of 
Ottawa Press, 2005), 150, 215; Paul Le Jeune, Jesuit Relations (1640), 83-85; Jean Hamelin, “Charles 
Huault de Montmagny (c. 1583-1653),” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online.  It was around 
this time that Montmagny himself became a character in Cyrano de Bergerac’s Voyage dans la Lune, 
whose protagonist crash lands in Canada on his way to the moon.  In the story, Montmagny and the 
protagonist have an extended debate over heliocentrism, before the governor takes leave to discuss the 
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arrived to assume his post in 1658, he visited the Jesuit seminary where a schoolboy, 
the future magistrate René-Louis Chartier de Lotbinière, improvised a play in the role 
of “the spirit of the forests, the interpreter for the strangers.”67  Governor Jacques-
René de Brisay de Denonville (1685-1689) once joked that a box of “Eskimo 
clothing” he sent to the minister of Marine was “fit for a masquerade.”68  The 
syncretic thrust of these performances (and imagined performances) is a reminder that 
one of the chief aims of early modern theater was to translate seemingly universal 
human experiences across lines of cultural difference.  By representing Europe to 
itself through a “savage mirror,” colonial officers, like contemporary dramatists, 
questioned what it meant to be civilized, made the foreign familiar, and staked 
political claims to overseas spaces.69  
In the seventeenth century, plays became a fixture of public life in Québec.70  
The colonists’ enthusiasm for the stage prompted one wag to quip that “when the 
French settle somewhere, the first thing they do [is] build a theater.”71  “You will not 
refuse me a few pounds’ spending money to help pass the time,” one newly-arrived 
chevalier begged his brother in 1682, “above all at some of the finest plays, like 
                                                                                                                                      
Iroquois threat with his Native allies.  Cyrano de Bergerac, Voyage dans la Lune (Paris: Flammarion, 
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 248 
l’avar[e], le malade imaginaire and some Crispains [sic].”72  Frontenac, whose 
family had once staged Garnier’s Bradamante for the young Louis XIII, delighted in 
watching his own entourage play Corneille and Racine.  In 1694, his plan to stage 
Tartuffe, which he had seen read at court by Molière himself, prompted the arrest of 
his lieutenant and leading man by order of the bishop of New France, who shared 
Bossuet’s distrust of theater.73  Few of these performances were as syncretic as 
Lescarbot’s or Montmagny’s—most, in fact, were thoroughly French—but they 
suggest that colonial officers were immersed in the dramatic arts of their day and 
keen to bring them to the New World.   
The theatrical worldview that royal officials brought with them to New France 
underpinned conventional ideas about diplomacy.  François de Callières—Louis 
XIV’s private secretary, a seasoned diplomat, and brother of the governor of New 
France, Louis-Hector de Callières (1698-1703)—described the ideal ambassador as 
one who “resembles in a way the Actor, exposed upon the stage before the eyes of the 
Public to play great roles.”  Diplomatic ceremonies were “plays,” he continued, in 
which ambassadors, as “kings of the theater,” represented “the personnage of the 
king.”74  The ambassador Abraham Van Wicquefort agreed: “To succeed in this 
profession one must be a bit of an Actor...perhaps in all the commerce of the World, 
there is no figure more Comique than the Ambassador.  There is no theater more 
                                                
72 Louis-Henri de Baugy to Eugène de Baugy, 22 November 1682, reproduced in Journal d’une 
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illustrious than the Court, no drama in which the actors appear less than as they 
actually are.”75  Both cast the diplomat as a figure who passed seamlessly between 
personas.  “As the most able actor is not always on stage & changes his manner of 
action after the curtain has fallen,” observed Wicquefort, “so the Ambassador, who 
has played his role well in the functions of his character, must become [again] the 
gentleman, when he is no longer performing the drama.”76  According to Callières, “a 
negotiator...must know how to accommodate himself to [the humors and fancies] of 
others; may he be like Proteus...always ready to assume all sorts of figures according 
to the needs of the moment.”77 
The notion that diplomatic success hinged on the protean flair of ambassadors 
was shared by the rhetorician and royal historiographer Jean de Lartigue, whose La 
politique des conquérants numbered among the books Frontenac kept in his library.  
If the governor ever read it, he would have learned that diplomats “assume different 
faces and represent diverse personas” in the course of their negotiations.  Their 
dexterity, Lartigue argued, was central to France’s manifest destiny as a universal 
empire: “People of Letters & of War, men of the Cabinet and of the Campaign” who 
served the king as ambassadors would have to mobilize both “Learning and 
Eloquence” in order to “manipulate the Minds” of their opponents.  In a metaphor 
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that might have appealed to Frontenac’s martial sensibilities, Lartigue characterized 
the negotiating table as a battlefield on which “one practices an Image of warfare, 
attacking and defending, seizing Towns, winning battles, [and] defeating one’s 
enemies without an army, without spilling blood, by reason & dexterity alone...by this 
imperceptible Art that is the highest degree of la Science Civile.”  Without resorting 
to “guile,” the ideal negotiator, using his “lively & prompt imagination,” should 
“adjust his intrigues & his speeches to the diversity of...Temperament of those with 
whom he deals, to their differences of Climate, mores, institutions, and 
Governance.”78   
 As these last lines suggest, the qualities of the successful diplomat could be 
deployed anywhere in the world.  “He will consider the nature of the people & the 
Nation with whom he negotiates,” Lartigue instructed, in terms similar to those of 
Wicquefort and Callières, “He will study their humor to accommodate himself to 
their inclinations.”  The precise manner in which an ambassador deployed his talents 
naturally depended upon where and with whom he found himself.  It was by 
dispatching negotiators to far-off countries and leaving them latitude in the conduct of 
affairs, Lartigue claimed, that the French had learned to tailor their diplomacy to a 
variety of local cultures.79   
 Officers and observers understood that in the colonies, as in Europe, public 
men wore masks, and not only when negotiating with foreign powers.  The 
Dominican chronicler Jean-Baptiste Du Tertre repeatedly referred to factional 
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conflicts in the Caribbean as occasions when the authorities abandoned pretense and 
“removed their masks.”  When Governor Poincy clashed with the Compagnie des 
Isles de l’Amérique, he did so because “the sole means to protect himself...was to lift 
his mask...by opposing them with all his power.”  Later he “removed his mask in 
favor of rebellion” by expelling company officials from Saint Christopher.  When 
Governor Houel of Guadeloupe openly incited his followers to defy the Lieutenant-
General of the Islands over a personal slight, he ceased “to act covertly & in secret, 
[and] removed his mask.”80  Like Lartigue, Du Tertre portrayed the strategic 
dissimulation of one’s feelings and aims as a fact of political life. 
 If the Caribbean was a political arena in which governors sometimes veiled 
their true intentions, Canada was a veritable masquerade.  In a country where “virtue 
does not triumph...only vice, scandal, and libel,” royal officials had to be many things 
to many people in order to maintain the king’s authority.81  Shortly after arriving at 
Québec in 1665, the colony’s first intendant, Jean Talon, reported that “a bit of 
Rhetoric” was required to lift the morale of colonists “beaten down” by decades of 
company misrule.82  More than half a century later, Governor Charles de Beauharnois 
(1726-1749) drew on the collective experience of his predecessors to warn that 
governors faced the constant threat of manipulation by subjects who were “generally 
of a spirit inclined to flatter and praise even as they are thinking otherwise.”  In a 
handwritten “Modèle politique d’un gouverneur du Canada,” he prescribed an array 
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of “wise outward appearances” calculated to persuade the colony’s restive inhabitants 
that their governor “[thinks] only of the public good and utility, and at the same time 
of the service of God and the establishment of peace and unity in the colony.”  
Although he considered such unity impossible to achieve in any full or lasting way, 
Beauharnois nonetheless believed that a governor could manipulate his public image 
to maintain obedience to himself and the king.   
Beauharnois detailed the variety of situations in which artifice would be 
necessary to forestall intrigue, defuse conflict, and uphold the crown’s interests in a 
distant colony.  A governor should be wary in the presence of missionaries, he 
warned, since they would slander him to their superiors in France even as they 
“dissemble [their grievances] in Canada.”  The Jesuits were particularly “dangerous 
enemies...writers able to ruin the reputation of those who deny them what they ask,” 
so one must be prepared to “cover any refusal in the cloak of service to the king, as 
they know how to wrap themselves in that of religion.”  In private, all of the colony’s 
religious orders could be appeased by “making it seem as if one inclines toward their 
side,” while in public, the governor could win their favor by praising their superiors, 
“but with a dexterity and in a manner that none can sense any preference.”  The 
bishop of New France would cooperate so long as he received “on all occasions...fine 
hopes and praises.”  The laity was just as susceptible to flattery and deceit, 
Beauharnois observed, but since most were commoners, the successful governor 
would need to address them with calculated condescension.  The Superior Council (“a 
court of injustice...comprised mostly of traders who were once petty clerks”) could be 
controlled easily through a show of collusion and back-slapping bonhomie—what 
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Beauharnois called “their system...[of] claiming to be friends with each other, I will 
do for you as you do for me.”  Among the more humble colonists, “being affable” 
would suffice “to win their hearts.”83   
 In a factious colony rife with sycophants and schemers, Beauharnois cast 
performance and deceit not only as facts of political life, but as everyday means of 
governance—necessary tools of the trade.  One moment the governor might be a 
benevolent father-protector winning the hearts of humble colonists, the next he might 
be cultivating allies among his social inferiors on the Council, nodding 
disingenuously at the petty gripes of the priesthood, or misleading the bishop, with 
the appearance of utmost piety and good faith, that he would request royal funds for 
the hospital of Québec.  In language akin to Lartigue’s, Beauharnois emphasized the 
use of “dexterity” and “wise outward appearances” to create an array of personas 
suited to the political landscape of the colony.  Unlike Lartigue, however, his rules 
were not the speculations of an armchair diplomat, nor were they written to please 
patrons or a public audience.  They were instead occupational “observations,” as he 
put it, informed by long experience and intended for use in the field.   
 It was in a world accustomed to thinking about performance and public life in 
these ways that French approaches to Native diplomacy made sense.  For noblemen, 
honor and authority were achieved rhetorically, through the manipulation of signs that 
persuaded others of their status and power.  Even violent forms of noble self-assertion 
such as executions, beatings, and judicial torture were heavily ritualized affairs 
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intended to impose symbolic order upon the disordered reality of existence.  If the 
self-conscious play of appearances was fundamental to the aristocratic experience in 
Europe, naturally, it was no less so in America.  Masks of authority, diplomatic 
pretense, rhetorical training, dramatic arts, and the everyday histrionics of high 
society all formed part of a theatrical sensibility that permeated elite culture on both 
sides of the Atlantic.  The conventional wisdom that life represented a series of 
“stages” on which noblemen displayed their virtues conditioned the way they moved 
through the world wherever they went.  By temporarily adapting their verbal and 
physical deportment in ways that took them far from what was socially normative in 
France, officers in New France learned to embody a Native persona that their 
successors would inherit and adjust to meet the shifting demands of diplomacy. 
 
Barbarians and Politicians 
 
During the half century following the royal takeover of New France in 1663, 
the ceremonial contours of Franco-Native diplomacy remained largely unchanged.  
Encounters typically began in the woods a few miles away from an agreed-upon 
rendez-vous—sometimes Native settlements or outlying French forts, sometimes 
Québec or Montréal.  French delegations included royal officers, missionaries, or 
traders who claimed to speak on behalf of the French as a whole.  Native 
communities, which reached political decisions by consensus, sent headmen who 
usually represented only their own bands or factions.  Once the emissaries had 
greeted each other, they proceeded to the rendez-vous site, where the visiting party 
was welcomed with volleys of musket fire.  After a day or two of rest, negotiations 
began: the sides faced each other, expressed condolences for each other’s dead or 
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sick, smoked a peace pipe (calumet de paix), and engaged in several days of speeches 
organized around the exchange wampum belts or collars (colliers), which later served 
as a common record of what had been discussed and concluded.84  The colliers were 
threaded with seashells or porcelain beads whose color and pattern represented a 
specific request—to make war on a mutual enemy, for example, or to adjust the value 
of furs.  Accepting a belt laid at one’s feet signified that the proposal or grievance it 
contained would be considered; refusing a belt meant outright denial.  Formal 
answers were not delivered until the following day or even several days afterward, 
during which time the parties socialized and engaged in trade.  When negotiations 
were over, everyone exchanged gifts, danced, smoked, and feasted at the host’s 
expense.85   
The etiquette that governed all of these ceremonies was as baroque and subtle 
as any code of courtesy in Europe, and observing it demanded a similar degree of 
mental and physical discipline, but royal officials claimed with mounting conviction 
that Native diplomacy was about more than following protocol: it was above all a 
matter of passion.  According to La Potherie, who based his history of the Iroquois 
Wars on firsthand experience as well as reports supplied to him by longtime 
negotiators, diplomatic ceremonies were a “Stage,” and those who spoke, sang, and 
danced in their midst were “actors.”  He described Native councils and war feasts as 
moments of extraordinary emotional intensity during which orators’ spirited words 
                                                
84 As one Jesuit put it, the belts were exchanged “as contracts, and as public proofs, which are handed 
down to posterity, and attest what has been done in any matter.”  Jesuit Relations 33: 133, quoted in 
Blackburn, Harvest of Souls, 88.  La Potherie explained that a collier was a “Spokesman, or a Contract, 
which has the same virtue as that which one makes before a Notary.”  La Potherie, Histoire de 
l’Amérique, t. III: “Termes et expressions des sauvages” (front matter). 
85 This résumé of diplomatic protocols between Natives and the French follows Havard, The Great 
Peace of Montréal, 21-25. 
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and contorted faces were “accompanied by very violent gestures and movements.”86  
In a rhetorical environment where passions ran high, the French had to match their 
allies’ emotional pitch with histrionic displays of their own: “One must have great 
political skill to manage these peoples,” he observed, adding that they could be won 
over only through a face-to-face “eloquence” whose “great charms...touches the 
ears...animates the passions...fortifies the mind...excites the affections of the 
soul...[and] has a gift of persuasion when it insinuates itself pleasantly.”87  La 
Potherie stated his case with exceptional literary gusto, but his chosen metaphors and 
arguments permeated French administrative reportage and printed relations in the 
decades after 1663.  By casting Native diplomacy as a stage, he and other officials not 
only glorified French negotiators as superior performers to whom the eyes of the 
world should be drawn, but also made their actions intelligible to readers as a 
rhetorical exercise with real political stakes.88  In the New World, as in the Old, 
eloquence achieved emotional power, and emotional power was political power.   
A rare visual artifact of a council held during this period captures the French 
view of Native diplomacy as a stage for the interplay of words, gestures, and feeling.  
The image (Figures 2 and 3), published in 1703 as part of the Baron de Lahontan’s 
                                                
86 La Potherie, Histoire, t. III: 198-199 (“Scene”), t. II: 116, t. 4: 199 (“acteurs”). 
87 La Potherie, Histoire, , t. II: 115-117 (“gestures”), t. III: 198-199 (“Scene”), t. II: 116, t. 4: 199 
(“acteurs”), t. II: 227 (“political skill”), t. IV: 83-84 (“eloquence”).  “It is difficult to express the 
particulars of these kinds of Feasts unless one has seen them himself,” La Potherie claimed, “I once 
found myself at a similar [war] banquet among the [Mission] Iroquois...& it seemed to me that I was in 
the midst of Hell.”  La Potherie, Histoire, t. II: 117.  On La Potherie’s sources, which included Jesuit 
missionaries and the former commandant at the Baie des Puants (Green Bay), Nicolas Perrot, see 
Nicolas Perrot, Mémoire sur les moeurs, coustumes et religion des sauvages de l’Amérique 
Septentrionale (Yorkshire, UK: S. R. Publishers, 1968 ed. [orig. c. 1715]), preface. 
88 In addition to its primary definition as the space in a theater where actors perform before the public, 
the word scène denoted a prominent or public office: “We say, figuratively, that A man appears on the 
stage, to mean that he is in a post, in a position that draws the eyes of the world to him.”  “Scène,” in 
Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (1694).   
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account of his military service in North America, depicts talks between Governor 
Joseph-Antoine Lefebvre de La Barre (1682-1685) and the Onondaga headman 
Outreouti in September 1684.  The governor, seated regally in a chair and flanked by 
two interpreters, faces Outreouti, who declaims proudly while holding a pipe.  The 
members of their entourages are shown standing or sitting in stylized poses—their 
arms outstretched or akimbo, their hands pointing or supinated, their heads turned this 
way and that.  Even in this still image, perpetual motion is encoded in their bodies, 
whose dramatic gestures would have implied both lively discussion and intense 
feeling: lively discussion because educated Frenchmen understood gesture to be 
fundamentally aligned with speech (geste being “the movements of the hand 
conforming to the things one says”), and intense feeling because words and gestures 
together formed the art of rhetorical delivery (which aimed “to persuade the mind & 
touch the heart of those who hear us”).89  The same thematic link between eloquence, 
movement, and emotion pervades Lahontan’s generalized scenes of Native diplomacy 
(Figure 4), where indigenous figures engage in animated speeches, dances, and other 
rituals of war and peace.  The pattern appears in other representations of the time, as 
well, notably the royal geographer Nicolas Le Fer’s 1698 drawing and description of 
Illinois headmen welcoming French officers with the calumet (Figure 5).  It is 
noticeably absent, on the other hand, from contemporary depictions of diplomacy in 
Europe, which tended to portray councils as serene, deliberative affairs held among 
seated negotiators (Figure 6).  
                                                
89 Pierre Richelet, Dictionnaire français (Geneva: Widerhold, 1680), t. I: 371 (“geste”) and t. II: 224 
(“prononciation”).  Gesture “refers principally to movements that accompany speech.”  “Geste,” in 
Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (1694).  The meanings of gesture within Baroque performance-
practice are explored more fully in Powell, “Music and Baroque Gesture.” 
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It was natural for French observers to identify passion as the lifeblood of a 
diplomatic environment where the heart often served as a metaphor for the state of 
relations.  Native headmen frequently proclaimed their allegiance to Onontio by 
asking him to “receive my heart” or to “make my heart one with your own.”  Those 
who felt they had an especially close bond with him, such as the Mission Iroquois, 
declared proudly that they “know better and more intimately than [others] the true 
sentiments of your heart.”90  Native ambassadors adopted the same language when 
relations broke down.  The Onondaga headman Tegannisorens once complained to a 
French negotiator, “You come and speak of peace and have scarcely sat down to 
smoke a pipe, but talk of coming and knocking us on the head, and therefore I say 
nobody knows your heart.”91  French officials incorporated heart-talk into their own 
diplomatic lexicon, assuring Native emissaries that they would “reveal my heart to 
you,” imploring them to reciprocate, and asking them to “be but one heart and one 
mind” with them.  In the speech preceding his war dance in 1690, Frontenac 
announced to his allies that he “would explain to them his feelings with an open 
heart.”92  
To the French, emotional manipulation by a well-deployed Native persona 
seemed like the surest means to control hearts governed by a curious mix of reason 
and impulse.  On the one hand, Amerindians appeared more than capable of 
reflective, complex, and strategic political behavior.  “When we speak of the Iroquois 
                                                
90 See, for example, the speeches delivered during the closing ceremony of the Great Peace of 
Montréal of 1701, in La Potherie, Histoire, t. IV: 240-252. 
91 Tegannisorens to Le Moyne de Maricourt, quoted in Havard, Great Peace, 204. 
92 La Potherie begrudgingly praised one Huron whose innuendos in council piqued the pride of his 
fellow headmen until he “wormed [the truth] out of them to uncover little by little the sentiments of 
their hearts.”  La Potherie, Histoire, t. IV: 23. 
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in France,” La Potherie admonished his readers, “we imagine that they are 
Barbarians, always thirsting for human blood.  Wrong...It is the proudest & most 
fearsome Nation in North America...the most political & judicious one could find.”  
Intendant Antoine-Denis Raudot considered Natives to have “all the wit and politique 
necessary to pursue their interests.”  The Jesuit missionary Jean Bobé agreed: “these 
peoples...[are] very wise & refined Politicans, skilled, dissimulating, understanding 
their interests perfectly and knowing how to achieve their designs...the French & the 
English need all of their dexterity & their wits to deal with them.”  Lahontan, La 
Barre, Frontenac, and the former commandant of Baie des Puants (Green Bay), 
Nicolas Perrot, likewise stressed that Natives acted according to a keen perception of 
their own self-interest.93   
On the other hand, Amerindians seemed prone to flights of feeling or fancy 
that overpowered their customary self-possession.  They would “believe anything” 
when their imaginations were “heated up” by dreams or drink or rumor, and their 
minds were “dominated imperiously” by sentiments of ambition, vengeance, and 
vainglory that “possess their hearts entirely.”94  To royal officials, Natives seemed to 
lack the refinement necessary to impose reasonable restraint upon their emotions as 
fully as Europeans could do.  Their self-regard was so consuming, Perrot claimed in a 
report to Intendant Michel Bégon de la Picardière around 1715, that “you would be 
                                                
93 La Potherie, Histoire, t. III: 1; Antoine-Denis Raudot, Relation par lettres de l’Amérique 
septentrionale (années 1709 et 1710), ed. Camille de Rochemonteix (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1904), 3, 
66; Jean Bobé, “Lettre de M. Bobé, missionaire,” in La Potherie, Histoire, t. IV: 270; Lahontan, 
Nouveaux voyages, t. II: 112; Perrot, Mémoire, 77-78; La Barre to Seignelay, 4 November 1683, 
ANOM COL C11A, vol. 6, ff. 134-144, reproduced in Dubé, La Nouvelle-France sous Joseph-Antoine 
Le Fevre de la Barre, 91; Frontenac to Pontchartrain, 30 April 1690, reproduced in RAPQ (1927-
1928), 30. 
94 Perrot, Mémoire, 69; La Potherie, Histoire, t. III: 28. 
 260 
shocked to see them arrange themselves, they don’t know what pose to strike; I 
believe that if they had a mirror before their eyes, they would change their appearance 
every quarter of an hour.”  The key to negotiating with them, he argued, was to 
exercise the same protean quality in a strategic way, alternately bribing, flattering, 
chiding, and intimidating them in order to exploit the vicissitudes of their passions.95   
To be sure, such reductive notions of the “Native mind” reflected 
longstanding assumptions about the impetuousness of “savage” peoples, but they also 
drew upon preconceived ideas about the emotional vulnerability of any public 
audience, even a European one.  In a 1689 handbook for lawyers and preachers, the 
rhetorician Étienne Dubois de Bretteville voiced the wholly conventional belief that 
men are governed by feeling, not intellect: “the mind has long been the dupe of the 
heart...to win over a man’s reason, it is necessary first to win over his passion.”  The 
problem for Bretteville and other educated observers was that the heart of man 
seemed like “an abyss whose shadows we have never penetrated...a sea whose bottom 
is impossible to find...a new world yet to be discovered.”96  Nonetheless, they were 
confident that close and sustained scrutiny of anyone’s outward appearances would 
reveal his true feelings in the end.  Although contemporaries debated the precise 
workings of the heart and its passions—were they mechanical or vital? soulful or 
material?—most believed that emotions operated according to regular patterns that 
                                                
95 Perrot, Mémoire sur les moeurs, esp. 69, 76-78. 
96 Étienne Dubois de Bretteville, L’éloquence de la chaire et du barreau (Paris: D. Thierry, 1689), 
315-317.  When the French spoke of the “mind,” or esprit, they could mean the rational faculties, but 
also the humors, dispositions, or capacity for imagination that likewise arose from the soul.  See 
“Esprit,” Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 1st ed. (1694). 
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could be identified by physical and verbal clues.97  “Since we read on a man’s face 
what passes in his heart,” Lamy observed, “the fire in his eyes, the lines of his 
forehead, [and] the changes of color in his face are obvious markers of the 
extraordinary movements of his soul.  His particular turns of phrase [and] manner of 
expressing himself, so far from those one maintains in moments of calm, are signs...of 
the agitation that move his mind during the time when he speaks.”98  Bretteville 
agreed that one could “judge the springs of the machine by its display, & surmise 
what is hidden inside by what escapes from it...No matter how secretive the heart is, 
Passion will betray it & make it known.”99   Natives were no exception to this rule, 
and the ambition of the French to discover the “new world” of their hearts was 
entirely consistent with a political culture that privileged passion as the animating 
force in public life. 
Unlike persuading parishioners or parlementaires in France, however, 
manipulating the Indians of North America meant learning to detect passions from an 
unfamiliar set of cues displayed by seemingly inscrutable and even treacherous 
peoples.  La Potherie noted that Europeans “who do not know [the Natives]” often 
mistook their “brutal” manners for anger, while at other times, the Indians 
deliberately hid their “violent feelings” behind a stoic façade.100  Raudot agreed that 
                                                
97 Bretteville, L’éloquence, 317.  On debates over the workings of the human heart and its passions, 
see Fay Bound Alberti, Matters of the Heart: History, Memory and Emotion (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2010).  On the early modern preoccupation with reading the passions from bodily 
clues, see “Strange Alteration: Physiology and Psychology from Galen to Rabelais,” in Reading the 
Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion, eds. Gail Kern Paster et al. 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 272-294. 
98 Lamy, La rhétorique, 108.   
99 Bretteville, L’éloquence, 317.  For a similar view, see Marin Cureau de la Chambre, Caractères des 
passions, t. I: “L’art de connoistre les hommes” (Paris: 1648).   
100 La Potherie, Histoire, t. II: 256 (“brutal”), t. III: 28 (“violent feelings”).  Mother Marie-Andrée 
Regnard Duplessis de Sainte-Hélène recalled witnessing one headman apologize to an intendant, “I 
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Natives often put a deceptively placid face on the rolling boil of their emotions.  
“They are very politique and very patient when insulted,” he observed, “but they 
maintain their resentment and lose no opportunity to take revenge [later].”101  
Summing up decades of frustration among missionaries and royal officers, La 
Potherie lamented that “the Savage mind is difficult to know; he says one thing & 
thinks another.”102  Close observation was the only way to discover the Natives’ true 
feelings, he concluded, and the charged atmosphere of diplomatic councils and war 
feasts provided some of the few occasions when their customary poise was absent: 
“The Savage is naturally phlegmatic, something is needed to excite him; only the 
hope of making war somewhere reveals at the same time the sentiments of his 
heart.”103  
As they adapted metropolitan preconceptions about persuasion and the 
passions to an unfamiliar audience of Native headmen, royal officials drew 
inspiration from the insights, experience, and patterns of performance bequeathed by 
their predecessors.  The founding governor of New France, Samuel de Champlain 
(1608-1635), served as a touchstone model of strategic imitation and accommodation.  
Champlain’s Voyages (another text owned by Frontenac) described how he had 
forged alliances with nearby bands by wintering with them and immersing himself in 
their ceremonies.  In his speeches, Champlain repeatedly insisted that Native 
headmen were his “brothers,” and that their children would one day intermarry with 
                                                                                                                                      
beg you, do not be offended that I speak so loudly.  Nature has given me this tone, and I mean you no 
disrespect by it.”  Regnard Duplessis de Sainte-Hélène to Hecquet de La Cloche, 17 October 1723, 
LAC FR CHAN T, vol. 62, p. 6. 
101 Raudot, Relation, 66. 
102 La Potherie, Histoire, t. II: 262. 
103 La Potherie, Histoire, t. III: 246.  This comment follows his description of a war feast.   
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the French to form one people.  He used a mixture of bribes, threats, and stage-
managed encounters to convince them to host Jesuit missionaries in their 
settlements.104  His writings portrayed Indians as peoples whose customs, once 
understood, could be exploited to win their affection (and, in the long run, their 
conversion and refinement into civilized Christians).  Although he was sometimes 
contemptuous of Native cultures, he nonetheless displayed a critical detachment from 
French proprieties in the face of indigenous ways of life.105  Looking back nearly a 
century later, Perrot idealized the Champlain era as a period when “we began to make 
ourselves master of the savages, even though there were few French at that time.”  
The key then, as at present, was to know their “nature” and traditions in order to 
“know how to manage them.”106   
The diplomatic practice of royal governors was fundamentally shaped by the 
career of Montmagny (1636-1648), as well.  It was he, after all, who forged a rare 
peace with the Mohawks in 1645 that earned him the Iroquoian sobriquet Onontio, or 
“Great Mountain”—a title derived literally from his name (mont meaning 
“mountain,” and magny, like magnus, meaning “great”).  Not only was Montmagny 
                                                
104 Samuel de Champlain, Les voyages de la Nouvelle-France occidentale (Paris: Collet, 1632); Alain 
Beaulieu, “The Birth of the Franco-American Alliance,” in Champlain, 153-161.  For stage-managed 
encounters, see Le Jeune, Jesuit Relations 6 (1633): 196-201.  On Champlain as “brother” to his allies, 
see Le Jeune, Jesuit Relations 5 (1633): 249.  On his (failed) vision of Christian intermarriage between 
Natives and the French, see Cook, “Onontio Gives Birth”: 177-178. 
105 Although he dismissed their faith in the spiritual power of dreams, for example, Champlain once 
assured a party of Huron (Wendat) and Montagnais (Innu) warriors that he had dreamed of many 
Iroquois drowning in a lake.  The warriors greeted his vision with “such belief, that they no longer 
doubted that what would happen to them [in battle] would turn out well,” and their ensuing victory 
over the Iroquois at Ticonderoga helped to establish a lasting alliance.  Champlain, Voyages, t. II: 148-
149.  The governor sometimes took an ironic view of his position between French and Native cultures.  
For instance, at the same table where he had histories and the lives of the saints read to him morning 
and night “like [in] a well-ordered Academy,” he partook of bear meat offered to him by a Native 
convert, laughing to the Jesuits that “if they knew in France that we were eating Bears, they would turn 
their faces away from our breath, and yet you see how good and delicate the meat is.”  Le Jeune, Jesuit 
Relations 5 (1633): 210-211 (bear) and 6 (1634): 4 (academy). 
106 Nicolas Perrot, Mémoire sur les moeurs, 76-78, 96. 
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the namesake of a role that would outlive him for more than a century, he was also, in 
his own time, “wonderfully adroit in using...all the presents, all the feasts—in a word, 
all the help and all the benevolent acts which have to be done for these barbarians to 
get along in peace with them.”107  Those benevolent acts included spectacles such as 
the “Tragi-comedy” performed in 1637.  They also encompassed an extensive 
fireworks show that featured dozens of rockets and “little serpents,” four spinning 
wheels, a lighted cross, a cascade of sparks, and the name of Saint Joseph illuminated 
on an animal skin.  When the governor ignited the display, his Jesuit interpreter 
explained that the French “were more powerful than Demons, that they commanded 
the fire, and that if they wished to burn the villages of their enemies, they could soon 
do it,” prompting a delighted audience of Huron and Algonquin allies to emit a lusty 
“hô! hô! hô!”108  
In staging such spectacles, Montmagny and his collaborators practiced 
familiar modes of persuasion within a Native idiom.  They played up the aspects of 
their own material, religious, and political culture that would best “strike the eyes and 
the ears” of their listeners.  Their performances were calculated to appeal to Native 
beliefs in the spiritual power of certain gestures and objects, combining public 
displays of mastery over “the fire” with feasts and gift-giving in order to inspire an 
admiration that could be read on their allies’ faces or heard “from the depths of their 
stomachs.”  During one feast the governor reportedly “had the banquet opened by a 
[Algonquin] Captain, who observed their ceremonies, explaining who it was that had 
invited them, and of what the feast was composed; at every dish...they showed their 
                                                
107 Le Jeune, Jesuit Relations 14 (1637), 67-69. 
108 Le Jeune, Jesuit Relations 14 (1637), 183-185.   
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satisfaction by their hô, hô, hô.”109  At a procession celebrating the birth of Louis 
XIV, Montmagny’s cannon “thundered forth, inspiring [the] poor Savages with a holy 
awe,” the Ursuline nuns “sang the Exaudiat, to the delight of our Savages,” and 
prayers were held “in the savage tongue.”110  In all of these ways, he collaborated 
with missionaries and Native go-betweens to make himself legible to his allies as a 
powerful warrior, a liberal host, and master of a seemingly endless supply of 
miraculous and useful goods.111 
Royal officials worked within patterns established by their predecessors, but 
as Montmagny’s own example attests, they learned how to embody a compelling 
Native persona primarily from those who actually lived on Native ground—namely, 
Jesuit missionaries.  After establishing a permanent foothold in the colony in 1632, 
the “black robes” quickly became renowned as the colony’s foremost experts in 
Native customs.  Years of being shunned for having “no sense” taught them how to 
think and act like their Indian hosts.  Initially dismissed as weak, ugly, effeminate, 
asocial, smelly, and awkward, they experimented with a variety of moods and miens 
to find a deportment that satisfied their would-be converts.112  Close scrutiny of the 
Natives was crucial to the process.  “A great step is gained when one has learned to 
know those with whom he has to deal,” wrote Father Jerôme Lalemant in 1642, 
“[when he] has penetrated their thoughts; has adapted himself to their language, their 
customs, and their manner of living; and when necessary, has been a Barbarian with 
                                                
109 Le Jeune, Jesuit Relations [14] (1637): 98-99. 
110 Le Jeune, Jesuit Relations 15 (1638): 9-11, 16-17. 
111 This interpretation draws on Allan Greer’s analysis of Native ideas about Jesuit power.  Greer, 
Mohawk Saint, 107. 
112 In this they followed the example of the Recollects who preceded them.  Axtell, The Invasion 
Within, 71-90. 
 266 
them in order to win them over to Jesus Christ.”  It was through just such an 
immersive approach, he later reported, that Jesuits living among the Wendat (Huron) 
had developed “a greater knowledge than ever before of their language, of their 
customs, and of the means that must be taken to enter into their minds and hearts.”113  
For Lalement, identification produced knowledge, and knowledge made persuasion 
possible.  Like his missionary counterparts in Europe and Asia, he considered the 
careful study and imitation of local peoples to be a prerequisite to their conversion.114 
The Jesuits recognized that all of their efforts would be pointless if they could 
not make themselves understood by their hosts.  From their first years in Canada, they 
set about learning and recording indigenous dialects, translating the catechism and the 
pater noster, and recruiting sympathetic headmen to expand upon and polish their 
own halting speeches.115  After observing that Native orators obtained influence 
through their “tongue’s end” and that they succeeded “not less by gesticulation than 
by language,” the missionaries imitated their movements and inflections.  “There is 
nowhere in the world where Rhetoric is more powerful than in Canada,” claimed 
Father Paul Le Jeune, who marveled at the “keenness and delicacy” of Native 
speeches “that might have come out of the schools of Aristotle or Cicero.”116  
According to Father Jean de Brébeuf, “[Amerindians] raise and bend their voices in 
the tone of old-time preachers, but slowly, steadily, distinctly, even repeating the 
                                                
113 Lalemant, Jesuit Relations 23 (1642) and Jesuit Relations 28 (1645), quoted in Blackburn, Harvest 
of Souls, 85-86. 
114 For comparison, see the Jesuit practices of imitation and accommodation in seventeenth-century 
Asia.  Chakravarti, “Many Faces”; Ronnie Po-chia Hsia, A Jesuit in the Forbidden City: Matteo Ricci, 
1552-1610 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
115 Jean de Brébeuf, Relation of 1635, reproduced in Écrits en huronie, ed. Gilles Thérien (Québec: 
Bibliothèque Québecoise, 1996), 169. 
116 Paul Le Jeune, Jesuit Relations 5 (1633), 203-204. 
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same reason several times.”117  If Native speechifying sounded Antique, however, the 
body language needed to animate it looked emphatically modern.  Father Simon Le 
Moyne preached “in what was really the Italian style,” which is to say a flamboyant 
manner.  By “walking about and...proclaiming with pomp the word of God” in “a 
torrent of forcible words,” he developed an oratorical presence pleasing enough to 
help conduct peace negotiations at Onondaga in 1654, where he “delivered my entire 
harangue, which I pronounced in the tone of a [Native] Captain—walking back and 
forth, as is their custom, like an actor on a stage.”118  The same principles of 
persuasion taught by Jesuit rhetoricians in France underpinned their missionary 
campaign in North America, since they believed that Natives could be moved like any 
other audience: by imitating their style, appealing to their needs and passions, and 
inciting them to action through a “charismatic momentum” of carefully calibrated 
words and gestures.119   
By dint of their ministry, the Jesuits became the first Europeans to develop 
stable and studied Native personas.  Much as later French governors inherited the title 
of Onontio from Montmagny, Jesuit superiors at Québec became known as 
Achiendassé, after the Huron sobriquet for Lalemant.  Some individual missionaries 
such as Brébeuf (Echon) received indigenous names of their own.  Investing their 
personas with recognizably “Native” attributes required an extensive project of self-
refashioning.  In a guide meant to instruct new recruits in how to live among the 
Wendat (Huron), Brébeuf drew on his own experience to stress the necessity of 
                                                
117 Simon Le Moyne, Jesuit Relations 41 (1654); Brébeuf, Relation of 1635, in Écrits, 168. 
118
 Le Moyne, Jesuit Relations 41 (1654): 111; Jean de Quens, 42 (1655-1656): 103-105.  On the 
ascendance of a flamboyant style of delivery among Jesuits in Italy during this period, see Filippi, 
“Orator’s Performance”: 515-516. 
119 Blackburn, Harvest of Souls, 85; Morrissey, “Terms of Encounter.” 
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transforming one’s speech, dress, and deportment in radically unfamiliar ways.  “This 
is a lesson easily learned but difficult to practice,” he observed, 
since, coming from a polite place, you fall into the hands 
of barbarians, who care neither for your philosophy nor 
your theology.  All of the fine things that could make 
you respected and admired in France are like pearls 
trampled at your feet by swine or, better yet, by mules 
who despise you to the last degree, seeing that you are 
not good pack animals like they are.  If you can go nude 
and carry a horse’s load on your back as they do, then 
you will be learned in their doctrine and recognized as a 
great man, otherwise not.  
 
Among Natives, such recognition mattered a great deal: if a man was judged 
annoying or difficult in his first encounter with them, Brébeuf noted, “that is how 
they will think of [him] in their villages,” and it would be virtually impossible to 
change their opinion.  Hence the missionary must not cause delays, get in the way, 
ask too many questions, appear unhappy, or fail to eat the Indians’ “dirty” and 
“flavorless” corn stew (sagamité).  To avoid accidents while traveling by canoe, he 
should wear a nightcap instead of his usual wide-brimmed hat—mortifying, Brébeuf 
conceded, but “there is no impropriety among the savages.”120   In short, “as for the 
great number of...things which might displease [you], one must suffer them for the 
love of God without saying a word of it or letting it show.”  In all of these ways, 
Jesuits like Brébeuf trained their tongues, faces, and bodies to conform to Native 
norms.  They assumed the trappings of a culture that was not their own, deploying 
“holy artifice” in heeding Christ’s call to “be all things to all men in order to win 
all.”121   
                                                
120 Jean de Brébeuf, Instruction pour les pères de notre Compagnie qui seront envoyés aux Hurons 
(1637), in Écrits en huronie, 197-200. 
121
 Axtell, The Invasion Within, 84. 
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  The Jesuits set the standard of cross-cultural performance to administrators 
who observed and abetted their work, and their presence in Native communities made 
them crucial reservoirs of influence and expertise.  They kept governors informed of 
the political mood in Native settlements and accompanied them on campaign to serve 
as interpreters and couriers.122  Their rhetorical practices bled into those of royal 
officials, who initially followed the black robes’ habit, inherited from Champlain, of 
referring to Natives as “brothers” united with the French in a powerful alliance under 
God the Father.123  Missionaries also laid the groundwork for negotiations between 
officers and headmen.  “Trust in them,” La Barre instructed one lieutenant destined 
for Illinois Country in 1683, for “they are the most knowledgeable people in the 




 In a diplomatic arena where performance was paramount, royal officials 
studied what missionaries and governors had done, but they did not—indeed could 
not—follow past precedent to the letter.  In the years immediately following the 
crown’s takeover of the colony, the needs of the French and their allies changed 
rapidly, as shifting political and demographic circumstances redefined the terms, 
relationships, and geography of their alliance.  Between 1663 and 1673, the French 
                                                
122 See Governor Denonville’s marching orders from the campaign of 1687, reproduced in Baugy, 
Journal, 199, 204.  For an example of missionaries keeping governors informed of news from Native 
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of Some Canadian Missionaries to Monsieur the Count de Frontenac,” in Jesuit Relations 56 (1672-
1673): 19-31. 
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 “Coppie des Instructions données par monsr le Gnal au sr de la Durantayes pour le voyage qu’il va 
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population of New France ballooned nearly four-fold, from around 2500 to over 
8000, just as epidemic disease and the continuing pressure of the Iroquois Wars were 
devastating their Native allies and driving them westward.125  Demobilized French 
soldiers and officers, meanwhile, began to establish trading posts along the Great 
Lakes and down the Mississippi River.  As Peter Cook has shown, the fraternal 
metaphor that had structured diplomacy since the time of Champlain was replaced at 
this time by a paternal one.  All parties adopted a ritual vocabulary that reflected the 
new balance of power between them.  The French, who understood fathers to hold 
coercive authority over their sons much as a king commands his subjects, eagerly 
embraced a patriarchal role that seemed to promise a similar dominion over their 
willful Indian allies; their allies, for whom fatherhood implied protection and 
generosity but not political mastery, hoped to receive greater relief as French 
“children” than as “brothers”; Iroquois headmen, momentarily war-weary, accepted 
that Onontio was the father of his allies in order to make better terms with him, or 
even became his children themselves, knowing that it obliged far less deference, in 
their own terms, than if they were his “nephews.”126  
  Although the term “father” carried different meanings for all sides, it 
represented a flexible metaphor through which they could rebuild relations as 
                                                
125 Historians continue to debate the extent to which northeastern Native communities were weakened 
and dislocated by warfare in the middle decades of the seventeenth century.  Here I follow the 
prevailing account that many of the Native communities that moved into the Great Lakes region after 
c. 1650 were composed of “refugees” fleeing disease and the pressures of the Iroquois Wars, but 
others, such as Heidi Bohaker, have used oral histories to suggest that these migrations westward were 
in fact “planned” by Natives and “embedded” in their culture.  In this telling, the embrace of Onontio-
as-father presumably would have resulted from Native strategies conceived from a position of strength 
rather than one of weakness and desperation.  Heidi Bohaker, “Nindoodemag: The Significance of 
Algonquian Kinship Networks in the Eastern Great Lakes Region,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 
Third Series, vol. 63, no. 1 (January 2006): 23-52. 
126 Cook, “Onontio Gives Birth.” 
 271 
warfare, disease, and dislocation transformed the political landscape around them, 
and the near universal acceptance of it allowed French administrators to invest the 
role of Onontio with a newfound coherence.  It is no accident that this coherence 
coincided with Frontenac’s lengthy tenures as governor (1672-1682, 1689-1698).  
From his earliest days in the colony, Frontenac represented himself as a father to his 
enemies as well as his allies.  In his first speech to the Five Nations, delivered near 
present-day Kingston, Ontario in July 1673, Frontenac “addressed them as children, 
and thereby bound himself to act towards them as a father...the other Onontios not 
having made use of that mark of authority, and [the Iroquois] having never consented 
to be addressed otherwise than as Brothers.”127  His secretary claimed that the 
governor’s gifts and speeches were well received by his listeners, “whose 
countenances were much changed by them.”128  The reality was undoubtedly more 
complex: the Iroquois accepted the presents Frontenac gave them as their self-
appointed “father,” but at least some of them surely contested that they were his 
dependent “children.”129  Whatever the case, over the course of his career the 
governor’s speeches, paperwork, and letters to court consistently portrayed Onontio 
as a father to his Native allies, just as many of their headmen professed to be his 
children, and together they established a firm new precedent for all concerned. 
                                                
127 Charles de Monseignat, “A detailed account of M. de Frontenac’s voyage to Lake Ontario...in June, 
July and August, 1673,” reproduced and translated in E. B. O’Callaghan, Documents Concerning the 
Colonial History of the State of New York, vol. IX (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons, and Co., 1855), 109. 
128 Monseignat, “Voyage to Lake Ontario,” in O’Callaghan, Documents, vol. IX: 104. 
129 Cook, “Onontio Gives Birth”: 191-192.  Less than a decade later, when Governor La Barre met 
with Iroquois emissaries at La Famine, their spokesman, the Onondaga headman Outreouti (or La 
Grande Gueule), affirmed the governor’s place as father to his Native allies but contrasted their 
dependent status with Iroquois autonomy.  “We are born free, we do not depend upon Onnontio,” he 
announced dismissively, “if your Allies are your slaves or your children, treat them as slaves or as 
children.”  Louis-Armand de Lom d’Arce, Baron de Lahontan, Nouveaux voyages dans l’Amérique 
septentrionale (La Haye: L’Honoré, 1703), t. I: 53. 
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That portrayal was destined for a long life not only because a confluence of 
impersonal forces encouraged Native headmen to embrace it, but also because 
individual headmen and governors committed to the role.  In tearing down the 
hagiographic portrait of Frontenac painted by Francis Parkman and other early 
historians, modern scholars have stressed the governor’s ignorance of what was 
“really going on” in his encounters with Indians, demoting him from a Great White 
Man who “mastered the savages” to an unwitting pawn in Native schemes or, at best, 
a ready beneficiary of circumstances beyond his control.130  Their revision is truer 
than the original image: Frontenac indeed exaggerated his influence over his allies, 
took advantage of sweeping demographic and political shifts in their communities, 
and failed to grasp the subtleties of their customs and conflicts in ways that cost the 
lives of people on all sides.  Yet even in debunking his supposed mastery of Native 
diplomacy, his critics acknowledge something important about him as a person—and, 
by implication, about the culture from which he came.  Writing about the governor’s 
negotiations with the English, his modern biographer observed, with grudging 
admiration, that “no one knew better than he how to invest such proceedings with a 
sense of drama, smacking of the Court of Versailles, or perhaps of the theatre.”131  
Another historian has called him a “narcissist” who nonetheless “knew how to inhabit 
                                                
130 For early hagiographies of Frontenac, see Francis Parkman, Count Frontenac and New France 
under Louis XIV (Boston: 1877); Henri Lorin, Le comte de Frontenac (Paris: 1895); Charles Colby, 
The Fighting Governor [cite].  The principal revisionist account is William J. Eccles’s Frontenac—The 
Courtier Governor (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1965).  More recently, Michael Witgen has 
emphasized Frontenac’s misunderstanding of Anishinaabe politics and diplomacy, and Peter Cook has 
stressed that the governor and his successors benefited from the willingness of their Native allies and 
enemies to call Onontio “father” for strategic reasons of their own.  Witgen, Infinity of Nations, 250-
260; Cook, “Onontio Gives Birth”: 191-192. 
131 Eccles, Frontenac, 233. 
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the persona of Onontio.”132  Instead of diminishing or pathologizing the governor’s 
“sense of drama,” however, we should take it seriously as an expression of his 
aristocratic worldview; without sidestepping the interpretive obstacles posed by the 
reductive and self-serving reports written by him and his successors, we can ask how 
those reports both reflected and reinforced emerging administrative ideas about the 
governance of Native passions.  
It seems clear, after all, that Frontenac himself took his performances quite 
seriously.  When he received orders to “Frenchify” the Huron in 1673, he promised to 
spend his first winter in Canada learning Iroquoian.  While there is no evidence to 
suggest that he followed through on his pledge, he recognized that a command of the 
language would enable him to acquire the sort of rhetorical prestige held by the 
Jesuits.133  In the absence of Native language skills of his own, he micromanaged his 
interpreters, insisting that they translate his speeches word for word, as he had written 
them down, “that you may not lose any of my remarks,” and even in his original 
French their contents obeyed the conventions of Native oratory (I will have more to 
say about these speeches later).134  He further immersed himself in indigenous culture 
by “adopting” eight Iroquois children given to him as peace hostages.135  The gesture 
amounted to a serious and novel sacrifice for the Five Nations, who risked precious 
                                                
132 Witgen, Infinity of Nations, 251. 
133 “I will work...this winter to learn a bit of their language,” he wrote Minister of Marine Jean-
Baptiste Colbert, “and if I can see it through, I hope that I will be a good missionary, and that I will 
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kin in what was likely a bid to secure French military support.136  But it also 
represented a real accommodation for the governor, who took in the children and 
raised two of them in his own household at a time when adoption was viewed with 
deep suspicion and rarely practiced by the nobility in France.137  
 Frontenac played up the magnificence and condescension of Onontio in ways 
that would have been utterly familiar to his predecessors.  In order to make a lasting 
impression upon Native delegations, he engaged in extravagant feasting and gift-
giving.  He doled out pensions, medals, and other specific tokens of regard and 
affection to individual headmen whose own rhetorical prowess, he believed, would 
amplify Onontio’s voice among their people.  His speeches mentioned his favorites 
by name, extolled their virtues, and flattered their families.138  He arranged war 
games, cannonades, guided tours of Québec, and other spectacles intended to win the 
confidence and respect of allies and enemies alike.139  Fusing the manner of an 
absolute monarch and an alliance chief, he demonstrated favor through an economy 
of access to his person: he permitted some Natives to weep at his knees or eat at his 
table, “caressing” and “speaking to them...rather like a Father meeting with his 
                                                
136 Eccles, Frontenac, 56. 
137 Kristin E. Gager, Blood Ties and Fictive Ties: Adoption and Family Life in Early Modern France 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 20-36. 
138 Instances of Frontenac’s hospitality toward Native emissaries are too numerous to cite here with 
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family, to whom he reveals the feelings of his heart,” while banishing others from his 
presence or ignoring them with a studied coldness.140  He shifted quickly and 
consciously between emotional registers.  When the Onondaga requested a truce with 
him to mourn the dead killed by a joint French-Odawa war party in 1697, for 
example, he haughtily threw the belt back in the face of their emissary, promising that 
“since the Iroquois were weeping over so trifling a blow, he would soon give them 
another reason for crying, and would again make them feel the weight of his 
Tomahawk.”  He then turned to several Odawa onlookers, gently pointing out to them 
that he could have made peace but, as their “faithful father,” would never do so 
without including them.141 
To the French, spectacular displays, elaborate ceremonies, and histrionic 
modes of oratory and gift-giving all represented somewhat familiar and acceptable 
means of persuasion, yet the pressures of continuous warfare encouraged them to 
adopt more transgressive ways of winning Native hearts, as well.  Slavery was illegal 
in metropolitan France, but French governors did not scruple to strengthen their 
alliance by doling out Iroquois prisoners as slaves, sacrifices, or adoptive children; in 
the course of ritually “covering” their allies’ dead, they eventually made Onontio the 
region’s largest distributor of captives.142  Scalping and torture, too, became 
important tools of French diplomacy.  Frontenac once gifted fifty Iroquois scalps to 
the Odawa, and while Champlain and Montmagny had condemned torture, interceded 
                                                
140 See, for example, his conduct among the Iroquois in 1673.  Monseignat, “Voyage to Lake 
Ontario.” 
141 La Potherie, “An account of the most remarkable Occurences in Canada” (1697), reproduced in 
O’Callaghan, Documents, vol. IX: 685. 
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to save or ransom the lives of prisoners, and adamantly refused to be present when 
their allies carried it out, later governors had no such qualms.143   
Vengeful, ritualized, and elaborate public torture was hardly unknown in early 
modern Europe, but its Native American counterpart struck Europeans as un-
Christian and barbaric, and it was not until the intensification of the Iroquois Wars in 
the final quarter of the seventeenth century that French officials embraced it as an 
integral part of Onontio’s persona.  Frontenac willingly rendered enemy captives to 
his allies when he thought doing so would shore up his influence.  He frequently 
ordered Iroquois prisoners to be burned, to the point that he once found himself in the 
ironic position of imploring his Mission Iroquois allies to torture an Onondaga 
captive who, like themselves, had converted to Catholicism.  (They refused, and after 
French troops had tormented the prisoner for over an hour, intervened to kill him 
mercifully with a swift blow to the head.)144  The executions gave force to the 
governor’s threats to “roast” or “commit to the kettle” those children who disobeyed 
him.145  It was in light of such gruesome accommodation that the English accused 
him of “not acting according to the manners of Europeans,” which, in a sense, is 
precisely what he intended to do.146 
The same policy filtered down to the governor’s subordinates along the Great 
Lakes.  Around 1690, for instance, the commandant of Michilimackinac, Louis de La 
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Porte de Louvigny, solicited the torture of an Iroquois warrior who had sought refuge 
with the Huron.  Louvigny hoped to sabotage ongoing negotiations between the 
Huron and the Five Nations that excluded the French, so he invited his Odawa allies, 
who opposed a peace, to help him “drink the broth of this iroquois” (“to conform to 
their manner of speaking,” as La Potherie noted).  Once the captive was bound, a 
Frenchman began rolling a red-hot gun barrel over the exposed skin of his feet.  Soon 
joined by an Odawa, they took turns “grilling [the captive] one after the other up to 
the hollows of his knees.”  After two more hours of punishment, a crowd of Odawa 
women and children scalped, stoned, and dismembered him as the French looked 
on.147   
Royal officials justified their adoption of indigenous forms of violence not by 
claiming that Natives were any less deserving of Christian mercy than Europeans, but 
rather by identifying torture and slavery as indispensable elements of Onontio’s 
image—key manifestations of his Indianness.  How could Onontio fail to reciprocate 
ways of killing and “eating” his children that clearly held enormous significance for 
Natives?  Were reprisals not anticipated by his allies, feared by his enemies, and often 
committed against the French themselves?   If administrators felt obliged to mimic 
the “very violent gestures and movements” they witnessed in council—dancing, 
singing, promising bloodshed, raising the tomahawk—they felt no less strongly that 
ritual violence was a necessary and persuasive diplomatic language.  La Potherie 
insisted that “the French character is the enemy of inhumanity,” yet he also believed 
that officers in Canada “cannot dispense with making a public example” of their 
                                                
147 La Potherie, Histoire, t. II: 298-299. 
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captives in the ways expected of an alliance chief.148  “One must come to these 
extremes because otherwise [the Natives] would become convinced that we will be 
soft on them,” he explained, after describing another incident in which Frontenac’s 
lieutenant and future successor, the Chevalier de Vaudreuil, burned alive a party of 
Iroquois trapped in a house.149  To pass for great warriors in America, the French 
should take a relative view toward the rules of engagement: “what would be barbarity 
among us, may pass for virtue in an Iroquois.”150  Concerned that his readers might 
condemn torture and slavery as cruel, La Potherie voiced a widespread conviction 
among officials that strategic barbarism was necessary to build solidarity with their 
allies and maintain belief in Onontio’s power.   
What Frontenac and his successors developed in the course of dispensing 
gifts, hosting feasts, delivering speeches, cultivating headmen, organizing spectacles, 
and publicly torturing and trading captives was not a perfect or stable control over 
their allies, but rather a repertoire of gestures and expressions they believed necessary 
to achieve it.  Their primary aim was to incite friendly Natives to wage war against a 
fearsome and numerous Iroquois-English coalition.  The campaign was constant, 
intense, violent, and expensive, and in the minds of French officials, it elevated 
Native diplomacy—and by extension the display of Indianness—to an affair of state 
worthy of tremendous effort and attention.  Toward the end of the century, the 
extension of that campaign into the American interior would place new demands on 
                                                
148 La Potherie, Histoire, t. II: 297-298. 
149 La Potherie, Histoire, t. III: 135. 
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royal practices of patronage and reportage and enlarge the stage on which French 




As royal officials defined the suite of practices through which Onontio should 
make himself legible as a generous ally and a terrible enemy, the range of agents who 
deployed knowledge and influence on his behalf broadened as well.  In addition to 
cultivating Native spokesmen, French governors received assistance from a growing 
number of men and women in the Iroquois missions.  The Mission Iroquois used their 
kinship ties to the Five Nations to gather and interpret intelligence for the Jesuits, 
who in turn forwarded their reports to administrators.151  When Governor 
Denonville’s army found a plank bearing symbols “in the [Iroquois] manner,” for 
instance, its meaning was interpreted by “our savages...without whom I do not believe 
we could have surmised what it was.”152  Native women, too, served the alliance in a 
variety of ways, not only as passive gifts and bargaining chips, but also as active 
informants, zealous converts to Catholicism, and living sources of diplomatic 
memory who wove the wampum belts that structured and recorded the course of 
negotiations.  Their marriages to European men, whether sacramental or “in the 
manner of the country,” multiplied the crown’s eyes and ears on the ground by further 
embedding the French in Native settlements and kinship networks.153 
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As French traders and missionaries penetrated further into the American 
interior, the question of how its Native inhabitants should be folded into the alliance, 
and by whom, became a source of tension among officials who disagreed about the 
broader commercial, strategic, and religious aims of their diplomacy.  Governor 
Denonville, who advocated rentrenchment and moved to abandon the colony’s 
western posts, insisted that controlling and converting Indians close at hand was the 
colony’s best hope of survival—a policy that necessarily gave the Jesuits the lead in 
negotiations.  “These Indian tribes can never govern themselves except by those 
Missionaries, who alone are able to maintain them in our interest and to prevent their 
revolting against us,” he informed the minister.  “I am convinced by observation, that 
the Jesuits are the most capable of controlling the minds of all the Indian tribes, for 
leaving out of consideration their tact, they alone are masters of the different [Native] 
languages by reason of a very long experience acquired among them.”154  By contrast, 
Frontenac and La Barre supported expansion and argued that lay interpreters were 
more likely than the Jesuits to act in the king’s interests, to communicate “what is 
proper for [Natives] to hear and also to know, exactly, their answers and 
sentiments.”155  Both governors had close, profitable ties to local merchants who 
claimed that access to western furs would enrich the colony at the expense of the 
English, and they invited a large group of traders to join in their deliberations on 
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Indian affairs.156  Although they still relied on missionaries as key informants and go-
betweens, their emphasis on trade over conversion as the binding force of the alliance 
gave lay subordinates a greater voice in the crown’s diplomacy than ever before.  
Historians typically explain the ascent of lay negotiators as a function of 
powerful political and economic interests in the colony, but as Frontenac’s remark 
suggests, there were performative reasons to favor them as well.  Unlike missionaries, 
their conjugal and commercial integration into Native societies was unimpeded by 
nettlesome vows of celibacy, poverty, or papal obedience.  As superior fighters, 
canoemen, sexual partners, and suppliers of useful goods, soldiers and traders could 
more readily make themselves seen as “true men.”157  The greater immersive 
potential of laymen could be threatening if taken too far, as in the case of the 
“libertine” coureurs de bois, but it also seemed increasingly precious to officials who 
looked to monopolize trade and diplomacy with the Great Lakes peoples.  “To make 
[those nations] our friends,” Duchesneau informed the minister, “the best 
means...would be, in the opinion of those who have been frequently among those 
Indians, to send among them every two years some intelligent Frenchmen who 
possess the tact, which some have, to arrange whatever unfortunate events might take 
place.”  Such events included “unforeseen murders” and “the deaths of the most 
considerable [people] of their tribes,” which the French should be prepared, he wrote, 
“to bewail after [the Natives’] fashion.”  He added that whoever France sent must 
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also know how and when to bribe the right headmen—“to gain over in an undeground 
way, as they term it, or underhand, as we say, those who have the management of 
their affairs,” which he estimated could cost upwards of 1500 pounds per year.158  
The intendant proposed no candidates, but in practice administrators increasingly 
turned to officer-traders to manage the expensive, vicious, and often violent dealings 
necessary to their diplomacy. 
As a result, royal networks of patronage grew to include laymen who placed 
their own indigenized personas in Onontio’s service.  Perrot, whose trade in guns for 
furs earned him the Algonquian nickname Metaminens (“Iron Legs”), acted as 
Onontio’s envoy to the Great Lakes peoples, and his success was rewarded with a 
position as commandant of the region around Baie des Puants in 1685.159  Similarly, 
the Montréal trader and militiaman Charles Le Moyne (Akouessan, or “Partridge”) 
served as an interpreter and negotiator among the Iroquois from 1671 onward, for 
which he received extensive land grants, letters of nobility, and the position of 
attorney-general of the colony.160  Both Perrot and Le Moyne were former Jesuit 
servants who had mastered Native languages before entering trade.  They numbered 
among the colonists “known & respected by our savage Allies” who were frequently 
                                                
158 “M. Du Chesneau’s Memoir on the Western Indians,” 13 September 1681, in O’Callaghan, 
Documents, vol. X: 165.  On the annual cost of gift-giving in the pays d’en haut in this period, see 
“Memoire de la depance faite par le sieur de la Durantaye aux Outaouacs...1683-1684,” 20 April 1685 
[processed by Champigny 4 November 1693], ANOM COL C11A, vol. 6, ff. 451-452, reproduced in 
Dubé, La Nouvelle-France, 279-281.  By 1700, the crown would budget 6,000 pounds per year for 
gift-giving, which Governor Callières and Intendant Champigny considered inadequate to the task of 
maintaining peace.  Champigny and Callières to Pontchartrain, 18 October 1700, ANOM COL C11A, 
vol. 18, f. 7. 
159 “Nicolas Perrot,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography. 
160 La Barre asked the king to reward Le Moyne’s services “in all the occasions that arise daily on the 
subject of the Iroquois.”  La Barre to Seignelay, 4 November 1683, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 6, ff. 134-
144, reproduced in Dubé, La Nouvelle-France, 97.  For Le Moyne’s role in negotiations, see Lahontan, 
Nouveaux voyages, 46-55; “Charles Le Moyne,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography. 
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dispatched on far-flung diplomatic missions, which, according to administrators, 
could only be carried out by those who “know the manners of the savages” and “hold 
the upper hand over the minds of all these peoples.”161   
What officials in Québec and Montréal sought in these years were loyal 
clients who had the know-how necessary to improvise within Native cultures on their 
own initiative and at a moment’s notice; in paperwork and printed accounts alike, 
they portrayed such men as masterful performers whose indigenized oratory curbed 
the chronic fickleness and factionalism of their allies.  An episode from the career of 
Commandant Antoine Laumet de Lamothe Cadillac provides a case in point.  In the 
midst of a council held at Michilimackinac in 1694, the Huron headman Le Baron 
recounted a vision that seemed to call for peace with the Five Nations and the 
English.  Threatened by the implications for France’s diplomacy, Lamothe Cadillac 
immediately intervened to counter him.  According to La Potherie, “The 
Commandant...invented a parable in order to accommodate himself to the character of 
these people”: 
Speaking to [the Sable Odawa headman] Grosse-Tete, 
he said, Have you seen the Moon in your Lake 
[Michigan], when the weather is calm and fair, [and the 
moon] appears to be in the water, although nothing is 
truer than that it is in the sky?  You are old now, but 
know that if you returned to your youth & took it into 
your head each year to fish for the Moon in your lake, 
[and] you succeeded, your net would better ensnare it 
than your mind would ever be able to grasp what you 
are thinking on now.  You exhaust yourself pointlessly 
[trying to understand European affairs].  Be assured that 
the French and the English cannot find themselves in 
the same land without killing each other.  These are 
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 Lahontan, Nouveaux voyages, 90; Vaudreuil, “Memoire de M. le Marquis de Vaudreuil a 
Monseigneur le comte de Pontchartrain,” 1710, ANOM, C11A, Vol. 31, ff. 67-70v; La Potherie, 
Histoire, t. III: 186. 
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things decided beyond the great lake [i.e., the Atlantic 
Ocean].  
 
Grosse-Tete responded simply, “How strange!”  But in La Potherie’s telling the 
parable effectively reasserted French command of the negotiations.  That Lamothe 
Cadillac could read the situation and concoct a fable tailored to the “character” of his 
audience was hardly surprising, the chronicler asserted, since “he is from a country 
[Gascony] where witty on-the-spot rejoinders are never lacking.”162 
 For the French, the notion that their pre-eminence derived from a culturally 
ingrained ability to manipulate Native words and passions was substantiated not only 
by momentary strokes of wit such as Lamothe Cadillac’s parable, but also by the 
decades-long careers of backwoods diplomats like Perrot.  In recommending Perrot to 
the minister, Frontenac praised him as someone who “has acquired much credit 
among the Western nations, by the long practice and knowledge he has of their 
humor, manners, and languages.”163  Others touted him as a model of how to 
“manage the minds” of France’s allies.164  La Potherie, who based his history 
primarily on reports supplied to him by the Jesuits and Perrot himself, reverently 
described how Metaminens had engaged in all “the rodomontades that one must affect 
with [the Indians]” in order to “make himself feared”: defeating their shamans in 
spiritual combat, fabricating dreams that prophesied their deliverance or destruction, 
and convincing them that he controlled fire and the weather.  Perrot, for his part, 
claimed that his conduct had inspired “a great deal of confidence...and I was loved by 
                                                
162 La Potherie, Histoire, t. IV: 27-28. 
163 Frontenac to Seignelay, 20 November 1690, ANOM COL C11A, reproduced in RAPQ (1927-
1928), 44. 
164 In addition to La Potherie’s praise, see Bobé, “Lettre,” in La Potherie, Histoire, t. IV: 268-269. 
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them.”165  In deploying his Native persona to build and maintain alliances far from 
the centers of French settlement, he seemed to embody precisely the sort of labile 
“tact” and “intelligence” that pro-expansion officials were eager to exploit.  
Like the Jesuits who trained him, Perrot shed European standards of dignity, 
comfort, and behavior in order to manufacture charisma on indigenous terms.  He 
suffered with good humor the ritual welcome of the Iowas, who smeared his head and 
shoulders with their tears and saliva and snot, served him raw and bloody bison 
tongue, and hugged him from behind in the midst of their dances, “making him move 
along with them in [their] manner.”  When the Fox seemingly mixed metaphors by 
asking him, as their “father,” to let them “drink...milk suckled from [his bosom],” he 
cleverly thrust forward his tobacco pipe, “telling them that it was his breast that he 
had always offered in order to feed them.”  To recover a crate of merchandise taken 
by the Dakota, he threatened to “burn and dry up all their swamps,” and to prove he 
could do it he dumped a cup of brandy on the council fire, creating a blaze so fierce 
that they quickly replaced the goods.  He alternately praised the bravery of his allies 
and excoriated their cowardice in order to “reduce them to their duty.”  And he 
repeatedly persuaded Native emissaries to make the long and dangerous trek to 
Montréal and Québec, where governors invoked him in their speeches, knowing that 
their authority along the Great Lakes depended in part on a close identification with 
his own.166  In narrating his exploits, Perrot and his contemporaries depicted him not 
                                                
165 Perrot, Mémoire, 119-122 (harangues and “confidence”); La Potherie, Histoire, t. II: 254 
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only as a protean ambassador, but also as something of an alliance chief in his own 
right—an Onontio of the west who wielded authority by mediating conflicts, 
distributing gifts, fighting bravely, commanding the elements, and delivering a series 
of improvised speeches that showcased his “Native” virtues.   
Perrot’s self-proclaimed successes invited the French to see the strategic 
performance of Indianness as an expression of their grandeur.  Like Frontenac, he 
seemed to showcase the political fruits that a well-deployed Native persona could 
bear.  From both men’s careers, observers drew a lesson: since Perrot and Frontenac 
could enact Indianness without risking their essential civility, they could teach the 
French how to know and govern a “savage” empire.  “No man will ever understand 
better than [Frontenac] the temper of the Indians who fear and love him,” Lamothe 
Cadillac declared in 1694.167  Frontenac and Perrot became the twin heroes of La 
Potherie’s narrative primarily because each of them demonstrated “the secret of 
making himself commendable among these Peoples.”168  It was for this reason that 
Bobé recommended La Potherie’s history as a guide to the “measures necessary” to 
preserve New France.  By reading La Potherie’s account, he suggested, future officers 
could learn to pattern themselves after those whose indigenized personas had 
insinuated a familiar brand of order into Native politics.169    
This political lesson was reinforced most dramatically by incidents where the 
French represented different Native communities to each other as actual Natives 
                                                                                                                                      
Frontenac’s war dance in 1690.  La Potherie, Histoire, t. III: 96-98.  On Perrot’s reputation among 
colonial officials, see “Perrot,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography.   
167 Lamothe Cadillac, “Memorandum of the Negotiations in Canada with the Iroquois” (1694), in 
O’Callaghan, Documents, vol. X: 584. 
168 La Potherie, Histoire, t. III: 252-253 (“secret”). 
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looked on.  When three Seneca headmen initiated peace talks with Frontenac in 1695, 
they selected a French officer and former captive, Louis-Thomas Chabert de Joncaire, 
to speak for them.  “We have adopted your Son, Joncaire, whom we have named 
Sonnonchiez,” he explained to Frontenac on their behalf, “We wish him to make 
peace for us, since he once took part in [your] public affairs.”  Joncaire then delivered 
their gifts and speeches.  When he had finished, a Jesuit, Father Millet, presented a 
belt from the Mission Iroquois calling on the governor to accept the Senecas’ 
request.170  Thus a council held between France and multiple Native communities was 
conducted entirely between Frenchmen.  In attempting to explain it, La Potherie 
concluded that Joncaire had “insinuated himself into [the Senecas’] mind so well, that 
they saw him as their most faithful friend, & like a man who had become naturalized 
among them.  They had so much confidence in him that they placed their own 
interests in his hands.”171  
The ability of French officers to speak credibly on behalf of Natives was 
critical, observers claimed, to the negotiations that produced New France’s grandest 
diplomatic achievement: the Great Peace of Montréal of 1701, which brought 
together more than a thousand members of some forty nations to mark the end of the 
Iroquois Wars.  Most Native communities sent headmen as representatives, but the 
Senecas and Onondagas both chose adoptive French “sons” to speak for them—
Joncaire for the Senecas, and Paul Le Moine de Maricourt (Taouestaouis), son of 
Charles Le Moine, for the Onondagas.  Joncaire and Maricourt led their delegations 
from Iroquoia to Montréal, met with Callières on their behalf, and conspired with the 
                                                
170 La Potherie, Histoire, t. III: 249-250. 
171 La Potherie, Histoire, t. III: 249. 
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governor behind the scenes to ensure the smooth progress of the talks.  The two 
officers’ freedom to pass between French and Indian roles according to the needs of 
the moment allowed them to game the negotiations according to Callières’s orders.  
When the Iroquois arrived without the scores of Native captives they had solemnly 
pledged to bring with them, for instance, Joncaire, at the governor’s urging, explained 
to France’s outraged allies that the fault was entirely Maricourt’s and his own, then 
pleaded with the Iroquois to rescue their “sons” from this “embarrassing 
predicament” by sending for their prisoners (which the Iroquois magnanimously 
agreed to do).  The mutual fiction allowed all sides to sidestep a potential snag and 
proceed with the peace.172  For the Senecas and Onondagas, appointing French sons 
as ambassadors likely represented a strategic choice to “hide in plain view” behind a 
European façade, with the expectation that they would receive better terms for it.173  
But to the French it showed that some Europeans could indeed know and represent 
Natives well enough to make actual Native voices superfluous.174 
 In staging the Great Peace, royal officers blended oratorical, musical, and 
balletic conventions meant to convey symbolically the patriarchal harmony Onontio 
had finally achieved with his “savage children.”  Callières, who had served under 
three different governors over nearly two decades, delivered a closing address infused 
with the indigenized imagery honed by his predecessors.  In a large pavilion built 
especially for the occasion and adorned with the colliers of each nation present, he 
                                                
172 Preliminary negotiations between Callières and Iroquois deputies, 18 July and 3 September 1700, 
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announced, “Having brought [you] together in my hands, I can make you live 
together in peace...In admonishing you to treat each other as Brothers, I take up anew 
all your tomahawks and instruments of war [and] bury them with my own in a pit so 
deep that no one can retrieve them to break the tranquility that I restore among my 
Children.”  Having positioned himself rhetorically as a peacemaker to whom all 
parties owed filial obedience, the governor further asserted his pre-eminence by 
inviting the Iroquois and allied headmen, Intendant Champigny, and subordinate 
French officers “to smoke from this peace pipe, which I will do first.”175  Once every 
orator had spoken and smoked, the governor arranged a performance designed “to 
confirm this great Alliance with something sensational”: as soldiers distributed cuts 
of beef, three Frenchmen emerged from the audience to dance the calumet, singing 
and “stepping in rhythm, their faces animated, moving their bodies to match the 
vehemence of their words,” which were punctuated by coordinated volleys of cannon, 
explosives, and musket fire.176    
 
 
Performance and Paperwork 
 
Amidst the noise of greetings, harangues, musket volleys, cannonades, 
drumbeats, sassagouez, and howls of pain or triumph, it is easy to forget that for 
French officials, the course of Franco-Native diplomacy was marked from beginning 
to end by the scratch of pens on paper.  The written word defined their understanding 
and performance of Indianness.  Indeed, it provided the essential medium through 
which they imagined what it meant to be Native, immersed themselves in a suitable 
                                                
175 “Ratification de la paix,” August and September 1701, ANOM, COL C11A, vol. 19, ff. 41-42. 
176 La Potherie, Histoire, t. IV: 240-253. 
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persona, and interpreted the experience for others.  In periodic flurries of written 
instructions, transcriptions, dispatches, administrative reports, and printed relations, 
royal administrators recorded and interpreted their face-to-face encounters with 
Indians.  The process required them to make sense of Native languages, gestures, and 
customs—to discover, as they put it, the “Native mind.”  During the five decades 
after 1663, their work became increasingly sophisticated, as the growing stakes and 
frequency of councils occasioned ever more ambitious levels of documentation on 
both sides of the Atlantic.  To account for their own conduct and to help the minister 
and the king formulate Native policy, royal officials produced a vast body of written 
knowledge about “savage” peoples and the means necessary to govern them. 
As the Onontio persona took root, the oral culture of diplomacy bled into the 
written culture of administration.  Like the Jesuits, royal officials knew the 
importance of adhering to Native conventions of oratory, such as listening without 
interrupting, recapitulating what previous speakers had said, reciting the names and 
achievements of individual headmen, attaching meaning to specific wampum belts, 
and employing the correct metaphors and kinship terms.  But keeping it all straight 
was virtually impossible without memory aids.  The Jesuits had long addressed 
Native councils from written lists, which allowed them to recognize each headman 
present by his nation, band, and family, and to keep track of their own talking 
points.177  Governors, fearing that they or their interpreters might misrepresent 
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Onontio to his “children,” followed suit.  In the process, they infused their own 
practices of speechwriting and reportage with the linguistic customs of their audience. 
Governors took a direct hand in writing Onontio’s speeches.  Frontenac 
recorded his instructions to subordinates as complete orations written out in the 
Native style.  When he first addressed the Five Nations in 1673, he read from a piece 
of paper, which he then handed to his interpreter, Le Moine, “so that he may explain 
it to you, word for word...that you may not lose any of my remarks.”178  Although he 
had probably consulted Le Moine beforehand about the content of the speech, he did 
not trust his interpreter to freely translate French expressions into Native ones.  
Rather, in “terms adapted to their manner of speaking,” the governor crafted a 
French-language address flavored with indigenized metaphors, repetitions, and 
locutions that Le Moine could render directly into Iroquoian: 
Children!  Onnontagues, Mohawks, Oneidas, Cayugas, 
and Senecas.  I am pleased to see you...I have had a fire 
lighted for you to smoke by, and for me to talk to you.  
O, it is well done, My Children, to have followed the 
orders and commands of your Father.  Take courage, 
then, my children; you will hear his word, which is full 
of tenderness and peace...My spirit is full of Peace, and 
she walks in company with me.  Courage, then, My 
Children, and rest yourselves...179 
 
Frontenac may never have learned Iroquoian, but he did speak a Native language: the 
“style at Council,” composed of “hyperboles, similes, and other figurative 
expressions.”  Some French observers found its locutions “elaborate” and “tiresome,” 
but Frontenac professed pride in matching an “eloquence, address, and finesse” he 
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compared favorably to “the manners of the Venetian Senate.”180  His lieutenants and 
successors, Callières and Vaudreuil, would adopt similar speech patterns, and like 
Frontenac they would write their orations in an indigenized idiom that allowed their 
interpreters to translate the contents word for word.181    
 French officials were immersed enough in the task of writing speeches to 
develop strong opinions about which phrases elicited the strongest emotional reaction 
from Native audiences.  Terms of kinship were crucial, of course: Frontenac made it a 
point of emphasis to address all Indians as his children and to be addressed in turn as 
their father, and his successors scrupulously maintained the paternal front.182  But 
filial forms of address comprised only a small portion of texts that abounded in vivid 
metaphors and rhetorical flourishes.  After transcribing Callières’s fulsome speeches 
to the Iroquois in October 1700, La Potherie explained the importance of the 
governor’s seemingly overwrought expressions to Pontchartrain: 
“Bury the hatchet,” “make a river pass over it,” “weep 
for the dead,” “strengthen the tree of peace”...none of 
that deeply touches those who love only metaphors [i.e., 
Natives].  But “may the straps and all the instruments of 
war be buried with this hatchet,” “may the earth be 
leveled over it,” “may all the rivers become beautiful 
and clean,” “may the blood of the dead on both sides go 
to the bottom of the water and the earth,” “may the 
branches and leaves of this tree of peace provide a shade 
so thick that those who place themselves beneath it are 
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 293 
not only cooled but also sheltered from all the storms 
that may threaten them”; that “Onontio has built the 
Council Hut, laid the mat, and lighted the fire of peace to 
warm all these children who will be united with their 
Father with whom they will make one body and smoke 
together peacefully”...when all this has been stated in the 
sight of so many chiefs, there is no doubt that every one 
of them will be profoundly touched by it.183 
 
Such evocative language was essential to pass as Onontio.  Animated by physical 
cues and delivered “in the sight” of Native headmen, La Potherie suggested, it aimed 
primarily to excite an emotional response (submission, shame, fear, grief, affection, 
joy, or belligerence, in most cases).  If the point of speeches was to move them to 
action, then speechwriting was largely a matter of deciding which rhetorical elements 
would most “profoundly touch” their hearts. 
The act of composing speeches, like the act of delivering them, required 
French governors to inhabit the Native personas they wished to project.  In choosing 
Ontonio’s words, they reflected on his relationship to his audience, imposed order on 
the world around him, and imagined what he should say to his “children.”  Their 
speeches, supplemented by gestures and gifts, were carefully selected to invest 
Onontio with personality, and calibrated to express familiar desires and emotions in 
an alien tongue.  What governors engaged in is not self-writing, as historians and 
anthropologists generally understand that term, since it was hardly constitutive of a 
modern sense of interiority, or a “true self.”184  But it did construct, through specific 
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discursive practices, an individual whose thoughts, feelings, and expressions were 
conditioned by the expectations of his performers and his listeners.185  As a cognitive 
exercise, then, it closely resembled the process of rhetorical learning, in which 
collégiens studied the words of Ancient orators, practiced their written and spoken 
conventions, and then devised original speeches intended to persuade an imagined 
audience of Greeks and Romans. 
The exercise of writing out speeches in the Native style compelled governors 
to pass back and forth between European and indigenized personas.  They left traces 
of their movements in the documents themselves.  Sometimes they ventriloquized the 
voice of the court, invoking the “grand Onontio” of France, or using orders from 
Versailles as “a guide as to the policy we shall have to observe in our speeches...[and] 
in what manner we shall prepare them, that is to say, with more or less mildness.”186  
At other times they switched pronouns or momentarily stepped out of character.  
When Frontenac dispatched Perrot to prevent the Odawa from making a separate 
peace with the English and the Five Nations in 1690, the governor wrote him a full 
address to be read out verbatim, in the first-person voice of Onontio, but for Perrot’s 
eyes only he also included an instructive title, “Speech that must be delivered to the 
Odawa to dissuade them from making the alliance that they wish to make with the 
Iroquois and the English.”187  La Barre’s instructions to one lieutenant slipped 
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repeatedly between third-person references to Onontio and first-person references to 
La Barre-as-governor and La Barre-as-Onontio:  
[La Durantaye] will confer with the...Jesuits and will 
determine with them in what way he can oblige the 
Kiskakons to come find me...it being necessary that they 
come see their new Father to discuss with him things 
which concern their security...[tell them] that I can 
conclude nothing definite until they come to find me and 
explain to me their interests which are dear to me like 
those of my children.  [La Durantaye] will make the 
same known to the Tionnontatez [Petuns] and Meamis 
and will incite them to come trade at Montréal and bring 
many pelts, assuring them that the ways are safe...The 
most important thing I advise [La Durantaye] to do is to 
make the savages come in the greatest number they 
possibly can in order to see their new Father who greatly 
desires to see them.188 
 
La Durantaye would have been able to adapt La Barre’s instructions into a speech on 
Onontio’s behalf, which is clearly what La Barre had intended; but first he would 
have had to sort out which La Barre was speaking when, and to whom. 
 As they read out Onontio’s words, subordinate French officers not only passed 
between European and Native personas, but even from one indigenized role to 
another.  Speaking in his absence, they claimed to act as neutral conduits for the 
unvarnished expression of his words and feelings—to temporarily embody him 
instead of their own Native “selves.”  Lamothe Cadillac, concluding an address to the 
Huron on Frontenac’s behalf in 1694, insisted that his “word” came directly from 
Onontio: “There is my word, it is the spirit of Onontio, it is his voice, listen to it 
well.”189  Several years later a commandant at Detroit announced to his Odawa, 
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Pottawatomi, Huron, and Mississauga listeners, “It is your father Onontio who 
convokes you, and who is about to speak to you through my mouth.  All that you are 
about to hear comes from him alone.  I only repeat here what he orders me to say to 
you.”  He then raised the tomahawk above his head and addressed each nation 
directly, switching to the first-person voice as he did so.190  In the same fashion, 
Perrot prepared a speech to the Anishinaabe that explicitly acknowledged Onontio’s 
authorship of the words before transitioning into the first person: “Listen, my 
children, our Father Onontio says; listen, he says; I regret to hear talk every year of 
the carnage committed in your lands...”191 
For French officials, the elaborate effort to encode themselves as Indian 
entailed a parallel process of decoding indigenous words and customs; like students 
of classical rhetoric, they studied Native oratory closely in order to grasp its meanings 
and master its conventions.  That process began with the transcription of speeches by 
French scribes, which allowed governors to reference past talks faithfully wherever 
they went.192  The mobile diplomatic archives they maintained were passed down 
from one administration to the next.  When La Barre arrived in 1683, he scrutinized 
the speeches and reports that Frontenac had left behind for him.  Frontenac, in turn, 
examined the speeches exchanged between Denonville and the Iroquois when he 
                                                
190 La Potherie, “An account of the most remarkable Occurences in Canada from the month of 
September 1694 to the sailing of the vessels in 1695,” reproduced in O’Callaghan, Documents, vol. 9: 
704-705. 
191 Perrot, Mémoire sur les moeurs, 153-154. 
192 “Acossen, tell [the Iroquois]...what passed yesterday, which I caused to be written down in your 
presence, so that nothing may be altered,” Frontenac ordered Le Moine on the second day of talks with 
the Iroquois in September 1682.  “Conference between Count de Frontenac and a Deputy from the 
Five Nations,” 12 September 1682, rep. and trans. in O’Callaghan, Documents, 185. 
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returned to the colony in 1689.193  Texts of speeches seem to have circulated widely 
among officers on the ground, who also kept written notes about their encounters that 
they used to prepare memoranda about Native oratory and customs.194  It was by 
collecting a vast number of these records from officials and missionaries that La 
Potherie was able to produce his history, which could more accurately be described as 
a compendium of diplomatic speeches dating back to the 1660s. 
The decoding process continued with conferences between governors and 
their advisors following the moment of encounter itself.  When La Barre met with 
Outreouti at La Famine in 1684, for instance, he understood nothing of what the 
headman said to him until Le Moine and the Jesuits, having retired to the governor’s 
tent, explained that Outreouti had been defiant and insolent (at which point La Barre 
flew into a rage).195  Once governors had grasped the meaning of Native speeches for 
themselves, they drew up reports for the minister, to whom they also sent copies of all 
of the orations, arranged side by side and listed according to their corresponding 
wampum belts (see below).  The interpretive process ended with a parsing of the 
transcripts by clerks of the ministry, who prepared annotated summaries of the 
speeches.  By that point, the king and his minister had a body of paperwork telling 
                                                
193 La Barre, “Procès-verbal de l’assemblée convoquée par le Gouverneur La Barre pour discuter du 
péril Iroquois,” 10 October 1682, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 6, ff. 68-70, reproduced in Dubé, La 
Nouvelle-France sous Joseph-Antoine Le Febvre de La Barre, 48-49.  La Barre’s instructions to La 
Durantaye in 1683 noted that original copies of La Durantaye’s commission and instructions remained 
in the hands of La Barre’s secretary, Regnault, who had written them out for the governor.  
“Commission donnée par Monsr le gnal au sr de la Durantayes pour aller a Missilimakina” and 
“Coppie des Instructions données par monsr le Gnal au sr de la Durantayes pour le voyage qu’il va 
faire aux Outaouax et Meamis,” in Baugy, Journal, 168.  Frontenac alluded to the speeches delivered 
to Denonville in his correspondence with Pontchartrain.  Frontenac to Pontchartrain, 10 May 1691, 
reproduced in RAPQ (1927-1928), 62. 
194 Perrot used his working notes to prepare extensive memoranda for Vaudreuil and Intendant Bégon; 
Louvigny did the same for Antoine-Denis Raudot; Baugy likewise took notes to inform his letters to 
family in France.  See Perrot, Mémoire sur les moeurs; Raudot, Relation; Baugy, Journal. 
195 Baugy, Journal, 55. 
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them who said what to whom, what it all meant, and what their subordinates thought 
they should do about it.   
In transcribing speeches and sending them back to court, royal officials 
extended a well-established tradition of diplomatic reportage to New France, but their 
work involved an added level of cultural and linguistic interpretation.196  After all, 
there had been little exposure to Native words at court before 1665, and the surviving 
evidence suggests that the king and his ministers did not initially grasp their 
significance.  When Intendant Talon sent back a treaty concluded that year with 
several Iroquois “Ambassadors,” Louis and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hugues de 
Lionne were amused and delighted by the appended “Explanation” of eleven gifts 
presented to Onontio (Figure 7), which summarized the speeches attached to each one 
while preserving the Iroquois’s unfamiliar locutions and metaphors.  “I will keep it as 
a very curious and well-done piece,” Lionne assured Talon.  “The King heard it read 
out to him with great pleasure.”197  The translations could be understood well enough 
to serve as a curiosity, and they were indeed preserved as evidence of French claims 
to sovereignty over the Iroquois, but they were not treated as working documents of 
state that required extensive parsing in the manner of European diplomatic records. 
That changed in the ensuing decades in part because the perceived stakes, 
cost, and intensity of the Iroquois Wars rose dramatically, but also because French 
governors claimed to derive much meaning from the words of Indian headmen.  They 
positioned themselves as interpreters of Native speeches, sprinkling their dispatches 
                                                
196 On European practices of diplomatic reportage and archiving, see Filippo de Vivo, “Archives of 
Speech: Recording Diplomatic Negotiation in Late Medieval and Early Modern Italy,” European 
Historical Quarterly, vol. 46 (July 2016): 519-544. 
197 Lionne to Talon, 7 January 1667, reproduced in RAPQ (1930-1931), 62. 
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with indigenous terms and metaphors in order to explain the course of negotiations 
and to represent themselves as thoroughly versed in the ways of Indians.  They 
couched indigenous figures of speech in phrases such as “I am speaking Savage,” “to 
use their terms,” “as they put it,” or “these are the terms...I used in speaking to them,” 
usually adding an explanation in idiomatic French (“that is to say...”).198   Their 
efforts at translation extended to noting which Native “signatures” corresponded to 
the individual headmen and nations that formed part of their alliance—an attempt to 
impose schematic order on pictograms that were otherwise unintelligible to them 
(Figures 8-9).  They presumed that the crown would be able to perceive the 
underlying truth of affairs thanks to the speeches and reports that they sent, many of 
which opened with formulas along the lines of “You will see, My Lord, by their 
words and my responses...”199   As Vaudreuil assured the minister in a typical missive 
from 1704, “The conflicts of the Savages of the upper country and the steps taken by 
the English to embroil us with the Iroquois would have caused me trouble, if I did not 
see in all the speeches the latter have made to me, the mind they have to abide by the 
peace treaty [of 1701], which you will see, My Lord, from the words of the Senecas 
of May 30, those of the Cayuga of July 2, and those of the Mohawk on the 11th of that 
same month.”200   
                                                
198 For instance, Frontenac to Pontchartrain, 10 October 1692, reproduced in RAPQ (1927-1928), 119; 
Vaudreuil to Pontchartrain, 4 November 1706, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 24, ff. 214-237, reproduced in 
RAPQ (1938-1939), 161; Vaudreuil and Raudot to Pontchartrain, 24 July 1707, ANOM COL C11A, 
vol. 26: ff. 54-61, reproduced in RAPQ (1939-1940), 380-381. 
199 See, for example, Vaudreuil and Bégon to Pontchartrain, 15 November 1703, reproduced in RAPQ 
(1938-1939), 12; Vaudreuil, Bégon, and Raudot to Pontchartrain, 19 October 1705, ANOM COL 
C11A, vol. 22, ff. 171-200, reproduced in RAPQ (1938-1939), 80; Vaudreuil to Pontchartrain, 19 
October 1705, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 22, ff. 235-254, reproduced in RAPQ (1938-1939), 93. 
200 Vaudreuil to Pontchartrain, 16 Nov 1704, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 22, ff. 34-40, reproduced in 
RAPQ (1938-1939), 45. 
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As Vaudreuil’s invocation of the Great Peace attests, Native speeches, and 
French interpretations of them, took on added significance after Onontio’s role shifted 
from war chief to guarantor of the peace.  No longer embroiled in constant bloodshed, 
the French were now absorbed in a constant and widespread effort to prevent it.  
Under these circumstances, it seemed more important than ever for governors to 
discern their allies’ true intentions.  When were they genuinely committed to peace, 
and when were they merely stalling for time or seeking to recruit the French to 
intervene in their internecine conflicts?  What was really going on, politically, in 
Native settlements along and beyond the Great Lakes?  In response to these questions, 
governors and their agents insisted that answers could be found in the careful reading 
of headmen’s words. 
The exchange of speeches and reports between Canada and Versailles was 
meant to collapse the distance between firsthand and secondhand experience by 
giving officials on both sides of the Atlantic a common record of their diplomacy, yet 
conflicts of interpretation did arise, and in those moments governors insisted on their 
own privileged understanding of the speeches delivered in council.  In Vaudreuil’s 
case, for instance, the crown acknowledged that he had unique insight into Indian 
affairs and rarely disputed his conduct or conclusions.201  But sometimes the minister 
or the king challenged him to account for speeches that seemed weak or indecisive 
enough to risk his personal dignity and the honor of France.202  On those occasions, 
                                                
201 “His Majesty has approved that you spoke to [the Miamis] the way you did,” confirmed one letter 
from Pontchartrain in 1704.  “His Majesty has seen and approved the speeches of the Senecas and the 
Onondagas addressed to the Sieur Marquis de Vaudreuil and the responses he gave to them,” read 
another.  Pontchartrain to Vaudreuil, 14 June 1704, and “Mémoire du Roi aux...Vaudreuil et Bégon,” 
14 June 1704, reproduced in RAPQ (1938-1939), 26, 30.  
202 Pontchartrain to Vaudreuil, 17 June 1705, reproduced in RAPQ (1938-1939), 70. 
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Vaudreuil touted his years of experience, alleging that his words had been 
misconstrued through the (discreetly implied) ignorance of his faraway superiors.  “I 
am persuaded...that the tranqullity of this colony depends on peace with the Savages,” 
Vaudreuil responded after Pontchartrain accused him of “softness” toward the 
Iroquois.  “I neglect nothing to Continue it...which I do with honor, and without 
degrading the Character which I have [the honor] of occupying.”  The governor went 
on to explain how his seeming prevarications had in fact responded effectively to the 
words of the Iroquois and prevented the renewal of hostilities between the Five 
Nations and the Odawa.  “I can give you no better indication of it than to send You 
the attached speeches,” he maintained.  If the minister doubted their accuracy, 
Vaudreuil reminded him that Onontio’s words passed through several hands and 
stood as a matter of public knowledge: “I speak in public [devant le monde], I have 
several Interpreters, and I am able neither to alter the truth nor to render the speeches 
in a way that would suit my purposes in order to mislead you.”203 
In the years following the Great Peace, speech transcripts became an essential 
lens through which the crown perceived the true state of Native diplomacy.  They 
served as the empirical basis not only for strategy and policymaking, but also for 
determing patronage and explicating Native customs.  One report prepared by 
Vaudreuil in 1703 provides a case in point.  After hosting several Iroquois emissaries 
to reaffirm the peace and ensure that its terms were being observed, he ordered his 
secretary to send copies of everyone’s speeches to Versailles.  When they arrived, an 
unnamed “specialist” (likely an ex-colonial official) summarized them for 
                                                
203 Vaudreuil to Pontchartrain, 4 November 1706, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 24, ff. 214-237, 
reproduced in RAPQ (1938-1939), 160-161. 
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Pontchartrain, who then made his own annotations in the margins.  An exchange 
between Vaudreuil and a Seneca named Oronatiez over whether or not Joncaire 
should winter among the Iroquois was rendered as follows: 
 
Oronatiez: 3rd collier: We 
beg you, my father, by 
this wampum belt to give 
us your son Joncaire to be 
witness to what passes 
between us and the 
English this winter and he 
will tell you of it this 
spring... 
 
Vaudreuil: You have asked me for 
your son Joncaire to go winter with 
you and be witness to what happens in 
your town; I would very much like to 
give him to you...at the same time I 
recommend him to you and give him to 
you only out of my esteem for you. 
 
Summary of Oronatiez’s 
speech: That they beg him 
as their father to give 
them their son Joncaire to 
be witness to what 
happens between them 
and the English this 
winter in order to give 
[Vaudreuil] a report of it 
this spring... 
 
Summary of Vaudreuil’s reply: That he 
would very much like to give them 
their son Joncaire whom he gives them 
and recommends to them only out of 
his esteem for them... 
 
Comment: The sieur 
Joncaire has a great deal 
of credit among them.  He 
is of a character of mind 
to manage them well and 
merits that we do 
something for him. 
 
Comment: [Vaudreuil] has done very 
well to give him the s[ieur] Joncaire, 
whom they call their son, because, 
having made him their prisoner in an 
action in which he did his duty very 
well, they spared him his life and 




To be sure, the ministry’s interpretation flattened “Seneca” desires and framed them 
within familiar political categories (of patriarchal power, for example).  Nevertheless, 
the intellectual labor involved was sophisticated.  Carried out from year to year and in 
a succession of similar documents, it defined for the minister who the various Indian 
nations were, what they wanted, and who among the French had the “character of 
mind” necessary to “manage” them.205 
In this way, diplomatic speeches and the paperwork surrounding them became 
a burgeoning administrative ethnography of Indians controlled by the crown.  In the 
course of reporting and interpreting encounters with indigenous headmen, royal 
administrators made definitive claims about Native culture and how it could best be 
manipulated to advance the king’s interests.  It was no accident that in this same 
                                                
204 Excerpted from “Paroles des Sauvages au Sr de Vaudreuil et les réponses dudit sr de Vaudreuil en 
1703” and “Paroles du Chef nommé Oronatyez Sonnontouan à Monsieur de Vaudreuil,” 25 October 
1703, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 21, ff. 68-86v. 
205 For similar documents, see the following in ANOM COL C11A, vol. 31: “Parolles des sauvages 
Onnontaguez a Monsieur le marquis de Vaudreuil, a Montreal, le 28 janvier 1710,” ff. 89-92; 
“Reponses de Vaudreuil,” 29 January 1710, ff. 92-96v; “Parolles des Iroquois Sonnontouans et 
Onnontaguez,” 8 August 1710, ff. 98-105v; “Parolles des sauvages de Michilimackinac, Outaouacs et 
autres, descendus avec le Sr. d’Argenteuil,” 29 July 1710, ff. 114-120v; “Parolles de Monsieur le 
Gouverneur general aux Onnontaguez et Sonnontouans qui s’en retournent le 31 Aoust 1711,” ff. 100-
103.  Also see the many requests for pensions and promotions made by French governors on behalf of 
clients such as Joncaire, Perrot, Le Moine, Henri de Tonty, Louis de La Porte de Louvigny, and others 
who allegedly had shown “perfect knowledge” of how to “master the minds” of Native peoples.  For 
example, La Barre to Seignelay, 4 November 1683, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 6, ff. 134-144, 
reproduced in Dubé, La Nouvelle-France sous Joseph-Antoine Le Febvre de La Barre, 91-93; 
Vaudreuil to Pontchartrain, 15 November 1703, reproduced in RAPQ (1938-1939), 17, 19; Vaudreuil 
to Pontchartrain, 3 and 4 November 1706, reproduced in RAPQ (1938-1939), 161.   
Minister: Good. 
 
Minister: Advise to explain this fact.204  
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period La Potherie (1703), Raudot (c. 1709), Perrot (c. 1715), and others all produced 
extensive texts that sought to capture the essential “nature” of Indians and identify the 
passions that governed their hearts.  The ultimate aim of their studies, these authors 
made clear, was to preserve France’s hard-won pre-eminence and “free these 
peoples...to adopt our ways and customs.”206  They grounded their conclusions first 
and foremost in what they and their fellow officers had seen and done firsthand.  
Their writings affirmed that knowing and mastering Indians was a matter of living 
among them, learning their ways, and moving through the world as they did, however 
temporarily.  In the epistolary preface to his volume on Native customs, La Potherie 
aptly captured the conventional wisdom that cross-cultural learning and cross-cultural 
performance were intertwined processes: “No doubt you were surprised to learn of 
my metamorphosis,” he announced to his imagined correspondent, “it is but the 
strangeness and changeability of the human heart.  I am now an Iroquois, & you will 




In October 1711, New France was again at war: the British were preparing to 
invade the colony by land and sea, and nearly seven hundred Iroquois warriors had 
massed at Albany, ready to break the Great Peace that French officials had struggled 
mightily to maintain for the past decade.  With the recent news that Acadia had fallen, 
Vaudreuil was desperate to mobilize Canada’s defenses.  Having heard that his allies 
were reluctant to fight a superior and seemingly ascendant foe, he invited some eight 
                                                
206 An effort they nonetheless acknowledged to be “the work of several centuries,” as Raudot put it.  
Raudot, Relations, 62. 
207 La Potherie, Histoire, t. IV: 83. 
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hundred of them to a “general feast” at Montréal, where he hoped to reassure them of 
French power and kindle their fighting spirit.  They arrived to witness an elaborate 
scene.  As a correspondent for the Mercure galant of Paris later reported, the Natives 
had scarcely seated themselves before the governor appeared before them, holding a 
long pole to which someone had stuck the half-roasted head of a dog.  In a 
coordinated series of movements, Vaudreuil proceeded to hand the pole to a 
subordinate, who carried it back and forth before withdrawing to stand among the 
Mission Iroquois.  A third Frenchman, described only as “a good interpreter of the 
languages of the western Savages” (probably Perrot), made a similar round before 
placing himself among the Odawas.  “These two officers, posted at the far end of the 
lines formed by the savage Nations, alternated making...the speech...on the part of 
Onnonthio, as they call the Governor general of the French in Canada.”  After the two 
interpreters had called upon Onontio’s children to “carry themselves like men” in 
making war upon their common enemy, Joncaire stepped forward to encourage those 
who might still waver: 
Taking up the dog’s head at the end of his staff, 
[Joncaire] danced & sang simultaneously, alone, which 
is the manner of the Savages, letting his left arm fall 
along the length of his hips, & turning his head like a 
madman [furieux] right and left, bending and 
straightening his body by fits and starts [sacades], 
spreading and gripping his knees, although his feet 
remained close to touching each other.  The song 
consisted only of delivering, with a great effort of the 
lungs, the interjection hé, hé, hé, which is about the 
same as that of our woodsmen.  [The Indians] responded 
to this sort of war cry with ho, ho, hai, ho, ho, hai, hai, 
which resembled rather bad Italian music.  Several 
French Officers, who know the ways of the Iroquois, 
danced & sang one after another, all carrying in hand 
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one of the staffs where there was a Dog’s head 
[attached]. 
 
At that point the French gave way to several headmen, who also danced and sang 
while brandishing dog heads.  A head was brought to the “chief” of the Mission 
Iroquois, “who raised an anguished cry to signify to the others that he was going to 
dance,” then, “having played his role, he presented the Dog’s head to another 
Chief...who danced & sang for a long time.”  The two heads were passed among all of 
the nations from one headman to another, until it reached the last two, who “broke 
them open to eat the brains & cried in their language, thus we will do to our enemies.”  
After seven more hours of dancing and speeches, “M[onsieu]r the Marquis de 
Vaudreuil, Onnonthio, who was hosting the feast, had abundant amounts of meat & 
beer distributed to each family.”208  The governor later informed the minister, with 
immense satisfaction, that “everyone accepted the tomahawk...and following their 
manner, made me master of their bodies.”209 
 The spectacle may have been new and exotic to some readers of the Mercure, 
but to officials in Canada and the ministry of the Navy, it formed part of an 
established pattern of indigenized performance honed for more than a century.  The 
self-conscious assumption of “Native” personas, and the self-satisfied claim that such 
personas achieved real political mastery over Native peoples, had become utterly 
conventional—in fact, it was now a matter of policy.  In subsequent decades, royal 
officials would request and receive advancement based on their knowledge of Indian 
customs, produce templates of Native speeches to guide their superiors and 
                                                
208 “Suite de la lettre de Quebec,” Mercure galant (April 1712): 3-20. 
209 Vaudreuil to Pontchartrain, 25 October 1711, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 32, ff. 41-64, reproduced in 
RAPQ (1946-1947), 433. 
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successors, and establish the control of “fickle and inconstant savages” as the “most 
essential...of all the areas of administration” entrusted to governors.210  By presiding 
over an alliance built around the performance of Onontio, the French believed, they 
had achieved the imaginative insight necessary to manipulate the passions, motives, 
and “esprit” of Indians.  Their administrative culture reflected that conviction. 
That is not to say that officials were always successful in attaining their goal, 
that their conclusions were uncontested, or that their knowledge represented anything 
more than a sophisticated cultural construct—far from it.  There were officers who 
failed to play the indigenized roles expected of them, failed to adapt to their 
surroundings, or failed to maintain the confidence of their superiors for any number 
of personal or circumstantial reasons.  Throughout its final five decades of rule in 
Canada, moreover, the crown would repeatedly intervene in damaging indigenous 
wars that its agents neither understood nor controlled.  The French would never 
achieve the sort of total subjugation or assimilation of Indians that many thought 
possible and desirable; nor, of course, did they ever achieve complete or accurate 
knowledge of the “Native mind” (the singular bears witness to their reductive 
approach).  The ideas about Indians they developed were hardly reflections of some 
independent empirical reality.  Instead, like performances of Indianness, they 
                                                
210 The concentration of patronage in the hands of officers believed to possess special influence over 
Natives is reflected in the careers of the Vaudreuil and Joncaire families.  See their entries in the 
Dictionary of Canadian Biography.  For imagined and template speeches, see Perrot, Mémoire des 
moeurs, esp. 143-156; Anonymous, “Moyens pour gagner du bien sans que personne en souffre,” c. 
1726, LAC MG18-G6, vol. 1, pp. 11-15.  For centrality of Native governance in royal instructions, see 
“Mémoire du Roy pour servir d’instruction au Sr [Pierre de Rigaud] de Vaudreuil de Cavagnal, 
Capitaine de Vaisseau, Gouverneur et Lieutenant général de la Nouvelle-France,” 22 March 1755, AN 
K 1232, pièce 50 and “Extrait des instructions données à Vaudreuil,” ANOM COL C11A, vol. 100, ff. 
50-51. 
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followed a logic conditioned by the cultural baggage their makers brought with them 
to America. 
Nonetheless, as far as certain “truths” about Indians became rooted in French 
administrative discourses and practices, they had a profound impact upon the lives of 
Natives and Europeans alike.  How French officials saw Indians (and, no less 
important, how Indians saw the French) determined the conduct of war and peace.  It 
guided royal decisions to court some nations and alienate others.  As a result, it 
violently transformed identities, kinship ties, trading relationships, emotional bonds, 
and patterns of settlement and subsistence.  It helped to produce and sustain dynamic 
ritual personas, above all Onontio, which provided a lasting basis for cultural 
exchange as well as conflict.211  Most enduringly, it established a conceit that the 
French were uniquely suited to rule over “savage” peoples, and inaugurated a 
tradition of writing about Natives as racialized Others.212   
France’s pursuit of Native alliances prefigured modern European attempts to 
manipulate the “hearts and minds” of indigenous peoples through imitative practices 
of oratory and self-presentation.  Father Jean Tailhan, a Jesuit priest who edited 
Perrot’s memorandum for publication in 1864, drew an explicit analogy between 
Metaminens and the Arab Bureau chiefs of his own day, who immersed themselves in 
local dialects, customs, and conflicts in order to pacify the Muslim Algerian subjects 
                                                
211 Onontio would remain ensconced in his ritual role until the British Conquest of New France in 
1763, and even afterward he would be invoked by Native opponents of British expansion who called 
for his return.  See White, Middle Ground, 276-290. 
212 On the French experience in New France as the origin of the “génie colonial” myth, see Cornelius 
Jaenen, “ ‘Les Sauvages Ameriquains’: Persistence into the 18th Century of Traditional French 
Concepts and Constructs for Apprehending Amerindians,” Ethnohistory, vol. 29, no. 1 (1982): 43-56; 
Gregory Dowd, “Wag the Imperial Dog: Indians and Overseas Empires in North America, 1650-
1776,” in A Companion to American Indian History, eds. Philip Deloria and Neal Salisbury (Oxford, 
UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), 55-56. 
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of France’s Second Empire.213  Carefully orchestrated patterns of “going Native” 
became a common tool of governance, diplomacy, and warfare in European 
empires.214  Still today, the synthesis of learning, performance, and persuasion across 
cultures lies at the heart of policing and counterinsurgency strategies employed by 
Western militaries abroad, including the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, whose leaders 
tout figures such as T. E. Lawrence and John Paul Vann as models.215  It also lies at 
the heart—quite literally—of the modern Canadian government’s contested efforts to 
negotiate the legal status of Aboriginals.216 
Nearly two and a half centuries after Frontenac brandished the tomahawk and 
led the war dance, George Orwell wrote about the appalling necessity of the colonizer 
“to do what the ‘natives’ expect of him.”  The tendency of European officials to see 
themselves as “the leading actor of the piece” in colonial encounters, he observed, 
                                                
213 “He was...under the successive governments of Messieurs de la Barre, Denonville and Frontenac 
(1684-1699), tasked with a command analogous to that of our Arab Bureau chiefs in Algeria.”  Perrot, 
Mémorie, vi. 
214 For a recent overview of the literature on “going Native” in everyday imperial contexts, see Roque, 
“Mimesis and Colonialism.”   
215 U.S. Army and Marine Corps, U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008); Robert D. Ramsey III, “Advice for Advisors: Suggestions 
and Observations from Lawrence to the Present,” Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 19 (Fort 
Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006); Montgomery McFate, “Culture,” in 
Understanding Counterinsurgency Warfare: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges, eds. Thomas Rid 
and Thomas Keaney (London: Routledge, 2010), 189-203; Alasdair Soussi, “Lawrence of Arabia, 
guiding US Army in Iraq and Afghanistan,” The Christian Science Monitor, 19 June 2010, URL: 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2010/0619/Lawrence-of-Arabia-guiding-US-Army-in-Iraq-and-
Afghanistan (accessed 3 July 2016). 
216 “Canada’s governor general eats raw heart after gutting seal,” The Telegraph, 26 May 2009, URL: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/canada/5389934/Canadas-governor-
general-eats-raw-heart-after-gutting-seal.html (accessed 3 July 2016); “Governor General’s seal snack 
sparks controversy,” Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 26 May 2009, URL: 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/governor-general-s-seal-snack-sparks-controversy-1.833274 (accessed 
3 July 2016); Mitch Potter, “Jean’s seal meal sparks feeding frenzy,” Toronto Star, 27 May 2009, 
URL: https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2009/05/27/jeans_seal_meal_sparks_feeding_frenzy.html 
(3 July 2016). 
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ignored the reality that their power was constrained by indigenous expectations.217  
The same insight guided the French administrative manuals of his time, whose 
authors, less concerned than Orwell about the degrading effects of imperialism, 
earnestly sought to “reform” indigènes by strategically accommodating their 
perceived customs and “political mentalities.”218  To the extent that early modern 
colonizers such as Frontenac and Perrot defined Onontio as a tool for the 
manipulation of “savage” peoples, they presaged the belief among their successors in 
France—and elsewhere in the West—that the governance of colonized subjects was 






















                                                
217 George Orwell, Shooting an Elephant, and Other Essays (London: Harcourt, 1950 ed.; orig. 1936), 
6. 
218 See, for example, Robert Arnaud, L’Islam et la politique musulmane française en Afrique 
occidentale française (Paris: Comité de l’Afrique Française, 1912); Ministre de la Guerre, Manuel 
élémentaire à l’usage des officiers et sous-officiers chargés à commander des indigènes coloniaux 
(Indochinois-Sénégalais-Malgaches) dans la métropole (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1923); Joseph-
Simon Gallieni, Madagascar de 1896 à 1905: rapport du Général Galliéni, Gouverneur Général au 
Ministre des Colonies, 2 vols. (Tananarive: Imprimerie Officielle de Tananarive, 1905); Jacques 











Figure 16. Speeches delivered by Huron (Wendat), Odawa, Saki, and Miami headmen during the Great 
Peace.  When they could, French officials noted the names of the individual headmen who spoke, as 
well as the specific “nations” or bands from which they came.  Source: ANOM COL C11A, vol. 19, f. 
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  One myth about France’s first colonial empire is that it was a “blank page” on 
which Louis XIV “could inscribe his ideals.”1  “When I want to discover the spirit 
and vices of Louis XIV’s government,” Alexis de Tocqueville declared in perhaps the 
most famous statement of the legend, 
It is to Canada that I must go.  There we can see the 
deformities of the object as if through a 
microscope...Nothing prevented the central power from 
abandoning itself to all of its natural inclinations and 
moulding all of the laws according to the spirit that 
animated it...An intendant wielding far greater power 
than his counterparts in France; an administration 
intruding on much more than it did in the metropole, and 
wanting to do everything through Paris, despite the 
1,800 leagues that separated them; never adopting the 
great principles that could render the colony populous 
and prosperous, but rather employing all manner of little 
artificial procedures and petty regulatory tyrannies to 
increase and scatter the population: forced agriculture, 
the need to farm in a certain way, the obligation to live 
in certain places instead of others, every dispute over 
land referred to a tribunal and decided by the 
administration alone, etc...One might believe himself 
already in Algeria, in the midst of modern centralization.  
Canada is indeed the faithful image of what we have 
always seen there....this administration, almost as 
numerous as the population itself, dominant, demanding, 
regulatory, restrictive, wanting to plan and take charge 
of everything, always knowing a subject’s interests 
better than himself, relentlessly active and sterile.2 
 
Another, equally powerful myth says that France’s colonies bore few marks of 
metropolitan rule.3  This dissertation challenges both interpretations for the half-
century prior to Louis XIV’s death.  It chronicles the efforts of French officials to 
                                                
1 Peter Moogk, La Nouvelle France—A Cultural History (East Lansing: Michigan State University 
Press, 2000), 59. 
2 Alexis de Tocqueville, L’ancien régime et la révolution (Paris: Lévy, 1856), 408-409. 
3 The most prominent recent statement of this version being Pritchard, In Search of Empire. 
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impose a familiar brand of public order on the New World and tracks the ways in 
which their experiences changed the crown’s perception of its colonies.  Royal 
governance overseas, like royal governance in France, was neither timeless nor 
unchanging; it was the product of cultural, political, and material processes that 
converged upon the Americas with particular force after 1663. 
Over the course of the eighteenth century, the Old Regime state’s perception 
of its colonies as component parts of a single imperial project was reflected with 
growing clarity in the structure and staffing of its administration.  In 1710, the crown 
combined the three wings of the naval ministry, the Ponant, the Levant, and the fonds, 
into a single Bureau des Colonies.  From that point forward the king promoted 
governors and intendants almost exclusively from within the ranks of the naval 
officer corps rather than the army or the Parisian magistracy.4  The ministry hoped to 
avoid the headaches caused by old soldiers like Bouloc or miscast magistrates like La 
Barre who arrived in America without any grasp of the special procedures, personnel, 
and problems that now patterned its approach to colonial governance.  By following 
an increasingly rigid and well-defined cursus honorum that began in the fleets and 
ports of the realm, the thinking went, officials would practice the “details” and 
acquire the “knowledge” necessary to police an empire that had developed an 
administrative culture all its own.5   
 Officials thought this way because decades of experience in direct royal 
governance had taught them two fundamental lessons about the colonies: first, that 
                                                
4 See the personnel dossiers of the various colonial governors and intendants appointed after this date, 
which are grouped alphabetically in ANOM COL E. 
5 Anonymous clerk, “Notes sur la Manutention du Bureau des Colonies,” and Monsieur P., 
“Observations sur les Bureaux des Colonies,” undated (c. 1772), AN Marine C2, vol. 120, ff. 1-4v, 4v-
5. 
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they were alike in their essential difference from the metropole, and second, that they 
were ruled primarily through a series of ports.  Clerks of the ministry repeated both 
lessons when they reviewed the state of the Bureau sometime in the years after 1768.  
They explained that the colonies required their own administration not only because 
their business “comprises almost every element of [the administration] of an entire 
Kingdom in its own right,” but also because their affairs were unique.  In addition to 
regulating slavery, maritime trade, and naval warfare, imperial administrators 
imposed extraordinary taxes, oversaw officers whose powers “extend far beyond 
those we give to our provincial governments,” and made the “endless modifications” 
to French laws “demanded by the difference of things and people.”6  The ministry had 
learned long ago that training in combat or the law was not sufficient to these tasks.  
To govern colonial settlements, “One must have knowledge of another kind, which 
cannot be found in Versailles or Paris.  It is only in the details of ports and in 
campaigns at sea that it can be acquired... only with one’s own eyes and on site, in the 
midst of operations.”  Combined with a thorough review of the paperwork describing 
“all that he may not know about the colonies,” firsthand experience in the Royal 
Marine gave an officer the sort of portable connaissances that he would need to serve 
anywhere in the empire.7 
 By the mid-eighteenth century, colonial empire was firmly ensconced as an 
affair of state.  It enjoyed not only a specialized bureau and a corps of specialized 
administrators, but also its own archives, its own budgets, and its own reformers.  It 
also held a prominent place in the crown’s strategic thinking.  When royal ministers 
                                                
6 “Observations sur les Bureaux des Colonies,” ff. 1-1v. 
7 “Observations sur les Bureaux des Colonies,” ff. 5v-6. 
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debated the future of French grandeur in the midst of the Seven Years’ War, they 
devoted particular attention to the fate of the colonies and what it would mean for the 
balance of power in Europe.  In 1759, the future controller-general of finance, Étienne 
de Silhouette, excavated a decade-old memorandum by the late governor-general of 
New France, Roland-Michel Barrin de La Galissonnière, to draft an appeal to Foreign 
Minister Étienne de Choiseul.  “Few people today would disagree that [colonies] are 
in some way necessary to a Great State,” Silhouette argued, echoing the governor.  “If 
anyone still doubts it, it would be enough to disabuse them to cast their eyes on the 
products listed in the King’s accounts, on the immense quantities of goods and 
manufactures that pass through the Colonies, [and] on the returns they bring which 
are so necessary to the industries and patterns of consumption that have become 
habitual and to some extent indispensable to the kingdom.”  The “utility” of the 
colonies was not only visible in France, he continued: anyone passing through the 
Antilles would encounter many once-poor wretches and humble families who had 
enriched themselves “in only a short time, and almost without any risk.”  If Canada 
and Louisiana were decidedly poorer, they were nonetheless vital, as the “boulevards 
of America,” to the integrity of the empire as a whole.  It was quite clear to 
Silhouette, as it had been to La Galissonière, that whatever the colonies had cost 
France to establish and maintain, they were now too valuable to be “abandoned to our 
jealous neighbors.”8 
                                                
8 The Marquis laid out his views in 1750, after which Silhouette rediscovered them and added his own 
gloss in a memorandum to Choiseul.  La Galissonière and Silhouette, “Mémoire sur les colonies de 
France dans l’Amérique septentrionale,” December 1750 and c. February 1759, ANOM COL C11A, 
vol. 96, ff. 249-250, 269v-270. 
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 Silhouette was moved to defend the colonies because France’s entire 
geopolitical strategy, centered on an Atlantic empire established according to 
Antoine-Denis Raudot’s best-laid plans, had been shattered when General James 
Wolfe and his men captured Louisbourg six months earlier.  The loss had prompted 
some in the ministry of the navy and colonies to call for a radical reorientation of 
French aims.  In a memorandum to Minister Nicolas René Berryer in December 1758, 
the influential Marquis de Capellis, recently returned from a tour of duty in the 
Americas, recommended an exchange of territories with Britain and Spain.  He 
proposed that the lower Saint Lawrence Valley, which had proven too vast and 
expensive to colonize properly, be given to Britain in exchange for Minorca and 
Newfoundland.  The arrangement, he claimed, would free the 50,000 inhabitants of 
Canada to migrate to the warmer and more fertile climes of Louisiana, which could 
easily be done because Governor Rigaud de Vaudreuil, “who served for several years 
in Louisiana and is adored by the Canadians and the Savages,” would “make them do 
the impossible.”  Meanwhile France could arrange for Spain to receive Port Mahon 
and Gibraltar in return for Santo Domingo.  These dealings would liberate France to 
concentrate its energies on the Caribbean—“which is much more valuable than 
Canada”—without completely abandoning access to the fisheries, forests, and furs of 
North America.  No less important, he predicted with remarkable foresight, they 
would deal an insidious blow to Britain, whose annexation of Canada’s “vast deserts” 
would “accelerate [Britain’s] ruin by hastening the defection of its American 
colonies, which will soon surpass the wealth of England and no doubt shake off the 
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yoke of their metropole.”9  With a navy rebuilt according to principles Capellis would 
detail in a separate memorandum, France could position itself to take advantage in the 
next war.10 
 Silhouette disagreed with this line of thinking not because he was particularly 
attached to Canada (he had already submitted his own proposal to forcibly relocate 
France’s Canadian colonists and Native allies to Louisiana), but because he saw in the 
pleas of Capellis and others to cede the colony a camouflaged retreat from 
colonization tout court.  “I cannot help but suspect that the difficulty of maintaining 
Canada is the real source of all the reasons with which we seek to color its 
abandonment,” he warned.  “If that is so, we could soon see the rebirth of the gothic 
System, [which holds] that France can do without Colonies, and that she has need 
only of soldiers and laborers.”  That sort of thinking played right into Britain’s hands.  
Having spent time in England and studied its leaders, he could assure Choiseul that 
they saw the “system of America” as fundamentally tied to the “system of Europe.”  
The conquest of Canada was merely the first step in their inveterate campaign to 
capture all of France’s New World dominions.  If Choiseul permitted it, he would 
forsake the ministry’s longstanding commitment to its colonies and reduce France to 
the rank of a second-tier state like Russia: “Russia does not lack for soldiers, she does 
not lack for laborers...Yet Russia receives subsidies from foreign powers.”  The truth, 
Silhouette insisted, was that “something more is needed for the dignity, the grandeur, 
and the Power of a State, above all a State that is bounded for the most part by the 
                                                
9 François de Capellis, “Mémoire concernant les Colonies et relatif à la Paix,” 11 December 1758, 
ANOM C11A, vol. 103, 497-499v; Capellis to Berryer, 11 December 1758, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 
103, ff. 500-501 (“deserts”). 
10 Capellis, “Esquisse d’une réforme ou reconstitution de la marine française,” 1758, AN Marine 
CITE. 
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sea, and which has for its capital enemy a nation whose Power consists principally in 
its naval forces”: the independence afforded by a robust colonial empire.11 
 Like the bureaucratic reviews of ministerial clerks, the competing appeals of 
Silhouette and Capellis bring together several themes that run throughout the 
preceding chapters.  Arguments grounded in firsthand experience or the expertise of 
officials on the ground; “facts” mobilized through state paperwork; administrative 
debates over the progress and ultimate aims of colonization; beliefs about French 
mastery over “savage” peoples; clashing ideas about the value of colonies and how to 
measure it; proposals for reform couched in sweeping visions of imperial grandeur; 
and searching meditations on the very identity of the state all emerged as features of 
French administrative culture in the half century before 1715.  To be sure, the shape 
of those arguments and ideas had changed over subsequent decades, as had the 
language used to articulate them and the settings in which they were put forth.  But 
they were fundamentally indebted to ways of seeing and thinking about the colonies 
that had been established around the turn of the eighteenth century.   
***** 
 
When we look closely at that formative period of overseas expansion, one of 
the most striking themes that surfaces is the frequency with which the demands of 
governing ports and colonies led royal officials to violate some of their most 
cherished aristocratic values.  Whether they were working with their hands among 
commoners in the shipyard, haggling over the nuts and bolts of trade with merchants, 
or playing Onontio for an audience of “savage” headmen, they routinely shed their 
                                                
11 Silhouette to Choiseul, 8 February 1759, ANOM COL C11A, vol. 104, ff. 456-461v. 
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customary manners of self-presentation.  In doing so, they drew upon a constellation 
of habits that primed them to perform across cultures and social ranks.  From an early 
age, they learned how to play a variety of roles, and they lived their lives as if they 
were constantly on display—for God, for king, for patrons, subordinates, subjects, 
and allies.  Their performative skill was not so much consciously honed as deeply 
ingrained: the economies of honor, power, and salvation that determined their place in 
this world and the next demanded that they exercise it.   
That they deployed that skill in the course of policing settlers, artisans, 
merchants, slaves, Indians, and others in the kingdom’s most diverse and marginal 
places would be less striking if it did not deviate so sharply from what scholars have 
taught us to expect.  When they write about European empires, historians often 
proceed as if state officials are easily understood.  An earlier generation of writers 
cast them as heroes—“caesars of the wilderness,” “fighting governors,” standard-
bearers of civilization in wigs and cravats.12  Fortunately, historians of late have 
assumed a more critical stance toward administrative records, but the fundamental 
image of administrators has remained largely unchanged.  Even as they 
misunderstand Native cultures or fail in their duties, French officials still appear as 
confident, fully-formed emissaries of “Frenchness,” “Europeanness,” or 
“absolutism.”  And on some level, they are assumed to be “like us.”13   
The truth, however, is that they were not.  Their habit of treating life like one 
long theatrical display is only one way in which that was so.  They did not think like 
                                                
12 Nute, Caesars of the Wilderness; Charles Colby, The Fighting Governor: A Chronicle of Frontenac 
(Toronto: Glasgow, Brook & Co, 1915). 
13 The point holds equally well for other agents of empire, as Allan Greer has argued in the case of 
missionaries.  Greer, Mohawk Saint, ix-x. 
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us, learn like us, practice governance like us, construct science like us, or maintain an 
integrated sense of themselves as we do (or as we believe we do).  Their political, 
spiritual, and intellectual frames of reference were remarkably different from our 
own.  In the course of researching and writing this dissertation, I was repeatedly 
reminded of their strangeness.  Their motives rarely felt accessible or coherent to me, 
which often made it difficult to interpret them coherently.  I found adopting an angle 
of vision trained on individuals and the ways in which they imposed order on their 
experience to be a useful means to structure my own thinking.  I am aware, however, 
that “structure” can be a euphemism for “simplify,” and that I might have written up 
my findings in a more complicated way.  What I mean to suggest in the preceding 
chapters, however imperfectly, is that we can learn a great deal about these European 
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